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ABSTRACT 
'Chacun ä son metier' 
Technological innovation is inescapable if civilisation is to continue 
in the face of population growth, rising expectations and resource ex- 
haustion. Unfortunately, major innovations, confidently thought to be 
safe, occasionally fail catastrophically. The fears so engendered are 
impeding technical progress generally and that of nuclear power in parti- 
cular. Attempts to allay disquiet about these disastrous Low Probabil- 
ity Events (LPEs) by exhaustive studies of nuclear power plant designs 
have, so far, been less than successful. The New Treatment adopts 
instead an approach that, after examination of the LPE in its historical 
and societal settings, combines theoretical design analysis with con- 
struction site and operational realities in pragmatic engineering, the 
quality of which can be assured by accountable inspection. 
The LPE is envisaged as a singularity in a stream of largely mundane, 
but untoward incidents, described as 'Event-noise'. Predictions of the 
likelihood of plant LPEs by frequency-theory probability are illusory 
because the LPE is unique and not part of a stable distribution. Again, 
noise analysis seems to lead to intractable mathematical expressions. 
While theoretical LPE prognostications depend on the identification of 
fault sequences in design that can either be designed-out or reduced to 
plausibly negligible probabilities, the reality of LPE prevention lies 
with the plant in operation. As absolute safety is unattainable, the 
approach aims at ensuring that the perceived residual nuclear risk is 
societally tolerable. An adaption of elementary Catastrophe theory to 
model the prospective Event-noise field to be experienced by the plant 
is proposed whereby potential, credible LPEs could be more readily 
discerned and avoided. 
In this milieu of increasing sophistication in technology when management 
in the traditional administrative mold is proving inadequate, the 
engineer emerges as the proper central decision-maker. The special 
intellectual capability needed is acquired during his training and exper- 
ience, a claim that can draw support from new studies in neuropsychology. 
The Nuclear Installation Inspectorate is cited as an exemplar of a body 
practising the kind of engineering inspection needed to apprehend those 
human fallibilities to which most catastrophic failures of technology 
are due. Nevertheless, such regulatory systems lack accountability and, 
as Goedel's theorem suggests, cannot assess their own efficiency. Indep- 
endent appraisal by Signal Detection Theory is suggested as a remedy. 
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GLOSSARY 
Note - In a text with a philosophical orientation. the precise aeaning of words is important 
and words nay be used in a way that may be unfamiliar to some readers. Some of those words and 
terms that are unco®on or employed in an unconventional sense have been defined here. The 
arbiter has. in the sia1n, been Collins New English Dictionary, thouzh the Concise Oxford Dict- 
ionary bam been consulted and its definitions taken where there has been any great divergence 
between British and international usage. In those cases where a wider interpretation or one 
that has specialist connotations has been wanted in a search for the 'sat huste', recourse has 
been made to the Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought or to appropriate technical lexicons. 
. 
Apperception - perception or comprehension effected by assimilating a perception to ideas al- 
in the mind, or perception with recognition or by association with an idea already perceived. 
Boß -a contract whereby the owner of a ship borrows money to enable the vessel to complete 
a voyage and pledges the ship as security for the loan, the lender losing his money if the ship 
is lost. An agreed fraction of the profit was taken if the enterprise was successful. 
Closed system -a term used to describe a risk situation when all the variable factors that 
create the risk are definitively known or can be allowed for or excluded as insignificant. 
In a wider context, an experimental scientist aims at establishing a closed system as the envir- 
onment for his experiment. 
Common-mode failure - interaction between systems not normally coupled, for example when a com- 
mon cause precipitates failure in more than one component, sub-system or system simultaneously. 
The term is often very loosely used to imply a vaguely defined common cause for failure. 
Common sense - in vernacular usage 'common sense' means plain, ordinary good-judgement. A more 
comprehensive definition adds the qualification that such judgement is tempered by the critical 
faculty of mind that tests concepts for congruence with learnt knowledge, previous experience, 
the corpus of commonly held beliefs and persuasions and the personal Weltanschauung, but it is, 
nonetheless, a faculty that is self-correcting in the course of the evolution of new knowledge. 
Consistency - the relationship between propositions which obtains if it logically possible that 
they should both be true. Two propositions are inconsistent if from the truth of either it 
follows that the other is false. The notion can be applied to groups of propositions larger 
than two. 
Contingency -a possible but not very likely future event or condition; an eventuality, depen- 
dence on chance or circumstances; something dependent on a possible future event; uncertainty 
of occurrence, chance occurrence, a thing that may happen at a later time. 
Credible - capable of being believed, worthy of belief; in the usage of nuclear engineer At 
means that an envisaged sequence of events, usually of unlikely constitution, can run to com- 
pletion, probably ending in a plant failure, though there are many variants of this definition. 
Defended Safety - an on-going approach to nuclear safety that is essentially dynamic, integra- 
ting the techniques of design safety assessment with an inspectional strategy based on foresight 
rather than hindsight. It is discussed in Section 11.3 et seq. of the text. 
Dialectic - the practice of assessing the truth of a theory or opinion by discussion and logic- 
al disputation. 
Disjunction - the separation of things that have previously been joined= a division formed be- 
tween parts of a thing that has previously existed as a whole. 
Histemoloa' - the theory of knowledge and particularly the critical study of its validity, 
method and scope. 
Event-noise - an analogy between the continual background of random disturbances in electronic 
circuits and communication channels and the run of mundane faulte, minor incidents and industr- 
ial accidents that may be expected to occur on a factory site. 
Gestalt -a perceptual pattern or structure possessing qualities as a whole that cannot be des- 
cribed merely as a sum of its parts. 
Hazard -a situation that has a potential to cause harm to people or damage to property or the 
environment. 
Heuristic -a method of problem solving or discovery by guided trial and error or by incremen- 
tal exploration. 
Idealism -a group of doctrines in which thought or mind is the only reality and external ob- 
jects consist merely of ideas. Thus, mind and spiritual values are fundamental to the world 
as a whole. 
Ideogram -a pictorial representation of ideas, particularly of words, is. logograms. The 
device is much used in engineering and in engineering design to express complex technical and 
scientific ideas which are difficult or impossible to communicate by written or spoken langu- 
age alone, hence ldeographical and ideographio. 
Idol -a false mental conception; a false notion or erroneous way of looking at things. 
Incredible -a state or situation beyond belief or understanding; in nuclear safety, the term 
is used to define a possible failure mode that would involve mechanisms whose existence is 
beyond reasonable belief. 
Intuition - Immediate insigtt; knowledge that is empirical in the broad sense of the word, 
being an extension of experience from sensation to introspection and the immediate grasp of 
values. 
10 
Low Probability Event (;.? 5') -a sudden, catastrophic and wholly unexpected accident or, more 
generally, major failure in a technological system, especially a system of an innovatory kind. 
The LPE is examined further in the Addendum below. 
Luddites and 'Fed' Ludd - machine breaking rioters following a legendary leader who blamed the 
new machinery for their loss of livelihood. There were serious anti-technology riots in'the 
textile -Ann, acturing districts of Nottinghamshire, Lancashire. Cheshire and Yorkshire frca 
1811 to 1816 which were ruthlessly put down. 
Materialism - the doctrine that matter is the only reality and that mind, the emotions, etc, 
are merely functions of it. Matter thus has a primary position and mind or spirit are secon- 
dary dependent realities. 
Mechanism -a philosophical attempt to explain phenomena in mechanical terms in which the 
causation of an event may be defined in clearly discernible antecedents and predictable con- 
temporaneous conditions. 
Metaphysics - in popular usage the word means abstruse or highly theoretical with a sense of 
the occult, but in modern philoephieal terminology it refers to enquiry into the kinds of 
things that there are and their modes of being, namely conception of existence, properties, and 
events, and into the nature of change, causation, mind, scatter, space and time. 
Metaphysical - of metaphysics; based on abstract reasoning, abstruse or over-theoretical. 
Ontolo- - the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being, or in logic, the set of 
entities presupposed by a theory. 
Oatolorýcal relativism - the principle that it is necessary to test the validity of all the 
relations and particular values given to the parameters used in a decision model. This implies 
that all constructs, is. the things that are put together to make the model should, if the are 
seaningful, be testable in principle. 
Phenomenalism - the theory that only phenomena are real and can be known. 
Physical monism - the doctrine that all physical laws are deducible from statistical mechanisms. 
Practical. Reasonably Practical - terms originating in the technico-legal vocabulary of Indust- 
safety regulation that have gained a wider currency. A case law definition of 'practical' in 
respect of measures that an employer must take for the protection of his workers is that they 
must take into consideration what is possible in the 'light of current knowledge and invention', 
but not to meet dangers 'scientifically unknown'. The qualification 'reasonably' implies that, 
although a measure may be possible, judgement can be exercised on what is feasible in the given 
circumstances. 
Pragmatism - the doctrine that practical consequences are the criteria of knowledge, meaning 
and value. It originated in the latter part of the last century with the American philosopher 
and scientist, Charles Sanders Peirce who developed a theory of truth that seems to side-step 
the idealist-materialist debate. It has profoundly influenced American thought. 
Probability - in a historical sense, it is a relatively new science, the subtler meanings and 
practical implications being still a matter of debate. There seem to be three main schools 
of interpretation, namely the: 
_ (i) Frequency theory or Aleatory Probability which assumes, overtly or tacitly, 'that every 
class of event shows a statistical regularity of occurrence if only one takes a suffi- 
cient number of instances of it'; 
(ii) Subjective theory according to which probability is to be interpreted in terms of the 
psychological state of the person making a probability judgement; and 
(iii) Objective theory which defines probability as an objective, logical relationship be- 
tween propositions and events, but one that is always elliptical because it implies 
that a probability is in a relationship with the data, context and other information 
from which it was calculated or deduced. 
The practical engineering interpretation seems to be that 'we have to treat the probability 
relation like other fundamental categories, as ultimate and indefinable. It may also well be 
that each of the rival views is true in one important sense of probability, but not in the others. 
Quality Assurance. quality Control - There is some confusion between the two terms. In this 
text, Quality Control refers to Viewing inspection, is. dimensional checks, functional testing, 
etc., to confirm compliance with specification, whereas Quality Assurance is a broader concept 
of activities integrated into the management system to ensure that a company's obligations under 
contract and to the community are met. 
Relevatism - any theory holding that knowledge and values are not absolute but are relative to 
a person's nature, the given situation or circumstances. 
Risk - the probability of occurrence of an event that can cause harm or damage to a person, human population or thing of value. 
Safeguards (Technological) - may be defined in two categories, namely: 
Intrinsic - safeguards inherent in the design concept of an artefact, and 
E gineered -a safety feature or system added to the design of the artefact, eg. 
plant or system, to correct weaknesses or deficiencies revealed in its intrinsic 
characteristics, for instance provision of an emergency system of control rods in 
a reactor to effect rapid shutdown compared with the stability given by the negative 
temperature co-efficient of the nuclear core. 
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Safety Factor - an engineering concept used in design to allow for overloads and defined ass 
'Once the breaking stress has been measured, ... the permitted working stress ... 
(say be cal- 
culated) ... by dividing by the appropriate factor of safety ... a number deterained 
by a vari- 
ety of considerations, mostly er,. irical, to provide a margin of reliability to cover such con- 
tingercies as imperfeotiens of erection, changes produced during fabrication, deterioration with 
time and imponderables such as tradition and repute. It as be of the order of 5 to 10 and 
usually brings the material within the elastic limit with a reasonable margin to spare'. 
(The underlying concept is basic in reliability engineering, though current applications are 
far more sophisticated. ) 
Sec"ndns raid -a term in logic used to identify a deceptive argument which uses a principle or 
proposition without regard to circumstances which modify its applicability in the given case. 
Trans-science -a term proposed by Alvin M. Weinberg (1972) to describe those questions of pub- 
lie decision and debate which lie at the ambiguous junction between science and society that 
can be stated in scientific terms, but are in principle beyond the proficiency of science to 
answer. He gives as examples attempts to make precise estimates of the effect of very low doses 
of ionising radiation to which a population may be exposed and of the probabilities of very 
unlikely, rate events. 
Truth -a word with many and controversial meanings. In popular usage it is the quality of 
being true, that Is genuine, actual or factual as opposed to being false. More philosophically, 
it is a proposition independent of individual opinions, being the predestined result to which 
sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead= in other words the outcome of scientific method. 
Again and pragmatically, it is a 'warranted assertion' or a working, satisfactory or verified 
hypothesis. 
Weltanschauung -a conception of the world, a comprehensive view or personal philosophy of 
human life and the universe. 
LDDENMM ON TEE LOW PROBABILITY EVERT (LPB) 
No formal definition of the Low Probability Event (LPE) has been given in the 
text as the term is largely self-descriptive and the particular weaning has 
been allowed to emerge in the wake of the descriptive exemplars. More 
specifically, the term is used to identify those 'incredible' occurrences 
and potential accidents that present the 'zero-infinity' actuarial risks 
associated with advanced technological innovations. 
No definitive numerical expectancies or failure rates can be a 6igned to 
eventualities of such low probability. Nonetheless, any rational approach 
to the management of these LPEa depends on a concept of probability of which 
there are three in use. The first is predicated by the aleatory or frequency 
theory of probability, claiming that a firm failure expectancy within definable 
cdnfidence limits can be associated with any possible plant LPr despite its 
being of very low probability, provided that enough data is available. The 
second is subjectivist. An expectancy may be calculated in a similar way, 
but its meaning is a product of the assessor's judgement or bias in his treat- 
ment of the circumstances, and this can vary grossly among assessors. The 
subjective risk estimate must be treated accordingly. The third approach 
follows the objective theory which holds that a numerical probability is only 
as stable as the data from which it is calculated. ? er data distributions 
are of sufficient stabibilty to justify confidence in such numerical risk 
estimates. f pragmatic engineering approach finds utility in all three, 
up to the limit of their relevance in each case to the problem in hand. 
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PART ONE 
THE HISTORICAL, HUMANITARIAN AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND TO A 
NEW TREATMENT OF LOW PROBABILITY EVENTS 
Sections 1 to 4 covering: 
The Industrial Revolution, the new dangers introduced 
by its technology, the beginning of the statutory safety 
regulation of industry, the emergence of the catastrophic 
Low Probability Event (LPE) in innovatory technological 
systems and some disastrous examples of them - 
Explosions, collapsing bridges, coal mine tragedies, 
shipwrecks and collisions at sea and on railways, 
the perils of atomic energy and ionising radiations, 
petrochemical plant and liquid natural gas storage 
and handling acidents and the hazards of underwater 
technology; 
being an attempt to portray the dangers of modern technology 
in a historical and sociological perspective in the light 
of the changing perceptions of risk. 
THEMATIC SYNOPSIS 
The aim is to set the scene for a study of the LPE that ends in 
a catastrophic failure in the societal milieu of the reactions 
of the public as citizens and workers to the risks of innovar- 
to technologies, taking into account the essential (evolution- 
aryy) need for continuing technological progress to preserve 
civilisation and, in particular, progress in the field of 
energy generation and resource conservation: a study especi- 
ally concerned with the steps that can be taken to treat the 
risks created by the new technologies, and by nuclear power in 
particular, as problems of engineering. 
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A NERV TREA1WNT OF LOW PROBABILITY EVENTS WITh 
PARTICULAR APPLICATION TO NWL ER POI%'ER PI F 
INCIDENTS 
1. INIRODUCPORY NIYrES 
The fire broke out at Master Farryner's 
bakehouse in Pudding Lane, Thames Street, 
in the early hours of Sunday, 2nd September, 
1666, and aided by high winds spread from the 
TOWER to the TEMPLE and from the THAMES to 
SMITHFIELD. St. Paul's Cathedral and 89 other 
churches were destroyed and 13,200 houses. ... In five days it covered 387 acres within the 
walls and 73 without. It was halted by 
blowing up houses at Pie Corner, WIHFIELD. ' 
The Great Fire of London 
from Brewer's Dictionary 
of Phrase and Fable, 
Centenary Edition, 1977. 
In addition to famines and pestilences of which 'The Old 
Testament' speaks so much and so solemnly, man has also suffered 
physical disasters which have caused heavy tolls of life and limb 
and great damage to property. Such events were fortunately rare, 
were of 'low probability', but usually came very suddenly giving 
little chance of escape to those threatened because they were seldom 
preceded by any clearly distinguishable warnings. In past ages, 
except for fires in great cities like ones in Rome in 64 AD and in 
London in 1666 and for shipwreck, they have been of natural origin, 
being earthquakes, volcanic eruptions like that which smothered 
Pompeii with ash in 79 AD, hurricanes, floods and tsunami (1). 
In the face of these things there was little that could be done 
except to take the consequences stoically. However, it has been 
possible through technology to give man some relief from these 
afflictions. Modern medicine and sanitation have dispelled the 
plagues, while the predictive sciences of hydrology, meteorology, 
seismology and vulcanology can reveal the imminence of cataclysmic 
terrestrial events so that precautionary measures can be taken, and 
facilities for effective disaster relief can be promptly and rapidly 
mobilised by Twentieth Century communications and transport with the 
saving of many thousands of lives. 
14 
Despite the advances which have so strikingly reduced these 
perils, the threat from disaster of technological origin has grown, 
and low probability events of an adverse kind from this source seem 
likely to became dominant over those of natural origin, at least in 
the more technically developed countries. Besides new dimensions 
have been added to the calamities attributable to man's activities 
in that certain damaging factors now exist which are not perceptible 
to the senses and therefore give no warning of their baneful effects. 
It is suspected that their consequences may be delayed for many years, 
even to the extent of emerging in generations subsequent to the one 
exposed. 
Moreover, though the destruction caused by a disastrous event may 
appear to be limited to the physical domain and its economic 
consequences, it can often have a veiled though serious detriment in 
another, though less obvious one. A catastophe causing heavy property 
damage and process losses which amount to a significant part of a 
community's wealth or, more widely, of the national product and 
capital stock, though being of very slight or no harm to humans 
directly and causing no fatalities, can still be a societal disaster. 
There is a correspondence between the aggregate economic loss 
attributable to the event and the well-being of the people afflicted 
by it which can be related to a reduction in the expected life span (2). 
While this may be of little importance to any given individual, the 
stun for the population as a whole may be large and serious. 
It is not surprising then that the outlook of many people and 
influential groups in Western society today is characterised by a 
growing distrust of technology to an extent which is hard to comprehend. 
Nowhere are these misgivings more evident than in the case of the 
safety of its complex, scientific applications in large scale industrial 
plants and processes of which nuclear power is the exemplar. Oddly, 
these apprehensions are associated with uneven appreciations of the 
risks involved. For example, the great and gruesome toll resulting 
from motor traffic on the roads is accepted with scarcely a murmur, 
while the nuclear industry which has been appropriately described as 
'the safest in the World' is viewed with grave disquiet (3). 
Despite the focussing of these fears on atomic energy, they are 
manifest in rising tempo in respect of other advanced technologies, 
e. g. liquid petroleum gas and the potent drugs of modern medicine 
which, except for the occasional tragic mishap, have transformed the 
scope and efficacy of its practice. The political outcome of these 
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concerns may prove to be a serious impediment, not only to the 
scientific and social advances needed for the continuing improvement 
of man's lot on the planet, but to those related industrial 
developments, particularly in the field of energy, which are necessary 
to ease the menacing international tensions caused by capricious 
restrictions on the flow of oil and the erratic fluctuations in its 
price. These latter instabilities reflect transient economic trends 
and political manoeuvring which bear little relationship to the true 
state of the World's petroleum reserves and the long term dependability 
of the sources of supply. Oil is an extractive industry and access to 
it must become progressively more difficult as the oil fields are 
exhausted in a few decades. The threat to the internal stability of 
countries almost entirely dependent on it for their transport and for 
much of their domestic and industrial energy could be grave and 
unpredictably upset the World balance of power between East and West, 
unless alternative energy sources of a suitable kind are developed in 
time. Nuclear power offers an abundant and adaptable one. Like 
quandaries may be expected as other natural resources become scarce. 
1.1 The Industrial Revolution 
The adverse influence which technical progress, the consequent 
mechanisation of industry and the ensuing growth of trade can have on 
society and the environment have been the causes of disquiet for 
generations and William Blake (1808) bewailed the 'dark Satanic mills' 
which were blighting 'England's green and pleasant Land', but as 
Benjamin Franklin (1760 ca. ) observed earlier, 'No nation was ever 
ruined by trade'. 
The profound societal consequences of the rapid and widespread 
changes in the economies of the occidental countries which have occurred 
over the past two centuries can be adequately described in the frame- 
work of British industrial safety legislation, the enactments of 
which were made in response to pressure from public opinion to abate 
the exploitation of workers and to ameliorate bad working conditions. 
This period of cataclysmic change which began in Britain about 1769, 
the year in which James Watt took out a patent for his new steam engine, 
is called the Industrial Revolution, the British experience being its 
paradigm. In other countries because of a later start and variations 
in national resources and character of the people, the economic and 
social transformations took a different, though not wholly dissimilar 
course, being delayed in Germany until 1860, modified in the U. S. A. by 
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the scarcity of free labour and in France by a lack of indigenous 
coal. By 1785 in England, Watt's patents were being fully exploited 
and steam power soon displaced hand, horse and water as the prime 
mover in the manufacturing processes, and factories, particularly 
cotton mills, moved from country settings to-towns %hich grew apace. 
Industrial productivity was greatly increased by the new 
technology and the enhanced output could support a rapid and 
previously unknown rate of economic growth, and England enjoyed a 
period of increasing prosperity which continued without major 
interruption until the outbreak of the first World War in August 
1914. Concomitant with the industrial progress were the advances in 
the humanities, the sciences, medicine and engineering which underpin 
modern European culture. 
In spite of the achievements there were some less happy results. 
Traditional industries were destroyed and the growing urban 
proletariat existed in conditions made notorious by Dickens and other 
chroniclers of their misery. This scene has been pithily described 
by G. D. H. Cole: 
'The old, relatively stable conditions of 
life were dissolved at a prodigious pace; 
and great masses of country bred workers 
found themselves flung into an urban way 
of life .... with no social services except the poor law (of varying dispensations) ... in towns built with almost no regard for 
sanitation or amenity. ' 
The Common People 1746-1946, 
Methuen, London, 1947. 
But, in spite of this dismal vista in the town slums, the overall 
picture was one of burgeoning wealth and opportunity and of national 
economic and cultural progress. The improvements in living standards, 
housing, sanitation and nutrition, for at least a substantial part of 
the population, were accompanied by remarkable increases in the 
expectation of life which rose from 34 years in 1790, a figure which 
had changed little over the preceding centuries, to 41 in 1850, 
reaching 50 at the turn of the century and nearly 70 for males and 
somewhat longer for women by 1950 and the prognosis is for an even 
further extension of the life span (see Section 6.1). In truth, the 
economic conditions of the poor in towns were little worse, if not 
better than in their previous rural state. What differed was that 
they could be seen as relatively impoverished, huddled masses in 
their urban environment, whereas previously they had been dispersed 
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to blend inconspicuously among the rural poor, and as a town based 
proletariat they provided a receptive audience for reforming 
politicians and radical publicists. 
Attitudes formed in revulsion against the grim conditions of 
the past industrial environment have played a major part in shaping 
the way in which the modern British approach to community hygiene and 
industrial health and safety have developed; now recognised as being 
amongst the foremost in the World. Accompanying this transformation 
there has come into being a generation whose birthright is the 
expectation of a long life endowed with 'a sound mind in a sound body' 
who demand the right to safe and pleasurable enjoyment of their 
inheritance. Thus, for the children of today there is a palmy life- 
style of which those living in a less fortunate era would not have 
dared to dream. For them, instead, there were: 
'No arts; no letters; no society; and 
which is worst of all, continual fear and 
danger of violent death; and the life of 
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short. ' 
Thomas Hobbes, 
Leviathan, 1651, Pt (i), Ch. 3. 
In contrast with this sombre past, modern life is Elysian for 
the citizens of the caring, democratic occidental states. Living 
much longer than their predessors, cosseted by health schemes, social 
security and pensions, they are having 'a taste of immortality' and 
the more perceptive are loath to give up this heritage and see their 
Eden spoilt, or their enjoyment of it curtailed. It is not surprising 
then that they bridle at hints of pollution which would foul their 
habitat and at threats of disease and death as a consequence of 
technological disasters or from exposure to industrial toxins or 
carcinogens. Paradoxically, they are less worried about the risks 
they may run in satisfying the whims of individual pleasure or 
convenience, nor do they seem to be much troubled by the ever present 
threat of a nuclear holocaust. 
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2. THE CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF RISK AND WE IECLI. NE OF FATALISM! 
'But boundless risk must pay for 
boundless gain. ' 
William rbrris, The Earthly Paradise: 
The Wanderers (1.1581), 1868-70. 
As W. D. Rowe (1977) so succinctly observed, 'Only death is 
certain', the uncertainty lying in how and when it will be met. 
Until a little more than two centuries ago, people did not consciously 
consider that an individual's fate in these respects could be varied. 
The casting of one's individuality at the moment of conception 
is the event of lowest probability that any human can ever experience. 
Fran then on survival is continuous exposure to risk unto the end of 
life. Very few, if any, adults have ever been oblivious to this 
latter fact, though their reaction can be greatly influenced by the 
strength of belief in an afterlife. In former times when religious 
faiths were more strongly held, the prospect of heaven or hell had a 
profound bearing on the personal attitude towards risk taking, but in 
the West today it is a factor of less importance. 
Our ancestors would, no doubt, have dismissed as trivial the 
very small risks to which the individual or connunity are now 
exceptionally exposed by the occasional low probability failures of 
a generally benificent technology. The fatalism of the past has given 
way to profound personal and public anxieties about health and safety. 
On the other hand, in earlier times there was much concern about 
arcane hazards such as 'The End of the World' and apocalyptic strokes 
of a vindictive providence, portents of which could give rise to 
great public consternation. There is an apocryphal tale about Dean 
Jonathan Swift when he was a prebend of St. Patrick's Cathedral in 
Dublin circa 1670. With jocular intent, he announced that a 
fictitious eclipse of the Sun was imminent and caused a great tumult 
in the city. 
Accordingly, before the Industrial Revolution had made its mark 
upon the social, economic and political structure of the Western World, 
people were little moved by disasters which were nearly all of natural 
cause and for the most part things which happened far away fron their 
ken. They were looked upon as Acts of God or fate and the private 
reaction was to secure preservation of self and household as far as 
this was possible. The state was loath to act and then only in 
extremis to do little more than to try to check the spread of the 
peril or to clean up the aftermath, blasting firebreaks, restricting 
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movement and arranging for death carts for the collection of 
corpses as was the practice during the Black Death. 
The disinterest of a very civilised and moralistic England 
during the calamity of the potato famines in Ireland of 1846 and 
1847 when millions died of starvation was typical of the times 
rather than heartless. 
2.1 Technology reveals its dangers 
In Europe before the middle of the last century, knowledge that 
a new and more efficient manufacturing technique could create 
industrial hazards would have had but little influence on the decision 
to adopt it and, thus, on the pace of technological advance. A much 
more important factor was the effect technical innovation could have 
on the traditional small scale manufacturing and handicraft industries 
and, less directly, on the existing social order (4). In the pervading 
atmosphere of fatalism, concerns about risks to the health and safety 
of workers were almost non-existent though there were some attempts 
even in ancient times to control pollution (5). Indeed, had there 
been the worries about the health and safety hazards of industrial 
employment which exercise people and their governments today, the 
phase of rapid scientific, technological and industrial development 
which started some 200 years ago might well have miscarried and 
Western civilisation stagnated as has been the case in the Orient. 
In view of the social background, it is not surprising that early 
records of industrial accidents are vestigial and until an Act of 1846, 
a master had little legal liability for the safety of his workers, 
even if one were killed in a factory accident. Industrial risks were 
accepted as inherent in one's way of life and the 'madness of hatters', 
scrotal malignancy in chimney sweeps and the diseased lungs of miners 
and glass cutters were taken to be unfortunate and regrettable, but 
unavoidable. It was likewise for workplace accidents and, though 
disastrous for a worker maimed and evocative of charity, scarcely 
newsworthy beyond their locale. 
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2.1.1 Society comes to grips with industrial hazards 
As industrial expansion continued, the value of the gross 
national product grew and society as a whole became correspondingly 
more affluent, although the rich benefitted most. Further, the 
tragic mounting score of factory and mine accidents and disease was 
bringing a new awareness of the need for safety in industry to the 
body politic. 1'bvements to improve conditions at work like the 
Shorter Hours Movement which began in 1830 were awakening public 
conscience. Important factors of a less idealistic kind not only 
contribued to the political pressure for change but made it possible. 
On the one hand it was becoming clear that the detriments of an 
unregulated industrial technology were no longer confined to the 
poorer elements of society as the nemesis of the transport accident 
such as a train crash or shipping disaster did not distinguish between 
rich and poor and disease and epidemics caused by bad living 
conditions could not be confined to the slums. Moreover, the loss of 
a good and skilled hand was a loss to his employer as well as his 
family. On the other hand, working people were being more effectively 
organised in unions and could exercise industrial and political 
pressure for better and safer conditions at work. The most weighty 
factor of all was that technology had created the wealth to pay for 
safety. 
The foregoing things coincided with the great humanitarian change 
which had its birth in Europe and America a little more than a century 
ago. It was a growing trend rather than a sudden change which brought 
with it free elementary education, laws aimed at ensuring the purity 
of food and drink and to control foul factory effluents, old age 
pensions, health insurance schemes, unemployment benefits and,. not 
least, continuing attempts through legislation towards greater safety 
at places of work. A short synopsis of the history of Health and 
Safety Legislation in Britain is given in Appendix I. 
2.1.2 Safety regulation and the point of diminishing returns 
The mundane health and safety hazards of unsafe machines and 
processes, of gassy mines, on construction sites and in public transport 
and shipping can be effectively reduced by legislation and enforcement 
of regulations by inspectors and by designing machines and processes 
with safety in mind. In consequence, there has been a steady decline 
in the incidence of industrial accidents and disease until the latter 
half of this century when it appeared that an end point was being 
approached. 
21 
Barbara Castle, the then Minister of Labour, told Parliament in 1970: 
that traditional legislation of the Factories 
Act type has not succeeded in bringing down the 
number of industrial accidents to a level which 
any of us find acceptable. The old approach is 
inadequate and something new is needed. I am 
setting up an enquiry to examine the matter. ' 
Hansard, March 2,1970, Col. 61. 
The Robens Committee of Health and Safety at Work was set up 
accordingly in that year and it reported in 1972. Its recommendations 
have been largely implemented in the Health and Safety at Work, etc. 
Act 1974. The new law aimed at a basic change in the philosophy, 
style and enforcement of factory safety legislation. Its achievements 
have yet to be assessed. 
2.1.3 Technology's new aspect of danger: the Low Probability Event 
Though much progress was being made towards general industrial 
safety, society was becoming aware that it was being faced with new 
dangers. Technology, in spite of its benefits, was bringing with it 
hazards of a less tractable kind and certainly beyond the scope of 
the traditional regulatory schemes. Accidents of another sort were 
happening; capricious, rare in any particular mode, seldom foreseen 
and often disastrous in terms of life, limb and property with effects 
able to reach well beyond their site of occurrence. 
These incidents may be likened to spikes in a background of noise 
and are defined here as 'low probability events' (LPEs). They are 
infrequent, unexpected happenings caused by factors either not 
perceived by the designer of the system which omission is called 
'ignorance of mechanism', an actuarial concept discussed in 
Sections 8.3.1(1) and 8.4.1, or wrongly identified by him as 'incredible' 
(see Glossary). 
The conanonplace run of industrial accidents has been the subject 
of much concern and legislation. On the other hand, the causation and 
management of the low probability technology event, often accompanied 
by disastrous consequences to life and property, had received less 
than due attention until the advent of the atomic energy industries 
during the last World War when attention began to be drawn to 
industrial hazards of a new kind. The well-established methods of 
safety engineering and good management have been shown to be unable 
to prevent occurrence of these 'low probability events' which need a 
new treatment, not only in the realms of safety engineering and 
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regulatory science, but in their interaction with society. The 
successful approach must therefore be interdisciplinary, mixing 
sound engineering with social psychology. 
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3. ThE SAGA OF SOME CAL NI'DOUS LOW PROBABILITY EVENTS 
'Fate has terrible power. 
You cannot escape it by wealth or war. 
No fort will keep it out, no ships outrun it. ' 
Sophocles, Antigone, 442-441 B. C. 
The saga of the 'low probability event' in the form of a sudden 
and catastrophic accident in a technological system is extensive and 
continuing. Although rare, such occurrences when accumulated on a 
Worldwide scale make up a list as numerous as it is diverse. It is 
possible, therefore, to consider only a few of the ones more relevant 
to the case here and among them chiefly those of an indigenous kind. 
They have been separated into 'conventional' happenings, that is, 
those occurring in well known engineering structure and systems like 
bridges, aircraft and chemical plant, and into those in advanced 
technology which include the new energy industries and, especially, 
nuclear power, although nowadays the dividing line is far from sharp. 
Some of the selected events mentioned briefly in the sections below 
are described in more detail in Appendix II. 
Whereas in earlier times the pernicious effects of technical 
innovations were for the most part mundane industrial accidents, 
disease and local pollution, the new risks of contemporary technology 
often present in unusual and startling ways. For instance, there are 
the tragic and unexpected side effects of some of the enthusiastically 
promoted wonder drugs as in the Thalidomide affair. The preparation 
which had been subjected to exhaustive testing was offered for sale 
as safe for human use and widely used in innocent trust throughout 
Europe in the 1960's until it was found to be the cause of severe 
deformation in babies born to some mothers who had been prescribed it 
during pregnancy. 
The sudden and catastrophic collapse of a whole section of a 
seemingly soundly designed and well-constructed tower block of flats 
in the East End of London brought into question what appeared to be a 
modern and efficient system of urban residential building. On the 
other side of the World, the lack of tidal flow through the quiet 
inland Shiranui Sea, located in the western part of Japan's southern 
island of Kyushu, turned a prosperous and beneficent industrial 
development into a malignant, and for a long time unrecognised, source 
of widespread mercury poisoning for those who lived along its shores. 
Despite nuclear power's extremely hazardous potential, there have 
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been but few serious accidents and those that have occurred have 
been more notorious than damaging to man and the environment. 
As a consequence of their unfamiliar and sensational nature, 
the impact of these rare disasters on what has become international 
public opinion is greatly enhanced by the assiduous efforts of news 
seeking journalists and publicists looking for a cause to promote. 
Accordingly, they are much more disturbing to the body politic than 
those risks of every day experience which in the aggregate cause 
more maim and fatalities by far, like the extraordinary toleration 
of the vast carnage attributable to motor transport accidents. Not 
only are the grisly features of actual disasters given wide publicity, 
but those of conjectured ones, like severe nuclear power station 
accidents, are described in graphic terms (6). 
3.1 Sony unexpected explosions 
The example of powder mill accidents is instructive. They had 
long been known for their destructive violence and Hounslow Heath was 
as notorious for these dangerous mills as it was for highwaymen. One 
such plant provided Guy Fawkes with his gun powder. They were 
prudently sited in the relative isolation of Hounslow, well outside 
London, but near the port of Isleworth. 
Military and industrial needs had greatly increased the demand 
for their product. In 1846 Professor Schoenbein, an eminent chemist 
at the University of Basle, discovered a new explosive, gun cotton, 
which had several times the impulse of gun powder and which, above 
all, he had convinvingly proved could be manufactured with great safety 
in a desensitised state. A factory for its manufacture an a large scale 
was soon set up at Faversham in Kent and all went well for a few months 
until at 11.00 a. m. on July 14,1847, it was demolished by a terrific 
explosion of mysterious cause which killed 21 people. The shock was 
not confined to the physical realm and its moral and political 
repercussions stopped the manufacture of gun cotton in spite of the 
demand for it. The incident was Britain's first significant experience 
of the 'low probability event' in the field of advanced technology. 
A more recent event occurred on July 17,1969 when there was an 
explosion in a large empty oil storage tank standing in an old tank 
farm at Dudgeon's Wharf on the bank of the Thames oxbow which forms 
the Isle of Dogs. The top of the tank was blown off with great 
violence. 
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Unfortunately a party of six members of the London Fire Brigade 
had just climbed up on to it to secure a better view of sorge local 
oil waste fires in the vicinity. They were all killed. The ignition 
was caused by an oxy-acetylene steel cutting torch which was being 
used in dismantling work %hich had been contracted to a scrap 
recovery firm. The flame had penetrated the metal membrane near the 
base of the tank. Another example is the devastasting detonation and 
fire which destroyed the British Nypro caprolactam chemical plant 
near Scunthorpe, South Humberside, in which there were 64 casualties 
among which 28 people died and much damage done in the nearby town of 
Flixborough. Last there is the casual, and still not fully explained, 
excursion in a process reactor at the Givaudan chemical plant at 
Seveso some miles north of Milan in Italy. There was a massive release 
to the surrounding countryside and nearby town of dioxin which is 
reputed to be exceedingly poisonous. A large number of people were 
affected. The full extent and consequences of the contamination of 
humans is not known, but it was extensive with 150 cases of chloracne 
in one school alone. 
3.2 Trouble with bridges 
The collapse of a large and busy bridge is always a newsworthy 
and sensational event which provides almost invariably important 
engineering data and design experience, but seldom without the tragedy 
of loss of human life. Three bridge failures stand out as notable 
LPEs of extraordinary causality. A central span of the bridge across 
the Firth of Tay in Scotland, which had been completed only a year and 
eight months before, collapsed on December 28,1879 with the loss of 
75 lives among whom were many children. The structure failed under 
the cross pressure of a high wind combined with the load of the train 
crossing the bridge. The engine and all the carriages fell into the 
river below. The subsequent Rothery inquiry (1880) severely 
criticised the engineering and the civil engineer in charge, Sir Thomas 
Bauch. However, enlighted by a fuller knowledge of the structural 
mechanics of wide span bridges, it is possible now, 100 years later, 
to take a less severe view when the circumstances are reassessed in 
the light of the experineces of more recent bridge failures. Two more 
recent examples are the collapse an November 7,1940 of the Tacoma 
Narrows Bridge which had been built to span the Puget Sound on the 
West Coast of the U. S. A. and that of a 367 ft. long span of the 
partially completed box girder West Gate Bridge over the River Yarra 
near Melbourne, Australia on October 15,1970. The Tacoma Narrows 
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incident was the result of aerodynamically induced oscillation in a 
high wind, an effect not appreciated by the engineers at that time 
and the Yarra River disaster in which 35 worlmen died was due to a 
lack of understanding by the designers of the nature of the complex 
stress patterns which would be set up during an attempt to correct an 
unexpected buckle in some of the plates forming a box. Both of these 
catastrophic failures occurred because of 'ignorance of mechanism' on 
the part of the designers. Likewise, although there was negligence 
on the part of Bouch, he had to solve the problems of load induced 
stresses in the Tay Bridge design by rule of thumb as structural 
mechanics was a relatively new engineering discipline at that time. 
In this he did not succeed. 
3.3 Two tragic but intriguing railway accidents 
The chronicle of railway accidents is grim and endless, though 
in comparison with the huge number of passengers carried, the overall 
safety record is outstandingly good. Railway safety engineering is a 
well developed discipline, soundly based on long experience in practice. 
The design requirements for railway rolling stock and signalling 
equipment specify the highest standards of reliability. When accidents 
happen, very rarely are they of obvious causation, except in cases of 
negligent or culpable human error. 
One of the points of greatest hazard in railway operation is the 
point of intersection between the track and a road and, as is to be 
expected, it is the site of the occasional crash. The one that 
occurred at Hixon crossing on January 6,1968 is unique amongst them. 
It happened where an automatic half-barrier of a well tested type and 
thought to be almost fool-proof controlled the crossing near Stafford 
where a busy, though by no means major road, passes over one of the 
main railway lines from London to the Northwest of England. An 
experienced heavy-duty road transport crew of 6 with a police escort 
inadvertently placed a 120 ton mass of steel, an electricity power 
supply transformer, on the track directly in front of a North-bound 
oncoming express train travelling at 75 m. p. h. The train driver did 
not see the obstruction until it was only a few hundred yards ahead 
of him. A collision was inevitable. The locomotive and five leading 
rail coaches were destroyed and three others derailed. The casualty 
roll of 11 dead and 45 injured would have been greater but for the 
heroism of the transporter driver who stayed at his post in an attempt 
to pull the transformer clear of the on-rushing engine. Though he 
did not succeed, his efforts placed the mass of metal so that it was 
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tossed aside in the impact, permitting the on-rushing coaches to 
brush past, rather than to crumple concertina fashion or pile on top 
of one another. 
The Moorgate tube station disaster of February 28,1975 in which 
43 people died and 74 were injured was the worst accident to have 
occurred in the London's underground railway system, excluding a panic 
in an air raid during the Second World War. Mr. Leslie Newsom, the 
driver of the morning rush-hour train, approaching Moorgate station at 
full speed, failed to stop as expected and instead over-ran the 
platform. He ploughed without any attempt at braking into a short 
blind-cut tunnel designed as a safety measure for trains over-running 
the platform. The passengers trapped in the leading compressed and 
crumpled carriages were thus squeezed together like sardines with no 
chance of escape. 
3.4 The grim human cost of coal 
From 1760 onwards, coal mining accidents in those pits which in 
the light of engineering knowledge at the time were held to be 
adequately safe and, thus, could be worked without undue danger of a 
major pit accident, were causing fatalities at a disturbing rate and 
the rising demand for statutory intervention was becoming irresistable. 
Doubts were cast about the soundness of many of the accepted practices 
in mining. One was the single access shaft technique, ventilation 
being maintained by use of a brattice to separate the downcast and 
upcast air flows. The terrible accident on January 16,1862 at the 
New Hartley pit (near Newcastle-upon-Tyne) when 204 men and boys were 
entombed and suffocated is an example of how the occurrence of a 'low 
probability event' can change firmly entrenched scientific ideas. Pit 
drainage was maintained by a powerful steam driven lift pump actuated 
by a rod extending to the bottom of the single shaft. The top of the 
rod was jointed in the end of a massive steel rocker beam so designed 
that failure under any conceivable load was incredible. The other end 
of the rocker was motivated by the reciprocating movement of the 
pumping engine. During a full working shift on that unhappy day, the 
beam snapped through metal fatigue, a phenomenon about which little 
was known at the time. The part poised above the shaft fell into it, 
where it lodged; too heavy to be retracted by any available lifting 
machinery. Not only did it cut off the sole escape route for the 
miners but it effectively blocked the air flow. There was, a great 
public outcry and the 'Two Shafts Act 1862' was passed later that year. 
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Four years later on the two days of December 12 and 13,1866, 
two successive explosions tore through the Oaks pit in Yorkshire, 
killing 361 miners and a number of rescuers. On the 8th of the 
following November, the Ferndale colliery at Pontypridd blew up 
killing 178 (Helen and B. Duckham 1973). The ensuing legislation, 
in addition to requiring a higher standard of ventilation in the 
underground workings which was recognised to be a key factor in the 
control of fire damp explosions, contained a new ingredient as the 
1872 Act stated that mine managers must be technically competent. 
The powers of the Inspectorate were also progressively strengthened. 
3.5 Dangers of the sea, technology and the energence of new hazards 
The toll of the sea has been historically heavy and until the turn 
of the 18th Century a merchantman's expected endurance at sea was to 
make somewhat better than 9 successful voyages out of 10 deep sea 
sailings. Inability to cast longitude with any measure of accuracy was 
the root of the trouble. The losses were becoming an intolerable burden 
upon trade and in 1714 the British Government offered rewards of up to 
£20,000 for a solution. Technology found a way and in 1773 John Harrison 
won the prize with his chronometer which was found to be only 5 seconds 
slow after a6 weeks sea trial: 'the most famous time piece ever made'. 
The sea became safer still as better charts, steam, iron ships, 
wireless and radar followed to aid the shipmaster, but the detrimental 
aspects of technology soon made their appearance. Collisions rather 
than rocks and reefs became the hazard and a serious one indeed as the 
shipping lanes became more and more crowded with the cargoes and 
passengers of rapidly expanding world trade. Before Harrison shipwreck 
was commonplace, but marine disasters of the modern world (circa 1776 
onwards) have tended to be LPEs of diverse cause and usually with an 
intriguing technological element. Some characteristic examples are 
given in the passages and subsections below. 
3.5.1 Shipwrecks and collisions 
One of the first marine disasters of modem genre to shock 
international public opinion, an entity which had come into being and 
was becoming an increasingly important political influence in World 
affairs in the last two decades of the 19th Century (infra) was the 
loss of the White Star Liner 'Atlantic' en route from Liverpool to 
New York with mail, valuable cargo and 1,000 passengers and crew. In 
heavy gales and short of fuel, her captain tried to make Halifax, N. S. 
for coal, but early in the morning of April 1,1873, strong currents, 
heavy weather and inaccurate navigation swept her on to the rocks of 
Mars Head, off Cape Prospect, just 20 miles fr® her destination. 
She was a total wreck and only able bodied men, and strong swimmers 
at that, could save themselves. 750 souls perished among whom were 
some 300 women and children. The loss sorge 13 years earlier on 
February 20,1860, of the U. S. Mail Steamer, 'Hungarian', which had 
run ashore on the same rocky coast with the total loss of all 250 
lives aboard had much less impact, but that was before the days of 
international telegraphic links. 
These losses were equalled and the horror of the human experience 
surpassed during the collision in fog between the British Iron 
Sailing Ship, 'Cromarty', and the French Liner, 'La Bourgogne' off 
Sable Island, once again near the Nova Scotian Atlantic coast, on 
July 4,1898. 'La Bourgogne' was running in poor visibility at some 
18 knots, having left New York for Le Havre with 725 crew and 
passengers. Her captain, an experienced ex-officer of the French Navy 
had established a full watch and was relying on the power of steam 
blown fog horn signals from his own and other vessels to confirm that 
his way ahead was clear. She was rammed amidships by the 'Cromarty' 
making 4 to 5 knots under reefed canvas: the whistles had not been 
heard until immediately before the collision. The sailing ship 
survived as her watertight compartments held and maintained her 
buoyancy and she put about to pick up survivors. 'La Bourgogne' was 
holed in the engine room, taking water rapidly and went down in 10 to 
15 minutes with the loss of 562 persons, only 163, mostly crew, being 
rescued. The scenes on deck and in the boats as the ship was abandoned 
were ugly and deplorable with a total collapse of discipline among the 
crew. The officers were at a loss to control them. Without firm and 
proper direction the bewildered and terrified men became so bent on 
saving themselves that, not only did they do nothing to help the 
passengers, but they beat back and assaulted those who tried to get 
into the lifeboats, exhibiting behaviour described as 'fiendish' by 
eye-witnesses. In the event, no children survived and only 2 women 
out of 300 female passengers were saved (7). Ignorance of the quirks 
of sound transmission in fog banks may well have been a contributory 
cause of this event; if so it will have been another case of 
'ignorance of mechanism'. 
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3.5.2 Two 'incredible' disasters at sea 
The foundering of the 'unsinkable' White Star liner, 'Titanic', 
on her maiden voyage in the early hours of April 16,1912 with the 
loss of at least 1503 lives in dead calm seas in the main North 
Atlantic shipping lanes some two days steaming from New York, after 
a chance encounter with an iceberg, is a classic 'incredible' LPE 
(Walter Lord 1976). It came abtut because of the over-confidence of 
master mariners and shipping company board rooms in the impressive 
achievements which had been made in marine technology and navigational 
science, though in fact they were unaware of the innate fallibility of 
unproved-technological innovation. 
Something of similar causation which occurred more than four 
decades later was the 'radar assisted collision' (L. Oudet 1960, 
F. J. Wylie 1978) between the superbly designed and equipped Italian 
liner 'Andrea Doria' and the Norwegian liner 'Stockholm', a ship 
constructed, maintained and navigated to a similar high standard. It 
occurred in sight of land at the approaches to New York on July 25, 
1956 between two ships operated by companies renowned for the excellence 
of their seamanship and quality and reliability of their service. It 
may be classed as one of the first of a series of technological 
disasters which have revealed hidden dangers from unexpected inter- 
actions between mechanical functions and normally routine operational 
procedures which, in spite of apparently adequate safety provision, 
are likely to arise in complex technical systems. Both disasters are 
examples of 'ignorance of mechanism' associated with 'common mode' 
interaction (see Glossary). 
3.5.3 Some mysterious maritime losses 
Lloyd's Register of Shipping holds the story of many other grim 
marine accidents. A series of disasters exhibiting a similar pattern 
of low probability causality has followed from the 'Titanic' to the 
present day. Among them are a number of events which have not been 
explained and they have occurred in spite of the remarkable 
facilities offered by the new navigational aids, marine safety services 
and the versatility of the modern life saving equipment carried. 
For example, there are the mysterious disappearances of a number 
of large bulk and specialised carriers of which the three following 
cases are representative. First are two Norwegian ships of some 
70,000 tons in cargo with ore. The 'Berge Istra' was lost on 
December 31,1975 and four years later her sister ship, the 'Berge 
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Vanga' vanished some time after October 30,1979 on which day the last 
signals were received from her, nothing being reported amiss. Losses 
at sea of this kind are usually total, though occasionally some 
identifiable flotsam has been recovered, the events which caused their 
fates being unknown beyond insubstantial conjecture. The 'Berge Istra' 
was-certainly lost through an explosion as three crew men who were 
sunbathing on deck were blown into the sea and were able to climb into 
a life raft which was fortuitously floating nearby. But why should 
there be an explosion of such destructive violence in a ship loaded 
with ore? Of the 'Berge Vanga' there is not a trace. Both ships had 
carried oil on previous voyages, but their holds had been cleaned and 
they were fitted with inert gas purging systems. 
The third case is that of the German Barge Carrier, '? rhnchen'. 
She was an up-to-date soundly constructed and well equipped vessel of 
37,134 tons gross en route from Rotterdam to New Orleans loaded with 
machinery and barges valued at some 122 million. After signalling on 
13 December 1978 that she was in a heavy gale about 450 miles North of 
the Azores she was not heard from again, vanishing without trace or 
evidence of cause. 
3.6 Aeronautical innovations, achievements and accidents 
The First World War established beyond doubt the importance of 
aeronautical technology and, aside from its military aspects, there 
were far sighted visions of profitable mass air transport. The lighter- 
than-air dirigible was seen as the economical and safe way forward and 
was enthusiastically developed by Britain, the U. S. A. and Germany. It 
was thought that the dangers of fire and explosion associated with 
hydrogen could be overcome by good engineering or by using helium 
instead, the latter approach being taken by the U. S. A. In the decade 
before Hitler's war, a number of these machines were put into service. 
Three of them out of five failed disastrously. 
The first of the bold ventures was the British 'R-100' and 'R-101' 
designed as large passenger carrying airships. Encouraged by 
successful trials with the 'R-100', her sister ship 'R-101' was 
completed as a luxurious air-liner for Empire service. Confidence 
that the hydrogen inflammability problem had been successfully solved 
was so high that smoking was permitted aboard. She was destroyed in 
a sensational crash in flames over France on October 5,1930, outward 
bound from Cardington to India. There was heavy loss of life including 
the British Air Minister, Lord Thompson. The accident ended British 
interest in lighter-than-air machines. 
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The U. S. Navy with assured supplies of the inert noble gas, 
helium, as the buoyancy medium commissioned the 'Akron' which avoided 
the hazards of inflammable hydrogen as the lifting agency. After a 
short period of successful service, she failed through structural 
collapse in a freak storm off the coast of New Jersey with the loss 
of 73 officers and men on April 4,1933. She was not replaced. - 
The Germans with a long background of experience with lighter- 
than-air machines, such as their 'Zeppelins' operated during the First 
World War, built the 'Hindenberg' and 'Graf Zeppelin', both of which 
had several years of successful and uneventful service. Disaster 
overtook the 'Hindenberg' on May 6,1937 when she burst into flames 
at the end of her 20th North Atlantic crossing while mooring at 
Lakehurst, N. J. and, though 30 lives were lost, 64 passengers and 
members of the crew were able to jump clear of the flaming wreck. 
The cause of the ignition has not been satisfactorily explained. The 
'Graf Zeppelin' continued in service for a time. 
The structural failure and consequent crashes of the 'Comet' 
early jet aircraft of British Airways on January 10 and April 8,1954, 
were two more accidents attributable to design weaknesses not perceived 
on the drawing board. 
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4. WE ADVANCE OF TECHNOLOC Y AND TE NEW HAZARDS OF THE ENERGY 
TNili i4TR TR S 
'The machine does not isolate man from the 
great problems of nature but plunges him 
more deeply into them. ' 
Antoine de Saint-Exup6ry 
(Writer and aviator): 
Wind, Sand and Stars (3), 1939, 
trans. Lewis Galantihre. 
The industrial developments which have been made to meet the 
vastly increased demand for energy from present day civilised 
communities have brought with them hazards of a new kind and aspect. 
The military use of atomic energy in World War II opened the way for 
the commercial generation of electricity from nuclear reactors and 
the substantial production of radio-isotopes for scientific, industrial 
and medical uses. There has been an even greater expansion in the oil 
industry and in the bulk transport, storage, processing and 
distribution of petrolamº products and liquid natural gas (LNG). 
Previously, the detriments of technology as sketched in the foregoing 
passages were confined, for the most part, to the working environment 
of mill, shop floor, construction site or mine, or to the poorer type 
of urban residence in the environs of gas works, chemical plant and 
tannery. In contrast to that milieu, these recent advances in 
technology, and those of energy and transport in particular, pose 
threats to whole cities and suburbs, affecting residents in better off 
areas and even to bother those who could afford to live pleasantly in 
semi-rural beauty spots. The reaction from this vocal strata of the 
population has been prompt, energetic and formidable as the aftermath 
of the Roskill Cannission's recommendation (1971) of Cublington, a 
few miles North of Aylesbury and fringing a residential belt of City, 
stockbroker and legal types of commuters, for the site of the Third 
London Airport soon revealed. There have been like reactions to other 
innovatory proposals adversely affecting residential and other 
amenities of the superior type elsewhere, and not only in Britain. 
The realisation that deleterious circumstances could come from 
technological innovation has to a large extent been brought about by 
the continuing series of spectacular and disastrous accidents. It is 
this awareness of disadvantage -which has inspired and given cause to 
the anti-technology norneaents and lobbies which are able to put a brake 
on scientific and technical developments in a way that is not 
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infrequently far from beneficial to the community at large, a matter 
mich is referred to again in the treatment of technological risks 
set out in another part of this text. Nevertheless, these concerns 
about safety are not illusory, but real and serious and the 
circumstances of the several accidents described below give evidence. 
They are also more fully reviewed among the synopses of those LPEs 
mich, as relevant disastrous incidents of rare and unanticipated 
causality, have been collected together in Appendix II. 
4.1 Nuclear Power and Radioactivity 
With the coming of atomic energy, industrial, public and 
environmental perils of a new compass came into existence: powerful 
and lethal sources of radiation, local contamination, large scale 
environmental pollution and the problem of the management of radio- 
active wastes all presented problems of safe keeping, use and disposal 
to uhich there were no easy solutions or even now some of them seen 
intractable. So serious were the potential dangers of atomic energy 
that it was recognised from the start with the Manhattan plutonium 
bomb project that matters of health and safety would have to be dealt 
with in a new way (Margaret Gowing 1974). Thus, radiation protection 
was transformed from an obscure speciality into an important and 
thriving branch of applied physics. Inevitably and in spite of much 
foresight and heavy investment in elaborate and expensive precautions, 
some bad accidents have happened, nearly all being LPEs caused by 
'human error' (8) or 'ignorance of mechanism' (see Sections 8.3.1(i) 
and 8.4.1). 
There have also been a number of minor incidents which have been 
harmful to individuals or small groups of workers exposed. They have 
for the most part happened in the handling of radioactive sources, 
though there have been several criticality incidents upwards of 1015 
fissions, some accidental releases of radioactivity to otherwise clean 
working environments and more numerous inadvertent excessive exposures 
to intense beams of radiation. It is notable that more than half to 
perhaps two-thirds of these events have been due to 'human error' in 
the form of careless mistakes, errors of judgement, but chiefly to 
negligent or deliberate failure to obey instructions as M. B. Biles 
(1969) and others since have consistently reported, for example 
R. Gausden (1979) in the section of his report on 'Over-exposures at 
industrial premises'. 
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4.2 Sane serious nuclear accidents 
Among the plant and process failures which have occurred in the 
industrial usage of atomic energy, mention must be made of the 
Windscale plutonium pile fire of October 10,1957 which, until the 
Three Mile Island (1MI) affair of March 28,1979, was probably the 
worst and potentially most dangerous known failure of a nuclear 
facility, though in both cases no established harm was done to humans. 
However, the financial losses in terms of damage to equipment and 
cessation of services have been very heavy. 
One of the most serious near-accidents to threaten a nuclear 
reactor was the incident of March 22,1975 which occurred at the 
Browns Ferry nuclear power station when an electrical technician 
testing for containment air leaks set fire to the insulation of the 
instrumentation-and control cables in their marshalling vault. Control 
of the reactor was nearly lost. 
There have been persistent and obliquely confirmed reports of a 
severe radiation accident in late 1957 or early 1958 involving a 
nuclear facility near Kyshtym, between Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk in 
the U. S. S. R. (J. H. Fremlin 1979), though neither the nature of event 
nor its consequences are known in the West. 
In spite of the foregoing happenings, no member of the public has 
received a dose of radiation with any significant known health 
effect (9). The contamination of the environment has been minimal 
with, once again, the worst case in the West being that caused by the 
Windscale incident when upwards of 20,000 Ci of fission products were 
released to the atmosphere from the 400 ft high pile stack. A 
relatively small quantity of agricultural produce, mainly milk, was 
destroyed on safety grounds. On the other hand 'ITS is still a major 
preoccupation in the disciplines of nuclear safety engineering and 
regulatory science. 
4.3 X-Rays, Isotopes and Radiooraphy Sources 
Reports of the severe somatic damage caused by exposure to X-rays 
were being received less than a year (S. J. R. 1896) after Roentgen's 
announcement of his discovery of them in December 1895. Until the 
advent of nuclear technology, radioactive materials of sufficient 
strength to be of experimental or therapeutic use were available only 
in tiny quantities, the World's stock of radium amounting to but a few 
grams. Fr® then on, they could be produced in abundance, both in 
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anount and type and thereby the risks of injury vastly increased. 
Gamma-ray sources could now be easily prepared for industrial and 
therapeutic purposes. Problems of handling, storage, safe use and 
contamination had to be faced. The solutions drew heavily on the 
sound, scientifically based approach to radicbiological safety which 
had been developed over the preceding half-century of experience-by 
medical radiographers and therapists in the use of ionising 
radiations (Margaret Gowing 1974). In spite of the general efficacy 
of these precautions, they failed from time to time and these 'low 
probability events' brought about some serious accidents. 
The dangers are principally due to-the insidious nature of 
ionising radiations which even at lethal intensities are imperceptible, 
so that a very harmful or even fatal dose may be received of which the 
victim is unaware at the time. The horrible nature of the consequences 
of a severe overdose of ionising radiations is borne out by the case 
of an unfortunate welder employed on an oil refinery at La Plata in 
Argentina. At work during the morning of May 3,1968 he saw a shiny 
metal bolt of odd shape lying on the ground which he picked up and 
carried in his overall pockets for the next two days. At home on the 
second night, he became ill and in the morning was admitted to the 
local hospital in pain. He was treated for 'bums of unknown origin' 
which did not respond to medication. On May 27, the loss of a 
radiography source was reported. When it was found in his works 
clothing, it was realised that the man was suffering from a severe 
radiation overdose. His condition steadily deteriorated with the 
development of large, dry necrotic scabs on his thighs and desquamation 
of morbid tissue. By mid-November, it-was necessary to amputate the 
left leg, then the right leg and thigh and finally the left thigh. By 
January of 1969, the condition of his hands began to deteriorate and 
further surgery was needed. Finally, devoid of legs and able to use 
only one hand, he remained a helpless torso until he died of cancer 
some 18 months later. Nbre graphic details are given in Appendix II. 
A recent and no less dramatic incident has been reported by 
Dr. D. Beninson of the Argentinian Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(1984). It occurred at the national RA-2 research reactor late on a 
Friday afternoon in September 1983. The facility manager, an 
experienced reactor physicist of about 50, in haste to complete an 
important experiment, entered the heavily shielded reactor cell after 
defeating all of a complex pattern of interlocks. He was unaccompanied, 
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leaving three members of his staff in the control rom. With the 
safeguards inoperative, he was able to re-arrange the core without 
drawing off the moderator, a time saving manoeuvre that he had 
repeated several times previously. This time he erred by failing to 
load absorber in several of the channels. The assembly went prompt 
critical, there was a Cherenkov flash and he fled from the chamber. 
Void formation, fuel damage and secondary safeguards prevented a 
second criticality. The man uho was guilty of culpable human error 
received a whole body dose of several thousand reins. Vomiting and 
diarrhoea started within 30 minutes. He died of respiratory failure 
through oedema of the lungs some 49 hours later. He was compos mentis 
until the end, being able to discuss the circumstances of the incident 
and improved safeguards and interlocks with official investigators and 
the facility staff. The excursion was estimated to have released 
lOMJ with 1017 fissions. 
4.4 The generality of radiation accidents 
In view of the extensive present day use of these extremely 
dangerous things, particularly gamma ray sources and radio-isotopes, 
it is not surprising that there are frequent reports of radiation 
accidents. Owing to the circumspect way in which they have cane to be 
handled and, not least, to the effectiveness of the regulatory controls, 
the number of the incidents is relatively small. In the U. K. in 1978, 
there were only 15 'whole body doses' of greater than 5 rems reported 
to the HSE (R. Gausden 1979). Of them, only one lay in the range of 
SO rems to 100 rems and, though this is an undesirably high dose, it 
is not one considered to be excessively traumatic and not unknown in 
certain medical diagnostic procedures. As these occurrences are to 
be identified with the generality of industrial and process accidents, 
they are not in the category of 'low probability events' and are not 
considered further here. 
4.5 Oil, Petrochemicals and Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) 
In spite of the attention focussed on atomic energy and its 
potential hazards and the hostility directed towards nuclear power, 
the petroleum industry has been the cause of much greater damage to 
property and harm to humans. The incidents are numerous, but it will 
suffice to mention but a few here. An early incident caused by bulk 
use of liquid natural gas occurred in 1944 when a storage tank in 
Cleveland, Ohio, ruptured and the liquid ran out into the nearby streets 
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and sewers. There was an explosion which caused 128 deaths and some 
300 injuries (H. Kunreuther 1980). There was a sensational and 
devastating accident when the French oil tanker 'Betelgeuse', blew up 
off hhiddy Island in Bantry Bay in Eire on January 8,1979 killing 50 
people, but had the conflagration spread to the adjoining oil storage 
terminal, the toll of death and damage could have been much greater. 
The annihilation of half the Spanish holiday camp at San Carlos de la 
Rapita on July 11,1978 when 144 campers were burnt to death by a flood 
of propylene gas which spewed out of a crashing tanker-truck is typical 
of the hazard posed by overland transport of petroleum products in 
bulk. Disastrous explosions in giant marine bulk oil carriers continue, 
in spite of inert gas filling of their oil tanks and other safety 
measures. The extent of the coastal pollution caused by these vessels 
is notorious, and unpleasant traces of the 'Torrey Canyon's' disastrous 
grounding on the Seven Stones Reef between Lands End and the Scilly 
Isles on March 18,1967, still linger on the holiday beaches of Devon 
and Cornwall. She was carrying 171,000 tons of crude oil from Kuwait 
to England. The wrecked hull was badly holed and upwards of 30,000 
tons of her cargo escaped to form a slick 18 miles long by up to a mile 
wide. Had it not been for energetic salvage and decontamination 
attempts, the coastal contamination would have been much worse. 
4.6 Underwater technology and its dangers 
Another important venture of the new technology is the exploration 
and recovery of the riches of the sea, ocean bed and its mineral 
bearing strata. Though the gains from the winning of these treasures 
promise to be very great, to which the present abundant flow of off- 
shore oil gives evidence, the associated risks are likely to be high, 
especially to the workers exposed to them. A foretaste of this adverse 
aspect is given by the toll taken by the efforts to win continental 
shelf oil so far, let alone that from deeper waters. Since 1976, more 
than 200 men have died in oil rig sinkings (TINE, March 1,1982). 
Furthermore, the vast as yet untapped natural resources of Antarctica 
offer a challenge likely to bear a heavy human penalty. They can only 
be tapped by driving through thousands of feet of the thick glacial 
cap or by working in seas thick with shifting pack ice or at hazard 
from huge icebergs, often the size of small islands. However, that is 
a story for the future and the immediate case concerns the price which 
is being paid for the extraction of off-shore oil. 
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4.6.1 Oil and the toll of its extraction from under-sea fields 
The search for oil, that raw material on which all advanced 
economies are critically dependent, and its extraction from land sited 
fields has not proved to be a highly dangerous undertaking, having an 
accident rate comparable with that of the construction industry. On 
the other hand, off-shore oil and specially from the open sea has been 
won only at the expense of many lives, particularly in rough, stormy 
and unsheltered waters like the North Sea. 
Certain phases of the work of drilling for oil and its extraction 
can not be carried out from large rigs on the surface, but require 
underwater operations by divers working on the sea bed often at the 
maximum safe depths from diving bells or at even greater depths by men 
in small submarines using manipulators. On return to the surface after 
a stint below, the divers must endure extensive periods of decompression 
which may last for several days, but the long term effects of the 
exposure of their lungs and blood stream to mixtures of oxygen and 
noble gases at high pressure are as yet unknown, though there is some 
evidence of bone necrosis. 
There have been a number of casualties both in the diving bells 
and submarines through interruption of life support services when 
supply lines and cables to the surface have been accidentally severed 
or otherwise cut off. In the case of the large semi-submersible rigs 
and platforms, upwards of ten thousand tons or more used in deeper 
waters, the novel engineering and reliability problems which have had 
to be faced have by no means yet been solved nor even fully appreciated. 
There have been a series of sinkings with many fatalities and these 
happenings have been paradigms of the catastrophic low probability 
event (LPE). 
Two of the more recent of these tragic LPEs of which the causes 
have still to be fully explained involved large rigs thought to be 
very reliable and able to withstand the most violent of storms. One 
in the North Sea was the loss of the 'Alexander Kielland' with 123 
lives on March 27,1980 when the rig, a 10,105 tons semi-submersible 
'flotel' with 212 men aboard, capsized in a heavy gale, though not 
excessively high seas. The immediate cause of the catastrophe was the 
structural collapse of one of the four buoyancy legs. The rig had 
previously been surveyed and classified as 'absolutely safe'. The 
other was the sinking of the 'Ocean Ranger', one of the World's largest 
drilling platforms, off Newfoundland on February 15,1982. It capsized 
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in a severe storm and high seas owing to failure of its buoyancy 
stabilising system. None of the 84 men aboard survived. The rig had 
been built in Japan in 1976 and was designed to endure the wildest 
expected weather conditions and to ride out waves of up to 110 ft, 
much worse than those experienced at the time of the incident. 
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PART two 
A REVIEW OF THE SALIENT PROBLEMS OF RISK PERCEPTION, APPRAISAL AND 
MANAGEMENT IN THE FIELD OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
Sections 5 to 7 covering: 
The growing public concern about the course of technological 
advance, evinced in an often largely irrational vay, and the 
hostility to nuclear power evoked by the continuing series of 
sensational catastrophic failures of technological systems as 
publicised by the media; the emergence of an informed public 
opinion as a major political force; further emphasis on the 
essential need for technical progress if the grave dangers 
of political and economic destablisation on a world scale 
due to resource exhaustion in the face of demands for better 
standards of living by a rapidly increasing population on 
the planet are to be avoided; the loss of confidence in the 
kind of health and safety protection provided by conventional 
regulatory procedures; an appraisal of the state-of-the-art 
in risk science; a critical review of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods of safety analysis with reference to the 
U. S. Reactor Safety Study; the enduring concept of the Maximum 
Credible Accident (MCA) in safety engineering; the importance 
of cultural factors in risk perception and management; 'trans- 
science' - the fringe between science, culture and politics; 
and the central role of the engineer in the assurance of safety. 
THEMATIC SYNOPSIS 
Part Two in its review of the grave social and geopolitical 
problems associated with the growing hostility in the West 
to technical innovation, and to nuclear power in particular, 
problems aggravated by rapidly rising, though cyclic, demands 
for amenities, food and energy in particular, has opened the 
way for an examination in depth of the methods currently 
adopted to manage the risks of innovation in technology and 
for arguments in favour of a new treatment. 
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S. THE ENIC? SA OF M)DERN PERCEPTIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS 
'Periculosum est credere et non credere; 
.......... 
Ergo exploranda est veritas multum, prius 
Quam stulta prave judicet sentential. 
(It is dangerous to believe and to disbelieve; 
therefore it is far better that the truth be 
thoroughly searched, than that a foolish 
opinion should pervert your judgement. ) 
Lucius Phaedrus, 25 B. C. 
Fables, Book 3,10,1 and 5,6. 
The peculiar, unanticipated disastrous accidents, briefly outlined 
in Sections 3 and 4 above of which some are dealt with in more detail 
in Appendix II, expose the odd nature of these 'low probability events' 
(LPEs). Those chosen, mainly in British settings, are representative 
examples of these rare happenings, selected from reports of the many, 
multifarious sad occurrences of the calamitous LPEs which follow one 
another in endless sporadic series. Besides the catastrophic physical 
consequences which they bring, almost without exception tragic, their 
summated effect has profoundly influenced and aroused the social 
awareness of the bodies politic in the communities affected. 
The awakened popular disquiet about technology and its hazards is 
a feature of the modern entity of sentient public opinion engendered 
in the masses of people as illiteracy and ignorance have been 
progressively reduced to little more than negligible residue in the 
more advanced countries. The source of the discontent is to be found 
in the advance of technology itself, particularly in commumications and 
transport. The process began with improvements in printing and the 
introduction of the electric telegraph followed by cables linking the 
Continents that enabled the successful promotion of the great 
'thundering' national newspapers of the 19th and first part of the 20th 
Centuries which both Abraham Lincoln and Bagehot recognised as 
powerful political forces. 
5.1 The emergent political potency of public opinion 
Though there have been few times in the recent past when 
governments have been able to disregard public opinion, it is now a 
very influential element in democratic politics. In addition to the 
spread of literacy, technological progress has made it possible for 
businessmen, politicians, officials and ordinary citizens to travel to 
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an extent inconceivable a hundred years ago and has provided 
facilities for rapid corra. mications through postal services, telegraphy 
mentioned above and latterly the telephone giving virtually instant 
communications nation-wide and, now, to all parts of the globe. News 
of the assissination of President Lincoln on April 14,1865 took ten 
days or more to reach London. In contrast, the attempt on the Pope's 
life on May 13,1981 was known to all within minutes of the occurrence 
and could be seen to be true through the technical miracle of 
television that, since the end of the Second World War has been 
developed to a perfection whereby events may often be observed in the 
homes of the viewers as they happen. If the occurrence itself is not 
caught by TV cameras, then the details are recounted by wellknown and 
trusted commentators. Thus, the citizens of the Western countries, at 
least, are well informed about the events which make news and the 
previous ignorance of the common people about the facts and motives 
which lie behind the political and economic decisions of governments 
has been dispelled. Enlightened, they respond if strongly motivated 
to voice opinions on matters of high policy and are able to influence 
even the most determined of politicians and administrators. Not only 
Parliamentary lobbies but factional pressure groups can be quickly 
brought together to challenge unpopular government plans and actions or 
to promote a sectional interest. Perhaps one of the first manifestations 
of the phenomenon of the power of spontaneously evoked mass displeasure 
was the forced resignation of the British Foreign Minister, Sir Samuel 
Hoare, on 18 December 1935 by public indignation over the Hoare-Laval 
proposal to yield Abyssinia to Mussolini. 
More recently, strong and often violent protests have been directed 
against major technological projects, particularly in opposition to the 
construction of nuclear power stations. This has been expressed in 
legal prohibitions that in certain cases have brought power station 
construction work to a halt in the U. S. A. and in violent clashes between 
anti-nuclear demonstrators and the police in West Germany. More 
extreme manifestations of hostility to technology have been reported 
from Spain where the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) group of 
terrorists by a series of murders, woundings and explosionns over some 
years in May of 1982 finally forced the constructors to abandon work 
on the Lemoniz nuclear power station in Northwest Spain, although the 
plant was nearing completion. The Government had refused a referendum 
on the siting of the station which the petitioners said was too near 
the crowded city of Bilbao. 
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Furthermore, organised groups of concerned citizens and 
objectors can engage the support of contrary or dissident, but 
eminently expert and thus formidable, witnesses who have the knowledge 
and authority to confound the most assured advocates of an officially 
backed technological project. In fact the pursuit of this kind of 
adversarial activity has become a minor profession, as for example the 
efforts of Ralph Nader (1979) and A. B. Lovins. The latter is noted 
for a strong aversion to nuclear power which should, according to him, 
'remain remotely sited in the Sun where it can flourish' (Lovins 1974). 
By raising standards of living, by encouraging mass education and 
literacy and by improving communications, things without which it can 
not thrive, technology is hoist by its own petard, having articulated 
its antagonists. Whereas at one time, the principles and formulation 
of an important engineering project could be decided in camera and then 
proceed to implementation without extraneous probing and evaluation and 
would be accepted and sustained by public trust in the officials 
promoting it and in their expert advisors, this is no longer the case. 
There are few projects today which can escape public scrutiny and 
debate if they are likely to bear upon the safety of the environment, 
workers and general public. 
5.2 The growing unease about technological innovations 
The opposition to technological innovation is not entirely without 
cause. Exposed to the endless occurrence of disastrous LPEs. and 
subjected to frequent warnings about the risks of iatrogenic disease 
or teratogenesis from the use of drugs and remedies on one day asserted 
to be safe and on the next announced to be harmful, the people of the 
Western world are not surprisingly sensitised to the dangers that 
technical innovations may bring. In a report written for the Council 
for Science and Society Professor John Ziman, summing up the views of 
his Working Party, wrote that there is evidence of - 
'.... public disquiet at the increasing cost of 
mistakes in large scale technical projects: 
mistakes sometimes revealed at the planning stage, 
sometimes during design and construction, but 
increasingly often only in operation .... a modern chemical plant explodes, a newly introduced air- 
liner crashes .... the increasing scale'and 
complexity of human artefacts - machinery, vehicles, 
buildings, power stations, communication networks, 
etc., generate a new scale of damaging consequences 
of failure'. 
Superstar Technologies, 
Barry Rose, London, 1976, 'Preface'. 
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He fo11oM-ed with the observation that - 
It is now within our capacity .... to design and introduce a coopletely 
new technical system on a large scale 
without practical experience or tests 
..... changes in the social and financial organisation of industry 
have also weakened some of the forces 
controlling technological innovation 
..... fertile innovators such as Isambard Kingdom Brunel or Thomas 
Alva Edison carried heavy personal 
responsibility for the safety and 
success of their designs and inventions 
..... they could not hide this respons- ibility in the anonymity of a large 
design team ..... or in a bureaucratic 
corporation. ' 
(Ibidem - Para. 1.2.6. ) 
Thus, the historically established checks and safeguards no 
longer operate and 'the evolution of successful and safe techniques 
by natural selection' and exposure to failure in operation, as has 
been the case in coal mining, can no longer take place. Safety 
assessment in advance of use and various methods of prediction have 
to replace the testing experience of failure and proving tests are 
no longer feasible nor permissible for large scale systems such as a 
nuclear power plant. 
The widespread apprehensions about the possible adverse 
consequences of further scientific and technical advance not only 
pertain to the artefacts of engineering and the unpleasant side- 
effects of new drugs but have deeper roots fertilised by worries which 
relate to the effect these things may have on human values, the 
freedom of thought, discussion and the exercise of personal discretion, 
the family and of intimate inter-personal relations of love and trust 
and, above all, the ever-present and perhaps growing threat of nuclear 
Armageddon. As Kirkpatrick Sale in his book 'Human Scale' (1980) has 
suggested these anxieties may come from a 'primordal human impulse' of 
self-preservation and instinctive defence of an ecology sensed to be 
under threat. All these things among other less identifiable influences 
have helped to feed the present growing tide of suspicion and antipathy 
which seems to be flowing against technical innovation in general, and 
against advanced technology in the domain of energy supply and 
generation in particular. Although of themselves intuitive and 
amorphous, such fears make fertile ground for the more extreme kinds 
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of environmentalist achvcacy like those of T. Roszak (1972) %bo 
portrays technological development as 'malevolent and anarchic' with 
man as a slave to 'technology out-of-control'. 
5.3 Anti-technology arguments: supposititious and real 
The cases that the anti-technologists, eco-activists and latter 
day Luddites (4) advance in support of their opposition to technological 
progress and innovation usually have superficially plausible factual 
bases by associating their objections with a hazard, environmental or 
ecological detriment or threat to a long established trade, being a 
danger that is known to exist even though it be minimal. When these 
arguments are pushed beyond their verifiable factual limits, they soon 
become less rational and are often extended by dubious postulations, 
speculative inferences, frank emotional appeals or warnings of direct 
action. Typical of such specious argumentation are the 'hot particle' 
hypothesis of lung cancer induction following ingestion of traces of 
plutonium that was publicised by Gofman and Tamplin (1973) and the 
equivocal extrapolations from technical data so ingeniously used in the 
anti-nuclear power film, 'The China Syndrome' (6). 
The anti-nuclear onslaughts of A. B. Lovins (1974), Bacon and 
Valentine (1981) and multifarious other polemicists are so committed 
and intense that it has been suggested by S. Cotgrove (1979,1982), 
O. H. Critchley (1980) and F. Sandbach (1980) and others that they are 
displacement activities relieving deeper concerns about trends and 
tensions in contemporary society as already suggested (supra). John C. 
Chicken in his review, 'Nuclear Power Hazard Control Policy' (1982) 
takes the more specific view that the terrors of nuclear warfare have, 
by association, coloured public attitudes towards real, but quite 
different, risk in the matter of nuclear power. This simple, single 
factor theory is true but insufficient and the circumstances are more 
complex. There is no doubt that there is an association between the 
dangers of radiation accidents in nuclear plants and the destructive 
potential of atomic bombs, especially in relation to fall-out, but 
there are other important considerations. For example, Flood and 
Grove-White (1976), two leading environmentalists speaking for the 
Friends of the Earth, see the 'nuclear threat' in terms of bureacratic 
centralisation of power and of sabotage and terrorism directed against 
the country's vital electricity supplies concentrated in relatively few 
vulnerable units evoking protective responses from the Government 
inimical to civil liberties. 
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Despite suspicions that the foregoing grim scenarios of 'hot 
particles', low level radiation carcinogenesis and teratogenesis and 
catastrophic nuclear reactor accidents are disseminated as a cloak for 
more political objections to advanced technology and nuclear power in 
particular, they can not be lightly disregarded. Taking the nuclear 
case as an exemplar, there is no doubt that the vision of a sudden and 
massive release of a cloud of insidiously poisonous fission products, 
described in the early days of atomic weapons as a 'particularly 
vicious form of poison gas' (H. de Wolf Smyth 1947), able to spread 
death, disease and destruction for hundreds of miles from the afflicted 
plant is frightening. The panic and tumult that followed immediately 
upon the Three Mile Island (TMI) incident of March 28,1979 (See 
Appendix II) give clear evidence that these threats are certainly held 
in awe. ? Moreover, it is generally believed by both advocates and 
critics of nuclear power that a major reactor radiation accident 
accompanied by casualties clearly attributable to it - there were none 
from NI - would bring the nuclear industry to a halt. 
5.3.1 Nuclear Power: vestigial risk 
Notwithstanding that the chances of a severe radiological accident 
at a nuclear power station are very small, approaching zero in a soundly 
designed, well-built and competently managed plant, they are still 
finite. The worst consequences are truly grave, giving some 
justification for the foregoing fears. The maximum accident involving 
an operating installation that has reached equilibrium with its fission 
product burden has been authoritatively envisaged as posing a worst 
case threat of 'about 3,400 killed, 34,000 injured and property damage 
of up to $7 billion' from a 500 I4(Th) reactor according to a wellknown 
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission sponsored study (H. S. Vance 1957). 
Present day reactors are larger and the fatalities, harm and damage 
would be correspondingly greater. A recently updated estimate of the 
possible consequences of the worst accident to a U. S. type of 
Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) is 100,000 deaths and $300 bn in 
property damage (Sandia Lab. 1982). Furthermore, apart from any direct 
injury to people or damage to property off the site, the capital, 
clean-up and revenue losses can be very large. For instance, the 
General Public Utility (GPU) to recoup themselves for the losses 
incurred as a result of the TMI incident have sued the constructors, 
Babcock and Wilcox, for $4 bn for negligence and with failing to inform 
the Utility of 'the safety hazards at the plant' and the U. S. Nuclear 
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Regulatory Commission (lam) for $4 bn for incompetent regulation 
(Financial Times Nov. 2,1982). If the 'loss detriment' relationship 
hinted at earlier (2) could be quantified, then the huge financial 
losses incurred by the DII incident might be expected to cause some 
reduction in the aggregated life-span of the population upon whom the 
burden of meeting the cost fell. However, the topic is peripheral to 
the theme of this research and will not be pursued. 
5.4 The riddle of hostility to nuclear power 
In view of the foregoing horrific scenarios, despite the fact that 
it is generally agreed that the chance of such a major -reactor radiation 
accident is minuscule, even the most confident of nuclear engineers, 
let alone members of the technically informed general public, find the 
prospect disturbing. However, the reality is that, although nuclear 
power is admittedly fraught with danger and in spite of a number of 
serious plant accidents, as far as the public and environment are 
concerned the hazards have been successfully managed and contained for 
more than 25 years. Since October 17,1956 when the Calder Hall nuclear 
power station went 'on the bars', and until the end of 1981,272 nuclear 
power reactors with a capacity of 152,603 M(e) in 23 countries had been 
commissioned and were in operation generating 9% of the World's total 
electricity. These reactors had accumulated some 2600 reactor-years 
of operating experience (IAEA Report for 1981), during which time no 
member of the public has been known to have been harmed as a result of 
exposure to radiation, no property external to the site of any reactor 
has been damaged and there has been no sensible contamination of the 
environment. The net picture is one of safe operation of clean and 
reliable nuclear plants that, unlike power stations burning fossil 
fuels, emit neither noxious, corrosive nor toxic fumes and in no way 
make any contribution to the growing menace of 'acid rain' which Robin 
Porter of the U. S. State Department (1982) has described as 'the most 
serious environmental problem facing the World'. Besides, the fact 
that nearly 3,000 reactor-years of operating experience have now been 
accumulated provides strong evidence in support of the claim that 
nuclear power can be kept adequately safe, assuming that the existing 
standards of safety engineering and operational vigilance are sustained. 
A major nuclear contribution is essential to any longer term World 
energy balance and efficaceous action to provide it should be taken 
soon. Therefore, it may be truly said that 'Those who attack nuclear 
energy show a cynical denial of human ingenuity' (A. Weinberg 1979) and 
a similar disregard for the needs of mankind. 
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5.4.1 Opposition hardening 
Be all that as it may, hostility to nuclear power seems to be far 
from abating, indeed, it may well be hardening, confirming Alvin 
Weinberg's view of some years ago (1977). It has forced the cancellation 
or postponement of 8 confirmed orders for reactors in the (kited States 
and there is no certainty of any new power reactor orders in the coming 
years (IAFA Report for 1981). Yet, atomic energy is one of the prime 
sources of environmentally clean power, offering a developed and tried 
technology with fuel reserves that could last till the end of the next 
century or longer. 
It is true as John Chicken has said (supra) that the adverse 
reaction to nuclear power has to a considerable extent been inspired 
among the less well-informed sections of the public by a false perception 
of the risks which they attribute to nuclear reactors by association 
with atomic boobs. This effect is waning as a result of educational 
publicity and is probably of little consequence now. Despite that, there 
is a related factor that is perhaps less openly acknowledged for its 
influence on public opinion but nonetheless telling. A nuclear power 
reactor can, without undue difficulty, be programmed to produce military 
grade plutonium and provide the transmutational facilities to produce a 
stockpile of atomic weapons and keep them at the ready. Albeit expensive 
and sophisticated chemical separation plants are needed, but these can 
be acquired. In the case of the powerful recognised weapon states, like 
the U. S. A., Britain, Russia, France and now China, this is of little 
relevance, but not so for smaller, possibly aggressive, turbulent and 
unstable nations which make up the large parts of the World. Further, 
even in the case of those nations that have signed the Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), their obligations can be abrogated unilaterally on three 
months' notice. There is, therefore, widespread and due concern that 
an expansion of nuclear power in the major industrial countries could 
result in its spread to states that might be less inclined to responsible 
and self-denying behaviour in the acquisition and deployment of nuclear 
weapons. This state of affairs coupled with a lack of faith in the 
effectiveness of restraints that can be imposed by international bodies 
like the United Nations or, even by the Great Powers on their smaller 
associates, is disturbing to responsible opinion forming elements in 
Western countries (Sir Brian Flowers 1976/a). 
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5.4.2 Fallacious affirmative arguments 
Regrettably, the case for nuclear per is not furthered by resort 
to the ingenuous, but subtly misleading, arguments in mich the 
controversy abounds, for example: 
'Before discussing the hazards of nuclear power, we would 
emphasise that in many respects these are not unique. ... 
.... There is a tendency to dramatise the risks in ways which 
convey quite misleading impressions to people who have no basic 
knowledge of the subject. It is said, for example, that a piece 
of plutonium the size of an orange contains enough of the 
substance to kill everyone on earth. So it does, but it is 
impossible that it could be so distributed as to have this effect. 
A very similar statement might be made about other substances 
that are commonly produced and used in industrial societies. 
For example, chlorine is a very basic material in the chemical 
industry and is made in the U. K. alone to the extent of about a 
million tons per year. Yet a mere 10 mg would be lethal if 
inhaled; little more than a two-millionth part of our annual 
production would, in theory, suffice to kill the entire 
population. It is important to see nuclear hazards in 
perspective and we have tried to do this throughout our study. ' 
Sir Brian Flowers, 
Sixth Report: Nuclear Power and 
the Environment, Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution, 
HM, (nmd 6618, Sept. 1976, S. 162. 
The argument is, of course, true, but it is not as relevant to 
nuclear power plant accidents as the Report imputes. In the case of 
the catastrophic failure of the containment of a large nuclear power 
reactor consequent on melting of most of its burden of nuclear fuel not 
only can a very large part of the core's radioactivity be released to 
the atmosphere, but it would be dispersed with the caprice of the 
elements and could cause up to 100,000 deaths in the worst conceivable 
case. The accident is highly improbable but not impossible as with the 
case of the chlorine. It is an example of the 'Zero-Infinity Dilemma' 
that at times faces insurers: almost vanishingly small risk coupled 
with indefinitely large and ruinous consequences, for example that of 
IM with $8 bn or more in pending damage claims (supra). It is this 
kind of calamitous accident that is the true matter of concern in the 
case of nuclear power and not the toxic effects of minor releases of 
radioactivity that may be properly likened to other harmful pollutants 
of industrial society, eg lead in petrol exhaust fumes from motor 
traffic and the oxides of nitrogen and sulphur in power station flue 
gases, and the carcinogenic dusts and vapours to which workers are 
exposed in many factory environments. 
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5.5 Conditions for toleration of the nuclear power risk 
In view of the prevailing doubts, public confidence in nuclear 
safety is unlikely to be won by attempts to prove that the hazard is 
so small that it may be ignored by recourse to arcane and elegant risk 
mathematics that try to present the dangers as sensibly zero and 
therefore insignificant by obscuring them in a fog of vanishingly small 
numbers (O. H. Critchley 1982 and elsewhere). The meaningful objections 
to nuclear power have roots in a different soil than that provided by 
commonplace accident data, namely one that is composed of the cultural 
attitudes to risk and chance and of the dominant societal perceptions 
of the nuclear hazard and of the economic and political changes likely 
to be brought about in a society that had become largely dependent on 
atomic energy. 
To secure acceptance, or better, toleration of the 'Zero-Infinity' 
hazard of nuclear power (See Section 8.3 et seq. ) the public exposed to 
the risk must be convinced that exposure to it is in their best 
interests, that the potential threat can be effectively kept on a firm 
engineering leash and, further, that the standard of safety management 
set in the beginning will not relax with time, but remain ever critical 
and vigilant. This concept of 'safety-by-contained-danger' effectively 
sustained by continuous alert surveillance is that of 'Defended Safety' 
-a theme to be elaborated upon in the passages that follow. 
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6.. THE IMPERATIVE FOR CONTINUING TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
'Technology made large populations 
possible, large populations now 
make technology indispensible. ' 
Joseph Wood Krutch; 
The Nemesis of Power: 
Hunan Nature and the 
Human Condition, 1959. 
As it has been noted earlier in this text, the long accepted 
view that technological progress is inherently beneficial and can 
eventually cure all the ills of the human condition and pave the way 
to a utopian future, is nowadays seriously questioned and, indeed, 
is vigorously opposed by some committed groups of social reformers. 
They advance well argued contentions that technological innovation 
should be halted or at least changed in direction. Supporting the 
latter view, David Dickson wrote that: 
'Contemporary society is characterised by a 
growing distrust of technology. The many 
social benefits which technology has helped 
to bring about are being increasingly 
counterbalanced by the social problems 
associated with its use. ' 
Alternative Technology and 
the Politics of Technical Change: 
Introduction, 1974. 
Unfortunately the issue is far from simple. Dickson is 
wrong in his premiss that 'technology has become an integral part of 
our social world'. He is wrong because technology is not a thing 
apart from the human condition. Instead, technology and the social 
world are, and always have been, integral parts of the same thing, 
that is the causal means of man's evolution from beast to intelligent 
social animal. Therefore, technical progress can not be turned off 
and on like a tap. Man has a choice between continuing technical 
progress which is, in fact, being subjected increasingly to adaptive 
and all-embracing controls in the advanced countries of the World 
and stagnation. Stagnation is a state that characterised the closed 
oriental societies of China and Japan until the latter was 'opened 
up' by Commodore Ferry's gunboats in 1854 and the regression that 
sealed the fate of the Tasmanian aborigines who had lost the art of 
making fire and were losing that of speech when contact with the 
White Man finally extinguished their race. That technological 
progress must continue is a fact; that it must be properly regulated 
is a necessity. This latter state is being achieved, the problems 
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of contamination, pollution and resource destruction are being 
identified and the required regulatory agencies are being created 
like those for environmental, energy and resource conservation in 
the U. S. A. 
It is not generally realised how deep lies the opposition to 
technical progress in Western society today. Hostility has been 
conspicuously focussed on nuclear technology as the front runner 
on the technical scene. The phenomenon was broadly examined in the 
preceding Section 5, though with attention directed at its political, 
psychological and sociological features. As its military aspects 
are inviolable, it is the civil application in nuclear power that 
bears the brunt. The disapprobation runs from the open distaste 
shown by Gofman and Tamplin in 'Poisoned Power' (1973) and their 
kind to the less than enthusiastic tolerance evinced by the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution: 
'Our basic concern is that a major 
commitment to fission power should be 
postponed as long as possible, in hope 
that it might be avoided altogether, 
by gaining the maxinun time for the 
development of alternative approaches 
which will not involve its grave 
potential implications for mankind. ' 
Sir Brian Flowers (Chairman) 
Sixth Report: Nuclear Power 
and the Environment, 
HMSO, London, Cmnd 6618, 
September 1976, S. 511. 
At this point in the argument and before moving on to a more 
technical line of thought, it may prove helpful to recall an earlier 
posit about the importance of nuclear energy. The fact oust be faced 
that the existing energy glut is historically only a short, transitory 
experience. The CEGB may now have 30% or so excess capacity, but 
this could disappear very quickly. Obsolescent plant is being phased 
out and the lead time for new plant is of the order of 5 to 10 years. 
When, as eventually it must, the present slump ends and 
industrial activity returns to, and exceeds, its earlier norms, the 
demand for energy will at least grow in proportion, if not at a mich 
faster rate. Once again, the spectre of resource depletion and an 
energy famine will emerge. It is then that nuclear power can play a 
key role. It will be necessary to mollify and overcome the 
opposition before that time. Essential tasks are to find an 
acceptable approach to safety assurance in nuclear power technology 
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and to establish controls that are neither stifling on the one hand, 
nor too lax on the other, but ones that encourage a due measure of 
progress and innovation. Above all, it must secure acceptance from 
the body politic by inspiring confidence in its engineering. It is 
certain that the forthcoming energy deficit cannot be made good by 
recourse to an undefined 'Alternative Technology' sans nuclear 
power that would have to fill the void created by 'the disappearance 
of contemporary forms of science and technology' as envisaged by 
David Dickson (1974) and those who, to a greater or lesser degree, 
share his convictions. 
6.1 Population growth and the inevitability of technical change 
Posed against the rising tide of hostility to technology are 
the growing needs of the rapidly increasing populations of the World. 
Those needs are the result of the medical successes in the fight 
against disease; of the achievements of public health in providing 
clean drinking water and sanitation; of the eradication of the vectors 
that transmit parasites; and of the reduction in infant and maternal 
mortalities. The accelerating growth of World population is shown in 
Table I. The step increase that occurred during the latter part of 
the 18th Century coincides with the onset of the Industrial Revolution. 
It continued without remission in the West until the First World War 
when it began to slow down, a phenomenon that has been attributed to 
the lengthening span of time needed for the education and training of 
the young in those countries. In the rest of the World, rapid 
population growth began about the time of the American Civil War, 
continuing at an accelerating rate since. The population of the 
World has more than doubled in the last 80 years or so and there are 
now about 4 billion people on the planet, a number likely to reach 
twice that size in the next 25 years. 
Examination of Table I provides some evidence that the massive 
increase in the World's population is largely the result of a longer 
expectation of life from birth. A surprising characteristic is the 
change in that expectation from some 22 years in the heyday of Rome, a 
relatively stable and prosperous time, to a span approaching 75 years 
today. The longer expectation of life, basically a steady change 
over the centuries of human existence is by no means wholely due to 
improvements in hygiene, medicine and nutrition (Cosslet P. Putnam 
1954). In spite of suggestions to the contrary, the Romans did not 
die young in mass because of lead poisoning (eg A. McWhirr et al 1982), 
though no doubt the extensive use of lead did not contribute to good 
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TABLE I 
Life Expectance Changes 
THEE EXPECTANCE OF LIFE FROM BIRTH IN RELATION TO THE CHANGING POPULATIONS OF THE 
WORLD, WESTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA OVER THE CENTURIES 
DATE 
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Vol. 10, Readers Union & 
J. M. Jent, London, 1968. 
It n n 
It It n 
n It n 
n It It 
It It It 
Whitaker's Almanack, 
113th Edition, 1981. 
NOTES 
(a) The bracketted figures are estimates. An asterisk (*) indicates an 
interpolation by the writer. 
(b) The figures are 'accurate' in the case of those countries in which some 
form of census has been possible, otherwise they are broad estimates 
which vary by as much as 20yä among those authorities held to be expert. 
(c) There is a vilely held view that the spurt in growth of the World 
population after 1650 was not due to increased fertility, but to a fall 
in mortality, particularly amongst children and young adults which 
coincided with the increasing standard of living attributable to the 
growth in the productivity of labour characteristic of the Industrial 
Revolution. 
(d) C. Palmer Putnam does not seem to be vholely in agreement with the 
opinion quoted in Note (c) above. He observes that the population of 
China (a country where some sort of attempt to enumerate the total 
population has been made throughout its long civilised existence) together 
with that of all the Vest passed througb a minimum in the 7th and 8th 
Centuries. There vag little change until about 1600 when a population 
explosion began in both areas and which has followed broadly the same 
continming pattern ever since. Be attributes this, like others, to an 
increase in life expectancy, though the reasons for this are not fully 
understood. The effect of improving standards of living is less than 
sight be expected. Some suggest that it might be due to an evolutionary 
change expressed as lengthening of the human life span. 
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health. : ºbreover, the growth of population has little to do with 
fertility for %hich there is little evidence of change, but a lot to 
do with vigour and survival potential. Putnam has suggested that 
factors as yet unexplained are involved, perhaps an evolutionary 
change. 
6.2 Booms, slumps, the long wave cycle and 
One thing is certain, a massive increase in the production of 
food, goods and services corresponding to the growing size and wants 
of the human race, not only in the Western nations, but more 
essentially in the presently backward and deprived countries of the 
World, is an absolute necessity. There are few, if any, amongst 
this growing mass of humanity who do not aspire to a fuller, better, 
healthier and happier life-style and the medium of modern 
communications by its wide dissemination of knowledge about happenings 
and conditions of life on other parts of the planet must make their 
demands ever more insistent. 
The problem of meeting the needs of the World today as the 
Western economies seem to be slipping into another period of cyclic 
depression corresponding to the 'Great Slump of 1929-1932' (Warren, 
J. P. 1982) which is currently baffling our politicians and will become 
even less tractable as we move into the 'Troubled 21st Century' 
predicted by G. Speth (1980). If the present Western economic 
distress is in fact a manifestation of a 'Krondriateff' cyclic 
down-swing, then, as suggested by Sir Bruce Williams (1981), escape 
can be effected only by extensive restructuring of patterns of 
production, employment, remuneration and mangement. Changes of this 
kind have given relief from previous long-term-cycle slumps. The 
relevant point is that they result in the long run in greatly increased 
demands for goods and services, substantially raising living standards 
in the countries that so respond. It will then be necessary to face 
sooner, not the problems of bounty, but the inevitable exhaustion of 
many of the planet's natural resources of oil, certain essential ores 
and other commercially important elements and compounds which will then 
be in short supply. Furthermore, the productivity of labour of all 
kinds it dependent on technical aids and, above all, on the availability 
of adequate sources of energy to power them. 
There is then, now and most certainly in the future, an imperative 
need for continuing technological progress, mostly of an advanced nature, 
so that not only can the dwindling resources of the Earth be made good, 
but other kinds of natural wealth can be tapped, for instance from the 
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sea bed, in Antartica and even from the waters of the oceans 
themselves. All these things need in addition to bold and 
innovative technologies, energy in abundance. Hence, the energy 
generating and distribution industries must flourish, expand and 
utilise the most advanced methods to provide warmth and light, to 
drive machinery, to mine and smelt ores, to till and irrigate the 
soil and to transport man and his goods across the World in 
pursuit of commerce and friendship. The alternative of 'no-growth' 
or shrinking economies is not possible, unless man is to slip into 
a new Dark Age. 
If technological advance does not continue and, indeed, 
perhaps be accelerated, then that 'Troubled 21st Century, (supra) 
which is less than two decades away will be a nightmare of social 
turbulence, wars, ecological disasters and starvation. Nuclear 
power is but one facet of the technological progression that will be 
necessary to avoid such calamities and, possibly, by no means the 
most hazardous among many innovations. For example, a hydrogen 
economy based on nuclear power as the prime energy source as 
suggested by C. Marchetti (1974), would be accompanied by some very 
grave risks. 
As the result of the concomitant changes in social structures 
that come inevitably with technological change, confrontations, not 
only with those motivated by anti-technology and environmentalist 
sentiments, but, more seriously, with those groups whose employment 
and social status are threatened, may be expected. 
History teaches that social groups whose existence and status 
is so threatened do not just disappear quietly, but react instead 
vigorously to the challenge. But, one thing is certain, despite 
these changes and the hostility they may induce, the World, in the 
long run, will have to face an ever increasing demand for energy. 
It is a demand that is most unlikely to be met without a major 
contribution from nuclear power. 
6.3 The need for new safety concepts 
The envisaged threats to society and the environment created 
by the innovation of the new hazardous technologies among which 
nuclear power plays the foremost place by tradition can be dealt 
with either by removing or, where that is not feasible, by containing 
them by physical means. Containment has been achieved with success 
in the nuclear case, but not in a manner that has disarmed those who 
persistently impugn its safety. 
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The cormonplace dangers of pollution, contaminated working 
conditions and other industrial hazards can be met by regulatory 
action of the familiar kind, for example by the safety regimen 
imposed on British industry by H. I. Factory Inspectorate (FMFI) 
which has been indubitably successful and is the paradigm of its 
type. This is not so for the threat of Low Probability Events 
(LPEs) in the classes considered in Sections 3 and 4 of this text. 
This lacuna in the system of industrial safety surveillance in 
Britain was acknowledged in regulatory circles after the disastrous 
explosion at the petrochemical factory at Flixborough on June 1, 
1974. Some time before the incident the premises were visited by 
a member of [WI who reported no serious breaches of the relevant 
regulations, though he did ask for the windows in the Control Room 
to be made shatter-proof (R. J. Parker 1975/a). In the event, the 
blast of the explosion demolished the Control Room, killed its 
occupants and wrecked a large part of the plant (See Appendix II). 
The subsequent committee of inquiry found that 'The disaster 
was caused wholly by the coincidence of a number of unlikely errors 
in the design and installation of a modification' and noted that 
'there was no mechanical engineer on site of sufficient qualifications, 
status or authority' to supervise the work (ibidem - b). The 
incident therefore seems to have been the result of a management 
weakness that was beyond the ambit of It4FI to inspect. The 
occasional occurrence of the unexpected, catastrophic failures like 
'Flixborough' and of which to date 'Three Mile Island' (TMI) of 
March 28,1979 is the most notorious, are further indications that 
existing regulatory philosophy and practice, if not inadequate for 
the safety surveillance of nuclear power plants and other major 
hazard advanced technology installations, lack the quality to 
convince the critical public that they provide proper safeguards 
aginst the occurrence of such incidents. 
6.3.1 The role of nuclear safety engineering 
In the case of nuclear technology, jobs and ways of working are 
not at issue and Ned Ludd does not stand in the way. Instead, 
employment is created because nuclear power offers a much needed and 
bountiful source of energy. It is in competition with oil rather 
than coal, a matter of considerable importance in Britain. The 
opposition to nuclear power has largely associated its case, at least 
implicitly, with the mystique of 'The Bomb'. This is a cognizable 
threat by which general public can be swayed. The potential danger 
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of nuclear fission and the concomitant hazards of disseminated 
radioactivity have been made abundantly clear by the existence of 
nuclear weapons, the reality of bomb test fallout and the importance 
that has been officially attached to the horrific military deterrent 
potentialities of the former. Though this fallacious apperception 
seriously handicaps and obstructs the progress of nuclear energy, - 
it is an identifiable objection that can be refuted because it is 
irrelevant to nuclear power per se. Moreover, the unique dangers 
also apperceived are more hypothetical than real. In spite of 
being well written and researched, Ralph Nader and Abbotts in their 
'The Menace of Atomic Energy' (1979) fail to make their case that' 
by the year 2000 there will be 12,000 cases of malignant and genetic 
disease among the general public attributable to emissions of krypton- 
85, iodine-29, tritium and carbon-14 from nuclear fuel reprocessing 
facilities. Nonetheless, safety remains the paramount issue for 
nuclear power and, more particularly, this lies in the real chance 
of LPEs in the form of the disastrous potential plant accidents that 
are on the fringe of possibility. Though there are other reasons 
that inspire the oppostion, these are matters of politics and 
diplomacy and are patently capable of resolution given the international 
will to do so. Still the nuclear option must not price itself out by 
excessive expenditure on safety, an outlay which is already approaching 
that point (Charles Komanoff 1980). 
Taking all the foregoing facts together, there are good and 
imperative reasons acting to allay the hostility that has been inspired. 
It can be argued that this is possible through demonstrable good 
engineering and alert and efficaceous mangement of nuclear power plants 
that have already proved that the true dangers of nuclear power to the 
community and environment are minimal, notwithstanding the incident 
at Three Mile Island in March 1979. Moreover, in the field of 
technology generally, as Wolf Haefele (1974) has said, nuclear power 
plays a path-finder role. Hence, as it presents the foremost and 
best publicised cause, the difficulties in securing its acceptance 
or, more properly, toleration of the risk it imposes, when overcome, 
should assist in securing the successful introduction of other 
advanced technologies that are so urgently needed by present day 
society. In this connection, among the most demanding of the 
challenges that nuclear engineers have to meet is resolution of the 
dilemma of safety versus cost, how to achieve adequacy while avoiding 
empty, safer-than-safe investment in safeguards. 
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7. STATE OF THE ART IN RISK SCIENCE 
'Only science can hope to keep technology 
in some sort of moral order. ' 
Edgar Z. Friedenberg 
(American Sociologist), 
Impact of the School: 
The Vanishing Adolescent, 1959. 
In the previous sections an attempt has been made to review 
the historical background in which the disastrous low probability 
events (LPEs) involving technological systems are set, to depict the 
characteristic circumstances in which these disasters have occurred 
with reference to some typical LPEs and to give an indication of the 
progressive changes in public opinion consequent upon the experience 
of these calamitous happenings, particularly as they have affected 
the steps that might be taken towards their management. Over the 
past two decades and since the plutonium pile incident at Windscale 
of October 10,1957 (See Appendix II) which seems to have been a 
watershed in Government and public attitudes towards hazard 
management in Britain, there has been an enhanced interest in the 
study of risk in industry and more generally in personal exposure to 
the multifarious risks of employment and of living, particular 
attention being directed at those installations and processes 
considered to present major hazards to the community. These latter 
potential LPEs are the 'zero-infinity' risks discussed further in 
Section 8.3 et seq. and saliently those of nuclear power. 
7.1 Progress in Risk and Hazard Studies 
The cultural impact of a few, but sensationally calamitous 
accidents, has, not surprisingly, evoked a spate of attempts to 
analyse the nature of hazards and to treat risks scientifically. 
Particular attention has been paid to those associated with atomic 
energy, specially, nuclear power and, more recently, those arising in 
the petrochemical industry and in the storage and transport of liquid 
natural gas (LGN), 'Frozen Fire', as it has been dubbed in some 
environmentalist circles. 
The perception of these dangers, both by the official and other 
executive bodies concerned with their regulation and by the 
scientific corr. Lmity, has changed progressively over the past few 
decades. This has been reflected by a growing tendency to refer to 
them in terns of 'risk' rather than 'hazard', the former having 
probability connotations. Risk has thus been the subject of numerous 
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studies and investigations, many of them of a highly mathematical 
orientation, that have contributed to a considerable literature on 
the topic. 
Notable among the serious and learned works on risk assessment 
and management which now abound are W. W. Lowrance's 'Of Acceptable 
Risk' (1976) and more recently W. D. Rowe's 'An Anatomy of Risk' (1977), 
'Energy Risk Management' which is a compilation of papers edited by 
Goodman and Rowe (1979), several compendia of articles by well-known 
authorities like 'RISK: a Seminar Series' collected by Howard Kunreuther 
(1982) of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and 
the publications of the prestigious Safety and Peliability Directorate 
(SRD) and its associated Systems Reliability Service (SRS) under the 
aegis of the U, K. Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). Works of a more 
pragmatic genre among the foregoing are those of F. P. Lees (1980) and 
T. A. Kletz (1982). Of an engineering orientation, they are largely 
concerned with the realities of loss prevention and the management of 
risks to employees in industry, and in the chemical industry in 
particular. The latter's contributions extend to the economics of 
hazard control in society for both individual and public (Kletz 1976, 
1977). 
The Directorate (SRD) were commissioned by the Health and Safety 
Executive (RSE) to carry out a risk assessment of the extensive 
petrochemical installation on Canvey Island which is on the North bank 
of the Thames near its mouth (Locke, Dunster and Pittom 1978). The 
report is a well structured and researched paradigm of this kind of risk 
study (10). Its conclusions are backed by exhaustive probabilistic 
treatments of the foreseeable events that could have catastrophic 
outcomes in fires, explosions and hazardous releases of liquids, vapours 
and gases. Published under the imprimatur of the Health and Safety 
Conmmission (HSC), it is in two parts, an executive summary and the 
detailed technical report of the investigating team. 
Exemplars among a miscellany of other works are the abstruse 
actuarial essays on 'Credal Probability and Chance' (Isaac Levy 1980) 
and an earlier proposal to reduce technological risks by 'Chan-neling 
Technology through the Law' (L. A. Tribe 1973) which advocated mandatory 
product and system assessments with liability for damage and injury 
strictly imposed. This idea has been incorporated in recent British 
industrial safety legislation through the Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1974 which in its Section 6 stipulates that anyone who 'designs, 
manufactures, imports or supplies any article for use at work' shall 
ensure 'so far as reasonably practicable' that it is safe in use without 
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risks to health. This assurance mist be verified by an assessment 
of its design and construction and by testing and examination with 
such supporting research as may be appropriate. Failure to comply 
has been punished by substantial fines (; McLain, Lynton 1977). 
Further, the U. K. nuclear installations legislation in a succession 
of Acts of 1959,1965 and 1970 imposes strict financial liability for 
hurt or damage caused by the 'nuclear hazard' attributable to the 
explosive, radioactive, radiotoxic and radiation dangers peculiar to 
a nuclear installation, that is a nuclear reactor and certain 
associated plants and processes as prescribed. In an action, for 
damage to be awarded, negligence on the part of the defendant does not 
have to be proved; it is sufficient to show that hurt or damage has 
been suffered (Street and Frame 1966). 
One or two studies not coiiiitted to mathematical probability 
have been either observational or interpretative or concerned with 
creating a constitutional framework in which industrial and public risk 
attributable to technology and its innovations could be managed. 
Recoamendations along these lines in regard to 'Public Safety' made by 
the Committee on Safety and Health at Work of 1970-72 (Roben, Chaps 
10 and 11,1972) have been implemented within the HSE by constitution 
of a Major Hazards Policy Group, supported by a specialist branch of 
H. M. Factory Inspectorate (J. G. D. Hamner 1980). 
An important work that has received less than due publicity is 
a report to the Council for Science and Society (CSS) by one of its 
expert working parties which included representatives of the arts, 
engineering, law, philosophy and the physical and social sciences. 
Its findings which were of a general nature and of-societal relevance 
led to the conclusion that: 
'The acceptability of risks cannot be simply derived 
from a scientific study of quantified probabilities, 
costs and benefits. The human factor influences 
the analysis at every point. ..... ' 
It made the single recommendation that 'those who are 
exposed to risks which are not iimnediately obvious to 
them should have a powerful voice - expressed responsibly 
and on full information and sound advice - in deciding 
what risks they should be exposed to. ' 
J. R. Ravetz et al., 
The Acceptability of Risks, 
1977 (9.1.1 and 9.2). 
The above CSS report is significant by virtue of its being an 
important interdisciplinary survey of the, then, state-of-the-art in 
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matters of risks, their management and acceptability. Though the 
Report (supra) was issued more than five years ago and a vast amount 
of research in the field has been done since, there has been little 
progress towards any concord in the contrary views of the schools 
represented by the participants in the Working Party that assisted in 
its preparation. The recommendations made in the Report are anything 
but positive, being limited to a proposal that there be a wide ranging 
investigation of the agencies and institutions concerned with control 
and mangement of the industrial, consumer and environmental risks to 
which people are exposed and may have to tolerate. Nonetheless, the 
Report was an important contribution to the study of risk and, not 
least, it revealed the disparate elements in the risk debate which 
continues in a very open state and is still topical. 
7.1.1 Safety by anticipation -a consequence of atomic energy 
The advent of atomic energy in circumstances of its accelerated 
development in a time of military exigency brought with it a change 
in the nature of the managerial attitudes to industrial safety. The 
program was driven forward by political considerations that overrode 
fears of possible risks, but what was lost from circumspection was made 
up for by prudence. The hazards of exposure to ionising radiations 
and of the ingestion of radioactive materials were known to be dire 
through the painful experiences of two generations of radiologists 
from the time of the discoveries of W. C. Roentgen in 1895 (R. F. Mould 
1980). To these dangers, the novel processes of plutonium production 
added the chance of a fortuitous escape of radioactivity in relatively 
vast quantities as well as that of a devastating explosion if 'a pile 
went up'. Many of the scientists associated with the Hanford project 
thought it too risky to proceed (Margaret Gowing 1974). 
The result was a move away from at might be described as a 
'determinist' policy of taking steps learnt from the experience of an 
accident to prevent its reoccurrence, that is 'safety by hindsight', 
towards 'safety by foresight'. The policy was revolutionary and put 
atomic energy in the van as the pace setter in the field of industrial 
safety, a role that was eventually to determine progress in all other 
areas of industrial risk-management. - 
A salient feature of the new policy was that of the Maxi 
Credible Accident W) or, to give it a more generalised title, that 
of the Design Basis Accident (DBA). The distinction is more than 
semantic because the 14A tends to be identified with siting policy, 
whereas the Ill is more suggestive of plant technology. 
The inadequacy 
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of the W -A in the former context was properly recognised by F. R. 
Farmer (1967) whose (then new) approach is discussed further elsewhere 
in this text (infra). Nevertheless, the philosophy of the DBA 
continues to underlie the recent developments in design safety 
assessment, the later quantifying methodologies differing from it more 
in emphasis than substance. 
In addition to the schema given below, a fuller account of 
experience with the DBA/MCA approach with its weaknesses and wider 
implications is given in Sections 9.1 to 9.3. The passages that 
follow are an abridged excerpt from the writer's published work on the 
philosophical basis of hazard control policy for nuclear power in the 
U. K. and is taken from Document No. 2 in the Annex of Supporting 
Papers: On the Maximum Credible Accident - 
'24. The ways in which the MCA could occur were examined 
by fault studies, by qualitative safety analysis programs 
and by operational research techniques. The assessed 
likelihood of the accident occurring was then minimised 
by modifying the design appropriately so as to provide 
barriers of various kinds against any identified fault 
initiating a chain of events which could, in the ultimate, 
precipitate that accident. These barriers, which included 
containment structures, design limitations, engineered 
safeguards, operational restraints, regimes of inspection 
and other such strategems aimed, not only at preventing 
the accident, but at securing that the consequences of a 
given 4A were socially and economically tolerable, eg of 
minimum detriment without the plant boundary or restricted 
zone. 
25. Beyond the MCA there was envisaged a second tier 
concept of a possible, highly improbable rhxinun Hypothetical 
Accident (MA) which could conceivably break through the 
barriers established at the MCA thresholds. It was posited 
that the chance occurrence of such a disastrous accident 
could be made vanishingly small, if not impossible, by 
appropriate barrier strategies. For exanple, in the case 
of a gas cooled nuclear reactor in a pre-stressed concrete 
pressure vessel catastrophic failure by bursting is virtually 
impossible and this limits the extent of any conceivable 
calamity to the core. ' 
'Aspects of the historical, philosophical and 
mathematical background to the statutory 
management of nuclear plant risks in the 
United Kingdom', 
Proc. Symposium on Radiation protection in 
nuclear power plants and the fuel cycle, 
British Nuclear Energy Society, 
London, 1978, pp. 14 - 15. 
7.1.2 Recent additions to the corpus of risk studies 
The foregoing critique appears to have been confirmed by a very 
recent and weighty contribution to risk literature, namely the Report of 
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the Royal Society's Study Group on Risk Assessment (Sir Frederick 
Werner 1932) which began its work in November 1978. It is introduced 
by a prefatory remark about the difficulty of reconciling the various, 
differing approaches of the biochemists, biologists, doctors, economists, 
engineers, physical scientists and psychologists who took part. The 
document %hich covers in depth the nature, estimation, perception and 
management of technological risks is orientated towards quantitative 
probability methods of assessing risks, detriments, costs and benefits 
in order to provide guidance appropriate to the regulatory processes 
involved. Again, it recognises the dearth of information about the 
manner in which the public, as distinct from the individual, perceives 
and reacts to risk. It concludes with a suggestion that 'the relevant 
institutions', ' the specialists', 'the public' and 'their 
representatives' should all be drawn into the work of constructing the 
necessary regulatory processes so as to achieve acceptance of 'a more 
balanced approach to the inevitable existence of risks and detriments'. 
In the matter of catastrophicengineering risks and those of advanced 
technologies and nuclear power in particular, it proposes that the 
so-called 'determinist approach' of safety factors and design 
philosophies based on experience of failures be replaced by one which 
is 'anticipatory'. It is relevant to note that 'the policy of safety 
by foresight rather than hindsight' has characterised the atomic 
energy industry since its inception (Margaret Gowing 1974). 
A section of the Report on 'Risk Perception' written by a 
sub-group chaired by Professor T. R. Lee comes to the following 
insightful and pertinent conclusion: 
'Probably the main achievement of research on perception is to 
demonstrate that the public's viewpoint must be considered, 
not as a form of indulgence or vote catching and especially 
not as error, but as an essential datum. This is because in 
matters of illness, injury and even death, or in policy issues 
involving questions of morality, only the public can estimate 
the severity of the detriment involved. 
The main methodological dilemma is that the most valid data is 
that which is elicited from ordinary individuals, but this is 
no guide to action unless it can be aggregated into something 
that represents 'the public'. The main administrative dilemma 
is that different sections of the public, and especially those 
who are directly exposed as distinct from those who are not, 
have differing perceptions; leaving a considerable role to be 
played by political judgement that combines expedience with 
equity. ' 
'The Perception of Risks', 
Risk Assessment: Report of 
a Study Group, 
The Royal Society, London, 1982. 
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The above findings are relevant to some of the propositions 
about 'anjor hazard' risk management in relation to nuclear power 
to be advanced later in this thesis. 
7.1.3 Cultural aspects of risk perception 
An important interdisciplinary contribution to risk studies 
has come from Social anthropology, or Cultural Anthropology as it is 
termed in the U. S. A., as for example Michael Thompson's work on the 
aesthetics of risk (1980). Thompson, an Everest climber and 
mountaineer of some eminence, views risk from the standpoint of the 
Sherpa and concludes that an individual's risk taking philosophy is 
embedded in the cultural set to which he has been conditioned by 
the society of which he is part. 
One of the most controversial difficulties in securing 
agreement in the field of risk assessment and hazard management is 
that a dilemma arises from the definition of acceptability and 
consequent administrative action deriving from it. Risk thus 
becomes a thing that on the one hand is imposed as acceptable by 
superior decision makers on those who may be either unaware or unable 
to appreciate the full significance of the hazard or, on the other 
hand, something knowingly accepted or tolerated by those exposed to 
it. It is this dilemma or, then, its overtones that are among the 
principal factors lying at the roots of popular opposition to nuclear 
power. It is the pith of the ultimate sentence of the quotation from 
Professor T. R. Lee's contribution to the Royal Society's recent study 
of risk assessment and management from which an excerpt is quoted in 
the immediately preceeding sub-section. 
A collection of essays called 'Risk and Culture' edited by Mary 
Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982) may set a new trend in risk studies. 
They posit that it is inappropriate to define the problem of risk either 
in objectively calculated physical terms along the lines of N. C. 
Rasmussen (1975) in the 'Reactor Safety Study' or in subjectively 
biased physical perceptions as W. W. Lowrance (1976) attempted in his 
book, 'Of Acceptable Risk'. Instead, between the two approaches lies 
a particular culture which shapes the perception of the hazard, a 
concept suggested earlier by Michael Thompson (1980) though in somewhat 
different terms (supra). However, Douglas and Wildavsky escape the 
challenging consequences of their seminal proposition by dismissing 
'the possibility that the reality of risk has changed in any 
significant way, essentially ignoring the increased scale and changing 
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character of technology-induced risk' (Dorothy Nelkin 1982). 
Their analysis is thus based on tacit acceptance of given American 
institutional arrangements for risk assessment, management and 
adjustment: incidentally a lucrative business activity costing that 
country between $200 and $300 million or more per year for systems 
analysis studies and computations. 
In spite of their creative and stimulating identification of 
an hiatus which may well have stultified contemporary risk studies, 
Douglas and Wildavsky, therefore, fail to acknowledge the discontinuity 
(supra) that has arisen in risk assessment and management as a result 
of the very cultural changes brought about by continuing rapid 
technological advance. Nelkin suggests that this may be a 
consequence of their clear aversion to any radical approach to hazard 
control policy that, if adopted, might profoundly alter the above 
mentioned lucrative institutional arrangements. 
7.2 The emergence of quantitative probability methods 
Those engineers concerned with safety and reliability in the 
atomic energy industry were from the start able to draw on the 
emergent new science of probability-based methods of situation analysis 
which had evolved from Operational Research for military purposes during 
the Second World War and the parallel development of statistical 
reliability analysis which had begun to be used for quality control in 
the manufacture of weapons, particularly in the mass production of 
military electronics and radar. At first, attention turned to specific 
safety matters, for instance the management of power reactor fuel 
elements and, particularly, to those related to components in the 
provision of which there was a necessary element of redundancy such as 
control rods and instrumentation sensor networks. Unfortunately, the 
early scientific papers on the use of these methods in the nuclear 
industry are not generally accessible for reference because of 
restrictions on publication. Notwithstanding that limitation, 
mention may be made of one or two items in this recondite set of works 
which were cleared for presentation at open meetings or conferences 
or were circulated without restriction for comment or discussion. 
In 1961, N. V. Worthington of the U. K. Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) issued a design guidance note on a 'Fuel 
Element Temperature Criterion for the Operating (Magnox) Reactor'. 
About this time a design safety assessment study concerning the 
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adequacy of core thenocouple provision in 'tagnox reactors was 
prepared for the NII (0. H. Critchley 1962) and circulated for coif ent 
throughout the industry (See Document No. S of the Annex). Abre 
recently, an operational version of the Worthington method was 
succinctly described by Dale and Harrison (1971) in a contribution 
on 'Safety in Nuclear Power Plants' to the 4th Geneva Conference on 
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy under the title of the 'Fire Risk 
Criterion'. 
The possibility of extending statistical probability analysis 
to more general safety matters was soon recognised. As early as 
1964, F. R. Farmer of the Health and Safety Branch of the U. K. Atomic 
Energy Authority (UKAEA) presented a paper on 'Safety Analysis as 
related to Reactor Siting' to the 3rd Geneva Conference on the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy and this was followed in 1967 by his notable 
and much cited presentation to a Vienna symposium sponsored by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which described a new 
approach to reactor siting. It employed in a cartesian, graphical 
representation the probability of major reactor radiation accidents 
plotted against the consequential release of radioactivity in curies. 
An accident probability could thus be identified as acceptable or 
unacceptable according as it fell above or below a transverse 
discriminating line which represented the criterion. 
Since the 1967 disclosure, the concept which has become 
generally known as the method of 'The Farmer Line' has been further 
elaborated by Farmer and his associates. A version of it was tabled 
as a supporting paper during a House of Lords debate on nuclear power 
reactor safety in late January 1976 (F. R. Farmer 1975). The 
methodology of the approach which requires the support of a 
sophisticated data base of reliability information has largely 
determined the policy of the UKAEA and its Safety and Reliability 
Directorate (SRD) in ratters of nuclear hazard control. 
Another early contribution to the topic was a highly mathematical 
paper in Russian by 0. P. Brobrovnikov (1969). It had a 'first time' 
claim and was read to an IAEA symposium on the handling of radiation 
accidents. 
7.3 The Rasmussen Reactor Safety Study 
One of the most important contributions to the science of 
probability analysis in the field of nuclear power is the U. S. 
'Reactor Safety Study' which was the work of a team led by Professor 
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N. C. Rasmussen and published under the imprimatur of the U. S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) in 1975 . This much quoted 
document is 'An assessment of accident risks in U. S. Commercial 
Nuclear Plants' and covers the Boiling Water (BWR) and Pressurised 
Water (PWR) reactor systems, being conditioned to a program of 100 
nuclear plants. The risks arising from a range of conceived plant 
accidents leading to releases of radioactivity to the environment 
were assessed by sophisticated methods of reliability analysis. The 
failure sequences that could cause the nuclear fuel to overheat and 
release its radioactivity and coincidental failure of clean-up 
systems and of the integrity of the reactor containments with 
consequent emission of fission products and other activated matter 
to the environment were analysed. The 'Study' defined two broad types 
of situations that might potentially lead to a melting of the reactor 
core: the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and transients. The latter 
term referred to any one of a number of conditions which could occur 
in a plant and require the reactor to be shut down. Following shut- 
down, the decay heat removal systems should operate to keep the core 
from overheating. However, certain failures in either the shut-down 
or decay heat removal could also cause the core to melt. The method 
of analysis used had two aspects, namely: 
'An Event Tree weich defines an initial failure within the 
plant. ttn proceeds to examine the course of events 
which follow as determined by the operation or failure of 
various systems that are provided to prevent the core from 
melting and to prevent release of radioactivity to the 
environment. Event trees were used ... ... to define 
thousands of potential accident paths which were examined 
to determine their likelihood of occurrence and the 
amount of radioactivity they might release. 
Fault Trees which were used to determine the likelihood of 
failure of the various systems identified in the Event Tree 
accident paths. A Fault Tree starts with the definition 
of an undesired event, such as the failure of the system 
to operate, and then determines, using engineering and 
mathematical logic, the ways in which the system can fail. 
Using data covering 1) the failure of components such as 
pumps, pipes and valves, 2) the likelihood of operator 
errors, and 3) the likelihood of maintenance errors, it is 
possible to estimate the likelihood of system failure, 
even here no data on total system failure exists. 
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The likelihood and size of radioactive releases from 
potential accident paths were used in combination with the 
likelihood of various weather conditions and population 
distributions in the vicinity of the reactor to calculate 
the consequences of the various potential accidents. ' 
U. S. Reactor Safety Study: 
Executive Sunti ry - WASH-1400, 
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmission, 
October 1975, Section 2.21. 
The results of the Study in probability terms were compared with 
those of various other natural and manmade hazards suffered by 
inhabitants of the continental territory of the United States. These 
risks were equated with those presented to the same individual by a 
program of 100 operating nuclear power plants for which the chance of 
fatality through a nuclear accident was put at 1 in 5,000,000,000 per 
year compared with the risk of death from all accidents, manmade or 
natural, of 1 in 1,600 per year, a ratio of about 3,000,000/1. The 
result of the Study put the risk of death from a nuclear accident as 
about the same as that of being killed by a meteor, a very real threat, 
but so small that nobody worries about it. Ergo, the U. S. commercial 
reactor program in acceptably safe. 
7.3.1 Criticism and the Peer Group Review 
Other than by the committed nuclear establishment and its 
supporters, the Study was skeptically received. The calculations 
were clearly complicated, especially those involving common mode 
failures and obscure in that they were inadequately described, a 
deficiency which has drawn unfavourable comment. 
The American Physical Society thought that their own 
'experience with problems of this nature involving very low 
probabilities' gave them no confidence 'in the presently calculated 
absolute values of the probabilities of the various branches' 
(N. C. Rasmussen 1975/a). The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency 
found that 'the area of human reliability appears to be improperly 
or incompetently considered' (Ibidem/b), a view not irrelevant in 
light of the accident at Three Mile Island (See Appendix II). The 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were discretely 
covert in their criticism, saying that they did not have the technical 
effort available to validate the numerical assessment. They further 
observed that with a small factual data base they favoured an 
empirical, evolutionary technique (Ibidem/c). This has been described 
71 
as a method of design %hich is inter-penetrant with practice using 
a 'design-make-test-fail-fix' iteration that enables a very high 
standard of reliability to be attained for space vehicles and other 
high risk systems (W. M. Bryan 1975). 
As a result of the criticism, the US RC commissioned Professor 
H. W. Lewis to chair a 'Peer Group' to review the Study. Its report 
was issued in September 1978. The Peer Group found that the 
Rasmussen methodology provided a useful tool for the work of reactor 
safety analysis, but considered that the presentation 'was inscrutable, 
it being exceedingly difficult to follow the detailed thread of any 
calculation to a conclusion'. The uncertainties involved in the data 
and calculations were not sufficiently emphasised. It suffered from 
a lack of data on which to base input distributions which were 
'associated with the invention and use of wrong statistical methods'. 
The general conclusion of the Peer Group was that the Study was 'a 
pioneering step leaving much to be desired', but one which hhd 
potentialities for further development. Its use to judge the 
acceptability of reactor risks was deprecated. In their wider 
influence, the findings of the Peer Group Review provided the 
orientation for the 'German (reactor) Risk Study' (infra). 
At present the balance of opinion on the U. S. Reactor Safety 
Study divides between administrators, physical scientists and 
politicians who favour nuclear power on the one hand and the 
engineers concerned with the realities of designing, constructing 
and operating nuclear power plants on the other (See Section 8.1). 
Whereas the former group have largely maintained their enthusiasm 
for the Rasmussen findings, like Lord Rothschild in his 1978 
Dimbleby lecture on 'Risk', the latter remain skeptical. Instead, 
the method is accepted as a supplement to established engineering 
practice and principles rather than as any true way of forecasting 
a low probability risk in the circumstances of an operating plant 
beyond the conjectures of the design situation (infra). 
It also offers a means for rational management of investment 
in safeguards which can thereby be more effectively apportioned over 
the design as a whole. Excessive involvement with a particular 
feature to the detriment of others not so immediately salient can thus 
be avoided. 
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7.4 The German (reactor) Risk Study 
Another important, but more recent, study of the risks 
attributable'to a thermal nuclear power plant, in this case the German 
version of the PWR, was made by the West German Reactor Safety 
Institute, namely, die Gesellschaft fair Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, 
at the request of, and under contract to, the Federal Ministry of 
Research and Technology (A. Birkhofer 1979 and infra). A sunilnry 
of the work, pending full publication, was presented in Bonn in 
August 1979. The terms of reference were to: 
(i) Assess the 'collective risk' attributable to nuclear power 
plant radiation accidents in the light of German conditions, 
and 
(ii) Compare the findings with the U. S. 'Reactor Safety Study' 
(supra) in order to be able to evaluate differences in 
engineered plant features and site conditions. 
The direction of the German investigation was influenced by the 
critical appraisal of the U. S. 'Study' made by the 'Peer Review Group' 
(supra) led by Professor Lewis. The German study is reserved in its 
approbation of the U. S. work. While recognising the merits of the 
latter and the usefulness of the quantitative probability analyses on 
which Rasmzssen's investigation relies, reference is made to its 
limitations and due acknowledgement is accorded to 'the proven worth' 
of the traditional qualitative approach, that is the use of the 
concept of maximum, inclusive credible accidents (ICAs) or, in other 
words, Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). It also draws attention to 
certain counter-productive aspects of quantitative methods of hazard 
assessment when applied to suppositious LPEs in respect of nuclear 
power plants. Three relevant excerpts from the summary of the German 
'Study' are reproduced below: 
On the Design Basis Accidents - from 1. INTRODUCTION 
'The safety review of nuclear power plants includes a 
comprehensive accident analysis. Safety-related requirements, 
in particular those for the design of safety systems, are set 
up against the background of design basis accidents, i. e. the 
accidents involving the largest loads and thus the most 
stringent requirements. The design of the safety systems is 
based on these requirements. The demonstration that these 
accidents will be coped with in terms of safety features 
includes at the same time the evidence that less serious 
accidents involving smaller loads than the design basis 
accidents will be coped with as well. As a result of the 
safety precautions which have been taken, accidents involving 
more serious consequences than the design basis accidents are 
considered to be so unlikely that they can be precluded as 
far as one can judge. 
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Experiences so far show that this safety concept has 
proven its worth. At a worldwide level there is now 
available the experience of some 1,500 reactor 
operation years over a period of about 25 years. 
During this time, neither deaths nor other health 
effects due to activity release have occurred in the 
environment of nuclear power plants. ' 
On quantitative methods - from 7. EVALlIiTION OF RESULTS 
'In the safety-related design of nuclear power plants, a 
probability concept has always been used implicitly when, 
on the basis of existing engineering experience, a 
decision has to be made as to which accident sequences 
will have to be coped with by the safety features. In 
many cases, decisions on protective requirements with 
regard to external events are made dependent on their 
occurrence frequency. Findings with respect to typical 
accident sequences may be used for the planning of 
emergency measures. 
..... . .... . ......... . 
However, the possible applications of risk analyses are 
limited. Risk analyses use probabilities which are, 
in most cases, small or very small. Thus, the results, 
whose character is that of an estimate anyhow, will 
become even more uncertain with decreasing probability ... It has to be doubted whether the state of the art is 
sufficient, in the case of events involving probabilities 
of 1: 1,000,000,000 per year, to determine somewhat 
reliable results which can serve as a basis for assessment 
and decision. Rirthermore, it remains doubtful whether 
events involving the frequency mentioned before or an 
even smaller frequency can still be made part of realistic 
considerations at all. 
On counterproductive aspects of risk studies - from 7 ibidem 
'The implementation of risk analyses will also lead to 
problems of a psychological nature which may counteract 
the purpose of risk analyses. Events which are impossible 
as far as one can humanly foresee will assume a real 
character as a result of a detailed analysis. Thus, 
people are made aware of possible hazards which in all 
probability will never result in fatalities and which 
do not play any role in the minds of most people. 
This may involve the paradoxical consequence that certain 
risks are demonstrated to be minimal but that fear of 
these risks is increased by the very demonstration, 
whereas far greater risks which may not have been 
investigated in detail will not be taken note of at 
all. ' 
Professor Dr. A. Birkhofer, 
The German Risk Study: Summary, 
Gesellschaft fUr Reaktorsicherheit, 
Cologne, August 15,1979. 
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7.4.1 Relevance to the 'New Treatment' 
The rather lengthy excerpts from the officially backed German 
reactor safety centre have been quoted because of the general 
support they give to the philosophy underlying the research reported 
in this thesis. Further, the first two of them show that German 
nuclear safety engineers have followed a path similar to that of the 
British Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), at least up to 
1 January, 1975 when the NII was merged into the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE). From that time onwards, its policy began to be 
influenced by the propinquity of the much larger and dominant H. M. 
Factory Inspectorate and its administrators whose safety policies 
derive from a more formal and legalistic tradition. The basis of 
the then NII's approach to the design safety assessment of the 
nuclear power reactors for which it had statutory licensing and 
safety responsibility was the predominance of sound and well based 
engineering judgement backed by field experience over ad hoc 
scientific studies and mathematical computations. Recourse was made 
to scientific research and sophisticated mathematical techniques, 
probabalistic safety analyses and reliability studies, when these 
aids were appropriate to the safety investigations in hand (Gronow 
and Gausden 1975/a). 
None of the above comments derogate from the value of 
quantitative safety and reliability analyses of the kind offered by 
the Safety and Reliability Directorate of the UKAEA when the approach 
is appropriate to the task. However, the line taken in the New 
Treatment is that these quantitative methods can only provide an 
adjunct to the discipline of nuclear safety engineering which must 
take account of the realities of the construction site and reactor 
control room as well as accommodating to theoretical appraisals 
coming from specialist bodies, computer offices and other 'centres 
of excellence'. 
7.5 Overview 
The preceding brief review of the state of the art in risk 
science reveals it as an area of study that has been researched 
widely and in depth. It has been the subject of numerous inquiries, 
conferences, symposia and working parties. The published reports 
and papers describing the results of these activities provide an 
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extensive literature that might be expected to cover every aspect of 
the topic. What place then can a new treatment of risk and its 
management in the domain of low probability events find in this well 
tilled field of knowledge? What contribution can it make when 
apparently everything important and relevant has been thoroughly- 
investigated already? 
It is obviously true that few aspects of risk have not been 
covered, but most of the numerous studies, reviews and researches 
have been classic, mathematical applications, tending to a 
traditional scientism and characterised by the Poissonian approach 
adopted by Green and Bourne in 'Reliability Technology' (1972), in 
the U. S. 'Reactor Safety Study' (N. C. Rasmussen 1975), in a 
compendium called 'Nuclear Reactor Safety' published under the 
imprimatur of the Safety and Reliability Directorate of the UKAEA 
(F. R. Farmer et al. 1977) and by Locke et al. in 'Canvey Island' 
(1978). These authors assume that, if adequate data are available, 
then almost all risk can be expressed meaningfully in quantified 
form, a momentous concept currently auch exploited. Implicit in 
this assumption is a conventional idea that pervades Western 
civilisation of an underlying order in the cosmos and, thereby, in 
the universe of technology in particular. Though widely supported 
in the most eminent of scientific circles, it is by no means 
universally accepted as valid. It has been challenged in principle 
by authorities among whom John Maynard Keynes (1922), E. Barankin 
(1956), Bruno de Finetti (1972) and J. R. Ravetz (1977) may be cited. 
More pragmatic criticism of the quantification of overall nuclear 
power plant risks has been voiced by some well-informed engineers, 
including Hanauer and Morris (1971), W. M. Bryan (1974), Gronow and 
Gausden (1975/a) and O. H. Critchley. The argument is of much greater 
profundity than at first might seem to be the case. Moreover, it is 
of considerable importance as it can significantly affect the approach 
to risk assessment and the measures adopted for hazard control. 
There is growing acknowledgement that an entity called 'The Public' 
is a key factor in risk acceptance by the body politic and that the 
acceptability of risk is a very complex thing not susceptible to a 
purely scientific analysis leading to precise numerical risk indices. 
This is coupled with a realisation that they way in which risks are 
perceived and the reactions of people to them vary and the response of 
an individual as such does not necessarily correspond with that of the 
same person identified as a member of 'The Public'. 
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In addition to exploring the foregoing aspect, Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1982) studied the response that may be evoked from a 
community by those hazards of wider consequence that have general 
or latent rather than specific effects among the population, for 
instance, low-level dispersed radioactivity such as that attributable 
to releases from various nuclear plants in normal operation. They 
claim that these apprehensions are features of the societal dimension 
of risk, being peculiar to the indigenous culture (supra). As in the 
case of the threat posed by a potential catastrophic LPE, say that of 
a major nuclear accident, social phenomena in this class show little 
or none of the proportionality between the magnitude of the agency or 
stimulus and the response that is characteristic of the reactions 
observed in the physical and life sciences. They exhibit instead 
what might be called 'irrationality', a term often used to describe 
apperception of a risk by 'The Public', but far from appropriate in 
the circumstances. The use of the word 'irrationality' in this sense 
is an example of an all too common solecism that may be attributed 
to a general tendency to have recourse to classic scientific method 
under the illusion that it is generally applicable to the solution 
of all problems, whereas it is not. 
Risk apperception is a subject in the domain of 'Trans-science' 
to use the term coined by Alvin Weinberg (1978) and ranges into 
intellectual territory beyond the bounds of the physical and life 
sciences, but where the engineer rust perform effectively. 
The investigation of those major accidents - LPEs - that have 
afflicted nuclear power plants, for instance, the Windscale Plutonium 
Pile fire of 1957, the Browns Ferry cable vault fire of 1975 and the 
loss of coolant at Three Mile Island in 1979 revealed that the 
causation of these, and other events like the explosion at the 
Flixborough chemical plant in 1974 (See Appendix II), involved factors 
outside the physical event schema and fault sequences envisaged in their 
design safety analyses. To account for this deficiency in the method 
of analysis there has been a comparatively recent recognition that an 
unanticipated and capricious agency, so-called 'Human Error', is an 
important element. Attempts have been made to measure it in a 
quantitative way. Once again, it is an indefinite statistic whose 
treatment lies beyond the bounds of quantitative science. Nonetheless, 
it is a potent and ubiquitous thing that mist be taken into account in 
technical safety analysis. 
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In spite of all the studies, learned papers, committees, 
conference deliberations and reports there has been little real progress 
in foreseeing and abating the severe but very rare disastrous failures 
that have come to be associated with the introduction of advanced 
technologies in industry, transportation and medicine. Neither has 
public confidence been won in the officially sponsored hazard control 
measures that have been introduced to allay public concern about the 
safety of certain innovations, notably nuclear power. Instead, their 
anxiety has been fed by the occasional, unlikely and unanticipated 
accidents that continue to occur sporadically with new drugs, in public 
transport and in industrial plants and processes, all of which things 
were presumed to be adequately safe before the failure. 
There are few who would not agree that absolute safety is not 
attainable, but that a compromise between reasonable cost and a safety 
asymptotic to that state is. As far as advanced technological 
processes or systems are concerned, the task is not only to attain the 
latter in such technical respects as are practicable, but to win the 
public to acceptance of its reality. Further, not only must this 
state of tolerable safety be achieved, but the resultant nest relate 
to something that is needed by the comnunity exposed to the risk or 
otherwise desired by it. 
The means are, therefore, almost as important as the end and so 
there must be a proper apportionment of publicly observable 
responsibility amongst the disciplines that have to act in concert to 
achieve that essential minimum condition of safety needed to obtain 
public toleration of a hazard presented by a given technological 
innovation. It was this kind of inter-disciplinary co-operation that 
ras so effective in the atomic energy industry during its early years 
of rapid progress (Margaret Gowing 1974, O. H. Critchley 1977). 
Distributing duties accordingly, it is the province of the scientist 
to gather the relevant technical facts; that of the administrator to 
handle the politics and finance; but the engineer has the central 
managerial role of bringing these three things together to fruition 
in a demonstrably safe plant or system. It is he who spells out the 
concept in terms of an engineering design and who effects its realisation 
in construction and operation of the end product. Besides, it is at the 
interface of design implementation with the day-to-day realities of 
interaction among drawing office, shop floor, construction site and 
control roam that the engineer exercises governance and accepts 
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responsibility. It is odd that these facts have escaped due 
acknowledgement by those senior administrative and political echelons 
who form certain of the Western national establishments and, not least, 
by the scientific com inity itself. This oversight has been lamented 
by Sir Alan Cottrell (1976). It is discussed further in-the following 
passages and in Appendix III. 
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PART THREE 
M HAZARDS OF ADVANCED TECHMDLOGY IN THE LIGHT OF RISK PERCEPTION 
AS A CULTURAL PHE}DMMN AND THE ENGINEER AS THE DEFENDER OF SAFETY 
Sections 8 to 10 comprising: 
An outline of the cultural frame of reference in which today's 
technological risks are perceived and tolerated, the orientation 
of_the Western intellect towards logic and science ascribed to 
the persisting influence of Aristotlean philosophy, a linguistic 
and neurological explanation for the liberating 'miracle' of 
ancient Greek thought; aspects of the widening disjunction 
between the purely intellectual realms of administration, law, 
politics, theoretical science and the humanities, defined as 'The Word', and the pragmatic domains of technology and the 
useful arts, defined as 'The Deed', engineering as the bridge 
across the divide; an analogy with 'noise theory' in the 
classification of industrial accidents and process faults and incidents, the singularity of the Low Probability Event (LPE) 
of catastrophic failure and the difficulty of the actuarial 
assessment of the potential LPE which presents a 'Zero-Infinity 
Dilemma', an engineering interpretation of the nine features of 
the 'Dilemma'; the question of the lack of accountability of 
technological risk assessors in government agencies and large 
public utilities; illusory aspects of convential methods for 
the safety assessment of design and of the probabalistic 
approach to risk appraisal; human error ad the most common 
element in accident causation, and the engineer as the bedrock 
of technological safety and of public confidence in hazard 
manegement. 
THEMATIC SYNOPSIS 
The ground has been prepared for the development of a New 
Treatment of Law Probability Events as an engineering 
response to the threats posed by modern innovatory technologies, 
one that the engineer per se is singularly well-suited to 
perform owing to his professionally adapted intellectual 
capabilities. As the qualitative methods of technical risk 
appraisal have been shown to be inadequate and the quantitative 
ones to be illusory, new methods in an engineering dimension are 
needed. 1Koreover, owing to the ubiquity of human error in its 
penetration of all systems and processes, the certain assurance 
of competence, not only in the performance of mechanical and 
technical tasks, but in all functions of management is necessary. 
For this purpose, the new style of engineering inspection that 
has evolved in the nuclear industry can provide a basis. 
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8. CULTURE, RISKS, 'ZERO-INFINITY DILEMMAS' AND TUE NEW TREATI NT 
"Twice two equals four: 'tis true, 
But too empty, and too trite. 
What we look for is a clue 
To some matters not so light. " 
Sir Karl R. Popper, 
Some comments on truth and 
the growth of knowledge', 
Proc. Int. Congress on Logic, Methodology 
and Philosophy of Science, (Ed. by 
Nagel, Suppes and Tarski), Stanford 
University Press, California, 1960, p. 290. 
Throughout the Western world, the public shock at certain 
technological disasters has been sharp and vigorous and their 
consequences have evoked profound concern. Several have had serious 
legal aftermaths and the corporate bodies culpable have had to bear 
the cost of heavy claims for compensation. Two notorious cases among 
them were the Thalidomide and Minimata tragedies involving respectively 
the teratogenic effects of an apparently harmless tranquiliser and the 
insidious poisoning of a whole Japanese community over a number of 
years by a factory effluent reasonably held to be innocuous but 
discharged into a bay that had an unusual confining flow pattern (See 
Appendix II). 
A characteristic of both cases was the strange reluctance of the 
public authorities and corporations responsible to accept the fact that 
these activities were causing serious harm in face of proof positive 
that this was so. Yet, those wealthy and powerful corporations 
responsible were, overtly at least, public spirited bodies and not 
ungenerous in their support of charitable and cultural programs conducted 
for the benefit of the community, locally and more widely. 
Another phenomenon of relevant interest is the lack of opposition 
to the hugb nuclear power program which is currently underway in France 
(Pierre Papon 1979). Though it has been anything but free of serious 
technical problems and reputed near accidents, those failures which 
have occurred have aroused surprisingly little hostility among the 
French public. The relative lack of objectors and weakness of such 
popular opposition as has been evident my not be unrelated to the 
country's paucity of indigenous energy sources. This deficiency had 
placed a serious brake upon her industrial development until large 
supplies of oil became readily available during this century. Continuing 
dependence on exotic energy supplies that could be easily restricted or 
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cut off by hostile actions and are in sight of exhaustion in any case 
sakes France extremely vulnerable to foreign political pressures and 
is clearly unpalatable to the very nation-conscious and patriotic 
'People of France'. 
8.1 The refractory persistence of the cultural dimension 
In the earlier Section 7.1.2, a brief reference was ffide to the 
work of Nlary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982) who with Michael 
Thompson (1980) and others have shown that the evocation and nature of 
the response to a risk by both individuals and the community as a whole 
are shaped by the culture in which the risk arises, is perceived and 
recognised as a threat. In addition, these cultural determinants or 
mores which are the efficient causes of such apperception are very 
enduring and resistant to change. Besides, the mores of a society are 
particularly relevant in the case of those technological risks of very 
low probability that combine dire consequences with vestigal chance of 
occurrence where apparently irrational attitudes to them can emerge. 
Therefore, in view of the dominant part that societal things of this 
kind can play in the formation of the notions held by individuals and 
the general public about such risks, the nature and sources of origin 
of these mores must be known if the complex and enigmatic phenomenon 
of risk apperception is to be properly understood and managed. 
In the Occident, each indigenous Weltanschauung derives largely 
from the ancient Greek scientist-philosophers whose seminal ideas on 
the nature of the physical, political and ethical world did so much to 
set European civilisation on its remarkable upward path. The eminent 
French academic, Arnold Reymond (1955), in assessing the influence of 
their thought wrote that the originality, insight and penetration of 
these Greek thinkers 'constitutes a veritable miracle', for which there 
is an intriguing scientific explanation (infra). The most important 
of them was Aristotle (388-322 BC) whose philosophy has laid the basis 
of the European Christian ethos and even that of its main deviant trend, 
Marxism. As interpreted by St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) in what 
Vernon J. Bourke (1967) has described as a rethinking of Aristotelianism, 
it still endures as the dominant theme in Catholic theology today and 
certainly in the whole of Christendom until the Reformation (circa Diet 
of Worms 1521) when Luther weakened the grip of Aristotle on Western 
philosophy and science: weakened but not overcome and not least in the 
mind of Luther himself (11). 
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It is a story that began nearly 3,000 years ago in the melting 
pot of cultures, languages, religions and technologies that existed in 
the Greek peninsula and archipelago and along the coasts of Asia Minor. 
Until the advent of Socrates (470-399 BC), the attention of these 
early scientist-philosophers was directed towards an attempt to 
understand man's natural environment. However, the time of Socrates is 
associated with a shift of interest from natural philosophy to politics 
and ethics that represented a change in the condition of society produced 
by the growth of the institution of slavery. By this time it had been 
transformed from a domestic institution of household retainers into a 
system in which most manual work and particularly mining, agricultural 
and industrial processes and the laborious tasks of transportation were 
performed by alien chattel slaves. Thus, the ideal was established of 
the citizen as one who did not engage in manual work. A far reaching 
and evil consequence of this was that technology and the knowledge 
essential to many branches of science passed into the hands of slaves 
and became associated with their subculture. 
Professor Benjamin Farrington (1947) has described this watershed 
in the development of human thought thus: "the 'word' was the concern 
of the citizen, the 'deed' was the concern of the slave". The 
practioners of applied science were in consequence despised and remained 
in this condition until Robert Boyle (1627-1691) provided a rationale in 
his 'The Skeptical Chymist' (1661) for the movement that secured the 
eventual release of chemistry and the physical sciences from the bondage 
of alchemy by the turn of the 18th Century. But engineering has not 
fared so well. Owing to his ability to fashion engines of war and to 
design and build public works, the engineer was usually allowed to 
pursue his task as a free man, but always in a lowly rank. For reasons 
that are not clear, his profession has yet to acquire the modest esteem 
accorded in our times to the scientist and the traces of the ancient 
prejudices against the engineer and his technicians and craftsmen remain 
to this day, a matter commented on in Appendix III. 
The influential Aristotlean philosophy of idealism wich is 
entrenched in the ideology of 'The Word' is particularly resistant to 
change. The history of the progress of science and technology has been 
a continuing fight in favour of the materialism of 'The Deed': that is 
the pursuit and establishment of knowledge and progress determined and 
supported, not by Ivory Tower speculation, but by the theory and practice 
of empirical science justified by experimental evidence. This battle has 
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not yet been won and the latter part of this century is seeing a 
'Drift from Science' (Nature-Editorial 1980; Anthony Smith 1980). It 
took a century or more for the Heliocentric Theory to gain acceptance; 
Professor Ohm was castigated for his 'preposterous theories'; the 
brilliant French physicist, Sadi Carnot (1796-1832), a founder of 
Thermodynamics, did not disclose his ultimate denial of the Caloric 
Theory of Heat, confining his thoughts to private papers, which were 
not published till long after his death. In our time there has been 
the extraordinary rejection of the Quantum Theory by Einstein on 
idealist grounds, 'The Gods do not play dice' (W. Ehrenberg 1977). 
The role of mathematics has been ambiguous and its 'Pernicious influence' 
on science has been decried by Professor J. Schwartz (1962) because of 
its use to underwrite often dubious hypotheses lacking empirical 
verification. 
Assuming the validity of the foregoing premises, there is good 
reason to suspect that the persisting idealism still deeply embedded in 
Western thought with its concomitant. hostility to the pragmatism of 
engineering has affected the approach to risk science and the 
management of the new technological hazards. If so, it has encouraged 
ones that lean towards the theoretic and scientistic rather than to the 
engineering commonsense that comes from practical engagement with 
reality. Present day examples of this tendency are the quantitative 
systems methodologies of risk assessment and hazard control that have 
emerged over the last 25 years in the domain of advanced technology and 
in particular that of nuclear power. The best known enunciation of its 
use in the latter field are due to F. R. Farmer (1978) and N. C. 
Rasmussen (1975) in the latter's 'Reactor Safety Study', matters 
reviewed in Section 7.3 et seq. While it cannot be denied that the 
introduction of these techniques has been a major advance in nuclear 
safety engineering, the preoccupation with which they have been espoused 
has shown a certain lack of balance. 
8.1.1 A linguistic explanation for the 'Golden Agd of Greece 
The extraordinary development of Greek intellectual life and its 
lasting effect on European culture discussed in the foregoing passages 
has long baffled anthropologists and historians seeking a convincing 
explanation for its cause. J. R. Skoyles (1984) has offered an 
intriguing linguistic explanation that has neurological support. 
Before the dawn of their Golden Age about 600 BC, the Greeks had developed 
and become proficient in the use of an alphabet that was unique in giving 
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them a fully phonetic representation of language. This limited the 
management of writing in the brain to the left cerebral hemisphere. 
The restriction does not apply to non-phonetic writing systems which 
can use reading strategies that engage the right hemisphere in the 
recognition of logograms. Neurological studies show that hemispheric 
representation of non-alphabetic writing systems differs markedly from 
that of alphabetic ones. Supporting clinical evidence comes from 
Japan where 'Kanji', the non-phonetic system, is vulnerable to different 
areas of brain injury from 'Kara', the phonetic writing system (23). 
The right hemisphere is fully competent, and probably more so, than the 
left to read hieroglyphics, logograms and other non-alphabetic writing. 
Such competences compete in the brain for expression and, in an analogy 
with Mendelian genes, the competences of the mind can have a dominant 
or recessive relationship to each other. Skoyles then posits that the 
alphabet, by producing a unilateral representation of lexicals in the 
left hemisphere, freed the recessive competences in that hemisphere 
which underlie rational, analytic and logical thought. Thus liberated 
from the inhibitions imposed by the right hemisphere, the left was able 
to develop fully its peculiar analytic and logical power. The 
implications for engineering in which thought is dependent on the 
ideograms of drawings and circuit diagrams are profound. 
8.1.2 The ambivalent societal circumstances of the engineer 
Any attempt to treat the catastrophic LPEs of modern technological 
society mist be compatible with the cultural setting in which it has to 
be accepted and applied. The school of Aristotle has not only fashioned 
Western thought, but has helped to-legitimate its social structures, even 
those appearing to be the most diverse. In affairs of management' this is 
expressed in a view that there is a clear divorce between those in a 
position to order the affairs of the World, the realm of 'The Word' and 
those naturally subordinate to them charged with the performance of 
tasks, the domain of 'The Deed', with engineers and, until recently, 
scientists, falling into the lower bracket. C. P. Snow (1959) described 
the division as the 'Two Cultures' as discussed in Section 8.1 
Despite the fact that European culture has been famed for its 
achievements in the domains of literature, mathematics, music, philosophy 
and politics, until the onset of the Industrial Revolution technology 
made relatively slower progress. It is relevant that the Industrial 
Revolution which began in Britain was associated with the growth of an 
educational form called the Mechanics Institute. The Institute provided 
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a technical education for able boys from the middling classes directed 
towards the mastery of the ideograms and non-linguistic concepts of 
engineering. They flourished and by about 1830 there were several 
hundred in England. By then the demands of the Empire for administrators, 
army officers, colonial officials and higher grade clerks brought into 
being new grammar and public schools which offered a liberal education 
in which classical learning and linguistic attainments took pride of 
place. The Mechanics Institutes suffered a corresponding loss of 
favour and by the end of the Nineteenth Century only a few of 
exceptional merit had survived. British engineering and technology 
which had led the World until about 1870 suffered a similar decline, 
though with a time lag of a generation. The unfortunate national 
consequences of this phenomenon are matters of major public interest 
today, a subject pursued further in Appendix III. 
Over the past millenium, this cultural divide has no doubt 
stabilised society and enabled intellectual, economic and social 
betterment to be achieved within an accepted framesork. However, 
technical advance since the Industrial Revolution has reached a stage 
when the technological tasks of 'The Deed' have acquired a complexity 
that has brought with it a qualitative change in their nature. Thus, 
technology and those who practice the intellectual disciplines of 
engineering are fast becoming transcendent elements in the social and 
cultural scene that are making structural changes in the social order 
inevitable. Engineering can now be identified as a discipline distinct 
from Science as depicted in Figure 1. 
There is evidence of a growing recognition of the importance of 
engineering and technological cultural elements in their own right . In 
his controversial Rede lecture that forced British academia to 
acknowledge 'Science' as a second culture rather than an inferior 
calling, C. P. Snow hinted at the existence of a still submerged third, 
that of 'Engineering'. He had in fact been long and specifically 
pre-empted by Auguste Cante (1825) who identified a new class emerging 
in the scientific body, 'Engineers distinct from the savants properly 
so called' whose task it was to interpret and apply the scientific 
discoveries of the latter. A recent sign of the times is the report 
of the Finniston Committee (1980). 
8.2 Accidents, Low Probability Events, Risk Predictiön and Prophecy 
Despite the repetition in saying that any serious treatment of 
unexpected disastrous failures in technological systems requires an 
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estimate of the chance of occurrence of the given LPE together with 
an assessment of its consequences, it is necessary to consider certain 
aspects of the matter more fully. Again, the manner of estimating the 
two parameters of chance and consequences is an aspect of risk analysis 
that has already been examined in some depth in Section 7 above. Some 
doubt has already been cast on the extent to which numerical evaluations 
can be used to represent low probability risks except in certain special 
cases. 
Beyond the foregoing tautologies, an important consideration in 
the treatment of LPEs is that meaningful assessment of the chance that 
this or that rare failure may happen differs qualitatively from the 
usual experience of handling the random adversities of normal life. 
For example, the most canon essay into the realm of prediction is the 
judgement involved in placing a bet with a bookmaker, but here the 
numerical odds against success are comprehensible within the Span of 
human appreciation. This is not so when the odds against an event are 
very great. 
Excluding considerations of material loss, the magnitude of an 
adverse event may range from minor somatic injury to loss of life itself. 
However, for simplicity of argument, it is convenient to treat the 
extreme calamity of death rather than to attempt to scale injuries and 
harm. Consequently, the typical risks listed in Table II relate to the 
single dimension of potential fatality. There are three main groups, 
namely, those that are commonplace or 'Mundane', those that are 'Unusual' 
in the sense of being infrequent and of less common causation and, 
lastly, truly rare, that is to say, 'Low Probability' risks which are 
the Low Probability Events (LPEs) of our inquiry. 
8.2.1 Mortality owing to 'Ai ndane' causes 
Most people can expect to pursue their lives without early death 
from disease or fatal somatic catastrophe until the age of 'three score 
years and ten'. Their graver experiences of danger, harm and death and 
their perceptions of risk and its management come with the knowledge of 
the fatal accidents of which they have personal experience, that is to 
workrate, colleague, neighbour, friend or kin. The risk of accidental 
death borne by the average citizen of the U. S. A. or Great Britain is 
about one chance in 1250 per year, varying with age, occupation, place 
of residence, sex, social class and mode of compilation of the 
statistics (G. D. Bell 1977). The causes are mainly of the kind 
classed as 'biindane' in Table H. They are the mortality caused by 
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TABLE 11 
Accidental Death -Average Risk of Fatality 
_ -2AF .Z 
CAl SE CT BE&-_9 IATVIDUAL'S CW CE CF FITAIITT SC-UM Z -f 
_ CLASS (Accident Type) ("naval risk to member of 
Ci 'L A 
group exposed to the hazard 
- rounded-off figures) 
. AIM Industrial Accidents I in 2,500 
(employees - UK) (a, b) (Construction sites, 
factories and nines) 
" Falls at boa* I in 3.000 (UK) (e) 
(Aire group 45 - 65 years) 
" Traffic Accidents 1 in 4,000 (UK and USA) (c, d) 
UNUSUAL Fires 1 in 25,000 (USA) (d) 
" ücovning 1 in 30,000 (USA) (d) 
" Air Travel I in 100,000 (International) (d) 
" Railway Passengers 1 in 400,000 (UK) (e) 
" Struck by lightning 1 In 2,000,000 (ti ar3 IISl) (c, d) 
W't PP3A3 LITT (Chance of death due to given 
GZOÜF 0? ZT: 2: TS Cause not calc iatle. Data 
exiguous and unstable. Zero- 
Infinity hazards presenting 
vestigal risk of unlimited losses. ) 
Actual 'Titanic' 1503 fatalities (f) 
'Andria Doria'/'Stockholm' 59 (f) 
collision at sea 
" Collapse of tower block 4 (f) 
flats - Ronan Point 
Explosion at Flixborougb 28 " (f) 
petrochemical plant 
" Three Ilile Island nuclear No casualties, but financial (f) 
power plant losses greater than $4 billion 
Hypothetical (These are potential accidents 
for which the assessed risk 
has been formally quantified) 
Canvey/Thvrrock 1 in 10,000 - Notional (g) 
trochenical installation estimate using data from (see 
note 'h' below) analoebus actual happenings 
Nuclear Power - for a1 in 5,000,000,000 (USA) (d) 
program of 100 reactors - Estimate derived by quantitative 
Radiation accident - analysis of synthesised model 
casualties among the public 
TiOý'3 
a Report by H. M. Inspector of Factories for 1973. 
b Wickenden and Mayhew, ATOM, June 1980, UkAEA house journal. 
c F. R. Farmer (Rd. ), Nuclear Reactor Safety, Academic Press, 1977- 
d N. C. Rasmussen, O. S. Reactor Safety Study - Main Report, WASH-1400(NRC), 1975. 
e Chambers's Encyclopaedia, Vol 11,1950, p. 502 (tends to be an invariant statistic). 
jf See Appendix II. 
g) Locke, J. et al., CAI-V&-r, ESE, London, 1978, Table 4, p. 25. 
(((h))) Included as an exemplar of a hypothetical risk prediction. but anomalously 
placed in the Low Probability Group of Events. Note 10 refers. 
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accidents at kvrk, in the home and on the streets that come in a 
steady dreary stream of every conceivable variation. There is thus 
no lack of data about them for quantitative statistical analysis. It 
is stable and is an important ingredient in those actuarial tables 
ccariled by insurance company accountants so remarkable for the 
accuracy of their predictions. Such data is characteristic of that 
taken from a 'closed system', (12) examples of which from the realm of 
natural science include radioactive decay, tides and the movements of 
the planets and their satellites. 
8.2.2 Casualties due to odd causes - 'Unusual Events' 
From time to time in addition to the deaths that are the result 
of commonplace incidents of the type that have been classed in the 
sub-section immediately above as 'Mundane', there are occasional fatal 
accidents attributable to less familiar causes. Among them are death 
in a fire, by drowning, by a stroke of lightning or in an air or rail 
disaster when many people may be killed or injured at one time. A 
few instances are listed with their expectations in the 'Unusual' 
grouping in Table II. Despite their local rarity, enough data about 
these events can be collected on a countrywide or international scale 
to provide material that is sufficiently abundant for meaningful 
statistical analysis by assuming a Poisson distribution. A mach quoted 
and classic example is the treatment by L. von Bortkiewicz (1898) of 
the mortality amr)ng Prussian army grooms caused by kicks from frisky 
horses. The case is of interest because it affected wide areas of 
scientific thought beyond mathematics. The conclusions Von Bortkiewicz 
and others have drawn from it were considered by many eminent 
mathematicians to be far-fetched and misleading, 'compromising 
mathematical science'. As a result probability theory languished in 
its development outside academic mathematical studies until early this 
century ( L. E. Maistrov 1974/a). The subject is still one of recondite 
controversy and is discussed further in Section 9.7. 
8.2.3 Rare and Unusual Events and Statistical Stability 
Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz, a mathematician of superlative skill, 
attempted to use the regularity exhibited in the stable experiences of 
the cavalry men of the Corps of Guards (supra) and in like 'piquant' 
examples to establish his 'Law of Small Numbers'. By this he sought to 
explain the shrewd and remarkably efficaceaus intuition of insurance 
actuaries in judging proposals bearing a concentration of risks, however 
small. - A recent and relevant case is presented in the insurance industry's 
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reaction to the 'Zero-Infinity' characteristic (See Section 8.3 et 
seq. ) of the nuclear risk that has brought into being new methods of 
underwriting and required legislative changes on an international 
scale (Street and Frame 1966). J. M. Keynes in his 'Treatise on 
Probability' (1922/a) dismisses this presumption as nothing more than 
another case amenable to Poisson's 'Law of Large lumbers' (1837), 
describing Bortkiewicz's mathematics as clever algebra rather than a 
recognition of reality. More significantly, Keynes (1922/b) rejects 
as 'certainly false' Poisson's idealist concept 'that in the whole 
field of chance and variable occurrence' there exist 'underlying 
discoverable systems' particular to the circumstances that can be 
revealed if enough instances of any given case are taken. He attaches 
great importance to the concept of 'stability' (infra) and, though 
much influenced by the German theoretician W. Lexis, developed an 
independent view (Ibidem - c). Keynes also observes that the 
existence of a fairly numerous set of statistics in respect of a 
phenomenon (say failures in large coolant circulating pumps for 
nuclear power plants - author's note) does not, a priori, justify an 
assumption that 'the observed degree of frequency is therefore stable'. 
Data of this kind may show: 
'That some statistical frequencies are, within narrower 
or wider limits, stable. But stable frequencies are 
not very common, and cannot be assumed lightly. ' 
J. M. (Lord) Keynes, 
Ibidem, p. 368. 
Nonetheless, it has long been known that there is a remarkable 
regularity about many comparatively rare events among which may be 
listed suicides, certain organic diseases and genetic abnormalities, 
eg Down's syndrome. But, in each case there will be a closed system 
of causation that can be discerned and the degree of frequency 
attributable to it is therefore stable. Bortkiewicz's grooms existed 
in anything but a chaotic universe as the Prussian army's elite Corps 
of (cards was a body centred on discipline and good order. In such a 
system one would expect to find a matrix of regularities shaping 
events and the frequencies of the occasional abberations would be as 
stable as the observances of the regime from which they deviated. 
Fallacious attempts to identify regularities and stable patterns in 
what are inherently labile or chaotic event fields abound in risk 
analysis, notably in the domain of adventitious hunan errors of 
judgement and action. 
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8.2.4 Qualitative characteristics of a Poisson DisLtribution 
If a rare event is of such a nature that it can be shown to 
share a common pattern of causation with like occurrences, that 
enough instances of kindred events have been reported to justify 
analysis and that there is reason to believe that such data is stable, 
then it may be treated as a member of a Poisson distribution. These 
are the criteria for classification in the 'Unusual' category that 
comprises the second part of Table II. In addition to those listed 
there, one may include the unexpected dangerous faults that emerge in 
a set of mass produced articles previously thought to be safe and 
reliable. For instance, 200,000 Austin-Morris 'Mini' motorcars had 
to be recalled for examination of their brake system master cylinders 
because there were a few otherwise unidentifiable defective units 
amongst them (Austin-Morris type fault 1978). These are once again 
events or potential events in virtually 'closed systems' (12). 
8.2.5 New technologies, catastrophic failures and negligible risk 
In Sections 8.2.1 to 8.2.3 above, it has been posited that the 
familiar run on untoward, but relatively infrequent events identified 
as 'Mundane' and 'Unusual' is comprehensible in terms of a probability 
distribution. These unfortunate happenings of which there are several 
examples in the first and second parts of Table II account for most of 
the fortuitous deaths and serious somatic injuries that afflict 
Western societies, for instance those caused by industrial accidents. 
They are generally amenable to statistical treatment as events forming 
particular Poisson distributions. Though these data are stable enough 
for the purpose, the conformity is by no means exact. In spite of 
that the deviations from the expectations predicted by the Poisson 
model are usually small and can be attributed to accident proneness, 
personality factors and variations in local circumstances of exposure 
to the given hazard. It is thus possible to calculate in finite terms 
the risk or chance of failure that can be associated with a given 
accident or fault. 
While these 'M ndane' and 'Unusual' happenings are manageable in 
terms of quantitative risk analysis and meaningful predictions of the 
likely frequencies of occurrence of particular accidents may be 
calculated, say the number of motor vehicles that might be expected to 
go out of control and cross the central reservation of a motorway in 
the circumstances of some assumed traffic density, there is a third 
class of event for which this is not so. These Low Probability Events 
92 
(LPEs) are those very rare, random catastrophic failures of sporadic 
occurrence in technological processes, plants and systems and chiefly 
those of an innovatory kind, that distinguish themselves by being 
expected not to happen: yet in spite of that occasionally they do, 
being described in popular parlance as the 'once-in-a-million' chance. 
They are truly in a category in which the expectation tends to zero, 
seldom, if ever, occurring twice in any closely similar mode. The 
weaknesses that give rise to them are usually eliminated from plant 
and system designs because the lessons learnt from one disastrous and 
well publicised event almost invariably ensure that such-identifiable 
defects do not remain uncorrected. A few exemplars are given in the 
'Low Probability' and third section of Table II. It has sub-classifications 
of 'Actual' and 'Hypothetical', the former being things that have 
happened and the latter those that might. These calamitous occurrences 
are drawn from a fuller and more representative list with short 
descriptions of the causation and consequences provided by Appendix II. 
Other examples of low probability catastrophic failures, sometimes 
called 'negative-valued events', are legion. Nonetheless, these 
collectively not infrequent collapses, collisions, crashes, explosions, 
sinkings and releases of toxic fumes, vapours and polluents are 
characteristically rare individually, being occurrences of a diverse 
nature, each having its own peculiarities. As a result they present 
no statistical distributions in the realm of reality, let alone the 
stable ones required for meaningful quantitative probability analysis. 
8.3 Risk management and 'The Zero-Infinity Dilemma' 
L. von Bortkiewicz in his 1898 paper, 'Das Gesetz der kleinen 
Zahlen', attacked a clearly defined problem in a closed situation, when 
he calculated the death risk faced by Prussian Army grooms. The 
actuarial task of assessing rates for compensating the military 
authority for the cost of loss of men would have been straightforward. 
Not so for that posed by total plant investment and societal loss 
cover for a modern major hazard technological complex, eg the Canvey 
Island/Thurrock petrochemical and liquid natural gas installation 
(Locke et al. 1978). Here there is a presumption of a very low 
probability of an event or series of events leading to a very large 
loss. This is the 'Zero-Infinity Dilemma' (infra) with its risk-cost 
imbalance which has been identified by Talbot Page (1978) as the most 
difficult problem facing the proximate decision makers, both commercial 
and political, who must promote, finance, authorise and regulate the 
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industrial exploitation of advanced technologies, particularly in the 
evaluation of 'prospective energy alternatives' in %hich class he 
names nuclear power. They are also policy areas in which matters of 
project acceptance by the body politic and its acquiescence in the 
selection of sites are complex and sensitive. 
Owing to the magnitude of the hazard consequent upon a major plant 
failure combined with the exceedingly small chance of its occurrence, 
the engineering, commercial and public experience of accidents upon 
which risk acceptance and management are normally built up does not 
exist. The questions of decision making about an innovation that brings 
with it the threat of a catastrophe of almost zero probability, but of 
virtually unlimited extent, in financial terms even though human life 
and limb may not be lost, has been brought into focus by the continuing 
and apparently endless debate about nuclear power. This 'Zero-Infinity 
Dilemma' poses a serious problem for the insurance industry owing to the 
scale, extent and new dimensions of risk that have to be underwritten if 
essential technical progress is not to be hindered. Among the many 
hazards of advanced technology in addition to atomic energy, those of 
the petrochemical industries and that of liquid natural gas (LNG), 
'Frozen Fire', loom large. The dangers attributable to the latter are 
so grave that the U. S. Federal and State Governments have imposed 
special siting regulations for LNG installations, limiting population 
density to an average of no more than 60 people per square mile within 
4 miles of a marine terminal and a lower population zone of not more 
than 10 within one mile of the installation (H. Kunreuther 1980). A 
very serious accident occurred in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1944 when the 
LNG flowing from a storage tank ruptured by brittle fracture ran into 
sewers where it evaporated and exploded, killing 128, injuring 300 and 
damaging $7 million in property. 
The potential scale of the hazard which was assessed in the case 
of the Oxnard proposed terminal in California to present a worst case 
scenario of a severe threat to 50,000 residents caused the State 
Government to refuse permission for its construction (ibidem). 
Another disastrous low probability event in the 'Zero-Infinity' 
class was the collision between the 'Aegean Captain', a 210,000 tons 
bulk crude oil carrier, and the 'Atlantic Empress' of 288,000 tons, 
also carrying crude oil, off Tab ago on 20 July 1979 in which 26 men 
were killed. The insurance claims were of the order of 166 millions. 
The accident occurred through confusion in the interpretation of radar 
screen displays, both ships being adequately manned, equipped with the 
most up-to-date facilities and fully seaworthy. 
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8.3.1 Nine characteristics of 'The Dilemma': an actuarial view 
The insurance industry in the West has had long experience of 
risk management and assessment and will provide cover for almost any 
imaginable risk, from compensation for multiple births to the career 
valuation put upon a film'star's legs, but the new ones of the zero- 
infinity kind have posed special problems. Failure to assess a set 
of risks properly can mean bankruptcy, either through ruinous imbalance 
between claims and premiums or loss of business to competitors offering 
more attractive rates. The competition is fierce and in this adverse 
environment Lloyd's of London has survived for three centuries, 'never 
having failed to pay out a justified claim'. There should be valuable 
lessons that the engineer involved in the obviously analogous work of 
the assessment and management of the risks presented by the new hazardous 
advanced technologies, and not least those of nuclear power, can learn 
from the savoir-faire of his opposite number in the world of insurance 
who faces decision making of a similar kind. 
Talbot Page's actuarial analysis of 'The Zero-Infinity Dileman' 
(1978) is very relevant to the treatment of the disastrous LPEs that 
are the concern of modern engineering and deserves due consideration 
therefore. He distinguishes some nine common characteristics in the 
zero-infinity dilemma that is presented by certain advanced technologies, 
though not all are directly related to physical risks and thus to the 
engineering features of their management. They are: 
(i) 'Ignorance of mechanism' which is perhaps the most 
important. It is lack of knowledge about the way in 
which the causes that lie behind a risk emerge to 
create an accident. It characterises all manner of 
risks, for instance, the chance of a major structural 
failure, a nuclear power plant incident, the transmission 
to man of radioactivity or other toxin that has 
adventitiously escaped into the food chain or the 
greivous harne that can be inflicted on a comianity by a 
medicine confidently promoted as safe. 'The mechanisms 
of generation, transmission and response are so poorly 
understood that the management of the problems arising 
is truly decision making under perverse uncertainty'. 
(ii) 'Potential for catastrophic costs and harm to humans' 
is again an in eterminate decision criterion as it is 
specifically related to mechanism which is the 
principal area of ignorance. 
(iii) 'Asymmetry between benefits and costs' as in the case 
of nuclear power when further investment in safeguards 
brings a modest reduction in risk. For example, the 
addition of an expensive safety feature is required to 
meet a vague danger which can not be precisely specified, 
but yet which can not be denied. 
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(iv) 'Low subjective probability' of catastrophic outcome 
has a commonsense influence in limiting safeguarding 
investment, though this again lacks specificity 
because of ignorance of mechanism. This is 
perception of the finite but near zero risk aspect 
of the 'dilemm'. It presents a particularly difficult 
problem for the safety-assessor as on the one hand he 
must direct design investment toward the reduction of 
risks, yet on the other he must abdure empty safeguard 
engineering. 
(v) 'Internal transfer of benefits' is an economic concept 
bearing on transfer of the benefits of the technology, 
eg cheaper nuclear generating costs per unit, through 
the market to the consumer by tending to lower product 
prices. 
(vi) 'External transfer of costs' is another economic 
concept describing It Fe direct non-market transfer of 
an effect'. The catastrophic costs of a nuclear plant 
accident of serious dimensions could not be transferred 
to the consumers through the mechanism of market prices 
of electricity and must be met from elsewhere, by 
government subventions. The high potential costs 
arising from a severe accident involve large safeguarding 
expenses which could not be borne wholly by the industry 
and are transferred to the general exchequer through 
direct government or subsidised institutional research, 
ie UKAEA. The failure of the market mechanisms to deal 
with this aspect of technological innovation is a 
primary reason for regulatory intervention in addition 
to public and environmental safeguarding. The commercial 
insurance market could not bear the strain of the 
catastrophic costs of a major nuclear power station 
accident, and the claims they are required to meet are 
limited by law with the government bearing the excess. 
(yii) 'Collective risk' is one borne by many people simultaneously 
as major environmental risk problems have the potential 
to affect large numbers of people at the same time. 
The effectiveness of insurance, liability law and other 
traditional compensatory mechanisms in protecting against 
loss resulting from risk is limited in the collective 
case. This also has engineering and regulatory overtones 
as the plant and process must be designed to reduce 
collective risk, eg discharges of radioactivity from 
nuclear installations are regulated by law, overall 
shielding of the reactor to minimise radiation exposure 
of the public and the design of the plant are subject to 
regulatory safety scrutiny. 
(viii) 'Latency' is the often extended delay between initiation 
o1 i adverse effect, eg massive release of 
radioactivity as the result of a nuclear accident, or 
exposure to the effect and. the manifestation of its 
damage or detriment. Latency can be from 20 to 30 years 
and has regulatory significance in that operator of the 
hazardous installation may enjoy a limited period of 
responsibility for ham caused but not revealed during 
the operation of the plant or process. In the UK, the 
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operator of a nuclear installation may not have to 
meet claims for loss attributable to a nuclear incident 
when such claims are presented more than 10 years after 
he has been formally relieved of his period of 
responsibility for that installation. 
(ix) 'Irreversibility' refers to the lingering consequences 
of adverse e ects of the hazard or as a practical 
matter reversal or removal of the effect takes a long 
time or is very costly. It applies particularly to 
contamination as for example that of plutonium which is 
highly toxic in minute traces and has a half-life of 
24,000 years which is considered to be absolutely 
irreversible. 
Commenting on the above nine characteristics of the extra risks 
that advanced technology projects present to the insurance industry, 
Talbot Page (1978) considered that 'latency and irreversibility of effect 
have profound ethical and institutional implications. They raise questions 
concerning fair distribution of risk over time and how institutions can 
be designed to anticipate these adverse effects, rather than merely to 
react to existing known effects'. Not all of the nine are likely to 
have any direct influence on the formulation of an efficacecus treatment 
designed to anticipate and inhibit those causes that could bring about 
a catastrophic low probability failure of the zero-infinity kind in a 
technological system. Nevertheless, all of them, to a greater or lesser 
degree, will have a significant bearing on the thought processes that 
underlie such a treatment and some will determine the course taken by 
the designer to assure the safety of the system in question, but that 
is a matter of engineering. 
8.4 Engineering interpretations of the 'Zero-Infinity' challenge 
While the foregoing characteristics of 'The Zero-Infinity Dilemma' 
as perceived by Talbot Page (supra) are of an actuarial nature, they are, 
nonetheless, in accord with the general milieu that exists in Western 
society today, a milieu that has been largely created by the important 
part that the new technologies have played in fashioning its organisation 
and structure. Thus, the body politic has, at last, had to yield to 
penetration by the engineers who have even been accorded status be 
being dubbed 'the technical intelligentsia' and the cultures of the 
advanced countries have had to adapt their mores to their needs. On the 
other hand, the conservative discipline of engineering has had to 
broaden its horizons and admit that it has interdisciplinary interests 
touching on subjects like ergonomics, health physics and management. 
Design per se has emerged as an important study (Malherbe and Ogorkiewicz 
1962, A. Moulton 1976, Bruce Afcher 1979). There are many new sub-disciplines 
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that share a community of interest with the life and social sciences 
sich in nuclear engineering include safety technology, siting and 
radiation protection. Neither has engineering escaped the challenge 
of the 'Zero-Infinity Dilemma'. There are, in fact, close comparisons 
between the quandary of the insurance risk assessor and that facing 
the engineer concerned with investment in the safeguarding of a major 
hazard installation, in our case a nuclear power plant, against a 
potentially catastrophic LPE. 
Out of the nine characteristics of the risk assessor's perception 
of the 'Zero-Infinity Dilemma', all but two are relevant to the analogous 
situation that can face a nuclear engineer. The transfer of costs and 
benefits, Talbot Page's fifth and sixth categories, are matters of 
economics and, as such, have no direct bearing on the management of 
LPEs. However, the sixth, 'External transfer of costs', was a factor 
that largely determined the peculiar and novel form of the statutory 
regulation of commercial nuclear power in Britain and the U. S. A., the 
legislation being drafted in part to meet the needs of the insurance 
industry (Street and Frame 1966). 
8.4.1 Catastrophic failures of uncertain causation 
(Re Page's 'Potential for catastrophic costs and harm to humans' 
and 
'Ignorance of mechanism') 
owing to political and societal pressures, a major technical 
innovation may be put into use before enough is known about it to enable 
its reliability and safety to be fully assured. In many cases access to 
the foreknowledge needed is difficult or impossible to obtain. If the 
potential modes of failure are unknown, then there is ignorance of that 
mechanism which might precipitate a catastrophic accident and it would 
not be feasible to take every conceivable precaution against a possible, 
low probability event of uncertain causation. Hence, occurrence of a 
catastrophic LEP cannot be absolutely excluded. From its earliest days, 
the nuclear branch of engineering science recognised this danger and 
net it be developing a new approach to the technologies of reliability, 
safety and risk management, leading the field in these matters, the 
philosophical inspiration being 'safety by foresight' (Margaret Gowing 
1974). 
The characteristic of 'Ignorance of mechanism' together with that 
of a potential for the catastrophic outcome of a possible failure 
sequence are the sources of most of the problems relevant to safety that 
98 
are likely to arise when a new technology is exploited, something 
indubitably true in the case of nuclear power. 
8.4.2 'Ratchetting' investment in engineering safeguards 
(Re Page's - 'Asynmetry between benefits and costs') 
Mile engineers may be well aware that a certain technical 
innovation has an inherent tendency to suffer from a fault potentiality 
that could lead to a catastrophic accident, they may well be ignorant 
of all the efficient mechanisms capable of bringing the event about. 
As a result of their lack of perception of the true nature of the 
overhanging threat, the decisions that involve efficaceous engineered 
or operational safeguards may in consequence be indeterminate. This 
circumstance arises because, although a precaution taken may appear to 
be sufficient at the time of its introduction, further knowledge shows 
that it can be circumvented by another failure mode which, though 
perhaps a little less likely, is equally efficient. To meet the new 
threat, an additional step of safeguarding investment is made. But, 
continuing inquiries reveal that there is still yet another failure 
mode that can precipitate the accident and the engineer is called upon 
to make a further investment in safety. As the approach to full safety 
confidence is generally asymptotic, there can be continued iteration 
and 'ratchetting' of investment in the particular provision of 
safeguards with 'asymmetry between benefits and costs'. The problem of 
determining the point at which investment in safety can be seen to be 
adequate is one of the most difficult problems facing nuclear engineering. 
8.4.3 Low Probability Events and the quandary of open-ended design targets 
(Re Page's 'Low subjective probability of catastrophic outcome') 
The designer of a hazardous technological system is confronted 
with a wide spectrum of potential faults, any one of which might 
initiate a sequence leading to a catastrophic failure. In the case of 
nuclear reactor design, his quandary is profound. Not surprisingly 
then, the problem of how to set realistic design targets which embody 
demonstrably adequate protection against the very real threat of a 
calamitous radiation accident of very low, but finite probability has 
exercised the nuclear power industry from its inception. Many of the 
more intractable of these faults can be designed out of the system 
entirely, as for instance the replacement of the steel membrane which 
formed the pressure vessel surrounding the core of a Magnox reactor by 
a pre-stressed concrete shell that made explosive rupture of the reactor's 
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main containment impossible, and 'fulfilled the requirement of 
unquestionable safety' (Kirk and Taylor 1971). Nonetheless, there 
remain those faults that cannot be eliminated in such a definitive 
way and, indeed, their very existence may be unsuspected. The true 
threat posed by these residual, but grave, weaknesses in the fabric 
of reactor design remins enigmatic, chiefly because of their low 
subjective probability. Despite their elusive character, the threat 
they present cannot be dismissed and design for safety in such 
circumstances is necessarily open-ended. Attempts made so far to 
escape from the quandary, at first by qualitative and more recently by 
quantitative methods of design safety assessment, have been less than 
wholely successful and the problem remains an obstacle in the way of 
the further development of atomic energy as a source of commercial 
power. 
8.4.4 Protection of the public: major hazards and reactor siting 
(Re Page's Collective Risk') 
The dangers that a major hazard installation can impose on the 
community in which it is located may extend to a considerable distance 
beyond its boundaries. As a result, people and property in the surrounding 
area are at risk collectively. Among the dangers to which they may be 
exposed are missiles and blast from an explosion, toxic fumes, gases 
and ejected particulate material and, in the case of a nuclear power 
plant, effusion of radioactivity and direct radiation from the process. 
While it is only recently that attention has been paid to the generality 
of industrial activities presenting hazards of this kind, siting 
restrictions have long been applied to nitration plants and to factories 
manufacturing and storing commercial explosives and munitions. In the 
case of nuclear power, the dangers were recognised from the beginning. 
At first attention was paid chiefly to site perimeter radiation levels 
and the massive adventitious release of radioactivity that could follow 
a radiation accident. More recently, it has been directed to the 
steady effusion of radioactivity resulting from normal operation as 
well which can contribute to low level doses to the general population 
over a wide area. Siting policy has always played an important part in 
nuclear safety regulation in Britain, but it has tended to remain in a 
traditional mold in spite of attempts to put it on a quantitative basis. 
While remote siting, as far as this has been feasible, has been accepted 
as appropriate to the risk, the economic inducements to bring power 
reactors closer to the main centres of population are strong. Undoubtedly, 
siting policy is likely to be a continuing matter of debate. 
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8.4.5 Control of radiation e. sure: dose limits and siting criteria 
(Compare Page's 'Latency' and 'Irreversibility') 
The characteristics of 'latency' and 'irreversibility' have no 
direct engineering relevance to the anticipation of LPEs, nonetheless 
they are important because they are factors taken into account in 
setting the permitted levels of ionising radiation and radioactive 
contamination to which people may be exposed and in prescribing limits 
for the amounts of radioactivity that may be released to the environment. 
The specific values and associated norms are set nationally, but in 
accordance with the Recommendations of the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection (ICRP), though with certain local variations in 
interpretation. By virtue of their regulatory status, they become 
determinants in the formulation of engineering design criteria for 
shielding, controlled discharges of radioactivity to the environment, 
radiation protection in the fuel cycle generally and for the initiation 
and planning of emergency action in the event of a radiation accident 
and in the prescription of siting criteria. 
8.4.6 Verification of accountability and accuracy in risk assessment 
Long experience has taught insurers to be wary of big risks with 
very low probabilities which 'create such a problem to the industry that 
it rather tries to avoid the insurance of such risks'. Nuclear risks in 
this class are underwritten only with specific government guarantees that 
are further covered by international conventions on liability, and 
premiums are arbitrary. Talbot Page posits that normal acceptance of 
risks of this kind, and nuclear ones in particular, can only be secured 
by establishing trust amongst the underwriters and the body politic. 
The industry in question, nuclear power, does not have to be shown to 
be absolutely without major risks, for that is impossible, but the 
institutions responsible for assuring the safety of nuclear power and 
the individuals who comprise and represent them must be known to be 
worthy of trust. Similar conditions apply to acceptance, or better 
toleration, of the nuclear risk by the concerned and politically aware 
elements of the public in the West, but with a more general proviso 
that they rust also be convinced that the nuclear option is a necessary 
contribution to the World energy balance. And, this theme underlies 
the New Treatment. 
In these circumstances, Talbot Page's proposed solution to the 
zero-infinity dilemma of nuclear power is relevant, profound and worthy 
of study. In advancing an actuarial thesis, Page notes as 'curious' a 
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situation in which insurance companies appear to have long used 
probability in their assessments of risk, but 'when this approach 
flowered later in the enormous complexity and sophistication of the 
Rasmussen report and similar treatments of decision trees, public 
confidence in them in fact declined'. He sets aside the suggestion 
made by certain specialists in risk assessment that the public is 
irrational and lacks understanding in the techniques used. Instead, 
he attributed 'the growing scepticism' and lack of confidence in risk 
assessors to ad hominem considerations such as 'of course he assesses 
the risk as very low, but then his career is invested-in nuclear power'. 
There are three salient things that make risk assessment in 
Western society of today different in quality from that to which the 
insurance industry had become conditioned. Previously, business in 
each class of cover was written against an experience of loss adjustment 
that was adequate for the given risk accepted. Secondly, the mechanism 
likely to precipitate a loss was largely known and understood, including 
the heavy losses occurring from time to time in air, marine and rail 
transportation. And lastly, the risk assessor's advice was validated 
against the continuing test of market forces, poor advice being an 
almost certain prescription for financial collapse of the underwriting 
syndicate. The sanction of accountability has proved the soundness of 
the renowned insurance corporations of today who enjoy public approbation 
and trust. 
8.4.7 Simulated accountability by 'Keeping Score' 
In a subsequent analysis of the actuarial enigma created by zero- 
infinity risks, Talbot Page (1979) identified 'Ignorance of Mechanism' 
as its first and most important characteristic. Owing to the potentiality 
of these new risks for a catastrophic outcome (Page's second characteristic), 
business of this kind has only been accepted on a basis of absolute 
liability without recourse and within maximum limits of loss supported by 
government guarantee for any excess. This latter involvement of the 
state has had far-reaching consequences. To the foregoing, he has added 
a third salient characteristic of 'Latency' which by a turn of logic is 
extended from his earlier definition (1978) (meaning the long delay 
between a calamitous event and its full consequences) to embrace the 
patent loss of trust now displayed in the new style of risk assessors. 
As a consequence of state involvement, they are, for the most part, 
employees of government agencies or sponsored bodies and as such bear no 
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direct responsibility for their advice and other interventions, 
working to a philosophy described as being 'concerned with influencing 
attitudes and creating a framework' and 'not with detailed prescriptions' 
because 'the primary responsibility lies with those who create risks' 
(Raben 1972/a). Indeed, any direct responsibility is constitutionally 
eschewed. Yet, these experts are the assessors who effectively 
determine whether or not this or that risk should be imposed. Page 
opines that this combined with 'latency' has been inimical to credibility. 
Nonetheless, he suggests that the credibility so essential to the work of 
risk assessment agencies could, in fact, be built up by simulating the 
actuarial obligation of accountability that has proved successful in 
maintaining the high standards of the insurance business and the trust 
so readily accorded to it. While it would not be feasible to establish 
direct responsibility for the circumstances that led to a rare and 
unusual accident, it would be possible to test nuclear risk assessors 
against a lower tier of faults and incidents that are of relatively 
frequent occurrence, although they do not progress to the final stage 
of disastrous consequences. He proposes an analogy with a game which 
he called 'Keeping Score', whereby assessors could be rated against 
their successes in predicting 'intermediate events and partial chains 
in their major decision trees' (Talbot Page 1979). By this device 
there would be more events and 'latency' would be less of a problem 
because such minor failures could be readily identified and reported 
with much less of a hiatus between expectation and occurrence. The 
process would have the teeth of accountability by imposing sanctions 
on the agencies and their assessors by rewarding success and penalising 
failure. The idea is developed further in Section 14.6 et seq. 
8.4.8 Bringing risk assessors to account: some constitutional issues 
Despite the profound insight that Page's proposals give into the 
vexatious problems that arise in the management of zero-infinity 
industrial risks, serious difficulties, both organisational and practical, 
stand in the way of their introduction. His case which is administrative 
and actuarial in essence involves an institutional extrapolation from the 
clearly defined task performed by risk assessors for underwriters in the 
insurance industry into the vague and almost inchoate situation in which 
advice is sought and received by the proximate decision makers in 
government departments, state industries and boards, public utilities 
and large commercial corporations. Furthermore, for 'Page' to be 
effective, profound changes of a constitutional kind are essential 
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because policy formulating authority over a wide technological area 
would have to be ceded by entrenched administrative officials in whose 
hands it traditionally rests to engineers in bodies like the U. S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U&NRC) and the ', Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate (NII) in Britain. In accepted constitutional practice, 
the latter two bodies are assigned inspectional functions to be properly 
exercised under higher tier administrative direction that precludes 
excursions into matters of policy, say direct involvement in the debate 
about choice of a nuclear reactor system, for instance Pressurised Water 
(PWR) versus Advanced Gas Cooled (AGR) reactor technology. But, owing 
to the complexity of the work undertaken by the USNRC and the NII both 
bodies and particularly the latter have acquired an unusual degree of 
autonomy in the policies they pursue and the actions they undertake in 
matters that are constitutionally beyond their competence. For instance, 
the NII exercises powers of licensing, is involved in the drafting of 
legislation and negotiates with public and official bodies to an extent 
that is unusual in the execution of an important Act of Parliament 
(O. H. Critchley 1977). The substantial further delegation of Ministerial 
authority in matters of nuclear power envisaged by Page (supra) would be 
seen as establishing a precedent of far reaching constitutional 
significance and, as such, would be likely to be resisted. 
The issue at stake lies deeper at the interface between the 
administrative realm of 'The Word' and the functional one of 'The Deed' 
where the engineer is intruding to exercise the new societal role that 
Auguste Comte identified (See Sections 8.1 and 10 et seq). Similar 
difficulties face the New Treatment, but in matters of atomic energy 
some of the necessary delegations have already been acquired in practice 
and wide areas of precedent established (supra). Further, the New 
Treatment is in the engineering dimension and that adds a legitimacy 
to its case that Page's constitutional challenge lacks. 
8.4.9 Illusory aspects of Design and Risk Assessment 
The fault and event decision trees of the U. S. Reactor Safety 
Study (See Section 7.3) are cited by Talbot Page (supra) as products of 
an analysis of the zero-infinity risks of nuclear power of the kind that 
could provide suitable material for appraising the competence of risk 
assessors. As an example, he notes that the assessors did not allow for 
the possibility of the human error that initiated the Browns Ferry 
accident (See Appendix II). Notwithstanding the considerable value that 
an analysis in depth of the Rasmussen kind can confer upon a complex 
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design concept by improving its quality and safety and, not least, by 
disclosing oversights, hidden weaknesses, unrecognised common mode 
fault potentialities and other less obvious causes of system failure, 
it is not possible for the assessors to foresee more than a part, 
though perhaps a large part, of the future situation. The writer in 
commenting on the assessed individual major accident risk of 2x 10-9 
per year per reactor predicted in the U. S. Reactor Safety Study 
(N. C. Rasmussen 1975 - 2) puts it thus: 
'A risk so forecast cannot be true. The true hazard is 
given by the summation of the occurrence probabilities 
of all the accident-producing causes which includes an 
almost infinite spectrum of unexpected, unusual or highly 
improbable though possible happendings or occurrences. 
At the present time, at least, the task of catching such 
a large number of rare, random and diverse things is 
Sisyphean. ' 
0. H. Critchley, 
'Risk prediction, safety analysis and quantitative 
probability methods -a caveat, ' 
J. Brit. Nucl. Energy Soc., Jan. 1976,15(1), 19 
(See Document No. 1 in the Annex of Supporting Papers). 
The foregoing is in keeping with established philosophy in modern 
plant engineering, for example Professor Frank P. Lees (Plant Engineering, 
Loughborough Technological University) writes: 
'9.1.8 Engineering Feasibility... ... There is obviously 
a limit both to the e plant reliability that can be 
achieved by even the best engineering practice and, equally 
important, the degree of confidence that can be placed in 
such assessments of plant reliability. 
A figure quoted for the reliability to which plants can be 
engineered is a hazard rate of 10'5 events/year (Bowen 1976). 
The reason that it is difficult to achieve lower hazard rates 
is that at this level the risk begins to be affected by rather 
improbable failures and common cause faults. 
It is important not only to be able to achieve low hazard rates 
but to have confidence in the estimate made of this rate. ' 
Loss Prevention in the Hazard Industries: 
Hazard identification, assessment and 
control, Volume 1, 
Butterworths, London and Boston, 1980, 
pp. 180-181. 
It is therefore hard to see how an assessor could find the time to 
cover enough of the vast field of possible happenings to include the odd 
human error that led to the Browns Ferry incident (supra). The Reactor 
Safety Study consisting of a Main Report and eleven substantial volumes 
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of supporting material was described by the Peer Review as inscrutable, 
difficult to follow and lacking in adequate data (See Section 7.3.1). 
Yet, it took a large team under the direction of Professor Norman C. 
Rasmussen of M. I. T. assisted by many supporting research bodies some 
two years. to produce. In spite of its wide ranging and sophisticated 
survey of possible accident sequences which included human errors, the 
text has to be tortured to extract from it any hint of the precursors 
of the Three Mile Island incident of 31 March 1979. By comparison the 
safety study for the inquiry chaired by Sir Frank Layfield into the 
Central Electricity Generating Board's (CEGB) proposal to site a 
Pressurised Water Reactor (P'nR) at Sizewell near Leiston in Suffolk is 
even more massive (13). Assuming a positive recommendation from the 
inquiry, it will be a decade before event reports from operations of 
the PWR will become available for comparison with the decision trees. 
In view of these long lead times, the idea of retrospectively 
bringing an assessor or his team to account for failure to predict 
some catastrophic failure seen chimerical, if not improper. Nonetheless, 
Page's suggestion (supra - 8.4.7) of rating assessors against their 
contemporaneous performance in predicting the occurrence of faults in 
the numerous 'intermediate and partial chains' has merit. Analogous 
data that met the criterion of ontological relativism as defined in 
Section 9.7.2 et seq. could be obtained through the licensee event 
reporting systems of which samples are displayed in Table III. 
8.5 'Lead time': another characteristic of 'The Zero-Infinity Dilemma' 
Talbot Page (1979) in his penetrating analysis of 'The Zero- 
Infinity Dilemma' recognised the importance of the often very considerable 
delay between cause and effect. In his earlier actuarial approach of 1978, 
he saw it in the limited terns of a detriment that confounded evaluation of 
a risk, defining it as 'latency' (See Section 8.3.1 - viii), citing as 
an example the long induction period between exposure to ionising 
radiations and the appearance of deleterious consequences. However, he 
overlooked another aspect, the delay, which, although it has long been 
known as an impediment in engineering, could seriously compound treatment 
of 'The Dilemma'. This is the engineering factor of 'lead time', no 
longer a confidently predictable feature of design, but an incommensurable 
element in the complex mix of latter day technology, for example the 
excessive, though unforeseen lead times that have distinguished the 
'Concorde' airliner and the Dungeness 'B' AGR nuclear power plant. 
Although it properly makes an independent and tenth characteristic of 
the dilemma, Page identifies it with 'latency', stretching that 
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TABLE III 
Licensee Event Reports 
(Two specimen sets of Licensee Event Reports excerpted from returns 
by U. S. nuclear power plant operators to the Nuclear Safety Inform- 
ation Center and issued after processing in February and April 1980) 
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Licensee Event Reports (LERs) are made by U. S. nuclear site licensees' 
to a data base at the Oak Ridge Natidnal Laboratory (ORNL) maintained 
by the Nuclear Regulato Commission. (NRC), the Advisory Committee on 
Reactor Safeguards (ACRSS and the Nuclear Safety Information Center 
(NSIC). After being collated and sururm ised, the LERs are issued 
monthly by the Licensee Operations and Evaluation Branch of the NRC. 
(Situation as at August 1980. See also Note 15. ) 
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characteristic to explain the futility and, indeed, impropriety of 
holding the risk assessors concerned with zero-infinity risk, like 
those engaged in the safety assessment of nuclear power plants, directly 
accountable for the accuracy of their predictions. 
The foregoing long and unforeseen lead times associated with - 
modern innovatory technology and particularly with nuclear power have 
not allayed public concern about its hazards and, not least, have 
helped to undermine confidence in officially sponsored claims for its 
safety. Furthermore, a long and indeterminate hiatus between the 
commencement of a major project and its completion destroys the 
continuity between the team that conceived, synthesised and assembled 
the information presented in the design packet and the engineers who at 
some much later date must construct, commission and operate the plant 
according to the design instructions. 
A long lead time can impair the clarity with which a design can 
be interpreted and the fidelity of compliancd with its instructions. 
The confidence that can be placed in any risk assessment based on that 
design is thus further diminished. The deviations from the design and 
other failures to realise its intent cannot be made good by actuarial 
judgement or allowed for in the process of assessment because their 
incidence cannot be foreseen with any certainty. They can only be 
corrected after detection during engineering work in the field as the 
plant is constructed and brought into operation. The concept of such 
monitoring is central to the New Treatment and is the theme of 
'Technological progress, safety and the guardian role of inspection' 
(O. H. Critchley 1981) which is offered as Document No. 4 of the Annex 
of Supporting Papers. 
8.6 Overview from the Engineering Dimension 
The modern disastrous technological LPE has been portrayed in its 
historical setting as an inevitable consequence of the progress of 
technology in Western society, something made necessary by population 
growth and associated pressures from the people for a healthier, better 
and fuller life. To meet their needs, it has been necessary to harness 
ever more powerful agencies and forces that carry risks which have risen 
in proportion to the potency of the instrumentalities used. Better 
technology has enabled man to live a longer and richer life, but at a 
price of suffering a greater toll of accidents which to the average 
person in the West now presents a risk of fatality of about 3.8 x 10-4 
per annum of which 2.5 x 10-4 can be attributed to traffic accidents, 
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although industry as a whole has become much safer. In this steady 
and largely stable flow of untoward events, the LPE, unexpected, 
unpredicted, catastrophic and costly in life, limb and property, 
presents itself as a singularity, like a crashing spike of random noise 
in an electronic communication channel. It inflicts a cultural shock 
on the community afflicted, often spreading to people far from its site 
of occurrence, evoking intense interest, concern and, sometimes, fear. 
However, as Professor R. Wilson (1975) has observed, the response is 
odd and anything but linear, a situation depicted in Figure 2. Typical 
among these catastrophes may be picked out the 'Titanic' (1912), 'Aberfan' 
(1966), 'Minamata' (1959-1971), 'Flixborcugh' (1974) and 'Three Mile 
Island' (1979) which are all mentioned in Appendix II. 
Characteristic of their causation is a combination of physical 
and human systems failures, usually involving glaring errors of action 
and judgement. Therefore, any attempt to reduce their incidence and to 
ameliorate the societal shock that is associated with major LPEs must 
recognise them as, not merely physical events of death, maim and 
destruction, but as events embedded in the contemporary culture, being 
due more to frailties of behaviour and management than to failures of 
plant or equipment. Despite that, the current interests of safety 
science seem to have been concentrated on scientistic rationalisations 
of the way in which people perceive risk and on the perfection of design 
through quantitative analyses of presumed plant function. The latter 
trend has led to some very sophisticated investigations of great 
complexity and depth like the U. S. Reactor Safety Study (N. C. Rasmussen 
197S). 
The quantitative approaches which were promoted largely as ways 
of resolving the problem of LPEs in nuclear power plants and thereby 
presenting a safe image of the technology were initially received with 
almost universal acclaim, although doubts were expressed by many informed 
engineers. There is now general agreement in the latter circles that 
they offer an effective way in which to make an exhaustive safety 
assessment of a design, but they are of little relevance to things that 
might precipitate an LPE in a spatially remote situation after a long 
lead time. Besides, there is growing scepticism of more presumptive 
claims. 
The early uncritical rush of support for the methods of quantification 
that are still favoured in some of the most august scientific circles, 
albeit out of the field of pragmatic engineering plant risk management, 
is of itself a phenomenon of societal interest. It arises in the 
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Aristotlean idealist Weltanschauung that still dominates Western 
thought (11). Causation is believed to act in a cosmos of underlying 
order and obedience to universal natural laws, despite chat may appear 
to be superficial chaos. Adherence to this ideal led Albert Einstein 
to question the Quantum theory even until his death still expecting - 
an alternative to be disccvered. It follows logically that by collecting 
enough data, it should be possible to cast a true quantitative 
probability that can define the likely behaviour of a system, despite 
any immediate inference of uncertainty. The random elements can be 
contained within confidence limits that may be established with sufficient 
stability for sound decision making to be based on the result. 
A not unrelated recent trend, inspired by the impressive developments 
in computer based information technology, is to build into the control 
circuits of a complex, potentially hazardous plant, eg a nuclear power 
station, automated safety, able to override the actions of the operators 
in the control room. Once again the idea is initially reassuring, but 
there are engineering doubts and the Air New Zealand disaster that 
overtook its DC - 10 on Mount Erebus in Antartica on November 28, 
1979, has disturbing implications. It seems likely that it was a 
computer assisted crash (See Appendix II , also Gordon Vette 1982). 
The validity of the idealist position will be challenged in the 
passages that follow and the New Treatment will offer an alternative 
approach in the engineering dimension that accepts a random and 
ultimately unforeseeable incidence of LPEs. Their causation will be 
attributed to the ubiquitous and unpredictable propensity of human 
beings to behave erratically, even when the most skilled people are 
engaged in familiar tasks. Severe accidents in well-managed and 
established systems are seldom, if ever, caused by failures of equipment 
or components alone without a compounding element of humn error (Glin 
Bennet 1983). 
8.6.1 An analogy with 'noise' theory 
The New Treatment draws an analogy with noise theory in which the 
LPE is identified with the spike of noise that is often observed in a 
communications circuit, both being surges of anomalous causation that 
disrupt the normal performance of the system by overloading, causing 
damage if they are of sufficient magnitude. Features of the phenomenon 
include an impulsive disturbance intruding from without the system, a 
sudden change of state within it due to release of internal stresses or 
tensions or a confluence of random events, usually faults or breakdown 
III 
of a component. These things, separately or in combination, build 
up to a major electrical surge or a fault sequence leading to an 
incident that may be catastrophic for a nuclear power plant. 
In the case of a severe plant LPE, the precipitating events 
might be failure of the electric grid supply, irregular operator actions 
consequent upon person or inter-personal tensions and additive 
combinations of equipment faults ani human errors. As noise theory can 
do no more than to identify the foregoing causative elements as signals 
indicative of the plant state, some interpretative process is needed. 
Catastrophe theory is introduced to assist the safety analyst in 
understanding the significance of these potential harbingers of failure. 
In the combination of Noise and Catastrophe theories, a nuclear 
power plant in its operational phases is envisaged as moving in a 
probabilistic behaviour field, being steered by human agencies to 
avoid those anomalies in the surface of the field that could destabilise 
the system, leading in an extreme case to catastrophic failure. 
Successful operation then depends on the quality of the engineering in 
all aspects of the management of the plant, a function that can be 
monitored and attested by inspection. 
In the light of this kind of pragmatic hazard management, 
acceptance of the 'zero-infinity' risk of disastrous accidents is 
unavoidable. The aim is to reduce the chance of their occurrence to 
the negligible, a state that can be recognised as such by a connunity 
willing to tolerate the residual hazard so that the benefits of the 
technology may be enjoyed. There is evidence to show that such a 
treatment can win the support of a responsible and properly informed 
body politic. Reference has been made to the experience of the 
Netherlands that has long existed under a ceaseless threat from the 
sea which is kept out by an extensive and complicated system of dykes, 
sluices and sea-walls maintained by the country's civil engineers. 
Despite the over hanging menace, the Dutch continue to live in their 
fertile and prosperous land, confident in the adequacy of their protection, 
notwithstanding the calamitous failure of these sea defences during the 
past millenium, one of which occurred this century. 
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9 SAFETY ASSFS&%£KP OF DESIGN: FACTS AND FALLACIES 
'It may be noted that it is the use of appropriate 
and precise methods of observation and reasoning which 
make an investigation scientific. The fact that the 
material is scanty, as may sometimes be the case in 
operational research, does not of itself render an 
investigation unscientific, although no amount of 
scientific method can get more out of data than 
there is in them. ' 
P. M. S. Blackett (Lord) 
'Operational Research', Part II - 
Studies of War: Nuclear and Conventional, 
Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh & London, 1962, p. 200. 
The New Treatment is an engineering approach to nuclear power risk 
management that proposes a specific application of the Scientific Method, 
whereas the existing approaches have become orientated towards theory 
rather than practice. Owing to the societal pressures on the industry, 
their significance is more cultural and promotional than scientific and 
has the marks of the dominance of 'Word' over 'Deed' that is character- 
istic of Western civilisation. A consequence has been a preoccupation 
with studies of design itself rather than a proper attention to the 
realisation of a given design in the hardware of the operating nuclear 
power reactor on site. The U. S. Reactor Safety Study (N. C. Rasmussen 
1975) is almost exclusively concerned with problems of design and the 
quantification of elusive possible fault sequences. Obviously, it is 
essential to have a sound design, as fault free as reasonably 
practicable, but proving that a potential event known to have a very 
low probability has an even lower one is of little relevance to 
operational safety. 
Safety assessment of a kind has long been practiced as a normal 
part of industrial plant design. In the nuclear power industry where 
the grave nature of a major radiation accident was inmediately manifest, 
a meticulous and structured system for the safety assessment of design 
has evolved. In the commercial field, it has become a statutory part 
of the licensing process, the applicant being required to submit a 
Safety Report which may be in several parts, giving a comprehensive 
description of the design of the plant and its safety provisions 
(R. Gausden 1982). The safety case presented in such a Report which 
would embrace all the technical design matters depicted in Figure 3 is 
then subjected to an exhaustive official safety assessment that may 
result in mandatory requirements for major design changes. These 
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there has been increasing pressure to adopt quantitative methods of 
the decision analysis kind (See Section 7.2 et seq. ). 
9.1 From 'Safety Factor' to 'Design Basis Accident' 
Early attempts to achieve safety and reliability in the design 
of the major artefacts of engineering, except in a few special fields 
like architecture and structural and aeronautical engineering, were 
largely matters of following established drawing office and shop floor 
procedures and rule-of-thumb. When faced with an innovation, the 
designer of a technically advanced industrial installation had little 
information and no prior experience from which definitive guidance 
could be gained. Consequently, there was ignorance of the true nature 
and extent of the failure possibilities and safety provisions were 
often the result of trial and error at the best and guesswork at the 
worst. On cost grounds alone, it is not feasible to provide 
engineered safeguards or administrative controls to prevent or abort 
every conceivable fault sequence. Absolute safety is unattainable if 
an iota of risk remains, as there is always some way in which the vestigial 
chance can precipitate a catastrophic failure. The aeroplane is a case 
in point as there can always be a crash while it is in flight no matter 
how many precautions are taken. To eliminate all but the most 
improbable causes of an unlikely accident would render the extra-safe 
machine useless, with little or no payload. 
In order to ensure that his work had an adequately safe and 
reliable outcome, the engineer has traditionally followed a course 
determined by his experience, technical knowledge and competence, 
striking a rational balance between his estimate of the likelihood of 
failure and the cost of the safeguards thought to be necessary, an 
exercise of skill called 'Engineering Judgement', a matter of some 
profundity dealt with further in Section 13.2.1. Though a conservative 
approach to failure margins has always distinguished sound engineering, 
in the absence of theory it was inevitably ingenuous. Attempts at an 
overtly scientific treatment were first formalised in the 'Safety 
Factor' concept (V. H. Searle 1950), becoming generally established 
practice towards the middle of the last century. 
Notwithstanding the rule that a Safety Factor is determined by 
calculations based on strength of materials or like data, many 
imponderables, judgements and precedents enter into the process. With 
the innovation of heavier-than-air flight, the art of Safety Factor 
estimation in aeroplane design became an important engineering 
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discipline in its own right. By the outbreak of the Second World War, 
that of the 'Stress Man' had become an important and well-paid vocation. 
His achievements contributed in no small measure to the outstandingly 
reliable aircraft supplied to the RAF and British civil aviation. 
The airship disasters of the decade and a half before the outbreak 
of the Second World War (See Section 3.6) coupled with the great 
expansion of civil and military aviation during 'The Thirties' had 
stimulated an awareness of the need to improve the safety and reliability 
of products of the aeronautical industry. Statistical methods of 
quality control were being introduced into the production lines with 
very fruitful results in the manufacture of electronic and associated 
materiel. The scene was thus set for the bold steps forward that were 
about to be taken to assure the safety of atomic energy that by 1941 was 
being exploited in a 'crash' program to produce 'The Bomb' (Leslie R. 
Groves 1963). 
The dangers of the new technology were unknown, except for those of 
its radiation hazard through experience that had been gained by 
radiologists (R. F. Mould 1980). The nuclear energy risks were thought 
to be of such a potential magnitude that 'some scientists doubted whether 
the programme could or should be prosecuted (Margaret Gowing 1974). 
There may have been no conscious technology transfer, but positive 
philosophies of safety had evolved in the form of radiological protection 
from the field of medicine and by way of design foresight in engineering 
through the developments that had taken place in the Safety Factor 
doctrine. Intellectual ground was thus ready for emergence of the 
'Design Basis' (DBA) or, in other words, the 'Maximum Credible Accident' 
(MCA) criterion. The MCA has since formed the cornerstone of safety 
policy in nuclear engineering (0. H. Critchley 1977), giving an effective 
pragmatic answer to the 'zero-infinity' risk quandary (See Section 8.4 
et seq. ). 
9.2 The Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) Doctrine 
Despite the fact that it is often mentioned, there are few explicit 
descriptions of the MCA method. With the exception of an excellent 
review by T. Coxon (1971) of its use in the design of an Advanced Gas- 
cooled Reactor (AGR), those that have been published are often vague 
or meagre. On the other hand, criticisms of the MCA concept and 
expositions of the quantitative probability approaches that are claimed 
to be alternative to it abound. The MCA is a hypothetical LPE 
envisaged after a critical review of the possible fault sequences in a 
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reactor system that might lead to a catastrophic nuclear plant 
accident and the release of radioactivity to the environment. By the 
exercise of balanced engineering judgements made on all the evidence 
available, the maximum accident that appears to be credible (See 
Glossary) is identified. The ? so conceived is taken to embrace all 
lesser accidents. These credible fault sequences are then studied to 
identify those components, plant elements and systems that could be 
modified or adapted to block progress of the faults along each of the 
given sequences. Those failure modes that it is not possible to design 
out are managed by instrumented limit trips, alarms or administrative 
controls. As a result of the safety measures taken to prevent the MCA, 
hypothetical accidents with more serious consequences are considered 
to be so unlikely that they may be precluded. An attempt to give a 
comparative measure of these subjective probabilities in numerical terms 
is made in Figure 4. 
Imponderable factors make it difficult to calculate the expected 
fission product release in the event of an MCA. Nevertheless, decisions 
about the location of nuclear power reactors have had to be made. 
Siting regulations in the UK and USA 'seem to assume explicitly or 
implicitly, a release of 103 curies' (F. R. Farmer 1975). In 
consequence, this value or a figure somewhat greater has provided a 
basis for siting policies in the two countries (Shaw and Palabrica 1974, 
Charlesworth and Gronow 1967). 
9.2.1 Limitations of the early MCA approach 
With increasing complexity of existing reactor designs and the 
introduction of more sophisticated types such as the Advanced Gas- 
cooled (AGR), the Steam Generating Heavy Water (SCHWR) and the Fast 
Breeder Reactor (FBR), the technical safety assessment of design was 
becoming an ever more formidable task. The field of technical problems 
facing the nuclear power reactor design safety analyst is shown in 
Figure 3. Not only was it now necessary to make comparisons between 
reactor types, but to take decisions on the apportionment of investment 
among the engineered safeguarding features which had become very 
elaborate. Furthermore, safety studies, often instigated by groups 
hostile to nuclear energy, were revealing new modes of failure which, 
though of very low probability, could result in major radiation 
accidents, for example the controversy over the integrity of emergency 
core cooling systems (ECCS) incorporated in U. S. light water reactors. 
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Doubts about the adequacy of the MCA doctrine were voiced. John 
Ablitt thought the approach outmoded: 
'4. The 'Maximum Credible Accident Concept has always 
suffered from the disadvantage that a sequence of events 
credible to one person could be utterly incredible to 
another, since credulity is an intensely personal 
attribute which varies considerably between individuals 
and can be strongly influenced by commercial and other 
pressures. Even as regards its use as a comparator between 
reactors, its value has been adversely criticised and 
whereas it may have been a convenient device in its day, 
its limitations are now recognised. ' 
The contribution of systematic incident 
evaluation to the achievement of reactor 
safety, Report AHSB (S) R. 89, Authority 
Health and Safety Branch, U. K. Atomic 
Energy Authority, London, 1965. 
Ablitt was right in identifying 'credulity' as a very subjective 
faculty, but the terms 'credible' and 'credibility' (See Glossary) as 
used in engineering discussions about matters of nuclear plant 
reliability and safety are not personal beliefs. Instead, they are 
soundly based, widely accepted engineering opinions formed after debate 
within and between competent, informed design teams and groups of safety 
assessors. But, that is something very different from 'credulity'. 
9.2.2 The resilience and survival of the MCA doctrine 
The MCA technique, assimilated to that of the Design Basis Accident, 
has adapted to the needs of increasingly complex designs of reactor and 
control systems in a situation where a multiplicity of severe accidents 
is possible. It is in fact a generic title and the engineer assessing 
the safety of a nuclear power plant is in consequence concerned, not 
with a single major radiation incident, but with many such events. 
The flexibility and 'proven worth' of the MCA (See Sections 7.1.1 
& 7.4) have now been established by long experience in use. The MCA 
has, thereby, determined the design of most of the nuclear power 
stations operating in the World today which have completed some 3,000 
reactor-years of virtually safe operating experience. Reliability 
analysis and associated quantitative methods have always formed an 
important part of its broadly based scheme of safety assessment. 
Indeed, the MCA doctrine may be said to embrace the methods of 
quantitative-safety analysis that have been developed over the past 
decade. By contributing a rationally structured procedure that the 
MCA previously lacked they have in fact enhanced its power. A widely 
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held view amongst engineering safety assessors is that the final 
judgement taken about the safety of a reactor design is inevitably 
qualitative, quantitative methods, although they may give essential 
help in reaching it, are inadequate to the task of making the ultimate 
design decisions (Hanauer and bbrris 1971, Gronow and Causden 1975/a). 
Thus, the DIA still rules in the domain of safety analysis. And this 
despite establishment advice to replace it by the quantitative approach 
(Robens 1972/b, Sir Brian Flowers 1976/b) which was underwritten by the 
motion in the House of Lords (1976) mentioned earlier. 
9.3 The MCA and power reactor siting considerations 
The MCA is by definition the peak of a hierarchy of possible plant 
failures and untoward occurrences that can result in the massive release 
of radioactivity to the environment about a power reactor site. As 
noted earlier, it is envisaged as a very rare event and one that is not 
expected to happen, but there are many lesser ones that do, and some of 
them repeatedly. There is thereby a continual escape of small 
quantities of fission products from a power reactor to its surroundings. 
For example, an operating gas-cooled Magnox or AGR plant may be expected 
to lose between 1 to SO tonnes of CO2 per day owing to leakage from the 
coolant gas circuit at penetrations, pipe joints, glands and mechanical 
seals on the shafts of blowers, pumps and valves. In spite of the best 
precautions, the coolant will suffer some contamination from the nuclear 
fuel that cannot be immediately removed by the clean-up filters. The 
escaping gas is thus faintly radioactive, if not all the time, then for 
some of it. In addition there are further fortuitous escapes of coolant 
during maintenance, from planned operational activities and by 
inadvertent blow-downs. Radioactive cesium, iodines, noble gases and 
small amounts of other nuclides as fine particulates are carried into 
the atmosphere to make the ambiance within a few miles of the reactor 
slightly radioactive. 
Any hazard from such minor leaks of radioactivity can be met by 
locating the installation in the centre of a zone of very low human 
occupational and residential usage. This requirement is met by the 
current practice of 'specifying the boundary of a low population area 
within a radius of 1 km', with emergency action, ie. evacuation 
procedures, envisaged out to a further periphery of 2 miles from the 
reactor. Both boundaries have been confirmed in a study by Shaw and 
Sina (1976) for a postulated 'unit release' of 10" curies in the stable 
weather conditions (F. Pasquill's 'Category D', 1962) that usually 
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prevail in Britain, although they put the evacuation perimeter at 
3 km (1.86 miles). Their 'unit release' corresponds to a dose of 
170 rem to the thyroid of a0-5 year old child and is an order 
greater than the 'nominal 1,000 curies release' said by F. R. Farmer 
to be characteristic of siting regulations (supra). 
Recognition of the MCA as the chief hazard of nuclear power with 
its concomitant release of radioactivity in large quantities has 
justified the prudent policy of the remote siting of reactors, for 
instance the ones meeting Class I criteria in the long standing UK 
scheme (Charlesworth and Gronow 1967, Shaw and Palabrica 1974) were 
those of choice. Unfortunately, the policy of remote siting involves 
a heavy cost in power transmission and, in a densely populated country 
like Britain, the number of such sites is limited, Shaw and Sina 
(ibidem) finding only Dungeness in East Sussex effectively so isolated, 
though they failed to evaluate Hinckley Point on the coast of 
Bridgewater Bay in Somerset. 
The difficulties that have to be faced in formulating a realistic 
policy for power reactor siting in the UK are exposed if one considers 
a possible MCA releasing some 106 curies when the evacuation perimeter 
might have to be extended to 20 miles. In the case of Dungeness, this 
would involve the evacuation of Hastings (75,000), Folkestone (45,000), 
Dover (34,000) and Ashford (23,000) and some 2 dozen smaller centres of 
population like Lydd (4,500). There are few feasible sites in Britain 
that could be styled as truly 'remote' other than Dounreay near Thurso, 
Caithness (now called the Highland Region), on the Northeast tip of 
Scotland. 
9.4 Emergence of the g antitative approach to siting 
Siting restrictions when combined with the difficulties to be 
faced by a utility seeking proximity of electricity generation to 
centres of load and having to acquire tenure of suitably located land 
could pose serious obstacles to an energy policy that made nuclear 
power its principal source. 
Referring to the need to escape from the foregoing constraints, 
F. R. Farmer recalled that: 
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'During the period of the mid-1960s, there was a move 
to bring reactors closer to populations; this required 
an amendment of the maxiTun credible accident to become 
more realistic and required more confidence in the 
functioning of safety equipment. ' 
Nuclear Reactor Safety: Preface, 
Academic Press, New York, San 
Francisco, London, 1977, xii. 
A way out of the quandary is to reduce, if not the true serious- 
ness of the MA as postulated, then the perception of its gravity. A 
new policy was advocated by certain design and research authorities 
that aimed at achieving this end by rationalising the conception of 
the detriments of nuclear power. For example, Farmer opined thus: 
'I had worked on the problem of how sites might be 
specified for power reactors in a thickly-populated 
country such as the UK. 
This led me in 1967 to consider a scale of probabilities 
for accidents according to a risk concept in terms of a 
possible casualty rate within a sizeable nuclear prograzme 
of, say, 1,000 reactor-years. ... ... I chose a target line weighting somewhat against the more serious events.... 
... I reasoned that even a small release - say the nominal 1,000 curies release envisaged in many siting regulations - 
obviously occurred very rarely -I guessed at a figure of 
once per 1,000 reactor-years ... ... Thus, I was led to 
a required rate for a 106 curies release of not more 
frequently than once in 10' reactor-years. ' 
'Advances in the reliability assessment 
of reactor systems', 
ATOM 230, December 1975, United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
publication, p. 218. 
The outcome of his cogitation was 'The Farmer Line' approach to 
siting referred to in Section 7.2 above, the reactor design being 
matched on a probabilistic fault-sequence-release assessment to the 
category of the site in terms of the rate at which thyroid malignancies 
would be expected to be induced in the event of a range of accident 
scenarios of ascending gravity and declining probability (F. R. Farmer 
ibidem). The 'Line' is a representation of the concept of probability 
assessment rather than a tool for specific application in solving 
design and siting problems. 
Another probability-based approach with much the same purpose is 
the U. S. 'Reactor Safety Study' reviewed in Section 7.3, (N. C. Rasmussen 
1975). The method was devised specifically for the probabilistic 
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safety assessment of the American BWR and P1%R nuclear power plants and 
applied to that end. 
It found the chance of the worst accident happening to a U. S. 
light water nuclear power plant, BBNR or PhR, as 'once in 1,000,000,000 
years of reactor operation' (See Figure 5). The Study's estimate of 
the overall personal risk of fatality through the existence of a 
nuclear power station within 25 miles of the individual's domicile is 
put at 7.5 x 10-8 per annum or roughly 16-7. 
Both methods aggregate the radiation detriments of nuclear power 
by taking together the whole spectrum of exposures of a population to 
radioactivity from routine operational releases, smaller accidents 
and the most unlikely massive escape of fission products attributable 
to the MCA or greater hypothetical accident, spread over a probability 
range from certain to the exceedingly remote. The risk is then 
averaged out over the lifetimes of the individuals likely to be 
affected and in these terms may be compared with the other risks, 
'Mundane' and 'Unusual' (supra), to which they may be exposed in their 
daily life and listed in Table II. In this context, the nuclear power 
risk appears to be trivial, 10 -7 against 7x 10-3 per year from all 
causes at the age of 50. These figures, although they differ from 
those given brief mention in Section 7.3 above, are consistent with 
them. Death 'from all causes' includes disease as well as accidents 
and the greater nuclear risk relates to those living near a nuclear 
plant, compared with the national population. 
At this stage it is impossible to foresee how much influence these 
two probabilistic strategies will have on power reactor siting. It is 
suspected, however, that, in the UK at least, this will continue to be 
determined more by practical and political expedience than by abstract 
theory. Nevertheless, if nuclear power is to make an eventual major 
contribution to the economies of the developed countries, then either 
nuclear power plants must be moved in closer to centres of population 
and in densely populated countries semi-urban sites used or more 
economical methods of power transmission from remotely located reactors 
developed. An attractive option in the latter case would be the 
production of hydrogen and oxygen rich by-products by the endothermic 
utilisation of nuclear heat to be sent by pipeline for use, mainly as 
energy sources, in centres of industry, cities and other heavily 
populated residential areas with electricity distributed from local 
power stations burning or otherwise converting the hydrogen to electrical 
energy. This scenario as envisaged by C. Marchetti (1974) has been 
briefly conmented on in Section 6.2 above. 
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PROBABILITY OF THE WORST CONSEQUENCES OF A US NUCLLAR POWER STATION ACCIDENT 
(Rasmussen - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 'The Safety Study and its Feedback' Vol 31 1975 p 281 
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9.5 The true role of systems analysis in nuclear safety 
The application of the quantitative methods of reliability 
analysis to nuclear plant siting advanced by F. R. Farmer (1967) was 
part of a more general move to extend quantitative probability over 
the whole field of technical design safety assessment, a policy which 
he subsequently described more fully in his 1975 ATOM paper and 
elseufiere (26). It was put into effect in the Canvey Island/ 
Thurrock petrochemical complex risk study mounted by the Health and 
Safety Executive (J. H. Locke et al. 1978) and in the U. S. Reactor 
Safety Study (N. C. Rasmussen 1975). Together with other decision 
methodologies, the foregoing quantitative techniques have their 
antecedents in operational research that was extensively developed 
for military purposes during and after World War II (P. M. S. Blackett 
1962, D. J. White 1975/a). All are examples of inductive reasoning 
which, in its application to nuclear safety, has been examined by 
O. H. Critchley (1978) in his work on the historical, philosophical 
and mathematical background to nuclear plant risk management in the 
U. K. (See DocimientNo. 2 in the Annex of Supporting Papers). 
The attractions that these methods offer to proximate 
administrative decision makers, politicians and certain theoretical 
scientists are understandable, and if their limitations are recognised, 
are not without justification. They lie in the idealistic 
Weltanschauung that has deep roots in Western society and dominates 
most of its non-technical divisions. This holds that causation has 
its place in a cosmos of underlying, though generally not superficial, 
order and that it obeys the universal laws of nature. Some of the 
profound, but misleading inferences drawn from this concept were 
mentioned in Section 8.2.3. One most relevant to safety engineering 
is that it should be possible, if not to make an accurate forecast of 
what may happen in the future, then at least to predict the chance of 
an LPE, say the catastrophic failure of a major artefact like a nuclear 
power reactor, assuming as Poisson (1837) did that a positive 
mathematical probability may be calculated for any situation with an 
element of chance in its outcome, given access to adequate data. 
Besides, in the case of major innovatory technologies like nuclear 
power where actual experience of catastrophic incidents is minimal, it 
is claimed by risk and systems analysts that the dearth can be made 
good by synthetic data distributions compiled from information about 
the behaviour of analogous and comparable components, equipment, plants 
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and systems. The topic is examined further in later sections of 
this chapter. 
On the other side of the ideological division, engineers tending 
naturally to the pragmatic philosophy of The Deed' place greater 
confidence in more traditional and established empirical methods. 
Their approach in dealing with the safety analysis of design and the 
practicalities of construction and operation of technological under- 
takings, and particularly nuclear power plants, is to use a method 
based on a concept of limiting possible accidents which has been 
discussed as the Design Basis (DBA) and Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) 
methods in Section 9.2 et seq. above. 
The issue of idealism versus pragmatism has been, and still is, 
at the root of a serious debate about nuclear safety that has reached 
the most imposing official levels, and at least two major public 
inquiries, one chaired by an eminent scientist (B. Flowers 1976/c) and 
the other by a distinguished member of the bar (R. J. Parker 1978) have 
found in favour of the quantified probability approach to safety 
assessment, disparaging MCA practice. Nonetheless, this approbation 
of quantified systems analysis, and certainly its application to the 
forecasting of LPEs in hazardous technologies, is by no means universal 
and has many critics among professional engineers and from academia. 
The matter is of paramount importance in the safe exploitation of 
advanced technologies and is central to the development of the New 
Treatment. Moreover, it is held that the concept of the DBA/MCA is 
fundamental and proper to the achievement of reliability and safety in 
nuclear power technology, and for that matter in other technologies 
presenting similar 'zero-infinity' risks. Consequently, the systems 
methodology in the form of quantitative safety analysis comes as a 
valuable adjunct to nuclear safety engineering, but cannot provide 
its central core. 
9.5.1 A Cartesian representation of the theory-practice disjunction 
The foregoing differences in outlook between those who practise 
the intellectual skills of engineering and technology and those 
involved in the arts, administration, jurisprudence, politics and 
certain aspects of theoretical science and mathematics lie deep in the 
structure of Western society, a matter which has been discussed earlier 
(Section 8.1). Nevertheless, an understanding of the disjunction may, 
perhaps, be assisted by an analogy that can be drawn for the divorce 
between theory and practice and the way in which a similar conceptual 
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partition is used to represent the two aspects of alternating current 
(AC) in electrical engineering as shown in Figure 6a. Without such an 
approach, AC technology would be both perceptually and practically 
intractable, but the analogy can be taken no further than an 
appreciation of the similarity. It is given diagrammatic form in 
Figure 6b, where the intellectual gulf between those things which may 
be properly associated with 'The Word' are depicted in cartesian form 
as lying in the j-direction (along the y-axis) and those of 'The Deed', 
including applied science and theory with empirical verification, 
technology, the useful arts and manual skills, lying in the real plane 
(along the x-axis). Those activities which bring together aspects of 
both 'Word' and 'Deed', as in the case of engineering that achieves its 
ends by utilising scientific theory in association with technology, 
technicians' skills and handicrafts, may be represented by intermediate 
axes as shown in the Figure. Then, technical safety assessment of 
design would lie on the upper or 'Management' side of a 45° axis and 
the construction and operation of the plant so designed would lie on 
the lower or 'Technology' side. 
Such a graphical portrayal of the foregoing sets of cognitive 
entities that are respectively co-ordinate in theory and practice is 
indicative of their essence rather than their magnitude. It can also 
help to establish the relevance of the metaphysics, that has been 
discussed, to the acquisition of foreknowledge about the imminence of 
catastrophic LPEs in nuclear power plants, to the provision of means 
by which they might be inhibited, to prudent anticipatory measures such 
as siting and, not least, to assessment of the validity of some of the 
procedures for risk prediction and safety analysis. 
The disjunction may also be seen as a consequence of 'The 
Information Explosion'. Thus, Figure 6b may be envisaged as two 
orthogonal radii lying in the surface of a diametral slice of the 
expanding sphere of human knowledge, the aspect so presented depending 
on the direction of the cut in relation to the branches of culture 
depicted in Figure 1. The length of the arc joining the ends of these 
radii, associated as they are with 'Word' and 'Deed', namely 
administration-theory-design and practice-technology in the given case, 
is then a measure of the extent of the divorce between the two domains. 
Clearly, at some stage in the expansion of scientific and technical 
knowledge, the gulf between the two domains will grow too wide for 
effective executive authority to be exercised across. Until now, an 
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'Word' and 'Deed' by acquiring a sufficient grasp of the salient 
features of a given technology to make wise and rational managerial 
decisions, referring as appropriate to engineers and scientists on tap. 
This is fast ceasing to be the case. Technology in our times presents 
technical and associated societal problems of another order of 
complexity. The technical features are often recondite and the full 
consequences of many important innovations impenetrable to those 
without an appropriate scientific and technical background. To 
appreciate this, one has only to compare nuclear power with the 
combustion of fossil fuels, computerised data processing and xerography 
with clerical paper filing routines and hot metal typographic 
processes, aerospace and satellite communications linking continents 
with sea transport and submarine cables, and all of these earlier forms 
in their time were leaders in technology. In addition, there are modern 
medicine and surgery, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology which are new 
and without past comparisons. All these things come within the ambit 
of 'the class of engineers' ... ... ... 
... ... .. e whom Auguste Comte (1825) saw as providing the 
practical link between science as such and industry. 
9.5.2 The administrator's need for decision analysis 
There is a natural inertia in human society and patterns of 
behaviour of individuals and groups are slow to change. Despite the 
remarkable advances that have been made in technology, the administra- 
tive traditions remain and generalist proximate decision makers have 
retained their dominant positions in government, commerce and industry. 
Moreover, at the level of direction, a managerial concept called 'pure 
administration' has come into being (24). This appears to be a mode 
of executive thought that is claimed to operate in a realm of business 
abstraction above and beyond the work of the engineer and technologist 
whose fields of practice are the laboratory, drawing office, shop 
floor, construction site and control room. Policy can be formulated 
whereby the work of the specialists can be organised as functions to 
be carried out according to directions issued by administrators and 
business executives who have little more than a superficial knowledge 
of the technologies involved or of the thought patterns those 
technologies require for their successful exploitation. Integrated 
and participating management is replaced by two fields separated by 
the interface between policy formulation and business direction on the 
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one hand and productive operations and their subordinate functions on 
the other through which management information must pass. 
In both private industry and public sector activities involved in 
the exploitation of advanced and particularly innovative technologies 
- and in the West today there are few that are not, most major business 
decisions are complicated by the profundities and societal ramifications 
of the given technology. The generalist administrator or director of 
today is, therefore, likely to be ill-equipped to draw together in full 
comprehension all the technical complexities that interact with his 
other corporate duties. Decision theory and systems analysis appear to 
offer an escape from such quandaries by reducing difficult concepts to 
readily appreciated numbers. The magic of being able to solve 
refractory problems by transforming them into impersonal mathematical 
operations is obviously attractive. Besides, systems analysis has very 
reputable origins in operational research that made an important 
contribution to victory in the last war (P. M. S. Blackett 1962). As well 
as offering a process with a stamp of scientific objectivity, the 
administrative decision maker can associate his mistakes with faults in 
the methodology, rather than to imperfect judgement on his part. It is 
not surprising that the methods of systems analysis are much in favour 
in the boardroom and with officialdom. But, the circumstances are no 
longer simple. It took no technical knowledge to understand the 
statistics of wartime convoy management or the tactics of pattern 
bombing: nuclear power and information technology are in another 
intellectual class requiring the professional background and trained 
judgement of the engineer for their proper comprehension. 
While a systems approach can rationalise a complex and apparently 
intractable business or financial problem, it cannot supply the 
professional judgements that must come from the engineering dimension. 
As Professor Ida Hoos observed in her critique of systems analysis: 
'There is a confusion between a systematic approach 
and a systems analysis approach.... ... Unfortunately, 
the lack of factual knowledge of conditions existing 
in the real world forces the model builder to base 
many if not all his general conclusions on all kinds 
of apriori assumptions.... ... Uncritical enthusiasm for mathematical formulation tends often to conceal the 
ephemeral substantive content of the argument behind 
the formidable front of algebraic signs. ' 
Systems analysis in public policy: a critique, 
University of California Press, 
Berkeley, Calif., 1972, p. 37. 
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9.6 Safety Assessment of Design: Illusory aspects 
There are some profound logical, philosophical and practical 
weaknesses in the claims made for the existing methods of risk and 
reliability analyses when they are used as the main basis of support 
for safety claims about nuclear power plants. The leading techniques 
of which there are two, both centred on the safety assessment of design, 
have been described earlier. One is that of the Maximum Credible 
Accident (MCA), sometimes called the Design Basis Accident (DBA), which 
has been described earlier in this section and the other is that of 
Quantitative Safety Analysis (QSA) used in the Reactor Safety Study 
described in Section 7.3. The latter which is the better known among 
several systems approaches was a large scale and exhaustive assessment 
of the two designs of American light water reactors of the BWR and PWR 
types, with a program of 100 reactors in mind. The two designs were 
taken as representative of the reactor types concerned, the Study being 
thus generic rather than specific. Its terms of reference specified 
that 'quantitative risk analysis methods' should be further developed 
to dispel the uncertainties about their applicability. QSA methods of 
a sophisticated kind were already in use at the UKAEA's Safety and 
Reliability Directorate's laboratories at Culcheth in Lancashire where 
they had been developed to supercede the MCA method (F. R. Farmer 1975). 
The attempts to forecast the occurrence of catastrophic LPEs in nuclear 
plants by the above methods of safety assessment are centred on studies 
of design of the plant types concerned and their validity is dependent 
upon the extent to which the plant as actually built and operating 
replicates the design in reality, whereas in practice there may be 
marked differences between them. Lead times preclude retrospective 
adaptions of the assessments to take into account deviations and 
modifications from the design in the state it was when assessed earlier. 
While both the MCA and QSA methods can explore in depth the intricacies 
of the design and improve its quality by exposing weaknesses and, in 
the case of the QSA, adjust a lack of balance of investment in safe- 
guards, they remain studies of design. Their estimates of the chances 
of occurrence of catastrophic LPEs in-the entity conceived by the 
design thus relate in principle only to the reality of the operating 
plant that will exist at the end of the construction process. 
Furthermore, both the MCA and QSA approaches are exercises in 
inductive reasoning which is the subject of much doubt as to its logical 
validity, though scientific method and commonsense escape from the 
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dilemma by recourse to probability (infra). It is in the domain of 
probability that the main differences between the MCA and QSA 
methodologies lie. The MCA method is one of objective probability 
that is mainly qualitative with subjective overtones, though 
quantitative reliability analysis is much used when deemed to be 
appropriate. As an example the paper presented as Supporting Document 
No. 5 in the Annex is part of an MCA assessment pertaining to nuclear 
core temperature management in a Magnox reactor. 
It must be said in favour the MCA technique that prediction was 
never its aim as it was devised to give a safety target for the design 
office and, indeed, the synonym for the MCA is the DBA which says so 
in its title. For specific risks, QSA as practised by SRS can be 
commissioned for the safety assessment of plants and processes 
presenting a major hazard. One such assessment was the Canvey/Thurrock 
petrochemical installation risk study (See Section 7.1) and a massive 
investigation with a QSA orientation has been made in support of the 
Central Electricity Generating Board's case for its prospective PWR 
nuclear power station at Sizewell and tabled at the current inquiry (13). 
9.6.1 Design Probabilities: Feasible and Metaphysical 
As suggested earlier, the advanced methods of technical design 
assessment now available to engineering provide penetrating and, indeed, 
inestimably useful tools for the safety and reliability analyses of 
design. To restate the case, the weaknesses and covert fault sequences 
so disclosed can be designed-out or corrected by modification of the 
design feature involved to give intrinsic safety, to introduce an 
engineered safeguard or to devise an administrative control. The 
Maxinom Credible (MCA) and Design Basis (DBA) Accident methods, being 
engineering rather than predictive techniques, do not lend themselves 
to the estimation of very low probability risks other than in terms of 
'credibility'. On the other hand, Quantitative Safety Analysis (QSA) 
as exemplified by the U. S. Reactor Safety Study has been promoted with 
quantitative prediction in view. Despite doubts about the true worth 
of such attempts at prophesy, QSA imposes a disciplined approach and 
can give guidance to a design office about the apportionment of 
investment among competing safeguarding features. Clearly, a judicious 
combination of the MCA/DBA approach with that of QSA is desirable. 
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In their treatments of design, both the MCA and QSA approaches 
reduce effectively to much the same thing, namely the identification 
of potential fault sequences, and particularly low probability ones, 
that could derogate from the safety and reliability of the plant. The 
substantial differences between the two arise at the fringe between 
tangible probabilities and hypotheticalities where the MCA method sets 
a limit to specific safeguarding actions by a concept of 'incredibility' 
which is a matter of engineering judgement, whereas QSA defines similar 
bounds in terms of assessed low probability limits of reliability 
expressed in numerical terms. F. R. Farmer (1975 -2) has suggested that 
the quantitative decision point should be related to an individual risk 
of 10-s per year per reactor program, with a reservation on political 
grounds that 10-6 to 10-7 would be advisable. 
However, beyond the foregoing decision points, the probabilities 
may become metaphysical, an aspect of objective probability identified 
by J. Le R. d'Alembert (1717 - 1783) as cited by L. E. Maistrov (1974/b) 
and by Emile Borel (1950) as his 'Single Law of Chance'. Both 
authorities posit that very rare events never happen, though this must 
be qualified by reservations about the nature of the system in which 
the action is conceived (14). Hence, very low fault probabilities of 
less than 10-6 per annum are too unlikely ever to occur and certainly 
not in the relatively short life time of any real nuclear plant. This 
does not mean that a nuclear power plant bears no chance of suffering 
a catastophic failure, for an event of this kind is always possible 
where there is an actual risk, even though it may be very small. The 
real hazard is due to a spectrun of small risks, both identified and 
unrecognised, that fluctuate with time and circumstances. The LPE that 
might occur is, therefore, most unlikely to be the one predicted by QSA. 
Furthermore, the message contained in the design by which the plant 
will be constructed and operated inevitably suffers distortion and 
modulation during its 'noisy' translation from concept into the reality 
of an operational nuclear power plant. In consequence, there will have 
been brought into existence a field of failure eventualities that lie 
beyond the scope of design analysis per se and thus will have escaped the 
scrutiny of the assessor. The circumstances are depicted in Figures 7 
and 8. The disastrous happenings at 'Browns Ferry', 'Three Mile Island' 
and other catastrophic industrial plant LPEs such as thatat 'Flixborough' 
(See Appendix II) are examples confirming the general experience. 
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Finally, to repeat, any system of design assessment, even one as 
exhaustive as the U. S. Reactor Safety Study, pertains to a design 
concept that remains as 'marks on paper' until it is realised as an 
operating nuclear power plant, many features of that concept being 
distorted by 'noise' in the process (supra). What is eventually brought 
into existence as hardware is, thus, something other than the entity 
conceived in the design, although it may be a very good representation 
of it. Valid safety assessments cannot be derived from studies of 
design alone, but must involve immediate knowledge of the artefact as 
well so that the assessment embraces not only the design, but the entity 
that represents it in reality. Such correspondence is seldom, if ever, 
attained for novel designs exhibiting those major innovatory elements 
common in nuclear power plants. Congruence can, however, be achieved 
after an interactive series of evolving replications through which the 
design asymptotically approaches full identity with the artefact. The 
process in a reliability application has been described by William 
Bryan (1975) as the 'design-make-test-fail-fix' iteration, an 
engineering process of design-assessment-construction interaction by 
which the American space agency (NASA) finally succeeded in putting men 
safely on the Moon. An approach to congruence is also to be achieved 
by that form of engineering inspection which the writer has defined as 
'Executive' in his paper on inspection that is presented as Supporting 
Document No. 4 in the Annex (O. H. Critchley 1981). It proceeds by an 
interchange of design, safety and reliability assessment and engineering 
feasibility information and judgements between the design authority and 
plant constructors and operators brought about by inspectional 
intervention of a third-party kind. The matter is discussed more fully 
in Section 14.2 et seq. The process is also depicted by the string of 
6 dots which link the 'ideational' and 'practice' fields shown in 
Figure 8. 
9.7 Some matters concerning the nature of probability 
After a short historical review, the critique that follows will be 
concerned with the use of probability in the technical safety assessment 
of the design of nuclear power plants and, especially, in its use in the 
Quantitative Safety Analysis (QSA) method of risk prediction. To 
justify its claim to the verity of the numerical estimates of risk so 
derived, QSA depends absolutely on the validity of the failure rate data 
accumulated in official data banks (F. R. Farmer 1975, S. R. S. 1984) that 
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are largely sponsored by public agencies. The claim is questionable 
for reasons that will be given in Sections 9.7.2 and 9.7.3 below which 
bear on the difficult subject of sampling. 
Probability which is the essence of safety assessment has long 
been a subject of controversy over its meaning and applicability. The 
general tendency abroad today to treat probability measures as if they 
were among the physical attributes of an entity or system, like Lord 
Rothschild's concept of risk (1978), has by no means received universal 
acceptance, even being facetiously described as a 'Phlogiston theory' 
(S. R. Watson 1981). 
It is a relatively new field of mathematics that emerged little 
more than 250 years ago when 'probability theory was raised to the 
status of a science and began a new era in its development' by James 
(Jacques) Bernoulli's treatise, 'Ars Conjectandi', that was published 
in 1713 (L. E. Maistrov 1974/c). The part it could play in the 
burgeoning insurance industry that had come into being as an essential 
economic support for the rapidly expanding commerce of an age on the 
threshold of the Industrial Revolution (See Section 1.1) was an 
important factor in its growth. Nevertheless, it can be argued that 
gambling was its true mainspring because this was the underlying theme 
of many of the early works on the subject, for example Christiaan 
Huygens'essay, 'About Dice Games' published in 1657 and Gerolamo 
Cardano's 'Book on Games of Chance' published posthumously in 1663 some 
90 years after his death (L. E. Maistrov 1974/d). While this is true, 
it is not inconsistent with the former view as all business ventures 
of the time beyond the traditional craft industries were gambling in 
the sense of their very high risk element. For instance, until the 
revolution in the art of navigation that followed on acceptance by the 
British official 'Board of Longitude' of John Harrison's marine 
chronometer in latter half of the 18th Century (See Section 3.5), deep 
sea merchant shipping was a hazardous undertaking. Accordingly, 
financial cover for such risks was very costly and bottomry (See 
Glossary) rates ran at seldom less than one-sixth of the valuation of 
ship and cargo per voyage. 
Though the mathematics of probability has made impressive progress, 
especially during the past 150 years, notably through the work of 
Simeon-Denis Poisson (1781 - 1840), Adolphe Quetelet (1794 - 1874) and 
Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz (1868 - 1931), its philosophical and societal 
interpretations are still matters of continuing dispute. The history 
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of the development of the science has been described by J. M. Keynes 
(1922/d) and more recently and comprehensively by L. E. Maistrov. 
The latter observed that: 
".... Poisson's main work on probability theory, 
'Recherches sur la probabilite des jugements en 
matiere criminelle et en matiere civile' (was) 
published in 1837. 
The ideas and conclusions in Poisson's book were supported 
in the first place by mathematicians who considered it 
natural to apply probability theory to problems of 
legislation, jurisprudence and the political and economical 
sciences. ... (But) a number of mathematicians were very 
much against such an application of probability theory. 
They accused Poisson and his followers of compromising 
mathematical science. 
(In spite of this important and fruitful initial period 
in the development of the philosophical basis of the science 
there followed) an indifferent attitude towards probability 
theory in the West and a definite rejection of the 
possibilities of utilising its methods in studying natural 
phenomena. This led to a long period of stagnation ... " 
L. E. Maistrov (Trans Samuel Kotz) 
Probability Theory: A Historical Sketch, 
Academic Press, New York and London, 
1974, pp 158 - 161. 
Except in certain special applications where the interpretation 
and management of error were of obvious importance, an appreciation of 
the power of mathematical statistics and probability theory did not 
penetrate the applied physical sciences and engineering until about 60 
years ago. 
The ignorance of statistics and probability is confirmed by the 
lack of any hint or reference to the two sciences by Professor Frank A. 
Laws of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in his internationally 
recognised and authoritative book, 'Electrical Measurements' (1917 & 
1938). This is surprising as the reduction of errors is specifically 
acknowledged by Laws as of paramount importance in the work of 
standardising the fundamental electrical quantities. Perhaps the most 
potent factors in creating an awareness of the significance of 
probability theory in the fields of engineering and the physical 
sciences have been the development of Operational Research during the 
last war (P. M. S. Blackett 1962) and the application of probability 
concepts to quality control in reliability engineering. 
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9.7.1 Idealism and realism in probability theory 
It is my view that the idealism that permeates the Western 
Weltanschauung (See Section 8.1) lies at the roots of the intriguing 
and enigmatic controversy about the nature of probability, that is to 
say whether it is 'objective', 'subjective' or 'aleatory', the latter 
associated with the 'frequency theory' (See Glossary). The aleatory 
concept provides justification for acceptance of the systems approaches 
currently so much in vogue. Realism favours the commonsense 
interpretation that expresses the reality of 'The Deed' and suggests 
that all three theories are true to the extent of the relevance and 
stability of the data available in a given case. Probability thus 
enables an engineer to make a good, plausible guess whereby he can 
escape from the dilemma presented by the gap between certainty and 
doubt. Moreover, it is a very powerful intellectual tool, relevant to 
all human activities. Nonetheless, owing to its comparatively recent 
revival, probability is still, by and large, an unfamiliar concept. 
Not surprisingly, errors in its use abound, notoriously in certain 
clinical applications (D. G. Altman 1980). 
Ordinary people use qualitative probability judgements all the 
time with words such as 'might', 'probably', 'likely', 'conceivable', 
'one in a million' and their antitheses such as 'improbable', 
'unlikely', 'not a chance' and so on. The doubts held by engineers and 
other scientists concern the quantitative or aleatory uses of 
probability in the realm of very small risks, a point made by the 
American Physical Society in their critique (1975) of the 'Safety Study' 
(N. C. Rasmussen 1975/d). However, serious debate about the justification 
or otherwise of the predictive value of probability is best left to 
philosophers and academic mathematicians. An indication of the abstruse 
and complex nature of the arguments evoked is given by the following 
excerpt from a work by A. W. F. Edwards of Caius College, Cambridge: 
'I have been unable to accept any philosophy in which 
a probability, subjective or not, can be associated 
with an uncertain proposition. After prolonged 
consideration of the various schemes advanced, I have 
been forced to conclude that they ill reflect the true 
complexity of inductive inference, representing a many- 
dimensioned substance by its one-dimensional shadow. ' 
Likelihood: Prologue on Probability, 
Cambridge University Press, 1972. p. xv. 
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Nevertheless, it is necessary to enter the debate to some 
peripheral extent. Consequently, the criticism is restricted to the 
meaning to be attributed to the very small risk numbers that are 
produced by the analyses, the relevance of data compilations used in 
them, the logic of the quantitative approach per se and the utility of 
numerical probability in safety analysis and risk prediction that must 
of necessity be practised by engineers. 
9.7.2 Data collection and risk models 
Any efficaceous approach to event prediction, be it of the more 
mundane expectancies of ordinary life or that of an LPE, will involve 
some form of sampling, that is the classification and consideration of 
those prior events that are deemed to be relevant. In their notes on 
sampling, G. Udny Yule and M. G. Kendall make the following pertinent 
observation: 
'The theory of sampling is thus closely bound up with 
the theory of probability. The many problems which 
arise in this connection are among the most 
interesting and at times the most difficult which 
science and philosophy offer. ' 
An introduction to the theory of statistics, 
Charles Griffin, London, 1944, p. 10,0.41. 
Some of the most important applications of methodologies of risk 
assessment and safety analysis, namely the 'Canvey Island' investigation 
(See Section 7.1) and the 'Reactor Safety Study' (See Section 7.3), have 
been mentioned earlier. The value of such analyses in a given risk 
situation can be no more efficaceous than the truth of the model 
constructed for the purpose and that of the data used in it. The 
criterion which is called 'Ontological Relativism' (See Glossary) 
requires that both the model and its data base be assured in terms of 
adequacy, relevance and validity. D. J. White (1975/b), has named three 
tests by which these properties may be established. For the safety 
analysis of a nuclear power reactor system, they may be restated thus: 
(i) A priori evaluation - 
Confirmation that the model used corresponds in all 
essential respects with the design or designs that 
it is supposed to represent; 
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(ii) Behaviour - 
Confirmation that the model is able to simulate all 
potential fault sequences and that the failure rate data used to quantify the fault trees are both valid 
and relevant; and 
(iii) Implementation - 
Comparison of the performance of the model and its 
output with accessible information about the behaviour 
of existing plants and systems of similar or analogous design. (This is one of the objectives of the U. S. 
Licensee Event Reporting scheme outlined in Note 15 and 
of which specimens are shown in Table III). 
It is interesting to note that in the summary of the principal 
comments concerning the credibility of the Safety Study's methodology 
(supra) virtually the same conditions for relativism were specified by 
NASA and the U. S. Department of Defense (N. C. Rasmussen 1975/e). They 
cover almost the same ground as the criteria set by O. H. Critchley 
(1976) for the meaningful application of quantitative safety analysis 
to a nuclear power program (See Document No. 1 in the Annex). These 
required verification that: 
(i) The plant has been or will be constructed strictly in 
accordance with the design as assessed; 
(ii) The materials, components, equipment, sub-assemblies 
and other elements used or to be used do in fact 
conform with the design requirements; 
(iii) The data about failure rates or time-to-failure used in 
the safety analysis are of a kind to provide true knowledge about the performance of the actual elements 
that comprise the plant or will comprise it as designed; 
(iv) Where true failure rate data are not available as in the 
case of a novel or modified system, then the inferential 
system that created the synthetic data is fully disclosed 
and any uncertainty factors openly stated; 
(v) It should be possible to show that an independent program 
of safety analysis would arrive at a similar quantitative 
assessment of the risk; and 
(vi) Enough user experience has been acquired with the given 
system or about similar systems to establish that those 
significant faults and failures have occurred, or are 
otherwise known, so that the credible fault sequences 
that could lead to a major catastrophic event have been, 
or can be, identified. 
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U. S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) in their approach to securing reliability 
in military and space hardware appear to have adopted the same 
principles of 'Ontological Relativism' as enunciated by D. J. White 
(supra) and their tests as described by U. S. Comptroller General (infra) 
cover similar ground to the above 6 criteria and, when not the same, 
are akin by implication and intent. When satisfactory relativism 
could not be established, NASA adopted a process sometimes called 
'burning-in' which W. Bryan (1975) has described as 'design-make-test- 
fail-fix' (supra). 
In the case of the 'Safety Study' (supra), factual failure rates 
for many of the major components and subsystems were not available. In 
order to quantify the fault trees, synthetic distributions were 
constructed to provide the missing data (infra). Inevitably, these 
distributions contained a large proportion of conjectural elements 
(N. C. Rasmussen 1975/f). 
The Peer Group Review and other critics found the management and 
presentation of this material less than safisfactory, the former body 
thought the treatment to be 'inscrutable' (See Section 7.3.1). 
In addition to being abstruse in the view of its critics, the data 
base of the 'Safety Study' fails to meet the last four of the six 
criteria for ontological relativism given immediately above. These 
defects impugn the credibility of the risk numbers cast by it. In this 
connection, in commenting on the 'Study', the U. S. Comptroller General 
(supra) observed that: 
'Absolute reliability numbers are misleading and 
that the time required to develop them is better 
spent on critical-component reliability analyses. ' 
Letter to Senator the Hon. Mike Gravel, 
Reactor Safety Study: Main Report, 
Attachment 3, WAS-i-1400, 
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, 
Washington, D. C., October 1975, p. 196. 
The Safety Study and other risk analyses using similar methods 
seem, therefore, to produce prophecy rather than valid predictions of 
system performance. A major weakness from which they suffer is the 
paucity and lack of relevance of the basic fault-rate data available 
for the calculations, but this is an irreparable characteristic of 
complex industrial innovations like nuclear power. The virtue of analyses 
of this kind is 'the discipline they can inject into design analysis'. 
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9.7.3 The fallibility of synthetic data distributions 
In order to make good the lack of relevant fault-rate data needed 
for quantitative risk and reliability analyses (QSA), many systems 
analysts have constructed synthetic data banks for their calculations. 
The report of the U. S. Reactor Safety Study makes an open and 
comprehensive disclosure of the method adopted to compile the 
required population. 
'The fault trees ... were developed to an extremely 
detailed 
level ... Each fault tree was constructed down to the basic component to determine the basic causes of system 
failure; relays, wires, wire contacts, and gaskets are 
examples of the level to which the fault trees were 
developed. - Major components such as pumps, valves, 
diesels, etc., were of course also included. A 
representative fault tree ... consisted of roughly 300 
basic 
component failure causes, 700 higher faults, ... 1,000 fault 
relations - gates on the tree - and 30,000 combinations of 
basic component failures that would result in system failure. 
The extreme detail in the fault trees made it possible to 
identify single component failures and single human failures 
that would cause the entire system to fail. ' 
N. C. Rasmussen et al. 
Reactor Safety Study: Main Report, 
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
WASH-1400, Washington, D. C., 
October 1975, pp. 160 - 161. 
T. Thedden (1979) in a review of the problems of quantification 
described the methods used to create the failure rate data required by 
safety analysts working in the field of risk evaluation in energy 
generation. He found that the failure rate figures for the components, 
sub-systems, sub-assemblies and other parts comprising a nuclear 
reactor, PWR or BWR (supra), were compiled from the following sources: - 
(a) Informed subjective judgements, 
(b) Estimates by specialist experts, 
(c) Results extrapolated from experiments with models, and 
(d) Time-to-failure figures derived from specialised data banks 
for components, sub-assemblies, sub-systems and so forth 
with reference to: 
(i) Similar or comparable types and 
(ii) replicates of the components specified. 
Of the four of these sources identified, the first two are the 
results of supposition, the third, though empirical, introduces the 
uncertainties of extrapolation and the last which is factual is in two 
parts of which only the second can be used without further assumptions 
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in the fault trees. The first, source (d)(i) inevitably requires the 
analyst to infer the relevance of the analogy between the given datum 
and the actual element to be incorporated in the plant. It is not a 
very stable one, therefore. Yet, in spite of the lack of fidelity, 
data of this kind provides the failure rate figures that must be used 
in many of the key links in the fault chains, namely ducts and other 
large pipes, pumps, structural parts of the main pressure vessel and 
its nuclear core and big valves, things that for the most part are 
purpose built for a given plant or are manufactured on site. 
More serious difficulties arise when attempts are made to create 
data that makes allowance for human error. It is a capricious factor 
with no respect for circumstances and, except in the most mundane of 
repetitious tasks, there is no satisfactory way of quantifying it. 
Furthermore, erratic human behaviour and mistakes have been the prime 
cause of many disastrous plant incidents, for example those at 'Browns 
Ferry', 'Three Mile Island' and 'Flixborough' (See Appendix II) and it 
is estimated that they are the cause of 60% or more of all accidents 
(M. B. Biles 1969, Glin Bennet 1983). Human error contributions were 
included in the 'Reactor Safety Study' fault tree computations (supra), 
but drew some adverse criticisms (See Section 7.3.1. ). 
Similarly compiled populations of data have been used by the 
Systems Reliability Service of the UKAEA (S. R. S. 1984) for its safety 
evaluations of the Authority's nuclear installations and in its 
commercial work, for example, the risk investigation supporting the 
Canvey Island/Thurrock petrochemical complex safety study (See Section 
7.1 and Note 10). Some years earlier, a very large and extensive 
assemblage of data was used for the cost-benefit analysis made in 
support of Mr. Justice Roskill's abortive inquiry (1971) into the 
siting of a third London airport, an exercise described by Peter Self 
as 'Nonsense on Stilts' (1970). 
Synthetic data distributions would appear to offer the analyst all 
the assets of one based on a collection of real, stable elements, but 
where the synthetic material constitutes a major part of the data, such 
a belief is illusory. The compilation of a synthetic data universe is 
an intricate and often open-ended task, and it is seldom easy to trace a 
datum back to its source. In the case of the Reactor Safety Study, the 
Peer Review Group were very critical of the way in which the failure 
rate data was managed (Lewis et al. 1978). 
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From the foregoing, it may be concluded that when the data base 
for the risk or safety analysis of a system has a major component of 
synthetic elements, then any quantitative predictions or assessments 
derived, particularly when LPEs are concerned, will be no more valid 
than the data used. If the data are insubstantial in quality, then 
quantitative attempts to assess a system's risks are little more than 
guessing, and that may be badly informed. Nonetheless, the foregoing 
criticisms do not derogate from the positive contribution that a well- 
organised national data bank can make to the quality and reliability 
of engineering products and major artefacts generally. 
9.8 Overview 
It has been the aim of the foregoing critical analysis of the 
development of technology and the consequent experience of accidents in 
Western society to show that the rare Low Probability Event manifest in 
the catastrophic failure of an engineering artefact, plant or system, is 
a singular phenomenon distinguished from the usual run of accidents, and 
even from those occasional, uncommon but not entirely unfamiliar, 
happenings of a more abnormal sort referred to in Table II as 'Unusual'. 
Accordingly, the hazard of the LPE is unique, presenting the community 
with a 'zero-infinity' risk. 
The Section has traced modern methods of risk management through 
their evolution from the engineering Safety Factor to the present day 
sophisticated techniques of quantitative safety and reliability analyses 
of which the U. S. Reactor Safety Study is a prime exemplar. There is no 
doubt that they have made important contributions to safety and 
reliability at the stage of design and may well assist in arriving at 
expedient decisions about nuclear reactor siting. In spite of these 
advances, they have not displaced the earlier Design Basis and Maximum 
Credible Accident concepts which are seen as developments of the Safety 
Factor criterion. It has been noted that, while these attempts to 
replace a mainly qualitative philosophy of safety engineering by an 
approach based on quantitative systems analysis have been welcomed by 
administrative decision makers, some important establishment figures 
and certain theoretical scientists, they have been coolly received by 
engineers. This paradox has been cited as an example of the widening 
disjunction between the cultural domain of administration, finance, law 
and politics and that of science, technology and engineering depicted 
in Figure 6b which has grown so markedly since the end of the Second 
World War. 
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The widening gulf is also an aspect of the 'Information Explosion' 
that is bringing about a qualitative change in the nature of 
administration and management in modern Western society. Whereas 
previously, a single able administrative brain could readily encompass 
within its executive fief all the relatively simple features of the 
industrial and social applications of technology, this is no longer the 
case because the fields that have to be covered have become so vast and 
complicated. The effect was foreseen by Auguste Comte more than 150 
years ago when he defined the engineer as a scientist of a new type who 
was placed to bridge the gap. For societal reasons of a profound 
nature that it is not appropriate to explore in this text, the engineer 
has not attained the important position envisaged. Instead, decision 
making methodologies and systems analysis have been developed that 
appear to offer an alternative to use of the engineer as an intermediary 
by reducing the nub of a technological problem to quantitative 
parameters that can be handled by a purely administrative approach. 
It is argued that quantitative methods of risk prediction and 
hazard management in nuclear power are in fact illusory. The fault 
sequences to which they assign feasible probabilities will be properly 
designed out in any competent engineering plant construction process, 
whereas those which they perceive as beyond the credibility fringe are 
metaphysical and therefore too unlikely to happen. The rare and unusual 
event that may rum to a catastrophic conclusion and is potential in any 
plant posing a major hazard will be one that has not been foreseen should 
it occur, as for instance the disastrous accidents at the 'Browns Ferry' 
and 'Three Mile Island' nuclear power stations. This risk situation is 
that depicted in Figures 7 and 8. Furthermore, the calculations under- 
lying these quantitative predictions in the case of highly innovatory 
technologies lack the support of an adequate data base. Deficiencies 
are made good by failure rate estimates compiled from analogies, 
engineering inferences and suppositions. While this kind of synthetic 
data may offer the plant designer with a vade mecum of technical 
performance estimates and reliability comparisons, it does not 
necessarily provide a stable foundation for the prediction of LPEs. 
The construction of synthetic data bases of the kind used in the Reactor 
Safety Study has been briefly discussed and the validity of the 
assumptions upon which they rest reviewed against the criterion of 
ontological relativism. The requirements are not satisfied, a finding 
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consistent with that of 'inscrutable' which was returned by the Peer 
Review of the Safety Study. 
As the topic of probability has played a major part in the research 
reported in this thesis, several subsections have been devoted to it. 
These deal with its history of comparatively recent emergence as a 
science, the realism of the objectivist concept compared with the 
idealism of the frequency and subjectivist theories and credibility 
in the prediction of LPEs. In the case of nuclear power plants, owing 
to the largely supposititious nature of the data base, the intrusion of 
unknown factors that may be likened to 'noise' into the processes to 
which the design is subjected before it is converted into the reality 
of an operating system and other uncertainties, attempts at prediction 
in any definitive sense are, therefore, deceptive. Informed guessing 
per se is an inadequate basis for the management of nuclear power risks. 
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10. INDUCTION, PROBABILITY, ENGINEERING AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
'Inductive processes have formed, of course, at all times 
a vital, habitual part of the mind's machinery. Whenever 
we learn by experience, we are using them. But in the 
logic of the schools they have taken their proper place 
slowly. No clear and satisfactory account of them is to 
be found anywhere. Within and yet beyond the scope of 
formal logic, on the line, apparently, between mental and 
natural philosophy, induction has been admitted into the 
organon of scientific proof, without much help from the 
logicians, no one quite knows when. ' 
John Maynard Keynes (Lord), 
'Induction and Analogy - Chap. 18, 
Treatise on Probability', 
The Collected Writings, Vol. VIII, 
MacMillan for the Royal Economic 
Society, London, 1973, p. 241. 
Before proceeding to develop further the style of engineering that 
plays a major part in the New Treatment, it is appropriate to consider 
certain philosophical and logical matters that arise which justify the 
novelty of its approach. Engineering has been defined, not as science 
per se, but as the science of applying the facts that have been 
established by scientific inquiry for the benefit of the community 
(M. I. T. 1956). It is therefore a discipline that lies between the 
domains of 'The Word' and 'The Deed' as shown in Figure 6b. Before the 
surge of technological discovery and invention that led to the 
Industrial Revolution, though its services were valued, the discipline 
itself was of poor standing in the body politic. It is from this lowly 
station that engineering is only just emerging. In fact, its 
practitioners have generally been little more than higher grade mechanics, 
responding to directions coming from the domain of 'The Word', 
determined by policy in which they have had no voice (A. Cottrell 1976). 
Since the Industrial Revolution engineering has been acquiring a 
broader purpose and a more significant definition, though the meta- 
morphosis has been far from one of steady progress. The change has 
been consequent upon both the advance of science and the concomitant 
enhanced importance of technology, factors that are rapidly widening 
the intellectual gulf between the administrative affairs of 'The Word' 
and the technics of 'The Deed' as described in Section 9.5.1. The need 
for a new discipline able to bridge the gap was foreseen by August Comte, 
namely that of the engineer (See Section 8.1.2). 
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With the recognition of his importance no longer denied, the engineer 
is becoming able to assert a growing influence on technological policy 
formulation and decision making, something required for the New 
Treatment, although his status in society has yet to receive proper 
recognition (See Appendix III), and, there are those who have foreseen 
even greater things (Thorstein Veblen 1921). 
10.1 Engineering and the ethos of nuclear power technology 
From what has been said so far, there are few aspects of the 
management of the hazards of atomic energy that are not properly 
germane to the fief of the nuclear engineer. The field is so wide that 
it has embraced almost every other science, has brought into being a 
special branch of medicine and toxicology in health physics and drawn 
upon many disciplines not normally associated with technology. Far 
reaching new legal concepts have been created and incorporated in 
statute law and regulations and extended Worldwide through binding 
international conventions (Street and Frame 1966). Alvin Weinberg 
(1978) has described the fringe between nuclear science and technology 
and the liberal arts and politics as the realm of 'trans-science' 
where thought patterns of a novel kind prevail and scientific method 
does not apply. 
In this milieu, the engineer working in the field of nuclear power 
has to face the challenge of decision making on matters of an advanced 
and hazardous technology that have serious economic, political and 
societal significance. It is particularly true for those engineers 
employed in the regulatory bodies concerned with nuclear safety, as 
for example the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), described 
in a later section of this thesis and elsewhere by O. H. Critchley 
(1977) in his study of the history and philosophy of U. K. nuclear 
regulatory practice. It is important, therefore, to examine certain 
matters of a logical, philosophical and mathematical kind that are 
normally'taken for granted in engineering practice because their 
uncritical acceptance can conceal fallacies, illusions and false 
assumptions and cloud technical judgement. For instance, the popular 
idea that the Euclidian pattern of mathematical reasoning is trans 
ferrable to the area of common sense (See Glossary) is, in fact, false. 
In particular, the process of thought known as inductive inference on 
which man relies for a very large part of his day-to-day decision 
making and which certainly underlies engineering design, technical 
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safety assessment and risk prediction cannot be justified by formal 
logic. (To cite K. Popper and D. Miller 1984: see also Document No. 2 
of the Annex. ) Neither does scientific method fall into any simple 
logical slot. Yet, it is by induction and scientific method that the 
work of engineering is done, and 'trans-science' must be left to the 
sociologist and politician. 
Owing to the beauty of its symmetry and the satisfaction that 
can be found in its simple logic, mathematics offers an intellectual 
attraction that can be specious. This combined with the ideological 
predominance of the realm of 'The Word' has led to an almost uncritical 
acceptance of the systems approach as a panacea for the difficulties of 
decision making under conditions of uncertainty. Moreover, this is 
aided by an impressive mathematical presentation that suggests 
scientific precision and authority. 
J. Schwartz (1962) warned of this extraordinary ability of 
mathematics to make a scientific argument look convincing without regard 
to its validity. It has in consequence exerted 'a pernicious influence 
on science' because 'it can dress scientific brilliance and scientific 
absurdity in the impressive uniform of formulae and theorems'. J. M. 
Keynes (1936) commented some years earlier on this failing as 
detrimental to economics, describing such regalia as 'concoctions ... ... 
which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and inter- 
dependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful 
symbols'. 
The process of design which is at the core of engineering is 
largely a matter of inferential logic. Present facts are assembled in 
the design to express a potential intent, the concept of some artefact 
that is a machine, structure or system to be created in the future by 
realising the image of the design. Design is thus an innately 
predictive activity. Furthermore, safety assessment and the other 
techniques of risk analysis, whether qualitative or quantitative, are 
also attempts to make rational forecasts about the behaviour of a plant 
or system that it is presumed will be built according to instructions 
given in the relevant design message. This again is an exercise of 
the faculty of inductive reasoning which has long been one of the 
fundamental questions of epistemology. Although he did not use the 
term, the 'problem of induction' was notably discussed by David Hone 
(1711 - 1776) in his famous work on causation (1748), 
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and this is generally accepted as the starting point of the modern 
debate which continues today. It seems to have little chance of being 
resolved satisfactorily through the logic of 'The Word', being 
intractable by the use of 'pure reason'. Despite that, induction is 
in illimitable, naive daily use, justified by the popular logic of 
connnon sense (supra). 
10.2 The riddle of inductive inference 
The mechanical engineer, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951), who 
later turned logician, dismissed the feasibility of inference by 
induction in the following terms: 
'5.135 There is no possible way of making an inference 
from the existence of one situation to the existence 
of another, entirely different situation. 
5.136 There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference. 
5.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future from those 
of t i-f e present. 
Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal 
nexus. ' 
(He appears to escape from the dilemma of the impossibility 
of inductive inference on the one hand and its practical 
necessity on the other with his final proposition. ) 
'7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in 
silence. ' 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus - 1922 
(Trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness), 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972. 
Professor Max Black of Cornell University states the difficulty 
about induction more explicitly: 
'An inductive inference from an observed association of 
attributes (An - Bn) can justify inference to another case 
(ý +1 Bn+l) or inference to the corresponding generalisation ('All A are B') only if the association is somehow known to 
be lawlike, not merely accidental. Yet how can this be known 
in primary inductions that do not themselves rest upon the 
assumed truth of other laws? Certainly not by immediate 
experience, nor a priori, nor, without begging the question, 
by an appeal to induction. ' 
'Problem of Induction', 
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 4 
(Editor Paul Edwards), 
Collier MacMillan, London, 1967, p. 171. 
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Notwithstanding the philosophical arguments about the validity of 
inductive inference, it is a matter of common experience that induction 
is both effective and necessary. Therefore, for the purposes of 
ordinary daily life, the issue appears to be a non-problem. The 
practice of engineering and the exercise of engineering judgement are 
inductive skills par excellence. It would be impossible to design, 
build and operate a complex plant without an effective means of 
acquiring foreknowledge about the likely consequences of the interplay 
of the forces and environmental stresses to which its components, 
structures and sub-systems will be exposed. Moreover, without induction 
the management of potential LPEs would be impossible. 
Despite some recent dissent (infra), there has been wide agreement 
that an escape from the logical dilemma of induction can be made by 
turning to the science of probability. The relevance of such an 
approach to nuclear power was discussed by O. H. Critchley in his work, 
'Aspects of the historical, philosophical and mathematical background 
to the statutory management of nuclear plant risks in the U. K. ' 
(Document No. 2 of the Annex) from which the excerpt below is taken: 
"Probability and Resolution of the Enigma of Induction 
33. The understanding of induction which is still far 
from complete has improved with man's grasp of the 
relatively new discipline of probability. Generalising 
from the science of statistical mechanics which about a 
century ago was resolving many of the knotty problems 
of physics, James Clerk Maxwell was moved to observe 
that Logic could deal only with certainty, doubt and 
impossibility, whereas reason went beyond these things. 
The link was provided by 'the calculus of probabilities' 
which was 'the true logic' for man and science. 
34. Now that probability has allowed an escape from 
the impasse of the problem of induction, the debate has 
moved on to the understanding of probability itself and 
that may be more difficult and contentious than the 
former challenge. " 
Symposium on radiation protection in 
nuclear power plants and the fuel cycle, 
British Nuclear Energy Society, 
London, 1978, pp. 11 - 18. 
Despite the confidence of the experimental physicist, James Clerk 
Maxwell (1831 - 1879), expressed in the quotation above, the case in 
pure logic still seems to be far from settled as no less an authority 
than Sir Karl Popper has just announced 'a mathematical proof of the 
impossibility of inductive probability' (K. Popper and D. Miller 1983). 
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The safety studies, assessments of design and risk analyses that 
are now in vogue are exercises in inductive probability of a large 
scale. Therefore, the quandary about induction is of no little 
relevance to the anticipation and management of the catastrophic LPEs 
that have blighted the operation of the advanced plants and the use of 
those other things that have been counted as the blessings of modern 
technology, among them nuclear power, oil and its petrochemical products 
and the new pharmaceuticals. A few decades ago when these hazards did 
not exist, or perhaps those that did were not recognised, for all 
practical purposes the problem of induction was ignored and left as a 
philosophical conundrum. Today's answer to the dilemma may lie in the 
sphere of scientific culture identified by C. P. Snow (See Section 8.1) 
and, thus, in recognition of that logically untidy entity, 'scientific 
method', as the pattern of thought germane to engineering and technology. 
10.3 Induction, Scientific Method and the language of technology 
In a discourse on problem-solving in the evolution of scientific 
knowledge, J. R. Ravetz describes the difficulty over induction in its 
modem aspect in the following words: 
... there is no formally valid pattern of argument that can establish properties of general classes 
from the reports of particular experiences. The 
argument may be partly mathematical and deductive, 
but (outside purely theoretical fields) it must 
include inductive, confirmatory, probabilistic, 
or analogical inferences, which are never capable 
of carrying certainty from premiss to conclusion. ' 
Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems, 
Penguin University Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 120 
(Earlier edition, CUP 1971). 
Incontestably, there is a well-grounded case in formal logic for 
the impossibility of induction, whereas the verified efficaciousness of 
the inductive processes used in everyday human activity is an obvious, 
though perhaps contrary, fact. As suggested earlier in this text, the 
philosophical impasse presented by induction may lie in the intellectual 
system which we have inherited from antiquity and are conditioned to 
accept as absolute. In the days of the glory of the Ronan Empire, the 
world of creative thought was closed to the slaves and lower orders of 
freemen concerned with technology (See Section 8.1). As Lucius Annaeus 
Seneca (4 BC - 65 AD) wrote when commenting on some of the inventions 
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of his time which included transparent window glass and a form of 
short-hand: 
'But the inventing of such things is drudgery for 
the lowest of slaves; philosophy lies deeper. 
It is not her office to teach men how to use their 
hands. The object of her lessons is to form the 
soul. ' 
'Epistolae morales 90', 
Quoted by Alan L. Mackay in 
The Harvest of the Quiet Eye, 
Institute of Physics, London and 
Bristol, 1977, p. 135. 
Hence, logic as we know it lies in the realm of 'The Word' and is 
of that precision of thought and grammar that is part of our cultural 
heritage which, like the message of Seneca's philosophy, has moulded 
our processes of cognition. Induction is a thing that works with deeds, 
useful arts, experiment and observation in a holistic way and, therefore, 
does not fit into the canons of a received logic. 
Human thought processes when used to solve a problem or formulate 
a particular concept are necessarily peculiar to the discipline in 
which the activity is set, but the language by which the result is 
expressed is constrained by the accepted linguistic pattern of the 
cultural milieu. Language which is the product of a society is formed 
by 'past generations and centuries of human experience', but is 
specifically fashioned by the intelligentsia who dominate that society. 
Before the explosive growth of science and technology that began with 
the Industrial Revolution, the limitations that the inadequacies of 
language must have placed upon the full communication of scientific 
ideas and theories were of no immediate societal consequence. They 
were comparatively simple and when it was too dangerous or suitable 
words could not be found to express a concept, it was contained in an 
allusive phrase meaningful to the informed. 
Be that as it may, as the ideas and theories became more 
complicated and with the widening disjunction between 'The Two Cultures' 
(C. P. Snow 1959), their presentation and communication in simple terms 
and hints became fraught with difficulties, not only because they 
challenged authority, but because they could not be properly explained. 
Dr. Ohm suffered grievously for this reason (See Section 8.1). More- 
over, the storehouse of relevant knowledge available to the 
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practitioners of 'The Deed' was becoming so large that each discipline 
began to create its own lexicon and metatechnology as well. 
It is not surprising then that conventional linguistics handed 
down from antiquity and properly slow to change was not able to express 
readily and in a general way the concepts of emerging science and 
technology and this view is not without authoritative backing. Recently, 
H. B. Barlow (1983) claimed that the development of language plays an 
essential part in the evolution of man's intellect. In addition to its 
function in the communication of ideas, it has 'a primary task of 
organising information in the mind'. Barlow then argues that language 
has not yet acquired the capability to provide a satisfactory definition 
of intelligence. Professor Bruce Archer (1979) holds that mathematics 
and logical models are the product of an alien mode of reasoning that is 
not helpful in the work of creative design. This is overcome by 'a 
designerly way of thinking and comrm. nicating' that is as different from 
the scholarly ways as it is powerful and productive. It may, then, 
not be unreasonable to suggest that induction shares a similar 
linguistic disability. 
The foregoing argument seems to have received support from recent 
research in neurolinguistics (See Section 8.1.1). This work suggests 
that the activities of 'The Deed' use the right cerebral hemisphere 
more than those of 'The Word'. Intellectual activities in the latter 
class are centred in the left hemisphere which is held to be the site 
of linguistic capability, abstract thought and rationalisation (J. R. 
Skoyles 1984). On the other hand, engineering and design, though no 
less dependent on analysis, rational thought and logic are also 
concerned with the intellectual processing of complex ideograms which 
has its province in the right hemisphere. Their thought processes 
might, therefore, be expected to include a dimension absent from the 
intellectualisations of 'The Word', engineer and designer acquiring 
their special propensities during their education, professional training 
and subsequent experience. Support for this case comes from the 
findings of Howard Gardner (1984) who claims that there is a specific 
cultural basis for the development of such intellectual faculties, for 
instance the evocation in the Japanese cultural milieu of musical 
virtuosity in ordinary children of 7 years of age and under who would 
be considered prodigies if they exhibited their attainments under 
different circumstances. 
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In Europe after the Renaissance and more particularly in its 
northern states, the prevailing cultural pattern enabled science to 
make rapid progress and her discoveries were presenting a serious 
challenge to the established schools of philosophy. The savants 
necessarily taking an empirical view side-stepped the issue of 
induction when they began to adapt their thinking to accommodate the 
new knowledge and concepts. Although science is logical, the canons 
of formal logic were of little help in their enquiries. The scientific 
way of thinking began to be defined. The first enunciation of the 
Scientific Method that is so fundamental to scientific discovery is 
generally attributed to Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626). A little later, 
the great experimental physicist, Sir Isaac Newton (1642 - 1724), 'a 
lad of his hands as well as his head', set down in his famous 
'Principia' 42 principles of scientific enquiry of which the fourth 
defines the nub of what is accepted as Scientific Method, namely: 
'Rule IV: In experimental philosophy we are to look upon 
propositions collected by general induction from phenomena 
as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any 
contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time 
as other phenomena occur, by which they may be made more 
accurate or liable to exceptions. ' 
'Rules for reasoning in Philosophy', 
Principia (1687) = Mathematical Principles 
of Natural Philosophy (Trans. Andrew Mott), 
Berkeley University Press, 1934, p. 398. 
The principle, although applied in our time in a more dialectic 
way than Newton might have tolerated, has been central to science and 
technology for nearly 300 years. It has been restated in more general 
terms by Professor Peter Caws as: 
'The method of science is a mixture - the proportions vary 
fron one science to another - of logical construction and 
empirical observation, these components standing in a 
roughly dialectical relation. ' 
'Scientific Method', 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7 
(Ed. Paul Edwards), 
Collier-McMillan, London, 1967, p. 343. 
In summary, it may be said that inductive reasoning in application 
to scientific and technical things may be identified with the thought 
processes that pertain to Scientific Method which, like intelligence, 
still lacks a definition that would be universally accepted as 
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satisfactory. Despite that, an approach that is essentially Scientific 
Method underlies almost every creative act in engineering, not least in 
design, and it plays a very important part in safety analysis for 
nuclear power plants. 
10.4 Recapitulatory synopsis 
This section together with Section 9 that precedes it completes 
the historical, cultural, mathematical and philosophical background 
against which the New Treatment will be developed. They considerably 
extend the research reported by the writer in his 1978 work, reproduced 
as Document No. 2 in the Annex. The New Treatment has emerged in a 
situation fraught with societal and political concerns engendered by 
contemporaneous advanced technology, and particularly by the peculiar 
'zero-infinity' risk of nuclear power. To justify the need for a new 
approach, it has been necessary to study in some depth the causes of 
the difficulties that its predecessors have failed to overcome. Some 
of these are intractable and there remains a grave but small residual 
risk of a devastating nuclear reactor accident. The question of 
greatest significance concerns the validity of the methods for the safety 
assessment of nuclear power plants and for the prognosis of those faults 
that could induce catastrophic failure with a massive release of fission 
products. Another of a different kind, but not unrelated, is to win 
public acceptance for the system of safety management adopted.. 
It can be proved to the satisfaction of formal linguistic logic 
that inductive reasoning is invalid and, in consequence, all attempts 
to foresee future happenings in terms of prior circumstances are nugatory. 
But this conclusion is at variance with human experience and normal 
expectations because, although such forecasts are by no means certain 
to be fulfilled, they are an efficaceous and necessary part of the 
conduct of affairs. Inductive reasoning of this kind is a matter of 
everyday experience and the planned activities of civilised life would 
be impossible without it. This is also true for the physical sciences, 
technology and engineering and induction is inherent in scientific method. 
The processes of design upon which engineering depends for its 
achievements. are also innately inductive. Probability would seem to 
offer an obvious escape from the dilemma, but, induetive probability can 
also be shown to be invalid in formal logic. In pursuit of a simpler 
technology in the past, engineering had neither need nor ability to be 
concerned with the philosophical conundrums of logic, and the physical 
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sciences slipped out of the quandary by enunciating the Scientific 
Method as a special way of problem solving peculiar to scientific 
discovery. 
The very rapid advance of science and the concomitant growth of 
technological industry has widened the intellectual gap between the 
culture of the milieu in which science and technology flourish, that 
is the domain of 'The Deed', and that of 'The Word' which is the culture 
of the arts and administrative disciplines. It is a disjunction to 
which C. P. Snow some 30 years ago referred in his controversial Rede 
Lecture on 'The Two Cultures' and the gulf has widened considerably 
since then. The difference between the thought processes peculiar to 
them has been acknowledged in this decade by eminent authorities in 
scientific fields as disparate as psychology and design. 
It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the problem of induction 
may in reality be one of communication because accepted language is not 
able to convey ideas that are strange to the thought patterns of the 
dominant social sphere, one in which science and technology are still 
alien and suspect. 
The difference between the role and outlook of those concerned with 
administration in business, finance and politics and the savants and 
their science was perceived by Auguste Comte early in the European 
industrial revolution who saw the need for a new kind of scientist who 
could work across the intellectual gulf to foster the exploitation of 
science by industry and thus promote economic and social progress. The 
Scientific Method may be seen thus, not as a logical anomaly, but as a 
special way of inductive reasoning proper to the sciences and engineering. 
For this purpose a linguistic form is needed that differs from the 
accepted language of the day, offering a dialectic in which the concepts 
peculiar to a given science or technology may be more tractably discussed 
and meaningfully expressed. 
Despite the fact that the quantitative methods of reliability 
analysis have made an important contribution to reliability in 
engineering design and that safer design has resulted, this achievement 
does not mean that they have the capability to define those unforeseen 
circumstances in which catastrophic LPEs may occur. No prior theoretical 
study of design, however exhaustive, can foresee the situations that may 
arise on a plant that has been constructed and is operated in another 
distinct dimension, that of practice. The facts are that of the 
eventualities envisaged, those that could credibly occur will be properly 
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designed out, while those at the fringe of incredibility are far too 
unlikely to happen. Yet, where such a hazard exists, some disastrous 
event is always possible, but the clues to it will either not have been 
present in the design or be too ambiguous to have been identified as 
efficient in the analysis. 
In addition to the foregoing commonsense reservations, there are 
more fundamental disabilities. Within the field of formal logic 
foresight of this nature is not possible. In the area of scientific 
method where inductive probability is efficient, the quantitative 
methodology also fails because it is primarily a tool for reliability 
analysis of design. Prognosis about things that might happen to a plant 
under conditions of use requires another technique. Yet, other than for 
knowledge acquired by continuing experience of replicate plants in use 
no such thing exists. It is certainly absent in the case of nuclear 
power owing to the essentially innovatory nature of its technology. 
Again, the very reliability estimates from which the forecasts about LPEs 
are made are in themselves unstable, being the result of theoretical 
studies that lose their validity when extrapolated into the 'noisy' 
dimensions of reality in which the plant in question must operate. 
Finally, there is a further disability that the methods of assessment 
per se lack the basis of adequate and stable failure rate data because 
of the novelty and inconstant nature of their sources, many of which will 
be of necessity synthetic. 
It follows that the preferred way of assuring adequate safety in the 
operation of nuclear power plants and, for that matter, in other types of 
innovatory technology, is to recognise the futility of attempting to 
attain that end by use of techniques of safety analysis and risk 
prediction that purport to be definitive. Theoretical investigations of 
this kind, no matter how exhaustive, cannot disclose the nature and 
occasion of the odd confluence of unlikely events and human errors that 
can combine together to initiate a disastrous fault sequence. Instead, 
success is more likely to be achieved by using design assessment aids 
such as the MCA concept and QSA to an extent appropriate to their proper 
purpose, assuring a level of safety perceived to be adequate by pursuit 
of sound engineering confirmed by independent surveillance. Design 
would then be seen in its proper place as a pattern for the construction 
and operation of a given plant, recognising the discontinuity between 
the 'marks on paper' that constitute it and the hardware of the 
engineering reality that has to be constructed according to its 
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instructions. The method to be favoured is essentially that of 
scientific method epitomised in W. Bryan's heuristic maxim (1974) 
of 'designmake-test-fail-fix' which characterised the approach to 
space vehicle reliability in the 'Apollo' Moon-shot program. 
The engineer, through his unique position of both design scientist 
and industrial manager participating in the construction and operation 
of the plant, is able to offer a direct executive link between the upper 
echelons of administration, finance and politics and the shop floor, 
construction site and control room. He is thus placed to draw together 
all aspects of nuclear power and to achieve an outcome of assured 
reliability: indeed, one that can be recognised as such by the body 
politic. An example is set by the confidence that Dutch civil engineers 
have been able to inspire in the population of Holland by their long 
and successful control of the perpetual threat of inundation from the 
sea. However, the problem of safety assurance for modern advanced 
technology is more complex because many of the restraints of the past 
on hazardous technical innovation, such as personal responsibility for 
the installation or process, are no longer as effective as they were in 
the days when the dykes were built. 
A system of monitoring is therefore necessary to define individual 
and corporate responsibility for those personal errors and managerial 
deficiencies that lead to serious plant accidents. O. H. Critchley in a 
paper on the part played by human error in the causation of catastrophic 
failures in major industrial installations and public transport vehicles 
published in 1981, which is reproduced as Document No. 4 in the Annex, 
described the evolution and monitoring role of a special class of 
engineers dedicated to safety technology and regulatory science. The 
topic is pursued later in this text. 
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PART SOUR 
FEATURES OF THE NEW TREAD: DEFENDED SAFETY, EVENT-NOISE AND 
CATASTROPHE THEORIES AND THE NEED FOR ENGINEERING INSPECTION 
Sections 11 to 13 comprising: 
A further exposition of the philosophy of the New Treatment 
in which 'the plant' is presented as a continuing 'noise' 
creating phenomenon from design concept to terminal shutdown, 
being maintained in a regime of engineering that blends the 
qualitative (MCA/DBA) and quantitative methodologies of design 
assessment and the strategies for construction and operation 
of the plant in a pragmatic policy for the defence of 'adequate' 
safety; observations on the nature of engineering design; the 
human factors - involvement, unintentional and culpable errors 
and accountability, in event causation; accidents, faults and 
incidents as 'Event-noise' (En) flux in 'which major failures 
and catastrophes are identified as singularities in the flow; 
the tautotlogy of formal Eli analysis; recourse to ideographic 
means to assist the interpretation and comprehension of safety 
and reliability problems, the' representation of Ea experience 
and plant operational strategies by a simple Catastrophe model; 
the paradox of event precursors, evidence of 'loss of resistance 
to failure' as a guide to safety defence tactics; and the role of 
engineering inspection in the defence of safety. 
VATIC SYNOPSIS 
Even though the most advanced methods of safety and reliability 
analysis of design and best organised of strategies of quality 
assurance and control in construction and operation may reduce 
the incidence of accidents, faults and mundane failures in a 
plant, system or process, they are unable to create a regime of 
absolute safety where there is a potentiality for catastrophic 
failure. Indeed, cases are legion where a disastrous accident 
has occurred in a wholely unsuspected and adventitious mode. 
There are few of these rare, low probability events that have 
not been precipitated by some human error or omission, unintend- 
ed, inadvertent or culpable. It is then to inspection, the age- 
old process that has evolved to detect, expose and prevent human 
error and kindred failings that attention is now turned. 
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11. AN OUTLINE FOR THE NEW TREATMENT OF L069 PROBABILITY EVENTS 
'Science is built of facts the way a house is built 
of bricks; but an accumulation of facts is no more 
science than a pile of bricks a house. ' 
Jules Henri Poincar6, 
La Science et 1'hypothese, 
Paris, 1902 
(Trans. W. J. Greenstreet, London, 1905). 
So far the 'New Treatment' has been alluded to rather than 
described and at this stage it is appropriate to say more of what it 
is about. Although it is an administrative as well as a technical 
course of action, its most important aspect is empirical and largely 
concerned with the way in which a certain kind of practical engineering 
is undertaken. This follows from the fact that serious accidents, 
indeed any incident, cannot occur in the corpus of the design of a 
plant, process or system per se because that design has no existence 
other than in the realms of thought, being but a collection of ideas 
and instructions on paper or otherwise recorded. Actual events, 
rather than speculations about imaginary happenings, must take place 
in a system that has physical existence. The 'New Treatment' is 
thus intimately involved in the whole engineering process from the 
conception of the artefact and the expression of that idea in the 
design to the realisation of the latter in a satisfatorily functioning 
entity, for the purposes of this study a reliable nuclear power station 
running on full load. In addition it must ensure that important 
societal criteria have been met. This requires that the whole sequence 
of actions must not only have achieved a safe and reliable outcome that 
imposes a negligible risk on the community served, but it must be 
apparent to the interested and concdrned public that this has been the 
case. 
The view that an individual takes of risks, safety and the 
unexpected occurrence of catastrophic failures in technological artefacts, 
structures and systems is largely determined by a cultural standpoint 
unique to him as an observer. Consequently, he who professes to 
expertise in one of the five great cultural disciplines depicted in 
Figure 1 may be expected to perceive the phenomena of risks and 
catastrophic failures, for our purposes here, Low Probability Events 
(LPEs), in a manner peculiar to his profession. The scientist will, 
therefore, try to measure and explain them; the administrator thinks in 
terms of principles, the interpretation of rules and of precedents; the 
163 
lawyer will seek to establish culpability for infraction and 
liability; the entrepreneur sees the situation in terms of profit and 
loss; the doctor will be concerned with the harm and hurt suffered by 
those exposed to their destructive forces; but the engineer will aim 
at enhancing the operational efficiency and resistance to failure of 
the entity at risk. There will be, of course, some interaction between 
the disciplines and at times a fertilising interchange of concepts, but 
the response in each case will in general be conditioned by the habits 
of the particular profession. As may be expected then, mathematicians 
and many theoretical scientists will favour the quantitative methods 
of systems analysis, as for example N. C. Rasmussen and F. R. Farmer, and 
their approaches have been endorsed by the administrative establishment 
(Lord Robens 1972/b, Sir Brian Flowers 1976/c). In contrast the 
engineer's stance is inherently pragmatic. His attention is directed 
to the site realities of accident causation and prevention, the 
expediencies of siting, emergency action and post-incident damage 
control and to those improvements in design, quality assured construction 
and operational practice and plant maintenance that such considerations 
show to be necessary. 
11.1 The 'trans-scientific' aspects of Engineering 
It is perhaps not generally recognised that the engineer's 
perception of the hazards associated with a technology and, thereby, 
his attitude to management of its risks is inherently different from 
those that would be evoked in a scientist, and a physical scientist in 
particular. Engineering is not an inferior kind of science, but a 
different, though still scientific, discipline cast in the role foreseen 
for it by Auguste Comte (supra). More recently, J. R. Ravetz found that: 
'... ... there are certain deep differences between the two sorts of work; so that for the preservation 
of the health of both they oust be kept distinct 
while yet in contact. ' 
Scientific Knowledge and its 
Social Problems, 
Penguin University Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 329. 
It may be that the greatest differences between the two fraternal 
disciplines lie in the use of measurement. The scientist in his search 
for truth tries to measure and quantify the phenomena he is called upon 
to explain. Lord Kelvin put this approach in the following words: 
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... .. I say that when you measure what you are 
speaking about and express it in humbers, you know 
something about it: but when you cannot measure it, 
when you cannot express it in numbers, your 
knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind. ' 
William Thomson, 
Lecture to the Institution 
of Civil Engineers, London, 1883. 
And without question this is the proper mode of investigation 
for physical science. It is certainly not an all embracing way of 
treating those scientific problems that exist in the fringe where 
science is in contact with society, the region defined by Alvin 
Weinberg (1978) as 'trans-science'. While measurement is essential 
to the engineer's pursuit of scientific method, many of the things he 
encounters cannot be measured and expressed in numbers, but must be 
appraised in their qualitative aspects. 
The engineer is unable to pursue his art with the quantitative 
rigour of physical science and he must therefore adopt a more flexible 
mode. Whereas the scientist can identify, select and restrict the 
variables presented by his problem, the engineer has no such facility. 
Instead, he must adapt his course of action to accommodate a variety 
of factors, variable, some incommensurable, many unexpected and others 
that are in no way scientific. In these circumstances, measurement 
and quantification are limited, though invaluable tools and mast be 
supplemented by qualitative means, by that indefinable faculty of 
'engineering judgement'. 
Oddly, engineering is the only major current discipline without 
a distinct and unique philosophy to guide and inspire its professionalism. 
There is a philosophy, indeed philosophies, of science. Law seeks its 
direction and amour propre in jurisprudence. Medicine has long hallowed 
precepts and practice dating back to Hippocrates. In all countries, 
administrators in establishment posts are necessarily imbued with a 
philosophy appropriate to their duties that maintains consistency in 
governmental and political policy fornaxlation and decision making. 
Some attempts have been made to fill the more obvious areas of deficiency 
and there are signs of a tendency for them to coalesce into an 
identifiable philosophical theme relevant to engineering. 
In the past two decades, 'design' has been recognised as a 
subject for independent study and research and has been incorporated as 
a topic in its own right in the syllabuses of many engineering degree 
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courses (M. C. de Malherbe and P. J. B. Solomon 1863-19.641. The 
importance of engineering design has-been given some recognition by 
the Government. The report of a departmental committee on 'Engineering 
Design' chaired by G. B. R. Feilden appeared in 1963. It recommended 
setting up of a 'Design Council'. It was updated in 1976 by a Design 
Council study of 'Engineering Design Education' directed by Alexander 
Moulton. The topic is beyond the scope of this text, except to say 
that the writer has given due cognisance of its importance in his 
research and critical judgements. 
11.2 Attempts to define some basic principles of safety and reliability 
Despite there being no coherent philosophy of engineering, a 
number of important doctrines have appeared ad hoc to guide design and 
bench, shop floor and site practice. Among them are the Safety Factor, 
the Design Basis and Maxinamº Credible Accident concepts in nuclear 
engineering, the criteria of simplicity and symmetry, 'avoid-a-sudden- 
change-of-section' and so on. In the specific area of nuclear plant 
design, a comprehensive set of 'Principles' was issued by the U. K. 
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) in 1976. The document has been 
progressively updated since (R. Gausden 1982 - 2). They are intended 
to apply to all systems of significance to safety in a nuclear power 
station'. They cover the safety assessment topics shown in Figure 3. 
Principles with statutory force applying to the operation of nuclear 
power plants are attached as conditions to U. K. nuclear site licences 
(R. Gausden 1982). They are a mix of legal obligations that concern 
site demarcation, record keeping, radiation exposure limits, fissile 
material and radioactive waste management and engineering safety 
principles bearing on the operation and maintenance of the plant. The 
latter are technical provisions of a very general nature that require 
the licensee to respond by formulating rules and instructions. 
11.2.1 Characteristics of the approach to radiological protection 
The aim of any serious approach to the management of low 
probability disastrous technological events should be to prevent them, 
and this has been the principle underlying nuclear safety engineering 
since its inception and is expressed in the Design Basis Accident 
doctrine. On the other hand, in the case of radiological protection 
generally, the policy is to minimise the risk of deterimental consequences 
as no lower exposure threshold has, as yet, been found, if indeed there 
is such a thing, and it is not feasible to create zero dose environments 
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for either public or iorkers. Practice throughout the World is 
largely determined by the prestigious 'Recommendations' of the 
International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP). The 
Commission assumes that "any exposure to radiation may carry some 
risk ... (and) ... there is no 'safe' dose ... " and protection aims 
at establishing 'a dose (which) might be called an acceptable dose' 
(ICRP Publication 9,1965). The situation is open-ended, labyrinthine, 
controversial and fluid. The position is currently that: 
The aim of radiation protection should be to prevent 
detrimental non-stochastic effects and to limit the 
probability of stochastic effects to levels deemed to 
be acceptable. An additional aim is to ensure that 
practices involving radiation exposure are justified. ' 
'Reconunendations of the International 
Conmission on Radiological Protection'. 
Radiation Protection, Publication 26, 
S. 9,1977. 
While the above 'Recommendation' is consistent with the ICRP's 
earlier philosophy, it represents a change in emphasis from qualitative 
attitudes of limitation in the spirit of 'as low as reasonably 
achievable' (ALARA) to quantitative concepts of acceptable dose 
determined by risk mathematics. In practice, Publication 26 may make 
little difference to the management of industrial exposures as of now 
and they will continue to be prudently minimized. Nonetheless, it is 
a trend towards reliance on quantitative criteria which have by no 
means secured universal acceptance among engineers and members of the 
international scientific community (Alvin Weinberg 1972, Karl-Z. 
Morgan 1978, Daphne Gloag 1980). 
11.2.2' Principles for the New Treatment 
The arguments in the preceding parts of this thesis have eroded 
the main bases of the present approaches to the management of the 
hazards of nuclear power. They have exposed the inadequacies of the 
claims made by the several methods of design safety assessment to 
predict the chances of catastrophic nuclear plant accidents and the 
further weakness of the quantitative techniques of safety analysis 
owing to the instability of the data. As observed earlier, the 
accidents that are revealed by such analyses are either properly 
designed out or are otherwise of too low a probability to happen. 
Moreover, their prognostications relate to design and not to the operating 
plant brought into being after a lead time of perhaps a decade or more. 
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However, in any given case the chance of a severe radiation accident 
will not have been eliminated as something beyond the scope of the 
analysis can happen instead as suggested in Figures 7 and 8. 
The New Treatment offers a supplementary approach, accepting the 
useful and, indeed, necessary features of the achievements of nuclear 
safety technology, in particular the enhancement of safety and 
reliability in design. Furthermore, its central theme is engineering 
by scientific method and is, thereby, directed at the reality of the 
operating entity of a nuclear power plant rather than at its design. 
Salient points in its philosophy are: 
(i) Engineering proceeds by inductive reasoning. Its 
envisaged end product and related conclusions are 
therefore probable rather than certain and any 
engineering endeavour must be of sufficient 
flexibility to adapt to the unexpected. 
(ii) Safety follows from reliability: a reliable plant is 
likely to be a safe one. Reliability cannot be 
achieved by studies of design alone, but is the 
result of an evolutionary process epitomised by the 
iterative maxim of 'design-make-try-fail-modify`. 
Therefore, in the pursuit of safety, novelty must be 
minimal. 
(iii) Potential events of metaphysical probability never 
happen (Borel's Single Law of Chance), but something 
else, unforeseen and equally catastrophic, may. 
(iv) Human error is ubiquitous, pervasive and capricious 
and no process of design or work of construction or 
operation of a plant or system is immune. Its 
incidence is unexpected, displacing those failings 
that are foreseen. It is the major cause of accidents 
of all kinds and a significant contributor to 
catastrophic failures. It is impossible to eliminate, 
but it can be minimised by surveillance in the form 
of inspection. 
(v) Nothing happens without precursors which are more 
often than not perceptible before an accident. 
Detection of 'evidence of loss of resistance to 
failure' is an effective means of anticipating and 
aborting sequences leading to system failures. 
(vi) An engineering approach characterised by elegance and 
simplicity involving no more novelty than the 
situation demands is most likely to be reliable and 
safe. 
(vii) Life is risk. Nothing is absolutely safe. Eiimans 
will tolerate a modicum of risk, but the risk perceived 
mist be so small in the circumstances of benefit that 
it can be ignored. 
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(viii) Human life is beyond price, but some valuation 
may be needed against malevolent chance in the 
economic mang ement of humanitarian investment 
in safety (16). 
A characteristic of certain important modem advances in 
technology is the enormity of the continuing societal risk that the 
associated hazard can impose on the community exposed. Although that 
hazard may be safely contained within apparently secure protective 
barriers, technical or administrative, the dangerous potential remains 
on leash. Success in risk management of this kind, epitomised by that 
of nuclear power, has two common goals. One is to secure effective and 
credible control of the threat and the other is to convince the 
concerned public that, this being so, the benefits derived are worth 
enduring a residual risk that tends to zero. 
There are four principal conditions to be met if these are to 
be achieved. They are to secure that: 
(i) The source of the hazard has been so effectively 
contained that there is no significant immediate 
threat (engineering), 
(ii) There exists a credible due process for ensuring 
that the system on which containment of the hazard 
relies is effectively and lastingly maintained in 
its proper state (regulation), 
(iii) Opinion leaders amongst the public accept that the 
system of hazard control meets the requirements of 
condition (ii) supra (political), and 
(iv) The public as a whole are satisfied that the benefits 
that come with continuing exposure to the hazard are 
worth the risk that it imposes (societal). 
If the engineering and regulatory conditions can be efficaceously 
met, and be seen to be met after democratic challenge, then public 
satisfaction with the system of hazard control is likely to follow and 
the risk should be accepted (J. R. Ravetz 1977 - 2, W. D. Rowe 1979). 
11.2.3 The quandaries of 'Adequate Safety' 
A challenge to be faced by the New Treatment is that of 
'Adequate Safety'. Expressions of disquiet about the safety of advanced 
modern technological innovations are proper in view of the continuing 
run of catastrophic accidents of which the public are kept aware by the 
news media. Although significant fears rust be investigated, there is 
a danger in over-anxious concerns about possible, but improbable risks 
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that are already satisfactorily contained; of adverse, though rare, 
reactions in a few patients treated by otherwise effective and safe 
medicines; and of futile pursuits of the chimeras of hypothetical 
plant accidents. Excessive emphasis on safety can result in the 
proliferation of regulations and codes and the ratchetting of 
industrial costs that bring minimal reduction in accident rates and 
disease incidence. It has become a blight on the drug industry where 
multiplying safety regulations and testing requirements have not only 
grossly increased costs, but have diminished the supply of new and 
much needed remedies (M. Weatherall 1982). It is justifiably claimed 
that unduly tight controls have already been responsible for shortened 
life spans of many throughout the World whom the new drugs could have 
cured, as in the case of beta-blockers in the U. S. A. Even when the 
opponents of a major technological project have failed to abort the 
object of their attack, they have often been the cause of lengthy 
delays in construction programs that have caused electric power 
utilities heavy financial losses. 
Again, in the case of nuclear power, the Sisyphean hearings on 
the subject of emergency cooling for the core of a PWR in the case of 
a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) have involved heavy expenditure on 
research and legal costs by the U. S. atomic energy authorities and the 
plant constructors. Design changes have been introduced and PWR may be 
a safer reactor as a result. Whether or not these were justified by 
the severity of the envisaged failure and the likelihood of the fault 
that could cause it or whether they will be truly effective in 
reducing the latter are moot points. Be that as it may, changes made 
to enhance the safety of a design as a result of debate about 
hypothetical faults, rather than those which are justified by 
experience in the field, can often lead into the morass of 'safer-than- 
safe' when technical safeguarding investment goes beyond the point of 
diminishing returns. But, experience of some faults is unobtainable 
because they are the very things safeguarding should prevent. 
A balance is hard to strike. The 'Minamata' (1956 to 1968) and 
the 'Thalidomide' (1958 to 1962) tragedies shocked the world, and the 
'Aberfan' (1968) and the 'Flixborough' (1974) disasters were followed 
by major public inquiries which changed the style of British safety 
regulation. None of these events could have been feasibly foreseen 
by prior design studies. The significant point is that in each case 
there was a 'hiss-before-bang', but the operators and regulators failed 
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to recognise the telltales or, gtherwise, chose to ignore them (See 
Appendix II). 
The New Treatment accepts that nuclear engineering in Britain 
has attained a standard that can assure safety in the design of power 
reactors, given that such designs are subjected to comprehensive 
safety assessment, guided by properly informed engineering judgement 
and using, as appropriate, the methods of reliability technology now 
available. There is a proviso that such assessment mist be a 
continuing process through design, construction, commissioning and 
operation of the plant until it is eventually shut down, conducted in 
intimate association with monitoring for human errors, 'evidence of 
loss of resistance to failure' and any suggestion of 'hiss-before-bang'. 
Despite the fact that the effective operational hazard can be reduced to 
a near zero risk, there is no treatment that can guarantee absolute 
safety. There is always a remote chance that some unforeseen event may 
break through the safeguards to disaster, but so rarely would this be 
the case that it is a tolerable risk like that of the ever present 
threat to Holland of a catastrophic inundation from the sea, a disaster 
that has happened only twice in the thousand year long history of the 
Netherlands. 
11.3 'Defended Safety' -a holistic concept 
The dilemma of public aversion to exposure to the unfamiliar, 
potential hazards of new technologies on the one hand, and the need 
for continuing technical progress on the other may appear at times to 
be intractable. In the case of the exemplar, nuclear power, opposition 
seems to be hardening, rather than being allayed (See Section 5.4.1). 
Attempts to escape from the dilemma by using risk-benefit analyses 
that purport to show that a risk is of no consequence because it is 
numerically very small in comparison with other risks have been less 
than conspicuously successful. The fact is that quantification of a 
risk already acknowledged to be minuscule is of little relevance to the 
basic cause of public unease, attributable in the case of nuclear power 
to the peculiar nature of the threat. 
Risk-benefit theory assumes that people form their attitude to a 
risk in proportion to their perception of the utility which it is 
assumed they associate with it and can weigh against the magnitude of 
the hazard. W. D. Rowe (1979) has suggested that the theory breaks 
dog when the proposition is tested in reverse and the undesired 
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consequences-become the measure. And, this is the case for nuclear 
power: avoidance of unwanted consequences is equivalent to averting 
a risk. The detriments of a nuclear power program have been widely 
publicised, the threat is thus clearly recognised and feared and the 
benefits still far from obvious. The early promise of limitless, cheap 
power from the atom has proved to be empty. People see no reason then 
to accept apparently unnecessary and grave risks which it has yet to be 
shown can be made negligible. 
The novelty of the new technologies rules out any historical bases 
for risk toleration of the kind established for certain common hazards, 
mainly those of transportation or the ones that arise in traditional 
industries and practices, such as deep sea fishing and coal mining and 
of medical intrusion into the body. Nevertheless, a risk will be 
accepted if people are convinced that, not only is it very small, but 
that there is a credible organisation which, 'through due process', is 
able to hold it to a degree perceived in the circumstances to be 
tolerable. Such is the case with surgery where the healing knife is 
used by hands known to be expert and trusted and verifiably guaranteed 
as such. It is the phenomenon of 'Defended Safety'. The perceived 
dangers have not been abolished or argued away but are effectively held 
at bay. This has been achieved in a number of industrial technologies 
that also place the public at risk, safety being defended through the 
agencies of air pilots, ship masters and others moose competence is 
properly licensed. 
Attempts to induce the public to think that nuclear power can be 
made intrinsically safe by ingenious improvements in design or by 
introduction of a sophisticated system of computer control would be 
less than honest. Intrinsic safety is unattainable because the danger 
is inherent in the process, safety being dependent on a dangerous entity 
being held in check by engineered safeguards. Despite that, the 
technology should be accepted as adequately safe, if its safety can be 
seen to be effectively defended. 
11.3.1 The relevance of 'human factors' and accountability 
Up to this point, the hardware and control systems of nuclear 
per technology have been treated as its major safety features. Prima 
facie, this is the case. Notwithstanding that, the human organisations 
that design, build and run the plants are no less important; they receive 
scant attention, yet their proper functions are essential to the 
assurance of; safety which is a unitary and holistic state. For 
instance, the Keator Safety Study makes only brief reference to the 
effect of 'human error'. Again, in British practice the allusion to 
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the 'human factort made liy A. Aitken (19771 is typical. Both 
approaches identify man asa subservient attendant on the machine, 
but one whose unfortunate errors can upset its normally smooth working. 
Hence, by greater automation and computer control the 'human factor' 
may be eliminated. 
The reliability of human performance in activities of a routine 
kind is notoriously uncertain owing to boredom and transient disturbances 
of mental state. The proper role for automation and the computer is to 
relieve the human brain of routine tasks and to handle information. But, 
for it to reduce man as operator to a mere machine minder is to court 
danger by depriving the system of human intellect as a high-level 
information processor and decision maker on call in an emergency. 
The artefact is more than an assembly of its physical parts and 
safety cannot be assured through engineered safeguards and automation 
alone. The reliability of the plant is dependent on the exercise of 
human skills and ingenuity throughout all its stages of design, 
construction, commissioning and operation. Defended safety is thus 
the holistic outcome of all those human efforts aimed at safety and 
reliability, but inadequacy, ignorance, incompetence or negligence in 
discharge of these functions can frustrate the most cunning of protective 
intentions. The concerned public are fully aware of the fact that the 
required standards of dedication and consistency of behaviour are not 
innate in human nature. There must, therefore, be clear evidence of a 
credible function monitored by a trustworthy organisation open to public 
scrutiny able to establish the accountability of those responsible for 
nuclear plant safety. The principle has been identified by Talbot Page 
(1979) as 'Keeping Score' in his actuarial critique of the 'Zero- 
Infinity Dilemma' that faces the insurance industry (See 8.3.1. ). 
Further, such accountability is neither a self-initiating nor a self- 
fulfilling function in a corporation responsible for creating a major 
technological risk. Instead, experience shows that large corporate 
entities suffer from strong centripetal tendencies, and not least 
internally, whereby the various units providing specialised services 
within the body exhibit sectarian trends towards agglomeration into 
discrete interest nuclei with minimal inter-group contacts. This is 
the antithesis of unitary corporate functional accountability and, in 
the case of a body charged with management of a hazardous plant or 
process, can lead to serious 'loss of resistance to failure'. Verification 
of the necessary unity, accountability and efficiency of the internal 
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integration of the corporate functions can only be provided by 
independent, disinterested, externally directed surveillance which 
is the proper task of inspection, a topic discussed in some detail 
by the writer in his paper, 'Technical Progress, Safety and the 
Guardian Role of Inspection', which is Document No. 4 in the Annex. 
The question of circularity raised by J. R. Ravetz (1974) may be 
answered by the ultimate national inspectional authority of a 
democratic parliament, acting independently of the executive arm of 
government. 
11.3.2. 'Bootstrapping' and 'Defended Safety' 
The problem of determining societal and personal risk imposition 
is not new. Georgius Agricola (1494-1555), metallurgist and minerologist, 
is quoted from his work, 'De re metallica', published in 1556, by Baruch 
Fischhoff et alia (1981) as proposing that activities which would create 
risks greater than those associated with those experienced in some 
'pre-existing natural state' should be prohibited. The concept of risk 
acceptance by reference to past experience is described by the same 
authors (ibidem) as the technique of evaluating the acceptability of 
currently proposed risks by comparing them with the level of risk 
tolerated in the past. The assumption is made that society has been 
able to reach a nearly optimal balance of risks and benefits for 
particular technologies and that this experience can be codified into 
historical standards to be used as comparisons in future risk-involved 
decisions. It is described as 'Bootstrapping' when used to justify the 
acceptance or imposition of a new risk attributable to the introduction 
of an innovatory technology, e. g. nuclear power. B. Fischhoff and his 
co-authors (ibidem) identify two other main approaches to technological 
risk management, namely: 
Professional Judgement - employing the expertise of engineers, 
safety scientists and other informed authorities in decision 
making about the level of risk that can be imposed or may be 
accepted as the result of technical innovation. This is a common 
regulatory approach to the management of the exposure of workers 
to industrial toxins and other noxious things. 
Formal Analysis - theory based procedures for the modelling of 
risk problems and calculating the best decisions therefrom. 
Cost-benefit and decision analyses are the best known methods. 
In the ultimate all scientific methods of risk management reduce 
to 'Bootstrapping', because they are attempts to win societal acquiescence 
to official plans to introduce a new risk. This requires the assessor to 
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establish that it will not impose one significantly greater than that 
associated with some already existing comparable risk or risks. Overt 
approaches of this kind are those of F. R. Farmer and N. C, Rasmussen 
made in connection with the nuclear power risk (See Section 7.2 and 
7.3). The quantitative risk assessments calculated are used for 
comparison with statistical tables of current causes of mortality 
among the populations likely to be exposed and in the nuclear case are 
orders lower (N. C. Rasmussen 1975 - 2, F. R. Farmer 1975). The verity 
of these results is not in dispute, but they pertain to design and not 
to the reality of the operational entities. They are, therefore, not 
'true' values, a point made in Section 8.4.9 above. 
In quantitative terms, it seems that there is general agreement 
that any hazard bearing a risk threshold of less than 10 
5 
chance of 
death per year to the individual, unless it provides no discernible 
benefit or can be easily reduced, is ignored by those exposed. While 
the 10-5 threshold may have a historic basis, it cannot be applied to 
unquantifiable risks, nor should it form an irrmutable fiducial value. 
It is desirable that human life should be made safer and longer and 
the decision criterion for risk toleration or imposition should not be 
formally related to some historic standard but should follow a trend to 
reduce all risks. It is keeping with public expectations and desire 
for 'a taste of immortality'. 
A matter of major political interest in risk management is that 
humans are concerned not to be unnecessarily or arbitrarily exposed to 
a risk for which they see no sound or immediate reason to tolerate. 
The cogent fact is one of assurance that the risk can be maintained 
below the threshold at which it may be ignored. In the case of exposure 
to risks from major hazard industries, and in our case nuclear power, 
this depends upon the establishment of public confidence in the 
maintenance of the engineering reliability and, thus, safety of the 
system presenting the hazard. 
It is recognised in the insurance industry, and elsewhere in 
engineering circles, that a risk created by a plant built to a sound and 
proved design in the hands of competent operators is virtually zero in 
spite of any grave intrinsic hazard possessed by such an entity. This 
is the actuarial 'zero-infinity dilemma' (See Section 8.3 et seq. ) in 
which circumstances safety is effectively assured but cannot be made 
absolute because of a vestigal risk that is intractable. Therefore, in 
the face of the most detailed provision of engineered safeguards, of 
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instrumentation and control systems and of managerial arrangements, 
there remains the possibility of a catastrophic accident of unforeseen 
causation that can circumvent those defences because of gaps in their 
continuity due to 'ignorance of mechanism' and, not least, to human 
fallibility. Inerradicable factors in the potential causation of these 
disasters set an ultimate limit to the tolerance of technological hazards 
because no risk which could have genocidal consequences in the event of 
an extreme accident is acceptable. While devastating losses of life and 
property about the environment of a hazardous plant could be borne by 
society, an accident with an outcome that could destroy the major part 
of its population or property could not. This is the ultimate criterion 
for technological risk acceptance (17). 
It is of little avail to hope to assure a permanent state of 
virtual-zero-risk in a nuclear power plant by pursuit of excellence in 
the artefacts of its engineering alone. Assured safety is a unitary 
combination of the physical system and human factors essential to its 
creation and use which rust continue through design, construction and 
operation. Therefore, the New Treatment envisages the possibility of 
a nuclear power program of virtual-zero-risk to the environment and 
public by establishment of an accountable regime of a continuing, 
dynamic defence of safety in which any tendency towards loss of 
resistance of the system to failure can be detected and countered. The 
plant is thus seen as a vital entity comprising all its parts, physical, 
organisational and human whose proper interrelations are conducive to 
a maxin mi of safety through reliability of function. It is not possible 
for an entity to sustain such a state in isolation by virtue of its 
internal efforts alone owing to the drift towards increasing disorder and 
lethargy caused by its inherent entropy. The continuing assurance of 
safety is in consequence dependent on external surveillance by a 
discrete and independent agency which can be identified as inspection. 
The topic of engineering inspection is central to the theme of the writer's 
published works offered as Documents No. 3 and No. 4 of the Annex, and is 
further discussed in Section 14. 
11.4 Synoptic Overview 
The text so far has attempted to describe the modern techniques 
of risk management and safety engineering in their historical and 
cultural settings. Attention has been directed at the catastrophic LPEs 
that are the consequence of failures in the sophisticated systems of 
today's innovatory technologies, and in nuclear power plants in particular, 
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which have become matters of great concern in the advanced Western 
countries. The existing approaches intended to control these events, 
traditional, qualitative and quantitative, have been reviewed and the 
risk theories underlying them examined. Although they have made notable 
contributions to the safety and reliability of the technology, none of 
them have provided fully satisfactory evidence of a capability to assure 
the concerned public that nuclear power is an acceptable risk. It has 
been to satisfy this desideratum that a new treatment of low probability 
events has been researched and developed. 
The New Treatment is not fundamentally divergent from the leading 
approaches that currently exist which include the long-standing qualitative 
design criterion of a maximum accident and the quantitative methodologies 
of risk evaluation of the kind originated by F. R. Farmer and his 
associates in Britain and by N. C. Rasmussen in the U. S. Reactor Safety 
Study. Despite the adverse criticism directed at it, the design concept 
of limiting fault sequences leading to some postulated, catastrophic 
system failure, namely a design basis (DBA) and a maximum credible (MCA) 
accident, has not been discarded. The conflict of choice between these 
qualitative and quantitative methods has been shown to be illusory and 
can be dismissed by an approach that embodies them both. In pursuit of 
this, the reliability and the quantitative safety analyses are seen as 
essential adjuncts to the qualitative design concept which provides an 
ultimate engineering decision criterion. Furthermore, the need for 
identification of those responsible for safety relevant decisions at all 
levels of management and performance, for the strict accoutability of 
those who take them and for democratic public scrutiny of any such major 
safety regime are advocated as essential for the winning of public 
confidence in the defended safety of nuclear power. 
The societal effects of the rapid advance of technology during the 
second half of the Century and the growing divorce between the 'Two 
Cultures'; one, the arts, law, politics, the academic philosophies and 
administrative practice, and the other, science, technology and 
engineering; on the approaches to safety and reliability have been 
ccnsidered. The cultural disjunction has encouraged recourse by generalist 
decision makers in the economic and political establishments to quantitative 
decision methodologies when faced with complex problems in matters 
technological and, not least, in the affairs of nuclear safety where it 
has had less than conspicuous success. 
The safety of a sophisticated and potentially hazardous plant is 
a dynamic rather than a static state. It is, therefore, necessary that 
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it be maintained and 'defended' by the alert and active participation 
and acceptance of responsibility of all concerned in its design, 
construction and operation. This state of safety depends upon a 
continuing, unitary, holistic combination of the relevant physical 
and human factors that make up the system. Such a condition is not an 
intrinsic property of any complex artificial system. It will instead 
exhibit, to a greater or lesser degree, those centripetal and entropic 
tendencies fron which no human social organism is free. These tendencies 
are inimical to the maintenance of internal cohesion and integration of 
safety routines. Any drift towards schism, lethargy and disorder reduces 
safety. To counter such trends, intrusive surveillance by an independent 
and disinterested authority is required. This corrective which may be 
identified as inspection is treated in detail in the Annex and later in 
the text. 
An attempt has been made to identify the salient elements that could 
make for a more credible structure for safety in nuclear power 
engineering. Among those of direct relevance to the New Treatment are: 
1) To use the M WDBA concept in association with the powerful 
methods of safety and reliability analyses that now exist to 
ensure that nuclear plant design in all respects meets adequate 
criteria, quantitative where applicable, to establish that the 
discernible, potential modes of failure of the plant are identified 
and the overall design modified to ensure that they may be classed 
as 'incredible'. It is proposed that this be achieved by a design 
orientated towards intrinsic safety or, where this is not achievable, 
by failure sequence blocks that employ engineered safeguards, 
control and instrumentation limiting parameters for alarm and 
shutdown, redundancy and administrative controls. 
2) The failure sequence criterion of 'incredibility' in 
quantitative terms is defined as the probability of failure for 
the system in question, e. g. a burst-duct/channel-fire 
catastrophe given a Magnox reactor. It should be not greater than 
10-6 per year which is Borel's limit beyond which an event is too 
rare to happen in human experience. 
3) In meeting the two foregoing requirements, the risk of a 
foreseeable reactor accident is reduced to a virtual zero and the 
chance of its occurrence, given the inviolability of the assumptions 
on which the forecast is made, may be ignored. Nevertheless, an LPE 
that has not been foreseen in the design analysis that has a finite, 
but indefinable, probability through ignorance of mechanism may 
still occur. An analogy has been drawn with noise theory in which 
the occurrence of such a disastrous LPE may be seen as an anomalous 
spike in the mundane flow of the normal event-stream of faults, 
failures and occasional minor accidents. It is argued that the 
event-stream if properly reported, collated and analysed could show 
divergencies and anomalies giving evidence of the loss of 
resistance to failure which is a normal precursor of a system 
failure, 'the hiss before bang'. 
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4) The information requirement of the immediately preceeding 
passage suggests that the plant's behaviour should be effectively 
monitored by its operators reporting all identifiable deviations 
from normality, namely faults, acts of maintenance, variations in 
operational program, and changes in the composition and 
responsibilities of managerial, specialist engineering and senior 
technician staff and any other such matters that might be of 
significance to safety. These Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 
should be agglomerated through a national reporting network and 
analysed nationally or, preferably, more widely. 
5) The inevitable centripetal tendency of a corporate body to 
form discrete self-centred interest groups should be discouraged 
by the intrusion of independent, disinterested regulatory 
inspection applying to the whole system constituted by the plant, 
being hardware, software and its technical and managerial 
complements, to confirm the efficiency of operation and function 
and viability of the state of the organisation. 
In application of the foregoing principles, the need for the 
standard of safety to be adequate, not 'safer than safe' rust be kept 
in mind. The state to be attained is one of adequately defended safety 
which does not attempt to claim the absolute, but a level which may be 
recognised as one that reduces the perceived risk to one which may be 
acknowledged as virtually zero and thus be ignored. 
Public confidence in this state of affairs can be secured by 
derronstrating the accountability of those responsible for its maintenance 
and by opening the safety mechanism to informed public scrutiny. The 
criterion of equivalence in 'Bootstrapping' whereby the assessed safety 
of the given hazard is compared with analogous risks of corrnnon experience 
is accepted as essential in any approach to risk management and, hence, 
not least, to that of LPEs. However, the Bootstrapping approach on its 
own is inadequate because there is no assurance that its requirements 
will be met throughout the 'at hazard' life of the plant. A design 
criterion of 10-S per year of the chance of death or serious injury to 
the individual member of the public at risk is too high in the nuclear 
case. It should be at least an order lower to be compatible with the 
qualitative criterion of 'incredible'. Moreover, such a criterion is 
not immutable. It must follow the historic trend in safety which is 
to reduce all risks and, thereby, to secure for man a safer and longer 
expectation of life. 
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12 ENGINEERING DESIGN, 'EVENT-NOISE' AND THE MANAGBIENT OF LPEs 
'When any great design thou dost intend, 
Think on the means, the manner and the end. ' 
Sir John Denham (1615 - 1668), 
Of Prudence, 1.186. 
The feature that distinguishes the 'New Treatment of Low 
Probability Events' from the more conventional approaches to nuclear 
power plant hazard control and, indeed, from concepts of risk management 
for other major-hazard industrial installations is its attempt to be 
pragmatic in its philosophy. Whereas, the U. S. Reactor Safety Study 
(See Section 7.3 et seq. ) which may be taken as the paradigm for the 
quantitative probability approach is largely an abstract study of those 
possible failure modes discernible in representative Boiling Water (BWR) 
and Pressurised Water (PWR) Reactor designs, the 'New Treatment' is 
empirical. It is more particularly concerned with the effects that 
arise in the construction and operation of plant than with contemplation 
of the design ideal per se. 
By placing its emphasis on site phenomena rather than on design 
office meditations and mathematical studies, the 'New Treatment' is, 
essentially, an engineering approach and, thus, an attempt to identify 
and extend the pragmatic methodology that has evolved in the line of 
the Design Basis (DBA) and Maximum Credible (MCA) Accident concepts of 
nuclear hazard management. Nevertheless, the 'New Treatment' does not 
eschew the important contributions to safety engineering attributable 
to reliability technology. It involves a philosophy of risk management 
centred on quality in engineering, defended by inspection (a theme 
developed further in supporting Document No. 4 of the Annex) rather 
than on the exhaustive and largely mathematical analyses of design. 
Nonetheless, it accords to design its due place in the theoretical 
structure of engineering where it is nothing less than the keystone of 
the art (infra). 
The 'New Treatment' is also at variance with a widely canvassed 
proposal to substitute a computer dominated, rather than assisted, regime 
for the judgement of control room engineers in a plant accident emergency. 
The idea is that a software program should override immediate operator 
actions taken to overcome the fault and contain the damage to the reactor. 
This view together with some portentous ideas about regulation and 
inspection has been put more explicitly by an eminent safety scientist 
and former Director of Nuclear Safety in the U. K. Health and Safety 
Executive. To quote him: 
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(On the management of emergencies) 
'Emergency procedures start in the control room. As far 
as the plant is concerned they should be fully automatic 
for the initial phase of perhaps half an hour and it is 
sometimes argued that the operator should be physically 
prevented from intervening during this time. 
... ...... ... 
(On inspection) 
There is a ... ... ... rather quaint opinion to the 
effect that inspection is the primary source of safety. 
... .... * but it is not, I fear entirely true. Certainly, the new look which an inspector can give to a 
situation which has become over familiar to the operating 
management enables safety issues to be raised and improvement 
suggested. But I suspect that these improvements are 
essentially marginal. 
... 0 .. 0.. 0.. 
(On the importance of theory in regulation) 
Perhaps, ... ... ... the regulatory bodies should be 
moving away from detailed studies of the safety of individual 
designs of plant and towards the assessment of the knowledge 
and understanding of physics, chemistry and engineering of 
that plant by designers and operators. ' 
H. J. Dunster, CB, 
'Some reactions to the accident 
at Three Mile Island', 
Nuclear Energy, June, 1980,19(3), 
pp. 139 - 142. 
While the foregoing opinions are not in themselves new, having 
formed the subjects of a long-standing debate on nuclear power plant 
management, it is only recently that they have been given such explicit 
expression. The significance of the above pronouncement is to reduce 
the role of the site engineers and their technicians in favour of 
stipulated routines at the expense of immediate intellectual involvement 
in the control of the plant. For instance, Dunster's hint has more 
recently been given official force by advocacy at the Sizewell PWR 
inquiry by Central Electricity Generating Board representatives that 
expert human operational decision functions in a reactor control room 
during an emergency should be superseded by a computer program (Gittus 
and Matthews 1984). The strategy for management of a plant emergency 
could thus become a matter of prescriptions in decision methodology 
formulated in a design office remote in space and time from the reactor 
in trouble. His advocacy of theory and rejection of empiricism is 
181 
extended to inspection and regulatory practice. It is an example of 
the profound disjunction that can exist between science per se and 
engineering (See Sections 8.1,10 and 10.1). 
12.1 On the nature of engineering design 
There are few concise and explicity definitions of engineering 
design, although Lord Kings Norton (H. R. Cox 1973) was not alone in 
recognising 'the art of design as the pinnacle of the whole structure 
of engineering'. Despite the approbation, design has received less 
than due attention in the education of engineers. Professor R. E. D. 
Bishop (1963) has suggested that there are three discrete processes in 
industrial design which are: 
i) Conception: visualisation of the intended artefact and 
ormu ation of possible approaches to its creation, 
utilising as appropriate those analogies that are known; 
ii) Anal sis: study of the feasibility of these approaches 
in the light of scientific knowledge, workshop and other 
construction technologies, prior experience and cost; and 
iii) S thesis: the process of attaining the design objective, 
taking the appropriate utility factors into account, such 
as economics, reliability, ergonomics, siting, safety and 
aesthetic styling. 
The end product of the design activity is a set of plans, 
drawings, specifications, consisting-of schedules and construction, 
commissioning, test and operating instructions. At this point none of 
these things exist in the form of matter, but as information as marks 
on paper or held in computer data banks. Design is thus differentiated 
from the other creative activities of engineering in that the work of 
the designer is separate from its realisation and can remain indefinitely 
in the realm of ideas. The implementation of a design is to attain 
correspondence between the concept and the artefact it is intended to 
create. There is, therefore, a discontinuity through which the action 
of design and its realisation must pass as it is interpreted in the 
light of engineering science and empirically established shop floor and 
construction site practice, a transformation depicted diagrammatically 
in Figure 8. The design is more than a scientific model as the process 
of artefact creation is holistic. Nonetheless, it is in essence 
incomplete because the designer implicitly assumes that lacunae will be 
made good in the light of the professional competence of the engineers 
and technicians who will read its prescriptions. 
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12.1.1 The Design-Hardware Transform and the concept of 'Event-noise' 
The information held in the design is of the nature of a message 
to be transmitted through time and space for realisation as hardware at 
some point in the future. The construction processes are neither 
proportional nor reversible and are of the nature of mapping the design 
concept on to a field of matter, a transform that is both convoluted 
and non-linear. As for any signal passing through a non-linear 
channel, modulation and inter-modulation products are formed which add 
things that were not present in the original message or, conversely, 
certain details are ablated from the information content or otherwise 
distorted. The design message suffers further mutilation and accretes 
extraneous elements in its experience of interpretation on the shop 
floor and construction site, both environments of engineering assumptions, 
expertise and practice that may well differ from those taken for granted 
by the designer. Again, as the message ages during the leadtime, it 
suffers entropic decay of its meaningful content as some of its 
constituents lose their clarity or become incongruous in a situation 
remote from the original design milieu. The construction and 
commissioning activities that convert the design into an operating plant 
are shown diagrammatically in Figure 9. 
In its transition from the realm of ideas to the reality of 
hardware, the distortion the design message suffers may be identified 
with the ubiquitous phenomenon of 'noise', namely those undesired 
effects that degrade the useful or wanted information in a signal. The 
plant after commissioning experiences further random effects that 
derogate from an authentic implementation of the design concept and 
disturb the steady circumstances of its operation. These latter things 
are the whole gamut of accidents and 'faults and incidents' to which 
some reference has already been made in Section 8.6.1 above. Taken 
together, all these random and unpredictable effects may be classed 
under a generic title of 'Event-noise'. Their existence is the chief 
factor that vitiates the assumption of stable distributions of failure 
rate and design-correspondence data implicit in attempts to make 
quantitative predictions of nuclear power plant risks, at least within 
meaningful confidence intervals. 
12.2 Philosophy and implications of 'Event-noise' theory 
Of salient importance in 'Event-noise' philosophy are its 
holistic implications. The 'plant', or synonymously the 'installation', 
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hardware and the electronics of instrumentation and control to embrace 
the people concerned with its creation and use. The plant is, therefore, 
a system that combines organised human intellect in the necessary 
echelons of engineering expertise and technical skills with that 
hardware and its ancilliary elements. 'Event-noise' (En) may thus be 
defined as systemic phenomena, each event being a disturbance affecting 
the whole entity to a greater or lesser degree. 
These systemic phenomena are the consequences of management and 
organisational misjudgements, mistakes and oversights; job performance 
errors and slackness on the part of personnel; specific failures in the 
physical system itself and the intrusion of external factors. Together 
or individually, they bring about that 'loss of resistance to failure' 
which precedes an untoward event, ranging from a minor industrial 
accident to catastrophic failure of the plant or system. Specific 
plant physical causes include ageing, wear-and-tear, faulty components 
and the emergency of covert design defects which are the main substance 
of the now conventional Licensee Event Reports (LERs) of Table III. 
The classification of those faults, incidents and failures as 
'Event-noise' suggests that the most efficaceous management of the 
threat of a catastrophic LPE is one based on surveillance of the noise 
sources, attuned to the detection of possible harbingers in the En stream. 
This is by no means new in principle. Indeed, it has been implicit in 
nuclear safety philosophy for a long time. The novelty is its 
enunciation in terms of En. This suggests that a change in direction 
of nuclear safety engineering in general, and of the approach to safety 
analysis in particular, is needed, a point made by the writer in a 
contribution to a symposium on 'Directions in Nuclear Engineering Research' 
in 1980. The paper is reproduced as Document No. 3 in the Annex. 
The long established conventional approach is one centred on 
design at the expense of the engineering on the shop floor and 
construction site by which that design is realised. The great and 
increasing complexity of modern high-technology, exemplified by nuclear 
power, requires that the design philosophy must take more into account 
the parity of the engineering art that raust be applied to achieve the 
design objective. Nowadays, in the realm of advanced technology, other 
than for replicate engineering, a design can no longer provide a 
comprehensive, self-contained package of assembly and operating instructions. 
There are deficiencies that cannot be made good at its origin, owing to 
ignorance of site circumstances and other things that pertain to a 
situation remote in time and immediate technology from it. The design 
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message is, therefore, incomplete in itself, an insufficiency made 
worse by the noise processes that mutilate it. The lacunae have to 
be made good by ad hoc engineering skills during the construction 
process. This is a further example of the growing disjunction between 
'The Word' and 'The Deed' which, as Auguste Comte (1825) opined, is 
the task of engineers of the scientific class to bridge (See Section 
8.1). 
12.2.1 Categories of Event-noise 
The above organic inadequacies in the design message are noisy 
per se because they complicate the task of its interpretation. In the 
phenomenon of Event-noise two kinds may be distinguished, namely 'Static 
Event-noise' (S-En) and its counterpart of 'Dynamic Event-noise' (D-En). 
The former, S-En, is seen as static because it originates in the design 
process itself due to flaws in theory, erroneous conceptions, mutilation 
by 'noise' during encoding, transmission and decoding and oversights in 
engineering on site. It is in a sense timeless, describing latent 
effects that are not brought into physical existence until the design 
is implemented in the operational plant, but the definition is by no 
means hard and fast. On the other hand, D-En is constituted mainly by 
the flow of mundane day-to-day accidents and failures with the occurrence 
of an occasional disastrous 'spike' in the form of a major incident (See 
Section 8.2 et seq. ). The phases of commissioning and early operation 
are 'noisy' periods in the life of a nuclear power reactor, being 
plagued by a host of minor failures that are, for the most part, of S-En 
origin. The faults that cause them, together with other defects that 
have become patent, are rectified by a process known as 'debugging', 
their progressive elimination being responsible for the steep negative 
gradient of the initial part of the 'Bathtub' reliability curve shown 
in Figure 10. However, not all the S-En defects appear at such an 
early stage and, for this reason, fail to be eliminated. The residuum 
is a most important sub-class of S-En covering many things that remain 
as covert weaknesses that can long lie dormant in the system. Owing to 
some odd transient disturbance or tension, one can precipitately emerge 
and interact with faults or incidents of the dynamic kind to cause a 
severe failure sequence. The low probability, but disastrous potentiality 
of the main pressure vessel of a Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) to fail 
catastrophically by the sudden progressive propagation of an undetected 
crack in its steel membrane (A. Cottrell 1980,1982) may be cited as an 
example of the precipitate emergency of such a hidden flaw from the 
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The disturbances of the second kind, classed as 'Dynamic Event- 
noise' (D-En), continue unceasingly throughout the operational life 
of a nuclear power reactor and, indeed, that of any other major 
industrial installation. Such failures of components, equipment, 
structures and systems which may be combined with other accidents, 
often involving personnel as well as plant, are typical of the 'fault 
and incident'data returned to nuclear regulatory bodies and collation 
and analysis centres as 'Licensee Event Reports' (LERs) of which an 
excerpt is reproduced in Table III and are reviewed in Note 15. LERs 
for the most part concern things of a mundane nature analogous to the 
common pattern of electrical circuit noise. This is the characteristic 
stream of random, weak impulses, occasionally punctuated by irregular, 
sort surges of much greater energy, such noise being an innate feature 
of communication circuits. These disturbances can mutilate and degrade 
the message carried by a signal. 
The most energetic of the impulses may be compared with the 
occasional serious events that interrupt operation or damage a plant, 
harm people on its site or involve combinations of these things. 
These 'spikes' of Event-noise include the rare Low Probability Events 
(LPEs) that have precipitated the disastrous accidents summarised 
in Appendix II. As mentioned above, events of this kind are often 
caused by a combination of D-En with the latent design or in-built 
plant defects characteristic of residual S-En. Take, for instance, 
the serious design error that permitted a confluence of unseggregated 
essential service and control and instrumentation cables to run 
together in the Browns Ferry nuclear reactor cable vault. A fire 
started on the insulating sheath of a cable by a carelessly placed 
candle used for draft detection spread rapidly through the web in 
the cable vault, progressively disabling the reactor control circuits. 
The fire was only brought under control in time to prevent a severe 
reactor accident and, incidentally, by an operator's initiative in 
violation of certain plant operating rules. 
12.2.2 Event-noise sources 
Event-noise (En) in a nuclear power program has some six 
identifiable and distinct sources. Being no more than potentialities 
held in a nuclear power plant's design package, En obviously cannot 
reveal itself before the construction program is underway. Despite 
that, many of the 'noisy' factors that would make for weaknesses in the 
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plant and its systems or be sources of potential failures can be 
eliminated from the design by safety analysis to the extent that the 
efficient factors are discernible. Yet, the analysis can never be 
complete and is particularly open in the case of a novel design. A 
residuum of undetected design flaws can thus pass into the 
constructional and operational phases of the plant's existence as 
latent causes of failure, for instance, a part weak because it is 
made from the wrong material, corrosion because a component is not 
compatible with its environment and so on. 
The common sources of En in nuclear power plants may be 
identified as: 
(i) The Design Process: a potential source of S-En 
Fallacious theory, misconceptions, 'ignorance of mechanism', 
false assumptions about operational and site conditions, 
paucity or irrelevance of data, calculation errors, omissions 
in conceptual sequences and defective models. Many of these 
things can only be recognised by experience in use and become 
S-En by slipping through the nets of safety and reliability 
analyses. The design process therefore does not produce En 
per se, but has the potentiality for the creation of S-En. 
(ii) Theatres of design implementation: the main source of S-En 
Failure to apprehend fully the design instructions, ablation 
or distortion of information during transmission and receipt 
of the design message, inapposite substitutions for lack of 
material and equipment as specified, inadequate design 
specifications, construction errors, bad workmanship, poor 
engineering, supply and material anomalies, consequences of 
industrial action and mischief. 
(iii) Running-in: the early phase of connercial operation 
The most prolific theatre of D-En and is characterised by the 
steep downward slope of the initial part of the 'Bathtub 
Curve' in which elements of S-En come to light as faults and 
incidents and are rectified. Reduction of the rate of En to 
a steady and acceptable level is a sine qua non for normal 
commercial operation. 
(iv) Commercial operation 
The En plateau in the 'Bathtub Curve' of Figure 10 
characterises the usual run of operational faults, incidents 
and accidents as described in Licensee Event Reports (LERs), 
a sequence of mundane events that may be expected to 
continue throughout the useful life of the plant, except for 
occasional interruptions for maintenance and overhauls and 
hiatuses due to the rare incidence of major faults. 
Commercial operation is, of course, the main theatre of D-En. 
189 
(v) Maintenance and modifications 
These two procedures aimed at reducing En are not 
infrequently agencies for introducing potential faults 
and weaknesses and, as such, are a source of further S-En. 
(vi) Externalities, Anomalies and Singularities 
These are the unusual, unforeseen and unexpected external 
events and internal agencies among which are electricity 
grid failures, severe environmental conditions, 
catastrophic external circumstances such as earthquakes, 
falling objects, missiles, maloperation, incompetent 
engineering and other human errors and capricious mistakes 
outside the normal ambit of operational experience which 
can produce 'spikes' in the flux of En of magnitude 
ranging from a temporary shutdown to a catastrophic failure. 
Although extraordinary, these events should be classed as 
D-En. 
Event-noise is ubiquitous in industrial plants and processes. 
Nonetheless it is logical to infer that the quieter a plant, the 
greater its presumed reliability and safety. Finally, the concept of 
Event-noise has analogies with that of 'reliability degradation' in 
conventional reliability engineering (18), identifying broadly the 
same factors. Consequent upon the grave potential hazard, the 
standards of safety and reliability in nuclear power engineering have 
been impressively high from the beginning. Although in no way an 
acknowledged aim, the result of the endeavours made to attain them has 
been to reduce that potpourri of detrimental effects here called 
Event-noise to a minimum. The S-En component of this medley has been 
managed by various methods of technical design safety assessment that, 
latterly, have been strongly influenced by quantitative probability 
philosophies. The D-En fraction has been largely controlled by 
monitoring the engineering activities on site. Nonetheless, it has not 
become an integrated engineering approach and has remained largely 
inchoate. 
What guiding philosophy there has been has tended to be scientistic 
rather than pragmatic in a situation that has more to do with humans and 
hardware than with speculations about risk theory. Less than due 
interest has been shown in the realities of day-to-day operational 
experience, a trend to which attention has been drawn in the introductory 
passages of this chapter. Furthermore, the writer has identified a 
co-ordinated approach, which he regards as essential in securing the 
acceptance of an adequately safe nuclear power program, with efficaceous 
engineering inspection. That matter is discussed at some length in his 
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paper on the topic offered as Document No. 4 of the Annex, and the 
hypothesis made is developed further along quasi-mathematical lines 
in the passages that follow. 
12.3 The Event-noise stream: Characteristics and singularities 
The sources of Event-noise (En) have so far been examined 
descriptively. So to recapitulate briefly, the two principal elements 
of En are a 'Static' or latent component, S-En, created by the 
interaction of the design with matter during the processes of 
construction and commissioning a nuclear power plant, and 'Dynamic' 
constituents that are mainly created during the course of its commercial 
operation. In addition to the foregoing, the plant may experience the 
occasional intrusion of 'Externalities' which are those unusual 
happenings that occur without the site, but produce marked effects 
within it, and 'Anomalies' which are events of extraordinary causation 
often being the result of some uncharacteristic human error. Among the 
latter contributions to the En flow may be included those rarer 'spikes' 
or 'Singularities', otherwise Low Probability Events (LPEs), that may 
be associated with major plant damage, the consequences of which range 
from a shutdown for repairs to a catastrophic radiation accident. 
12.3.1 The Event-noise concept and the Reactor Safety Study 
A comparison of the Event-noise approach with that of the U. S. 
Reactor Safety Study (See Section 7.3) is of interest. In the latter 
work, representative designs of the Boiling Water (BWR) and Pressurised 
Water (PWR) Reactors were exhaustively and imaginatively analysed in 
order to construct 'Event Trees' and 'Fault Trees' from which the 
probabilities of failure sequences could be deduced. An 'Event Tree' 
presented the course of events from an initial failure within the 
plant to its consequences in a postulated radiation accident, ranging 
from minor to catastrophic. A spectrum of 'Event Trees' for the given 
reactor type covered all radiation accidents judged to have a feasible 
mechanism of occurrence. The likelihood of each failure sequence in 
the 'Event Trees' was then calculated in terms of its numerical 
probability from the corresponding sequence in a relevant 'Fault Tree', 
using failure rate records collected in specially maintained and 
serviced data banks, the required material being synthesised where 
none existed (See Section 9.7.3). An attempt was made to allow for 
'Externalities' and 'Anomalies' (supra) respectively as extraordinary 
faults and 'human error', but this presented almost intractable 
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difficulties in quantification owing to the very arbitrary and 
capricious nature of errant human behaviour and the rarity of the 
former. 
While the approach is rational, the philosophy underlying the 
Safety Study, differs fundamentally from that of the Event-noise 
approach, the latter effectively starting where the former ends. The 
Study is a meta-assessment of representative designs of the BWR and 
PWR that had already in their prototypes been exposed to that process 
of incisive safety assessment which has long been established practice 
in the Western nuclear industries in the preparation of a 'Safety 
Case' supporting the claim for the reliability and safety of the 
design (J. F. Ablitt 1960). Therefore, no nuclear reactor design with 
discernible features that were credibly unsafe or unreliable would 
have been presented to the Study's analysts. Consequently, those 
accident sequences revealed by its processes of further exhaustive 
safety analysis would either be of very low probability or obscure or 
both or, otherwise, they would have been eliminated by a further 
refinement of the design. As argued earlier in Section 9.6.1 and in 
the appraisal of quantitative probability methods in Document No. 1 
of the Annex, those unlikely failure sequences that remained after this 
hierarchy of scrutinies would be so rare that they could not happen in 
realisable plant experience because the probability is metaphysical. 
Despite that, there is the reservation that some unpredicted event might 
happen instead and not in the manner conjectured in the analysis. 
The Event-noise approach accepts that a design subject to such 
searching safety analyses is safe enough per se and, given satisfactory 
quality assurance during construction and commissioning, can produce a 
plant that is, prima facie, adequately so. The rare chance of a 
catastrophic accident cannot be absolutely excluded despite the 
elaboration of safeguards, for instance an element of S-En not perceived 
during the processes of design assessment and its implementation in the 
constructed plant may have escaped detection. The net risk is 
indeterminately small, but still finite. It can, nonetheless, be made 
tolerable because verifiable arrangements can be devised that are able 
to secure the safety bastions, a matter to be dealt with in some detail 
later and particularly in Section 13. 
Although as a result the true risk may be made demonstrably 
negligible, it is still not zero. There is, moreover, an essential 
reservation. A design that holds the clear threat of an unacceptable 
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accident (17), however remote the credible chance of its happening, 
is not tolerable in Event-noise philosophy. Despite the fact that 
the assessed quantitative design probability be metaphysical, an 
unsuspected fault sequence might exist that could bring it about. 
This does not preclude the possibility of a credible engineered 
safeguard that could absolutely prevent such an eventuality as 
suggested in Section 8.4.3 (Kirk and Taylor 1971). The implications 
for siting policy and choice of reactor system are not dealt with 
here. 
12.3.2 An analytical treatment of the Event-noise concept 
An attempt to put Event-noise theory in mathematical form may 
help to clarify the foregoing verbal descriptions, although it will 
have little quantitative significance at this stage owing to unresolved 
mathematical problems, but also because the necessary data is 
unobtainable by reason of commercial security and lack of collection 
and collation of certain essential elements. As defined, Event-noise 
is an ensemble of effects of diverse origin characteristic of a given 
plant that are indicative of disturbances in its performance, expected 
or capricious as the case may be. While the argument here will be 
confined to a notional nuclear power plant, it nonetheless applies to 
any large, technically complex industrial installation. Giving 
symbolic representation to the efficient factors and circumstances in 
the situations in which they take their effect, we can write the 
conditions leading to the generation of the Event-noise (En) emanating 
from the plant, thus: 
Let e be the general En state of the plant at reactor-time, 
't', in the particular circumstances, 'c', 'p' and 
'q', owing to the peculiarities of its design, 
construction and operation, these circumstances being 
compounded by certain external conditions, 'x', and 
by certain anomalies, ' z', arising in its internal 
state, where, more specifically: 
'c' relates to any lack of congruence with the design 
at the completion of the construction and commissioning 
processes prior to operation; 
'p' is associated with the immediate situation on the 
site as it impinges on the design, its implementation 
and use of the plant, being such things as mal-operation, 
faulty maintenance or misconceived modifications as at 
'Flixborough'; 
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'q' is the result of 'human factors' and other 
related unusual conditions arising within the site 
or otherwise affecting it owing to management, 
personnel or engineering matters, say a vacancy in a 
key post as at 'Flixborough'; 
'x' is an Externality, being some physical factor 
which affects the state of the plant, but originating 
outside the site, say failure of the main electricity 
supply drawn from an assured external source, eg. the 
'Grid'; and 
'z' is an Anomaly, being a divergence from the normal, 
internal state of the plant caused by some abnormal 
intervention in its operation, say a strike or the 
arbitrary re-programming of the autopilot and change 
of flight plan imposed by the Air New Zealand 
administration of which the crew were ignorant that 
led to the Mount Erebus polar sightseeing flight 
disaster; 
the above symbols being represented ideographically in the latter part 
of the Event-noise creation sequence shown in Figure 9. 
Then, e=n+s+1........ (i), 
where 'n', 's' and '1' are the D-En. S-En and 'spike' 
components of the given En experience at 't', and 
n= fn(P, q, t) ........ (ii), 
s= fs (c, p, n) ........ (iii) and 
1= f1(s, n, x, z) ...... (iv). 
The latter term (iv), the 'spike' function, is the chief component 
of the Event-noise of interest here. It is designated as 'L', the 
Catastrophe-function, when it describes the plant's operational history 
of major En incidents up to the experience of a terminal event at some 
reactor-time, t=T. 
If 'Se' is an undifferentiated element in the stream of En, then 
6e = Sn + 6s + 61 ........... (v). 
Representationally, these differentials may be seen as derivatives over 
an instant, 'St', a time short compared with the normal operational 
life of the plant, of the respective En generating functions. 
Thus, Sn = fn(p, q, t)St ................ (vi), 
Ss = f'(c, p, n)St ................ (vii), and 
61 = f1(s, n, x, z)St .............. (viii), 
where fn, fs and fi are symbolic of the changing state of the plant 
with time and the other time dependent circumstances. The differentials, 
dn, ös and 61 are representative respectively of individual En incidents, 
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namely mundane faults, failures and industrial accidents of D-En; 
the design associated events of S-En or the occasional 'spikes' of 
En experience that may, in rare cases, be the terminal events of 
catastrophic failure. Despite the simplistic representation above, 
they are very complex, multidimensional functions in design and 
operational space and cannot be properly represented on any tuo- 
dimensional graph. The attempts to do so by the event-trees and 
fault-trees of quantitative reliability analysis are incomplete 
because they are portrayals in design space alone. The complexity and 
multidimensionality of the circumstances in which Event-noise has its 
origin are illustrated by the combination of the two failure causation 
triangles, one due to Sir Henry Chilver (1977), namely Figures 14 and 
15 which are discussed in the preamble to Appendix II and on page 206. 
Summation of the differentials described by the identities (vi), 
(vii) and (viii) above, 
t=T t=Tt=T tT 
de = do + ds +d......... ax), 
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may be written, 
E=N+S+L.................. (x), 
where 'N' and 'S' are respectively the Dynamic and Static contributions 
to the Event-noise experience of the plant from the beginning of 
commercial operation until some final time, 'T', when it reaches the 
point of ultimate shutdown for economic or operational reasons or in 
the low probability event of catastrophic failure. These are the 
circumstances depicted in the final stage of the historical Event-noise 
sequence shown in the ideogram of Figure 9. The Catastrophe-function is 
represented by 'L' which is associated with those major instabilities of 
behaviour properly outside the D-En classification that have been called 
'spikes'. 'L' also embraces those major plant accidents whose 
consequences exceed the 'Damage Threshold' depicted in the graphs of 
Figure 11 derived from the Bathtub Curve of Figure 10 which include 
severe operational accidents and the ultimate terminator of catastrophic 
failure, the treatment of which is the avowed aim of this study. 
In summary, there is reason to conclude from logical considerations 
supported by field experience that the mathematics of risk science and 
its operational research specialities of reliability analysis and 
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Catastrophe-function, 'L', when manifest as the low probability 
event of severe plant damage or catastrophic failure. Moreover, the 
attempt to use Event-noise theory for the latter purpose leads to the 
tautology of Equation (x) and the intractable expression for 'L' 
involving the suianation of identity (viii). 
12.3.3 Engineering and its proper involvement in the defence of safety 
The preceding attempts to establish a formal mathematical 
framework for the treatment of catastrophic LPEs have proved to be 
nugatory. Furthermore, those familiar approaches, both quantitative 
and qualitative, that deal in the appraisal of design are inadequate 
because they are unable to enter the theatre of operational reality 
where the fault sequences that lead to catastrophic plant failure 
actually take place. The concept of Event-noise which could join 
theory and practice has been shown to be beyond conventional mathematics. 
Moreover, it has to be recognised that nuclear power together with 
certain other large scale energy industries has become too sophisticated 
and the penalties for failure too grave for critical technical decisions 
to be made by ad hoc engineering judgements. 
Engineering inspection has already been identified as a most 
important part of the New Treatment. However inspection is not enough 
because the loss of resistance to failure which it attempts to detect 
cannot be properly perceived by the classic approach limited to the 
assessment of design and shop and site surveying. So far, cognisance 
has not been given, overtly at least, to the plant as a compound 
entity of interacting physical systems and human behaviour in their 
societal setting. Loss of resistance to failure is a ccelmon property 
of engineering systems, but it becomes a threat to safety when it is 
not recognised or when nothing is done about it. On the other hand, 
the developments in engineering science have opened the way to a less 
circumscribed approach. This is necessarily one which can bring 
together the engineering sciences of materials and structures, the 
technologies of non-destructive testing, radiological protection and 
control and instrumentation and other such advances with the newer 
disciplines of management in engineering, ergonomics, industrial 
psychology and decision methodology, all of which have effectively 
utilised operational research (OR). What is needed is a way of 
orchestrating all these thing so that they can act together in a defence 
of safety that is not only efficaceous per se, but which can be 
convincingly presented to the public as such. 
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In view of the importance that has been placed on OR, and it 
underlies the quantitative treatment of risk and safety assessment, 
it is appropriate to distinguish more specifically between the ways 
in which OR is used. Its application to prophecy inthe field of low 
probability events differs from its use in reliability engineering. 
The case of prophecy is typified by the Reactor Safety Study (N. C. 
Rasmussen 1975) and by 'CANVEY' (Locke et al. 1978). These studies 
and certain other essays of like kind have been the subject of critical 
appraisal earlier when their claims to define field safety situations 
have been faulted, a critique summarised in Section 9.8. 
On the other hand, the latter use of OR in reliability engineering 
is seen as a further and important advance in 'safety by hindsight', 
having little connection with prognostication other than through 
enhancement of plant safety in design as a consequence of technology 
transfer. A convenient exemplar is the reliability analysis of pithead 
winding gear protection that followed the Markham Colliery shaft cage 
crash of July 30,1973 (25) in which 18 miners lost their lives (J. W. 
Calder 1974). Another example of a more distributed nature is the 
piquant reporting and analysis of mainly minor, but no less serious, 
plant accidents, failures and process loss incidents and their correction 
by 'fixes' that has been published by the Petrochemicals and Plastics 
Division of the Imperial Chemical Industries (T. A. Kletz 1982). An 
even more sophisticated and powerful approach, dominated by experiment, 
is that attributed to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) in America described as 'burning-in' or 'design-make-test-fail- 
fix' (W. M. Bryan 1975). 
An analogous OR approach is already in use in the engineering of 
defended safety, the 'fixes' being engineered safeguards, the limit and 
shutdown functions of control-and-instrumentation and administrative 
controls. However, as there will be no past experience to justify 
these 'fixes', anticipation must be used instead. This is a matter for 
engineering judgement for which neither design assessment nor noise 
theory give firm and cost effective guidance. Attention has been drawn 
to the dangers of 'ratchetting' in Section 8.4.2. 
The task of organising and maintaining the defensive system thus 
falls to the engineer. To carry it out he must be able to grasp and 
interpret information and concepts that, in addition to the societal 
aspects of management, are presented largely in ideographic ways, namely 
by engineering drawings, pictorial plans, circuit diagrams and other 
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graphic symbols. As suggested in Section 8.1.1, the engineer can 
cope with this peculiar language because, in addition to the logical 
and analytical powers that are essential to the performance of any 
responsible intellectual function, he possesses a special mental 
faculty, acquired during his training and professional experience 
which enables him to comprehend and use information conveyed in 
ideographic form. 
Having set aside the methodologies of design safety analysis and 
finding noise theory beyond the scope of any mathematical technique 
available in the present circumstances, a more tractable approach is 
needed. It seems that this may be found in Thom's Catastrophe Theory 
which can offer a simple multidimensional, dynamic model that can 
combine the principles of the 'fix' with the probability functions of 
noise theory. His 'General Theory of Models' offers a novel explanation 
for the sudden changes of form that occur in biological and physical 
systems (D. H. Fowler 1975) and this is relevant to the LPE. 
12.4 The relevance of Thom's 'Catastrophe Theory' 
The discontinuity problem of an apparently stable system 
experiencing a sudden change of state to which Rena Thom (E. C. Zeeman 
1977) has provided a novel mathematical solution in what has become 
known as 'Catastrophe Theory' is relevant to the safety and stability 
of nuclear power plants. An elementary application of the theory is 
shown by the cuboid graph of Figure 12. The circumstances in which 
the Event-noise attributable to the plant is created can be described 
in terms of the movement of two points, 'P' and 'Q', lying on two roughly 
parallel surfaces, a lower and horizontal one called the 'Control Plane' 
(OBCD) and an irregular 'Behaviour Surface' (EFGH) of the nature of a 
probability field above it. 
The intended operational program of the reactor is depicted by 
the path of the point 'P', plotted on the Control Plane. The instantaneous 
position of this point describes the actual response of the given nuclear 
power plant as a holistic system embracing both physical and human 
aspects to the control imposed upon it, a control which is intended to 
achieve the particular electricity generation policy of its mangement. 
The position of 'P' is, then, determined by two orthogonal co-ordinates, 
'OB' and 'OD', taken for convenience along the two bounding edges of 
the rectangular Control Plane, the corner at '0' forming the origin 
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The side 'OB' is designated the 'Operational Command Axis' 
along which the control co-ordinate, 'µ', extends as a function of 
time, 't', in accordance with management action defined as the 'Command 
Force'. There is a corresponding extension, 'q', along the side 'OD' 
which is the 'System Response Axis'. The 'OD' co-ordinate represents 
the instantaneous state of the reactor system as it responds to the 
Command Force. The response of the system is not immediate, nor is it 
directly proportional to the particular instructions presented by the 
Command Force, 'U', because the reactor system is a holistic entity of 
diverse interacting elements, material and human. The material aspects 
comprise the plant's structure, core, nuclear fuel, instrumentation and 
control system and ancilliary equipment which are interpenetrant with 
those that are human, namely the site operational team of engineers, 
control room staff, service technicians and supporting personnel. The 
response, 'q', thus lags on the Command Force, 'u', owing to modulation 
and delays in this complex system of linkages, that actuates the system. 
As a result, the path taken by 'P' is a distorted hysteresis loop 
instead of being a straight line from the origin at '0'. 
(a) The Behaviour Surface 
The observed behaviour of the plant is described in terms of 
Event-noise by the experience of the point, 'Q', and it moves over the 
Behaviour Surface (ERli). That point is the image of 'P' and is 
located where the normal to 'P' meets the latter Surface and, hence, 
'Q' also follows the distorted hysteresis loop traced by 'P'. 
While the Control Plane (OBCD) is determinate, flat and smooth, 
the Behaviour Surface (EFGH) is not, its irregularities being 
characteristic of its probabilistic nature. It is, nonetheless, 
continuous and, as shown in Figure 12, much of the surface is either 
bumpy or wrinkled and there may be a fold ('fold-curve'). These 
asperities, undulations and folds describe the operational vicissitudes 
the plant may experience in terms of Event-noise. 
A map of the Behaviour Surface will, by its very nature, be 
inconstant, being subject to change as the circumstances of the plant's 
constitution and environment vary the probabilities of those factors 
that can create Event-noise and are represented by the irregularities. 
While the irregularities have magnitude in a qualitative sense, this 
dimension is not quantifiable in prospect other than in terms of 
potentialities which are more subjective than objective. This, of course, 
is the nub of the objection to the validity of the very low probabilities 
cast for catastrophic LPEs by quantitative methods of safety and 
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reliability analysis. In these cases the potentialities become ever 
harder to discern as less and less likely events are identified, 
becoming insubstantial at the metaphysical fringe shown in Figure 4. 
Charting of the Behaviour Surface is more a matter for engineering 
judgement than for computation. 
(b) The Stub Vector 
The instantaneous state of the plant is represented by the 
attitude of a short stem or 'Stub Vector' supported by the point, 'Q', 
which is always normal to the Behaviour Surface itself at the point of 
contact. It is aligned to the perpendicular where the surface is flat, 
but the asperities, bumps and folds translate the point as it moves 
over them into domains of instability where the resistance of the 
system to failure is lost in measures proportional to the deformity of 
the surface. The Stub Vector then tilts, its degree of displacement 
from the vertical indicating the extent by which the plant has been 
disturbed from its stable state as shown in Table IV. 
The duration of the instabilities represented by an encounter of 
'Q' with a Behaviour Surface anomaly is, of course, the time for which 
the Stub Vector remains at the tilt. This is a function of the rate 
at which 'Q' moves across the particular surface irregularity. 
Clearly, the speed at which 'P' moves in the Control Plane is not 
constant, being determined by the operational strategy pursued as 
varied by exigent system requirements: tending to be stationary when 
the plant is shutdown, though plant and human factors render demarcation 
of such periods indeterminate. For example, time is taken to remove 
after-heat in the core before a planned shutdown can be completed and 
start-up may be a lengthy and complicated operation. In retrospect, 
the encounters that 'Q' has with the Behaviour Surface anomalies are 
otherwise identifiable as elements of Event-noise, 'Dynamic' (D-En), 
'Static' (S-En) and the 'spikes' of the Catastrophe-function, 'L', as 
the case may be. Salient among the latter is the rare and terminal 
event of catastrophic failure designated as 'L', a topic of the 
following Sub-section 12.4.1. 
(c) The Behaviour Surface as an Event-noise generator 
While the Control Plane is determinate, the Behaviour Surface has 
been identified as a probability field on which Event-noise characteristic 
of the operation of the reactor is generated as the point, 'Q', bearing 
its Stub Vector, passes across the irregularities in that surface, the 
analogy with a gramophone needle and record groove being strong. The 
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TABLE IV 
Stub Vector Attitudes 
&planatory Note - In discussing the Event-noise (EN) features of the Behaviour Surface (EFC21) of the Cuboi. d Model, it is appropriate to assign 
weaning to its upward slope from E-F to G-B. The bumps, creases and folds 
that form the 'asperities', the 'wrinkles' and the 'fold-curve' which repre- 
sent the En probabilities then appear as changes of slope with respect to the 
s-axis. The magnitude of these changes is indicative of the severity of the 
particular E experience, potential or realised, and is described by the tilt 
induced in the Stub Vector as 'Q' proceeds around the operational hysteresis 
loop and encounters the various Behaviour Surface irregularities. 
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instabilities indicated by the orientation of the Vector may be 
associated with specific Behaviour Surface anomalies which can be 
described as 'asperities' for minor irregularities, 'wrinkles' and 
'folds' in ascending order of magnitude as shown in Table IV. The 
extreme case is a 'fold-curve' which results in complete inversion 
of the Stub Vector, turning it through 1800, bringing about the 
terminal LPE of 'L' (supra). More particularly, the asperities may 
be associated with industrial accidents and minor component and 
systemic faults of a casual nature. The wrinkles, symptomatic of 
more significant disturbances to the system's stability, represent 
major equipment, sub-assembly, structural and system failures and 
the occasional reactor trips consequent upon them. Taken together, 
the asperities and wrinkles symbolise the generality of D-En and S-En 
as identified by 'n' and 's' in Equation (i). 
In conditions of normal, steady operation the reactor will cycle 
around a loop of start-up, occasional trip, maintenance in service, 
periodic shutdown for overhaul and return to operational service, being 
little troubled by the mundane Event-noise arising, a situation 
depicted in Figure 12. 
(d) The Fold-curve and other surface anomalies 
Nbre serious events appear in the medley of En when, owing to 
the unusual circumstances suggested by the factors operating on the 
term on the 11S of Equation (viii) above, the point 'P' deviates from 
its expected cyclic path in the Control Plane. As a result, the image 
point 'Q', following the deviant path taken by 'P', is deflected from 
its prospective course and may encounter an unanticipated major wrinkle 
or fold in one of the rougher and uncharted areas of the Behaviour 
Surface which have been labelled En*. Such events constitute the 
'spikes' of En that mark certain parts of the 'Bathtub Curve' (See 
Figure 11). Catastrophic failure of the whole system is represented 
by 'Q' moving over the rare anomaly of a fold-curve when a sudden 
change of state occurs as the point passes over and down, or up and 
under, the lip of the fold on to its lower surface where the direction 
of the stub vector is reversed, indicative of a catastrophe as 
described in Table IV. 
It is reasonable to think that the presence of 'Q' in the region 
of the fold could result in the appearance in the Event-noise flux of 
precursors of the impending loss of the system's resistance to failure. 
The New Treatment will suggest that such warning signals could be 
detected by alert and percipient observers properly cognisant of the 
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engineering of the plant and its circumstances of operation. The topic 
is raised again in the next Section. 
In addition to the hysteresis loop traced on the Control Plane by 
the point, 'P', the projection downward of the 'fold-curve' in the 
Behaviour Surface appears in the form of the 'bifurcation set' suggestive 
of a 'cusp' (E. C. Zeeman 1977). Despite that, the probability distribution 
of the fold-curve is unimodal for any conceivable maximum reactor accident 
and, although, the lips of the 'fold-curve' may be approached from two 
directions as shown in Figure 12, only one type of catastrophe is 
described by the form of the given surface. The representation is, 
therefore, not that of a 'cusp catastrophe', but one analogous to the 
capsizing of an ocean-going ship, ie unimodal outcome, but of multiform 
possibilities of causation. By comparison, salient among those in the 
case of a nuclear power plant are the LOCA, a reactivity excursion, 
loss of control and precipitate total rupture of the main coolant pressure 
vessel. 
12.4.1 Some qualitative aspects of the Cuboid Catastrophe Model 
In the attempt to combine the Event-noise concept with Catastrophe 
Theory, it has been necessary to take some liberties with the formal 
presentation of the latter. Rend Thom's theory deals with the 
catastrophe per se which, in the first example used by E. C. Zeeman 
(1977/a), describes the state of rising tension in the case of an animal 
facing a threat or provocation. The creature experiences rising fear 
and aggression, the tension being relieved by a catastrophic change of 
behaviour into flight or fight. Similar scenarios can be written for 
the collapse of a strut under increasing load and with appropriate 
sophistication for systems of increasing complexity. 
The case of the animal is a simple 'cusp-catastrophe', but much 
more complicated catastrophe situations may be treated, some of which 
involve higher orders of dimensionality such as those concerning 
problems of space-time as discussed by D. Trotman (E. C. Zeeman 1977/b). 
The major simplication made here has been to describe the risk 
of nuclear power plant failure in terms of the degrees of loss of 
stability shown in Table IV as represented by the attitude of the 'Stub 
Vector'. By the embellishment of the Theory it has been possible to 
combine the Event-noise and Catastrophe concepts in a simple idea whereby 
the Behaviour Surface (EFCH) of the Cuboid Model of Figure 12 is depicted 
not only as having the characteristic 'fold-curve' used to describe a 
simple catastrophe, that is total loss of stability corresponding to 
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catastrophic failure of a nuclear power plant, but as having surface 
anomalies as well which represent Event-noise (En) of increasing 
severity. 
To avoid involved descriptions and recourse to the mathematics 
of Thom's theory, the feature of the 'cusp' has been glossed over 
because there is only one catastrophic case mich is total loss of 
stability. Doubtless, the multiplicity of forms which that might 
take, for instance a LOCA, criticality excursion, channel dry-out and 
so on could be studied in depth, but this is not necessary for the 
purposes of the New Treatment. To quote E. C. Zeeman on this point 
when discussing the 'Stability of Ships': 
'This approach in terms of canonical forms offers a 
qualitative geometry that is complementary to the 
classical approach. Whether or not such formulation 
is of any use remains to be seen, because to make 
quantitative predictions it is still necessary to use 
co-ordinates and approximations as in the classical 
theory. However as a general principle it is always 
advantageous to retain the dynamics in a conceptually 
simple form for as long as possible so that the 
importance of the qualitative features can be kept in 
the forefront of the mind unobscured by_ detail, 
allowing the eventual approximation to be tailored to 
the job in hand. ' 
Catastrophe Theory: Selected Papers 
1972-1977, pp. 441-442. 
Although the simple Catastrophe Theory model given above is 
3-dimensional, or'Cuboid', it has in effect more than three because of 
the complex linkages involved in the 'Command' (u) and 'Response' (ý) 
functions acting in the Control Plane and the peculiarities of the 
Behaviour Surface. This 'Cuboid Model' offers a multi-dimensional 
concept in contrast to what is essentially the 2-dimensional design 
regime that characterises quantitative safety and reliability analysis 
as in the Reactor Safety Study (N. C. Rasmussen 1975). The Cuboid 
MDdel through its multi-dimensionality thus helps to blend the reality 
of plant construction and operation with design theory, bridging the 
gulf between the two regimes of theory-as-design and practice-in- 
construction as shown in Figure 8. 
The simple exposition of Catastrophe Theory presented here is no 
more than an introduction in a treatment that is innately qualitative, 
being concerned with an understanding of the quandaries of LPE 
management rather than with the underlying mathematical logic of any 
specific application of the Theory. A study in greater depth might be 
justified on grounds of rigour but is well beyond the scope of the 
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present text and would add little to understanding. 
The style of modelling used to represent the LPE of catastrophic 
outcome is associated with the 'fold-curve', an approach that tends to 
be subjective, and properly so because the Model has to represent 
the analyst's conception of a multi-dimensional entity, that is the 
reactor system as a complex grouping of factors that is labile and 
lacks definitive bounds. The case for the more general class of 
technological LPEs is illustrated by the combination of the two 
'Failure Triangles' of Figures 14 and 15 as discussed in the Preamble 
to Appendix II. The above use of Catastrophe methodology in the 
treatment of LPEs may be compared with the exiguous simplicity of the 
2-dimensional representation of the Event-trees and Fault-trees on 
which the analyses in the Reactor Safety Study are based. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some quantifiable 
elements in the Catastrophe Theory treatment among which are control 
rod redundancy, the provision of instrumentation sensors and various 
operational limits, one of these being the provision of fuel element 
thermocouples in the British Magnox reactors as described in Document 
No. 5 of the Annex. 
In view of the simplicity of the Catastrophe Theory application 
that has been adopted, the value of the concept in relation to study 
of LPEs may be questioned. In this connection it is useful to observe 
the qualitative modelling used in many branches of modern physics and 
other sciences, not least in Particle Physics. Even some 20 years 
ago the use of qualitative models was described by Professor A. W. 
Merrison in 1964 as 'simple, but imaginative modelling, trivial 
arithmetic and hard thought'. 
The New Treatment is, then, using Catastrophe Theory to give a 
multi-dimensional representation of the causative phenomena that 
precede and underlie the catastrophic failure of a nuclear power plant. 
By this means, the steps that must be taken to prevent such an untoward 
event by defending the safety of the plant at risk may be better 
understood. Clearly, the outcome is going to be neither one of 
mathematics and algebra nor specifically quantitative. It is one 
instead that can assist inspectional policy by keeping the practical 
features of a nuclear plant risk to the fore, while 'keeping at the 
back of one's mind the necessary reservations, qualifications and 
adjustments we shall have to make later on' to paraphrase John Maynard 
(Lord) Keynes's disparagement of a tendency to place excessive emphasis 
on mathematical treatments in economics (1936). 
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A NEW OUTLOOK ON LPE CAUSATION 
An ideogram that proportionately ascribes three generic 
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FITTING FLIXBOROUGH INTO A PATTERN 
Prom an article by Sir Harry Chilver, 
Nature, 10 February 1977, vol. 265,494 
Using the explosion of June 1,1974 which devastated the petrochemical pro- 
cessing plant at Flixborough as an example, Sir Henry Chilver writing in 
Nature early in 1977 identified the important issues raised by the event in 
respect of the safety and reliability of complex installations of the kind. 
Be saw them as the adequacy of the engineering skills available for their 
design and construction and the effectiveness of the supervision of these 
engineering activities in practice. B. observed that, not only must all 
engineering disasters be individually explored with a view to discerning the 
causes, but they mast be seen arore broadly as matters of concern to engineer- 
ing science as they may disclose 'some general pattern of engineering fail- 
ures as a whole'. Be attempted to generalise the case by 'fitting Flixborough 
into a pattern' that could embrace other engineering failures. 
Be distinguished three main causal factors among a number of notorious 
failures# namely: 
(i) Unknown structural or material deficiencies, for example, the 
materiale used may have been substandard or a vital component 
have suffered accidental damage, is. 'Structural Deficiencies'. 
(ii) Unknown forces in the environment of the structure, for example 
a long-span bridge shy suffer exceptionally high winds or a 
building experience an unusually severe earthquake, is. 
'Unknown Environmental Forces'. 
(iii) Unknown forms of behaviour of the structure within its environ- 
sent, for example a new form of oscillation, or buckling aay 
occur for a new structural form, is. 'Unpredictable behaviour'. 
Chilver relates these factors to apices of a 'Triangle of Failures' su shown 
in the figure above. Failures of very different sorts my be located in the 
Triangle and, where a failure involves mixes of factors, it can be placed 
nearer to the apex associated with the cause deemed to be dominant. 
The representation is not quantitative, but it can assist in forming a qual- 
itative judgement about the main sources of loss of resistance to failure. 
This can provide a basis on which policy in regard to design and inspection 
may be formulated. 
THE CHILVER FAILURE TRIANGLE (Appendix II refers) FIG 14 
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The size of each dot gives an indication of the scale. of the 
incident in terms of injury to humans and damage to property. 
In the cases of the Three Mile Island (ME) and Browns Ferry 
nuclear power station accidents, though there has been very 
heavy financial loss, no known harm was done to either workers 
or the public by leakage of radioactivity from the plant. 
The clustering of the dotr is in accord with the findings of 
the Analysis in Appendix II. It show a definite trend towards 
culpable human error, defined in the diagram as 'Culpability', 
as the major factor in accident causation, a deduction, that 
has been confirmed by more generalised accident studies. It 
is, however, one that can be effectively minimised by a re- 
gime of inspection of a suitable kind. 
TRIANGLE OF INCIDENT CAUSATION Fig 15 
(Appendix II refers) 
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12.4.2 The nature of the Catastrophe-function 'L' 
It seems-that none of the present approaches to nuclear hazard 
management offers any sure guidance for the defence of a plant against 
those severe system failures of very low, but imponderable probability, 
that are occasionally realised, a point that may be confirmed by 
reference to Appendix II. 
Nonetheless, Catastrophe theory can assist understanding of the 
complicated interactions between matter and the human intellect that 
enable an intricate machine to be designed, constructed and properly 
used in safety. In this connection, E. C. Zeeman concludes an erudite 
exposition of 'A catastrophe model for the stability of ships' with 
the following observation: 
' ... there is at present a lack in the theory of non- linear coupling. Consequently, there is a lack of 
mathematical language in which to express and communicate 
the intuition which experienced pilots possess of how to 
handle a ship in heavy weather. It is not enough to say 
that capsizing is probably due to that once-in-a-million 
freak wave, because capsizings do occur more frequently 
than we would wish, and it might be that the intuitive 
knowledge of one experienced pilot could have saved 
another. A case in point is Lindemann's discovery of 
how to get out of a flat spin in an aircraft by pushing 
the stick fully forward and kicking hard on the opposite 
rudder. What was at one time a situation dreaded by all 
fliers, is now a routine recovery procedure taught to 
all beginners. Analogously, in ship stability, the 
qualitative simplicity of the singularities that we have 
been discussing might eventually lead to a better 
understanding of the routine procedures for handling that 
big wave. ' 
'Catastrophe Theory: Selected Papers 
1972-1977', 
Addison-Wesley, Reading, 
Massachusetts, 1977, p. 492. 
It is suggested that the answer may lie, not in more recherche 
excursions into risk and reliability analyses, but in ascertaining 
how to anticipate a covert, major wrinkle or latent fold-curve in the 
Behaviour Surface of a Cuboid Catastrophe Model. The vagaries in the 
path of 'P' on the Control Plane (OBCD) shown in Figure 12 are due to 
the 'non-linear coupling' between the 'Operational Command' (p) of the 
plant management and the 'Response' (4) of the system. Besides the 
Response has its own, often capricious, dynamic owing to human 
initiatives and other factors defined in Section 12.3.2. above, namely 
'p' and 'q' and the associated 'Anomalies', 'z'. Moreover, the 
Behaviour Surface (EF(-i) is a probability field owing among other things 
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to the circumstances of 'c' which is the lack of congruence between 
the theory of the design and the reality of the plant, of impingeing 
externalities, 'x', that disturb the system and the internally 
generated inconsistencies just mentioned. In consequence, the 
irregularities of the Surface which are its asperities, wrinkles and 
such folds as may be distinguished are not fixed features and the 
encounters of 'Q' with them are also influenced by an element of 
chance. By earlier definition, then, 'öl', the 'spike' of Event-noise, 
a major instability that is the result of 'Q' passing across a wrinkle 
or fold-curve in that surface, is represented by an output pulse of 
the 'Catastrophe-function', 'L' which may be written formally by 
summation of identity (viii) as 
t 
L= K(s, n, x, z)St ............ (xi), 
0 
where 't' is the duration of the passage. 
As written, the function, 'L', depicts all 'spikes' in the 
Event-noise flux as major, impulsive fluctuations in the stability of 
the plant's system, but that associated with catastrophic failure is 
terminal. The latter is, therefore, in a separate class and is 
designated as 't'. 
The last term, '1', in the earlier Event-noise equation, 
e=n+s+1................ (i) 
now becomes 1=L+ Pr(L) ................ (xii) 
for t=T when the plant has reached the end of its useful life. 
Pr(E) which is the objective probability of the system experiencing a 
catastrophic terminal event is very small and tends to zero. The 
term may be associated with the 'zero' concept in the 'Zero-Infinity 
Dilemma' facing the insurance industry actuary when assessing nuclear 
and certain other modern technological risks. 
The movement of 'P' on the Control Plane is, of course, the 
result of the operational intention represented by the 'Comnand' 
co-ordinate, 'u' and the expected 'System Response', 'ý'(supra). The 
point is 'steerable', but its course exhibits an unpredictability 
owing to the non-linear couplings between the interactive human and 
physical linkages. This uncertainty added to the stochastic nature of 
the Behaviour Surface makes the experience of 'Q' unforeseeable in a 
definitive quantitative sense. Besides, the confidence limits are too 
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wide to give values to the risk parameters that are meaningful in 
anything but a qualitative connotation for the plant as an operating 
physical entity, a conclusion arrived at by more tortuous mathematical 
and engineering arguments earlier in the text. 
12.5 An interpretation of the Catastrophe/Event-noise approach 
By combining the Event-noise and Catastrophe Theories, a model 
of the plant as a working entity of interacting physical and human 
parts may be constructed. It can then be presented as a holistic 
system in an engineering aspect and an escape made from the inhibiting 
formality of the quantification logic of reliability analysis which 
then falls into place as a valuable intellectual tool in the exercise 
of performance assessment. Thus, the New Treatment gives scope for 
functional analysis in depth of a nuclear power plant along the lines 
pioneered by Rend Thom and others. As E. C. Zeeman (supra) also 
remarks: 
'Firstly, the geometry of elementary catastrophes may be used 
to describe phenomena, particularly those in which gradually 
changing forces produce sudden effects. The philosophical 
justification ... is that mathematically they are higher dimensional analogues of the simple concepts of maxima, minima 
and thresholds. ... such a model may be scientific in the 
sense of reducing the arbitrariness of a description, by 
providing a coherent synthesis of otherwise unrelated 
observations. Secondly, it may be possible to explain a model 
by deducing it from more fundamental hypotheses. ... ... Thirdly, ... models (may be used) ... to design experiments 
and predict new results. ' 
Catastrophe Theory: Selected 
Papers 1972 - 1977, Preface. 
Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 
1977, pp. ix - x. 
The elementary Catastrophe theory model of Figure 12 is a static 
slice taken from a multidimensional system progressing in time. Without 
allowance for updating, it would rapidly fail to represent the system. 
However, Event-noise theory provides for continuity by introducing a 
dynamical aspect that enables the changing physical and human linkages 
to be recognised and the consequences of their interactions described. 
In the case of nuclear power plants, this wider knowledge of the system 
as a whole may be used to emend safety and reliability engineering 
strategies and to re-orientate engineering investment in safeguards, 
physical and administrative, on a more effective basis. The risk may 
be thus assessed in circumstances that obtain beyond the realm of the 
design office. 
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12.5.1 Some 'Catastrophe' representations of Event-noise elements 
Further examination of the RHS of Equations (i) to (iv) yields 
some more information relevant to a better understanding of the 
problems of nuclear power hazard control. 
(a) Dynamic Event-noise - D-En 
The complex term for 'n' on the REIS of Equation (ii) represents 
the D-En experience of an operating nuclear power plant. It describes 
the random occurrence of minor equipment, components and structural 
faults, process interruptions and industrial accidents typical of any 
large engineering installation, an experience also portrayed by the 
asperities of the Behaviour Surface of the model in Figure 12. Owing 
to the high level of safety and reliability awareness that pervades 
such industrial entities, as for example in factories handling 
explosives, the rate of D-En flux may be expected to be substantially 
lower than for the generality of industry. This has been confirmed 
by the rate reported from the U. S. nuclear industry over the first 
15 years of operation which was only one-third of the national figure 
(M. B. Biles 1969) and a similar pattern prevails in the U. K. It 
also suggests that the safety and reliability problems inherent in 
D-En are being efficaceously managed by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) and the British Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 
(NII). 
(b) Static Event-noise - S-En 
Interpretation of the term for 's' on the RHS of Equation (iii) 
is more profound. S-En as defined in Sections 12.2 and 12.2.1 above 
is a phenomenon of the design and construction processes that 
introduces largely covert defects into the whole fabric of the entity. 
The more significant of them are represented by the wrinkles in the 
Behaviour Surface of the cuboid model. Most of the elements of S-En 
not eliminated during commissioning emerge as copious En in the 
initial phases of operation to constitute the typically large, but 
rapidly decreasing numberd early failures' characteristic of the 
'Bathtub Curve' shown in Figure 10. Residuals remain and can appear 
fortuitously later in the history of the plant, occasionally combining 
with other elements of En in propitious systemic circumstances to make 
paths for fault sequences that can run to catastrophic failure of the 
system, that is to produce a fold-curve in the Behaviour Surface. An 
example of the late emergency of covert, residual S-En was the casual 
discovery of break-away corrosion of vital steel bolts in the graphite 
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core restraint bands in the British 'Magnox' reactors in 1968 (Daily 
Telegraph 1973, David Fishlock 1975), the consequent 'behavioural' 
instability being so serious as to require a drastic reduction in 
output of these stations and later shutdown for major repairs. 
However, this 'event' may be seen as a major 'spike' of En and may be 
grouped with effects of the Catastrophe-function, 'L'. 
(c) Event-noise 'spikes' and the Catastrophe-function 'L' 
The En element represented by the term, '1', in Equation (i) 
comprises 'noise' events of a more serious kind than those of 'n' and 
's', being identified with the 'spikes' discussed in the text above. 
These events of low probability, and for the most part threats to 
the stability of the system but not envisaged in its design, are of 
diverse causations acting in unanticipated situations. The 'spike' 
generating function, described by the expression on the RNS of 
Equation (iv) is complex, convoluted and enigmatic and its meaning 
cannot be fully understood in any mechanistic sense prior to the 
event with which it is identified. Its action is almost invariably 
systemic, if not in its origin, then in its consequences, and the 
'spike' itself is the result of interaction among the multifarious 
factors identified on the RHS of Equation (iv). The occurrence of 
such incidents usually involves the late emergence of covert S-En, 
although seldom without human fallibility making an important 
contribution. In Catastrophe Theory, 'L' is represented by wrinkles 
and major irregularities on the Behaviour Surface of the cuboid model 
of Figure 12 which 'Q', the image of the Control point, 'P', may 
encounter as it moves in response to the directions of the system 
control program. The wrinkles are illustrative of situations in which 
the stability of the system'is disturbed sufficiently to create 'spikes' 
in the Event-noise flux. 
Typical examples of low probability 'spike' events due to major 
surface anomalies include the ingress of sea water into the nuclear 
core of one of the Hunterston AGR reactors and the cracks found in 
the fabric of the main coolant ducts of the Dungeness 'A' power station 
No. 2 reactor in August 1978 during a routine shutdown for overhaul 
(David Fishlock 1979, Anthony Tucker 1980). Inspection disclosed 
covert S-En in the presence of cracks in the membranes of the expansion 
bellows assemblies. The system suffered an extended shutdown for 
repairs. Catastrophic crack propagation leading to precipitate failure 
of a duct in operational circumstances and explosive decompression of 
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the reactor coolant pressure circuit would result in the archetypal 
Maxirum Credible (MCA) or Design Basis (DBA) Accident for a 'Magnox' 
system. More seriously, passage of 'Q' over a fold-curve represents 
terminal destabilisation of the system. This terminal low probability 
event symbolised by Pr(E) in Equation (xii), although strictly a 
'spike', is discussed separately infra. 
(d) The Low Probability Event Pr(L)- the Terminal Catastrophe 
In the Event-noise stream coming from a nuclear power plant, 
catastrophic failure symbolised by E in Equation (xii), stands out 
from the generality of 'spikes', being singular in consequences 
rather than in nature despite the fact that it terminates the flow. 
The very low probability of this unlikely happening is depicted by the 
operator, 'Pr' that has been introduced into the Equation. The 
resulting term, Pr(L), is also indicative of the asymptotic zero risk 
identified actuarially as the 'Zero-Infinity Dilemma' of the insurance 
industry discussed earlier in Section 8.4. Notwithstanding the vestigal 
probability of occurrence, the fact that a damaged nuclear power reactor 
can release very large quantities of radioactivity to the environment 
capable of putting a whole community at risk makes Pr(L) an issue of 
transcendent importance in both the engineering and politics of 
nuclear power. The event, L, is represented in the cuboid catastrophe 
model of Figure 12 by an encounter of the point, 'Q', with the lip of 
the fold-curve. The ensuing inversion of the stub-vector indicates a 
total loss of the system's stability as described in Table IV. The 
probability and scale of such an event and the quest for ways by which 
it may be averted has been, and continues to be, the central theme of 
all approaches to safety in the management of nuclear power. 
An example of an L event is provided by the Three Mile Island 
catastrophe. The failure sequence was initiated by tripping of the 
main feedwater pumps due to an S-En element introduced during 
maintenance. The system reacted correctly, but owing to a design 
weakness (S-En) the emergency feedwater valves were set in the closed 
position. The steam generators boiled dry, depriving the reactor of 
a heat sink (a destabilising 'spike'). As a result of inadequate 
design, a pilot operated relief valve on the pressuriser (S-En) did not 
close when the reactor pressure surge relaxed which mislead the operators 
as to the true state of the plant. In consequence, a series of operational 
errors (D-En) followed. Nuclear fuel in the core overheated with some 
melting and release of fission products and generation of hydrogen from 
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the reaction between steam and zircalloy contributed major 'spikes' to 
the now chaotic En flux. The catastrophe culminated in a massive 
escape of radioactivity to the containment where a hydrogen bubble 
was also formed which later exploded. There was general confusion in 
the control room and for a time the system was totally destabilised. 
Viewed systemically, a plant experience which might have been no more 
than a minor 'spike' instability, became a catastrophic failure 
because of defects in the human links in the response system. The 
plant was, in effect, steered across the Control Plane (OB®) of the 
cuboid model into catastrophe, represented on the Behaviour Surface 
(EF(-i) by the operational state image point, 'Q', passing over the 
lip of an unenvisaged fold-curve. Among the many factors of human 
S-En was the obese somatype of a senior control room engineer that 
inhibited his proper perception of the instrument panel displays 
(Barbara Culliton et al. 1979). A further, enigmatic feature of the 
incident was that the fold-curve encountered was conceptually anomalous 
because the catastrophe was beyond the DBA (P. Halliday 1982). 
A similar analysis can be applied to the sequence of events that 
led to the 'Flixborough' petrochemical plant disaster of 1974. It was 
initiated by cracking of the membrane of one of 6 large cyclohexane 
reactors, owing to inadequate metallurgical design (S-En). The defective 
unit was properly bypassed for repairs and after tests the plant returned 
to the production of caprolactam. As the vacant post of plant 
engineering manager had not been filled (S-En), responsibility for site 
engineering was in the hands of a maintenance foreman (S-En). The 
technology of the repair was beyond his competence and his design faulty, 
though the 4orkmanship was excellent (S-En). Some 4 weeks later, the 
bypass failed in service (D-En) and the site was blanketed by a cloud 
of cyclohexane vapour. It was ignited by an open flame (D-En) and the 
consequent explosion (fold-curve catastrophe) wrecked the plant, killing 
28 workers and causing extensive damage in the nearby villages. The 
actual direct cause of the incident was a matter of dispute at the 
subsequent inquiry, but the official view prevailed. Like 'TMI' the 
accident was beyond the DBA (Christopher Simon 1975), being the result 
of inadequate human linkages in the mechanism that determined the 
Response (q) of the system to the Operational Commands (u) of management. 
The catastrophic rush over the fold-curve which happened in minutes 
rather than hours may be attributed to the sudden, consecutive realisation 
of the chain of S-En elements. 
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12.5.2 An evaluation of Event-noise/Catastrophe Theory 
As concluded in the earlier comments on the expression Pr(E) 
of Equation (xii) the potpourri of interacting factors that determine 
the response, '4)', of the plant to the command parameter, 'u', are 
intractable and defy analysis by any known rigorous logical or 
mathematical device. Hence, the consequent experience of the system 
depicted by its progress in the probability field of the Behaviour 
Surface (EFGH) of the model (Figure 12) cannot be forecast in any 
meaningful quantitative sense for low probability events beyond 
mundane industrial experience. As posited in Section 9.6.1, quantitative 
prophecies of very low risks, especially when made from design concepts, 
are metaphysical and describe hypothetical events that are too rare to 
happen in the manner foreseen. The system is no more reliable thereby 
because something not conceived in the analysis may happen instead, a 
conclusion justified by the experience of technological failures (See 
Appendix II). 
Although Event-noise and the Catastrophe theories give no more 
in the way of direct guidance towards the desired goal of absolute 
safety than any of the other methods of treating the nuclear risk, the 
combined approach offers an advance by identifying L as part of the 
En flux, being the last of an otherwise continuing sequence of 'spikes' 
and exceptional only in that it becomes the terminator. This gives 
the method a conceptual continuity that is absent from the DBA or the 
equivalent MCA approaches which have their focus on major catastrophic 
events to the apparent exclusion of the smaller ones, although these 
still have serious consequences. Although this has long been recognised 
by nuclear engineers as a weakness, the criticism of the MCA was first 
voiced by F. R. Farmer (1967) to justify his criterion of distributed 
radiation accident probabilities known as the 'Farmer Line'. 
Both the DBA/MCA and the quantitative probability methods of the 
'Farmer Line' type are engrossed in theoretical matters of design at 
the expense of practice in engineering site and operational realities. 
By comparison, the New Treatment by combining the Event-noise and 
Catastrophe theories takes due account of the importance of practice 
by including engineering realities of construction and operation in the 
En stream while continuing to recognise the basic role of the design 
theory. Nbreover, the assimilation of En elements into the catastrophe 
model completes the representation of the plant's operational behaviour 
by the inclusion of human factors in both the decision function (u) and 
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the system response (c). The overall behaviour of the plant is thus 
depicted as a system experiencing a consistent succession of disparate 
events that possesses the ergodic continuity characteristic of noise. 
The outcome of the approach is not predictive but explanatory, 
thereby enabling steps to be taken to abort the drift of an apparently 
safe system into catastrophe. 
A nuclear power plant would be dead and useless without the 
human motivation and direction provided by its operating team, recognised 
by Event-noise theory as an integral part of the plant's holistic 
constitution. That there are few catastrophic failures in major 
technological systems which have not been primarily due to human error 
establishes the truth and importance of this fact. Therefore, assurance 
of the integrity and stability of the plant's system of human factors is 
essential to its safety and reliability. An inference from Goedel's 
theorem justified by field experience implies that the vital concord, 
consistency and efficiency cannot be wholly protected against entropic 
deterioration by efforts from within the system itself. Action by an 
external agency is needed and that is the principal duty of inspection, 
a topic discussed in the next main Section and in Document No. 4 of 
the Annex. A further inspectional task would be to distinguish the 
potential precursors of a fold-curve encounter which the continuity of 
Catastrophe theory suggests are always present in the En flux, though 
not necessarily either overt or immediate, being usually emergent S-En 
or a sudden human lapse. In fact, attempts to ascertain such loss of 
resistance to failure have already been made in the American Licensee 
Event Reporting (LER) scheme (15) from which an excerpt is shown in 
Table III. The scheme has been orientated towards faults and incidents 
arising in the physical realm rather than towards evidence of human 
failings. 
Catastrophe theory has not been uncritically received. Zahler 
and Sussmann (1977) among others claim that it has 'no advantage over 
better established mathematical tools' quoting its failure to produce 
'true testable predictions'. Brian Goodman (Open University), reviewing 
a critique of the theory by the Russian mathematician, V. I. Arnold 
(1984), describes it as the 'most extraordinary mathematical development 
of the Century'. However, its use in this thesis has been, not to 
predict, but to explain the nature of the relationships between those 
disparate factors that are able to cause a nuclear power plant accident, 
and that is a very different matter. Thus, elementary Catastrophe theory 
218 
has been used to build the Cuboid Model ideogram of Figure 12 to 
assist conceptualisation of the vicissitudes that accompany the 
operational behaviour of a nuclear power plant. 
12.6 Overview 
The 'Two Cultures' disjunction has long consigned the field 
aspects of engineering to limbo compared with the attention given to 
theory, design and administration. While this position was tenable 
in a world of the relatively simple technologies of wireless, uniselectors, 
permanent way and 'Ocean Queens', it is certainly not so for the advanced 
technologies of today, the pace setter among which has been nuclear power. 
Full recognition and understanding of the field accomplishments required 
of engineering have now become essential for both the continuation of 
technical progress and for the defence of safety in the more hazardous 
applications of science, the latter having become a major issue of 
social concern. 
Event-noise theory is an attempt to move beyond the formalism 
of quantitative systems methods which are preoccupied with analyses of 
design into an objective regime where due weight is given to the 
realities of engineering experience as these relate to the safety and 
reliability in technology and particularly nuclear power. While the 
paramount importance of design and theory oust be acknowledged as the 
themes which determine all practice, a design is seen by New Treatment 
as a packet of instructions to be transmitted from the design authority 
through time for implementation on a remote shop floor, construction 
site or control room. As for all signals, the design message suffers 
distortion, mutilation and loss of information during transmission, 
that is it experiences the phenomenon of 'noise'. Event-noise theory 
extends the concept to embrace all effects which impoverish, modify or 
corrupt the design intent. Two main classes of 'noise' are distinguished. 
The first, of latent effect, is 'Static Event-noise' (S-En) which 
describes flaws in the design as hidden defects introduced into the 
plant during construction or through later modifications or maintenance, 
its elements emerging unexpectedly from time to time. The second, 
'Dynamic Event-noise' (D-En), is an active component embracing the 
sequence of accidents, failures, faults, errors and multifarious 
incidents of an immediate nature which disturb, or otherwise destabilise, 
the plant in its proper function. D-En combined with emergent S-En 
together constitute the Event-noise stream which characterises the 
operational experience of a plant from commissioning to terminal shutdown. 
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In reliability science, this is described by the 'Bathtub Curve' of 
failure rates plotted against plant operating time. 
Attempts to express the Event-noise characteristic of a nuclear 
power plant in mathematical terms have been shown to produce intractable 
expressions, particularly that for the transcendent probability of 
catastrophic failure, a very low probability event identified as the 
terminal 'spike' of Event-noise represented by the term Pr(L). 
Recognising the futility of this effort, attention was turned to 
representation of the behaviour of the reactor system by an adaption 
of Catastrophe theory. This enables the stream of Event-noise to be 
described in terms of the experience of a point moving in a probability 
field called the Behaviour Surface that forms the upper sheet of a 
cuboid catastrophe model. Deformities in the Surface represent 
potential disturbances to the stability of the plant which, if realised, 
produce Event-noise ranging in scale from minor incidents to 
catastrophic failure. The degree of stability is depicted by the 
attitude of a stub vector located at the point, the vector being normal 
to the Surface and thus becomes tilted as it passes over protuberances. 
Its inversion at lip of the fold-curve symbolises catastrophic failure, 
represented by the terminal event, L, in the Event-noise flux. The 
point bearing the stub vector is the image of another moving in the 
lower sheet of the model called the Control Plane which is parallel 
in aspect to the upper surface. Its instantaneous position is 
determined by two orthogonal co-ordinates, one representing the 
operational decisions of management and the other, the overall response 
of the plant as a system of interacting, synergistic physical and 
human factors. The path it takes on the Control Plane is a hysteresis 
loop owing to the lack of proportionality in the response linkages. 
Safe and reliable operation of the plant requires an engineering 
strategy that mist reduce the probability of exposure of the system 
to effects caused by encounters of the image point and stub vector with 
major abnormalities of the Behaviour Surface and, particularly, that 
of the maximus accident of catastrophic failure should it pass across 
a fold-curve. 
Three important conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing 
first-order adaption of Catastrophe theory to the Event-noise concept. 
First, it is descriptive and explanatory and in no way predictive in 
any quantitative sense. Second, the plant's operational policy must 
be related to its existence as a holistic entity of interacting 
physical and human components which may give indications that can 
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supercede historical considerations based on analyses of design. 
That is to say, the fold-curve encountered may represent a catastrophe 
beyond the DBA or outside the predictions of a quantitative risk 
analysis, two examples of which have been cited. The third is that 
a presumption of continuity made from Catastrophe theory predicates 
the existence of precursors in the Event-noise sequence preceding 
a major disturbance of plant stability. Assurance of safety, therefore, 
lies in their perception and consequent change of operational policy so 
that an encounter with a major protuberance or fold-curve in the 
Behaviour Surface may be avoided. Efforts to detect such harbingers 
have already been made in U. S. nuclear industry, but the reporting 
schemes are more concerned with failures and failure rates for physical 
components and sub-systems than with the equally important matter of 
quality in the human aspects of plant management. 
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13 EVENT-NOISE: CAUSATION, SIGNIFICANCE AND PRECURSORS 
'Hinton (Sir Christopher) wrote that engineering 
is an art rather than a science because in the 
arts there are no single answers to problems: 
engineers are faced with many possible answers, 
each one a compromise between conflicting 
advantages and disadvantages. ... ... the previously unknown hazards of nuclear power 
presented a new challenge (paraphrased for 
brevity) 
... ... In the event -a lack of 
precedent in matters of health and safety - the atomic energy industry set a notable example 
as the first through rigorous scientific control 
of its hazards before, not after, evidence of damage had enforced action. ' 
Margaret Gowing, 
Independence and Deterence: Britain 
and Atomic Energy, Vol. II, 
MacMillan, London, 1974, p. 101. 
The study of the phenomenon of plant Event-noise (En) has so 
far been mainly one of classification concerned with the macro-aspects 
of the total En experienced by a nuclear power plant over its useful 
life cycle. Little attention has been paid to the micro-aspects of 
the particular causation of these flux elements per se. They 
are, nonetheless, important because in the En experienced may lie clues 
that the system is moving towards a fold-curve and possible catastrophe 
as described in Section 12.4 et seq. 
Any approach to absolute safety in nuclear power is either 
illusory or asymptotic, but confident attainment of the latter is 
feasible and can be achieved by good engineering through evolved 
reliability in design, construction, operation and maintenance as, for 
instance, in the case of the civil engineering works that are the 
Dutch dykes or in the space vehicles launched by the U. S. National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. In its development, the New 
Treatment advocates this line and has attempted to show how 
interdependent it is on the above functions. In particular, it cannot 
be achieved through design studies alone because of the 'noise' that 
mutilates the design message in the process of conversion from ideas 
to reality. 
The construct of the Event-noise/Catastrophe theory in the 
cuboid model of Figure 12 symbolises the risk situation as it is in 
reality for a nuclear power plant. The roughness of the Behaviour 
Surface with its asperities, bumps and fold-curves could be 
represented by probability density functions for the various En elements, 
but, though this might be more satisfying mathematically, it would not 
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be very helpful in a qualitative study such as this one and the topic 
is not pursued further here. 
13.1 Some further deductions from En-Catastrophe theory 
The mechanism whereby the En flux produces significant 
disturbances to the plant's stability, represented by 'spikes', and 
the realisation of catastrophic failure by an encounter with a fold- 
curve on the Behaviour Surface of the En-Catastrophe model have 
already been discussed. A point to note is that the Behaviour Surface 
is a probability field and not static. Not only can the Surface 
abnormalities change their positions in that field, but new ones may 
appear. The 'Three Mile Island' catastrophe is such a case because 
that disastrous incident was beyond the Design Basis Accident (DBA), 
representing an encounter with a fold-curve immediately created by 
management default and operational errors. The attitude of the stub- 
vector represents the instantaneous state of the plant and, therefore, 
the history of its attitudes up to the point of a major instability 
can expose the precursors that led to that instability. While these 
obviously have no predictive value because the event has already 
occurred, they provide valuable data for 'fixes'. Furthermore, they 
can reveal operational paths to be avoided in similar plants, but 
more significantly, they disclose management and organisational 
frailties that can reduce reliability and safety. For instance in the 
case of the 'Three Mile Island' incident of 1979, a notable weakness 
was the lack of proper technical understanding of the plant shown by 
its operators and certain technical advisors who arrived later on 
the scene. A conclusion may be drawn from the probabilistic nature 
of the Behaviour Surface is that, while the provision of sophisticated 
information technology can be of assistance to the proximate plant 
operators by giving the knowledge that may be otherwise lacking, it 
cannot replace satisfactorily the decision functions of the human 
operator. The program written for the purpose of overriding 
independent operator decisions rust be based on the assumption that 
events following an incident will take a predetermined course, but in 
the event that course may not be followed by the system or even exist 
in the future state. As Ludwig Wittgenstein contended: 
'5.1362 The freedom of will consists in the impossibility 
of knowing actions that still lie in the future. ' 
Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus 
(Trans. Pears and McGuinness) 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1972. 
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In fact, the arrangement suggested above in Section 12 could be 
dangerous, as for example the incident of the Air New Zealand Mount 
Erebus disaster of 1979 (See Appendix II). Awareness of the 
approximate behavioural position of a fold-curve distinguished as a 
potential MCA provides no reason for assuming that there are no other 
unsuspected fold-curves on that surface. 
The constructs of the probability field of the Behaviour Surface 
and the decision field of the Control Plane of the cuboid model of 
Figure 12 depict the inherent pervading presence of human intellect, 
actions and skills in the reality of the operating system. The state 
of the probability field itself and the operational path taken by 'Q', 
the image of the instantaneous control position, indicated by 'P', are 
the outcomes of managerial and technical decisions and the responses 
of the holistic system thereto. The control path is taken purposively 
to avoid situations of significant risk to the plant represented by 
major surface anomalies and an identified fold-curve. The human factor 
thus plays a dominant part in every aspect of the creation and operation 
of the system and all faults and failures in the ultimate derive 
therefrom. The certain attainment of nuclear power plant safety and 
reliability is therefore tantamount to the successful management of the 
immanent human factors, and this theme will be dominant in this text 
from now on. Although this may seem patently obvious, it has received 
less than due acknowledgement and attention has been concentrated on 
matters of theory and design at the expense of practice in their 
realisation in the field. The situation is characteristic of Western 
society today, being the result of the 'Two Cultures' disjunction 
which still separates the administrative, legal and literary intelligensia 
from the engineers and technologists (See Section 8.1), and that formalism 
also evinced by certain applications of systems analysis as noted in 
Sections 8.1,9.6 and 12 above. 
A safety conscious management aims in its engineering to steer 
a smooth and safe path through the hazards of the Behaviour Surface as 
far as these have been identified. Such a tactic was adopted for the 
U. K. Magnox nuclear plants to avoid a break-away fuel element fire in 
the graphite core following a burst duct LOCA. The operational decision 
situation involving a 'fire risk criterion' (Dale and Harrison, 1971) 
is discussed in 'Thermal Control of the Magnox Nuclear Heat Engine' 
(Document No. 5 of the Annex), particular attention being directed to 
its Figures 1,3,5 and 7. Despite the most careful plans, any such 
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safety strategy will be inevitably plagued by unknowns which can be 
eliminated only through their realisation in operational experience 
or by the artifice of virtual operational experience as through the 
'design-make-test-fail-fix' method of NASA which was used to 
establish confidence in the reliability of the 'Apollo Moonshot' 
vehicles (W. M. Bryan 1975). The flow of Event-noise created in the 
passage of 'Q' over the Behaviour Surface described in Section 12.4 
et seq. will contain precursors of its approach to a cause of major 
instability, that is to a 'spike' or a fold-curve, owing to the 
continuity of that Surface. In other words the event is the 
consequence of a chain of causes, although the links in that chain 
would not have been discerned by the proximate observers before it 
occurred, otherwise the sequence could have been arrested. Indeed, 
the tragedy of October 21,1966 at Aberfan was notorious for the 
gross lack of perception by those responsible for the safety of the 
No. 7 spoil tip. 
13.2 The enigmatic nature of event precursors 
Precursors deny themselves because if they are perceived and 
action taken, the event does not occur and they are precursors only 
in a virtual sense. Despite the fact precursors to major En 
phenomena may be known with certainty after the event but not 
beforehand, it has been argued in the preceding Section 12 that 
analysis of the En elements emitted by a plant can reveal things about 
the state of the system, thereby identifying weaknesses that could presage 
failure if not corrected. However, these elements which might be 
called 'virtual precursors', are seldom discernible by observers 
within the system, as for 'Aberfan' (supra), 'Three Mile Island' and the 
other catastrophes that are legion. 
13.2.1 A role for technical intuition or engineering judgement 
As there are no certain logical processes by which the future 
may be foretold, man's need for reliable harbingers of things to come 
has brought forth legions of soothsayers from the Stone Age witchdoctors 
to modern systems analysts. Nature through evolution has, however, not 
been unresponsive to this demand and the human brain over some two 
million years of necessity has acquired a remarkable faculty called 
'intuition' (See Glossary) which is the power of immediate intelligent 
insight and is less mysterious than may appear at first sight. Man can 
hold in the unfathomable depths of his memory a vast store of information. 
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A feature of this data base is the penetrating associative property 
of the access facility which can recognise faint analogies and 
similarities, a problem that has yet to be solved for artificial 
intelligence. Intuition coupled with the faculty of reason underlies 
most creative human endeavours, as for example its exercise by 
successful entrepreneurs and politicians. In the field of science, 
intuition enabled Max Planck to resolve the dilemma of the 'Ultraviolet 
catastrophe' by correcting the radiation formula (Werner Braunbeck 1974). 
This faculty of perception appears in technology as 'engineering 
judgment' and when highly developed, as in the case of experienced 
engineers, has led the way to great technological advances, not least, 
the electric telegraph, telephone, radio, radar, the jet engine and 
atomic energy itself. In the actuarial field, it is the necessary 
forte of the successful assessor of the more exotic risks. 
A solution to the problem of discerning such ephemeral potential 
precursors in the En flow from a nuclear power plant may lie in using 
the intuitive faculty. A difficulty is that in technology it is a 
specialised rather than a generalised talent and it would have to be 
applied to a particular type of plant by an engineer with detailed 
knowledge of its constitution and management. Attainment of credible 
ability in it depends therefore on long practical experience in the 
field supported by ample theoretical and technical knowledge and the 
ability to exercise a particular intuitive skill with penetration and 
perception. Such individuals are scarce owing to the tendency to 
specialism in engineering, but are to be found in the community of 
engineering inspectors who have to acquire an interdisciplinary approach. 
Moreover, it appears to be measurable by psychcohysical methods, a point 
to be made in the next Section. 
13.3 Loss of resistance to failure, a harbinger of major system faults 
Experience in the aeronautical industry and particularly in air 
transport has established a concept of 'perception of that loss of 
resistance to failure' which generally heralds the advent of an accident 
or mishap. It was initially developed in Latin American airlines to 
improve the efficiency of maintenance and to reduce costs. Its reported 
success attracted the attention of established air transport operators 
in the U. S. A. and formally constituted debriefings of aircrews along 
similar lines are now customary. Pilots and engineers fresh from 
experience with a machine are able to report on perceptible changes in 
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performance suggestive of deterioration in function. Maintenance is 
then directed towards correction of the identified weaknesses rather 
than invested in blanket routine schedules which can often introduce 
faults per se (M. A. Laceby 1976). 
The Licensee Event Reporting (LER) scheme that covers selected 
Event-noise elements as developed of recent years in the U. S. nuclear 
industry (15) is analogous to the management of aircrew debriefing 
data. Hhile no such scheme of intuitive analysis of nuclear plant 
event reports could give an assurance of absolute effectiveness because 
even the tost perceptive of analysts may miss a clue, a comprehensive 
one could, nevertheless, reduce still further what is already a very 
small risk. For instance, it is doubtful if the pre-accident situation 
at 'Flixborough' in May of 1974 would have escaped perception of its 
hazardous instability if it had been exposed to scrutiny of the 
foregoing kind, when the catastrophic sequence would have been aborted. 
13.4 The problem of lethargy and centripetal tendencies 
The organisation of a nuclear power station including the higher 
levels of management in the controlling utility is a closed system of 
directors, managers, operators and technicians, exchanging instructions 
downwards and passing information upwards in vertical hierarchical 
channels which acquire centripetal propensities that inhibit horizontal 
flows among departments. This is a wellknown weakness in large corporate 
bodies which justifies recourse to management consultants. A serious 
consequence of this departmental egocentricity is that it can conceal 
lethargy and discourages internal criticism of weaknesses. These 
tendencies are inimical to safety and reliability. The intrusion of 
the disinterested, independent inspection imposed by a statutory body 
like the Aeronautical Inspection Directorate in the field of supply 
for the armed forced or by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate and 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the U. S. A. can exercise a potent 
corrective effect, breaking down psychological barriers between 
departments and encouraging internal self-criticism otherwise lacking 
(A. K. Nuttall 1946, T. Griffiths 1966). The nature and application 
of inspection are treated more fully in Documents 3 and 4 of the Annex 
and in the following Section with particular application to the 
management of low probability events. 
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13.5 The assurance of safety and reliability by stability of form 
Early experience in use with new types of plant or variants of 
an established type is invariably 'noisy'. It is impossible to foresee 
and eliminate in advance all the faults and failures that will arise 
when a nuclear power plant of this kind is put into service. The 
initial or 'early failures' slope of the 'Bathtub' reliability curve 
of Figure 10 depicts the occurrence of these failures and likewise 
for the experience on the Behaviour Surface of the cuboid En-Catastrophe 
model of Figure 12 as the image point, 'Q', proceeds around the 
operational hysteresis loop. As the faults emerge and are eliminated 
by 'fixes' taken to prevent their re-occurrence, being designed-out, 
contained by effective administrative controls or otherwise treated, 
the system acquires an improved reliability in an asymptotic approach 
towards the highest feasible standard. Such is the case of the Rolls- 
Royce automobile for which it is claimed changes in engineering and 
styling are imperceptible over less than a decade (Daily Telegraph 
1976, Edward Eves 1979), the manufacturer's aim being to maintain the 
quality and reliability of a product of known excellence. The 
phenomenon is well-known in nature as the principle of the survival of 
the fittest that ensures the continuance of the best and most reliable 
of forms that survive by their stability and resistance to failure under 
stress (Roberts and Tregonning 1980) which is exhibited in 'the 
robustness of natural systems'. 
As interpreted in the development of nuclear power, the occurrence 
of certain Event-noise elements of permanent system significance (S-En) 
in a generic reactor type, say the appearance of cracks in the 
membranes of the main coolant gas ducts of certain British reactors, tends 
to diminish and approach zero as the system moves towards greater safety 
and reliability. This implies that reactor designs should be 
standardised as reliability evolves in use. Ad hoc design improvements 
should therefore be resisted, except as the need for change is shown 
to be desirable by experience because of the proven superiority of 
established, stable forms over novelty (John Maddox 1984), despite any 
attractions of the latter scientistically. 
13.6 Overview 
En-Catastrophe theory offers an approach to the management of 
the hazard of catastrophic failure of a nuclear power plant that is 
pragmatic rather than theoretical. Assuming that the design has been 
subjected to a comprehensive and penetrating safety analysis and has 
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been constructed according to that safety assured design, then the 
plant will not suffer the DBA or MCA or other envisaged unlikely 
accident as their probabilities are metaphysical. Despite that, 
something unforeseen, and no less catastrophic could happen instead. 
But, such an event cannot occur without prior links in its failure 
sequence and, if these precursors could be discerned before the 
prospective event, then it could be averted. However, such precursors 
are usually 'virtual' in that their identification is enigmatic and 
their status as such can never be confirmed as efficient with certainty 
unless the untoward incident occurs. 
The history of incidents, faults and failures experienced by a 
nuclear power reactor, or other industrial plant, has been described in 
tenns of Event-noise. The process of creation of an En flux has been 
depicted in terms of the cuboid model construct of Figure 12 for which 
the operating strategy is one of steering the plant in safety through 
the instabilities of a Behaviour Surface which is an incommensurable, 
though objective, probability field. En-Catastrophe theory thus 
presents a likelihood scenario that describes the current state of 
the plant as a holistic system in a human dimension rather than in 
terms of some prior safety assessment of its design. Then, given a 
plant of verifiable sound design and construction, reliability and 
safety thereby depend upon competent engineering in achieving that end. 
The state of this complex plant-entity can be monitored by analysis of 
the En flux emanating from it and evidence of loss of resistance to 
failure detected. However, this requires an exercise of human judgement 
attuned to the given technical situation which must be aided by a linked 
examination of the system in operation so that any entropic deterioration 
in its efficiency may be apprehended. 
Success in technological analyses of the foregoing kind requires an 
intuitive faculty of penetrating intellect supported by relevant 
theoretical knowledge and pertinent practical experience, in other words 
good engineering judgement. When the safety of a nuclear power plant is 
defended in this way, the probability of a disastrous accident becomes 
very small indeed and may be properly presented as a tolerable risk in 
view of the accompanying energy amenity. 
Despite the foregoing precautions there remains a risk, though 
asymptotic to zero, that in some rare and unusual circumstances a 
previously unperceived threat of catastrophe may be realised: the 'Zero- 
Infinity' potentiality. Nonetheless, further confidence in safety may be 
assured through stability of form as the system's reliability is proved 
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by experience in use for a set of like plants. This requires that 
changes in an established design of proved worth must be resisted 
except where there is an unchallengeable case for modification on 
cogent safety grounds. 
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ß, 4R7 FIVE 
INSPECTION: FEATURES, FALLACIES -AND FACTS, AND A SYNOPSIS OF THE NEW 
T'REA'TMENT OF LOW PROBABILITY EVENTS 
Sections 14 and 15 comprising: 
A critical review of inspection, the societal regulatory agency 
of ancient antecedents that has evolved to meet the need of modern 
technological civilisation for a wide range of checking, investi- 
gatory, monitoring and police functions which are, in the main, 
those which it is incumbent on the State to provide; some falla- 
cious ideas about inspection that are held in certain scientific 
and establishment circles: the hierarchy of functions that char- 
acterise engineering inspection, namely 'Viewing', 'Examining' 
and 'Executive Inspection'; Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
and their inspectional identities; the innate inability of an 
inspectional organisation to appraise its own performance (Goedel's 
theorem); the need for accountability and Signal Detection Theory 
as a means of appraising the efficiency and reliability of risk 
assessors and safety inspectors engaged in regulatory activities. 
f synoptic and recapitulatory survey of the case made in justi- fication of the New Treatment of Low Probability Events and of the style of regulatory inspection central to it for which the 
U. K. Nuclear Installations Inspectorate has been taken as a 
representative example. 
THEMATIC SUMMARY 
Throughout this study an attempt has been made to describe and justify a new approach to the management of those low probability 
events that can end in the catastrophic failure of a technolog- ical innovation, and of those incidents that concern nuclear 
power plants in particular. This New Treatment, while embrac- ing the scientific advances, engineered safeguards and other things that have made nuclear power, despite-its grave potential hazards, an innovation which experience has shown can be con- tained in effective safety, emphasises that this state is in- herently unstable. It depends absolutely upon the integrity of the engineering involved fot which the new style of inspection 
has proved to be the guarantor. It is further suggested that inspection according to the New Treatment could offer the assur- 
ance of safety in the maintenance of that recognised state of 
negligible risk needed to inspire the public trust necessary if the hazard of nuclear power is to be accepted as tolerable. 
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14 PROBLEMS OF INSPECTION IN THE DEFENCE OF SAFETY 
'In any formal system adequate for number theory there 
exists an undecidable formula - that is, a formula that is not provable and whose negation is not provable, the 
undecidable formula being true. It therefore follows that 
it is impossible to prove the consistency of a formal system 
of this kind within the system itself. '- Goedel's Theorem. 
Anthony Quinton, 
Trinity College, Oxford, 
Excerpt from The Fontana Dictionary 
of Modern Thought, 
Fontana/Collins, London, 1971, p. 267. 
In 1931, Kurt Goedel published a paper setting out his famous 
theorem which is paraphrased in the above quotation. Its immediate 
result was to bring to aasend attempts with which Bertrand Russell was 
associated to formalise mathematics in one complete and consistent 
system. Professor J. van Heijenoort described its far-reaching effects 
thus: 
'Goedel's theorem shattered the Aristotelian ideal of 
perfect deduction from first principles. The bounds of 
mathematics cannot be those of one formal system. Since 
mathematics has often been regarded as the standard of 
rational knowledge to which other sciences should attain, 
Goedel's theorem seems to acquire significance for the 
whole body of human knowledge ... ... ... ... ... However, all sciences other than mathematics are so remote 
from a complete formalisation that this conclusion remains 
of little consequence outside mathematics. ' 
'Goedel's Theorem: Epistemological Significance 
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3, 
Collier MacMillan Publishers, 
London, 1967, p. 356. 
In spite of the caution of conservative logicians like Heijenoort, 
the generalisations of Goedel's theorem and its corollaries are still 
making their mark on modern thought. One of the wider inferences is 
'the falsity of any theory which takes human mind to be a mechanical, 
deterministic system' (Anthony Quinton - ibidem). 
If the human mind is not mechanical and deterministic , then neither 
are the disciplines that it creates and they are stultified when attempts 
are made to so constrain them. This principle applies to engineering 
science and its practice and, not least, to engineering inspection which 
it has been argued by the writer, here and in his fourth paper of the 
Annex, is the key to safety in nuclear power and an essential factor 
in securing popular acceptance of that state. 
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14.1 The nature of 'inspection' 
The activities embraced by the term 'inspection' are very wide 
and varied and are in no way confined to engineering. Neither are the 
dictionary definitions restrictive, for example: 
'To examine closely, especially for faults and errors', 
Collins (New English) 1979, 
and 
'Looking carefully into, viewing closely and critically, 
examining something with a view to find out its character 
and condition', 
OED, Edition 1901. 
Inspection is an activity of great antiquity used by governments 
to back the authority of the state. Today, it has many varied and 
specialised functions and is largely concerned to protect the health 
and welfare of citizen and community. Over the past century, it has 
assumed important engineering and scientific dimensions to meet the 
regulatory and safety needs of technological advances in industry, 
medicine, power generation and transport among other things. Of 
particular interest is the part it can play in the management of the 
risks of catastrophic low probability events (LPEs) stemming from the 
peculiarly hazardous processes and substances used in the exploitation 
of advanced technologies, not least in the case of a nuclear power 
plant as illustrated in Figure 13. 
Inspection is largely, but by no means exclusively, concerned 
with the task of detecting, anticipating and investigating all manner 
of human errors, i. e. lack of foresight, omissions, mistakes and 
malfeasance, with a view to preventing or correcting them and, thereby, 
aborting their consequences from tax evasion to radiation accidents. 
Among the few substantial studies of inspection is the profound research 
by Gerald Rhodes (1981/a) into 'Inspectorates in British Government'. 
He distinguishes seven varieties of official inspection, namely: 
(i) Enforcement - to ensure compliance with duties and 
o igations imposed by statute or ordnance. In this 
group Rhodes lists 34 inspectorates that include H. M. 
Factory Inspectorate, Cruelty to Animals, Wages, Drugs, 
Gaming and the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) 
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(ii) Efficiency - monitoring the performance of bodies which 
receive and disburse government grants, among which 
Rhodes names some six bodies concerned with education, 
the police and fire services. 
(iii) Internal Management - surveillance of numbers and 
quality-of staff Government departments. 
(iv) Revenue Collecting - collection of taxes, customs duties 
and other imposts. 
(v) Checking - in this group Rhodes mixes H. M. Quality Assurance Directorate (QAD) which is concerned with 
engineering inspection in the supervision of Ministry of Defence procurement contracts with the surveillance of 
such things as the proper use of regional development 
grants. 
(vi) Quasi-judicial - hearings into planning appeals referred 
to Department of Environment. 
(vii) Investigatory - investigations into aircraft accidents and financial frauds in the field of commerce. 
Rhodes categories are administrative rather than functional and 
he pays little attention to the modi operandi of the inspectors at the 
practical task interfaces. However, for most of the inspectorates he 
has listed, their function is a formalised matter of taking evidence 
and weighing its legal implications, for instance dereliction of duty, 
abuse of authority, or breach of regulations, with a view to possible 
prosecution. The job of the inspector is 'to enforce regulations and, 
if they are good regulations, they achieve the objective of the 
legislation under which they are made' (19). Rhodes appears to ignore 
engineering inspection (infra) as a distinct activity, seeing it merely 
as a mechanism of enforcement, dismissing the important part it has 
come to play in the field of industrial technology by a brief reference 
to 'checking inspection concerned with the examination of physical 
objects as in quality control'. The NII he rates as 'a new inspectorate 
set up with little or no discussion of the need for it' (ibidem p. 22, 
paraphrased). 
Gerald Rhodes's study is effectively confined to the world of 
'The Word' and he makes no attempt to investigate affairs of the 
technological scene on the other side of the cultural disjunction. He 
brackets the technological inspectorates, e. g. the NII, H. M. Inspectorate 
of Mines and Quarries (HMII and the Major Hazards Group in the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) with the generality of enforcement 
inspection which he impugns as obsolescent, if not unnecessary. 
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To quote him: 
'It can be said therefore that in the 1970s enforcement 
inspection continues to flourish largely because nobody 
has seriously explored - and certainly not in any systematic 
way - either the limits or alternatives to inspection. ' 
Gerald Rhodes, 
Inspectorates in British Government, 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1981, p. 226. 
Committed to the above position, it would have been difficult for 
him to admit to the existence of another kind of inspection lying 
ouside his administrative categories, being one that was perceptive, 
consultative and participative and of a form accessible to accountability. 
Nonetheless, engineering inspection undeniably exists as a necessary, 
emergent and evolving discipline, though one as yet lacking recognised 
formal integration and currently receiving less than due attention in 
spite of its importance in the management of LPEs. 
14.2 Aspects of 'engineering inspection' 
Until the end of the 19th Century, engineering inspection was an 
informal task falling to foremen or one of self-appraisal by craftsmen 
and finishers. As the products of industry were for the most part unique 
structures or simple artifacts and machines, it was little more than 
'checking inspection', Rhodes's fifth category (supra). However, the 
invention of heavier-than-air flight by the Wright brothers in 1903 
proved to be a turning point in its evolution. Their invention of the 
flying machine was followed by the rapid development of military aviation 
and the mass production of warplanes. 
By 1911, the number of these machines lost in crashes had become a 
matter of official concern. Dr. R. T. Glazebrook (1913) was commissioned 
to hold an inquiry into the cause. He reported that the failures were 
due to manufacturing defects which could be remedied by properly 
organised inspection. His report was accepted and in January 1914 the 
Army Council authorised the formation of an Inspection Department. 
This became the AID (Aeronautical Inspection Directorate) which 
continued under that title for nearly 70 years when, quite recently in 
a major Ministry of Defence re-organisation to meet the call for better 
integration of procurement within NATO, it became the Aeronautical 
Quality Assurance Directorate (AQD). Until that change, its basic 
approach to engineering inspection remained relatively unaltered. In 
the U. K. it has been the antecedent of all similar engineering bodies 
236 
and, latterly, of the NII as described in the Appendix to Document 
No. 4 of the Annex. Indeed, it may be truly said to be the antecedent 
of all systems of manufacturing inspection, notably those of quality 
control by statistical methods (infra). 
Rhodes'failure to deal adequately with the engineering aspects 
of inspection may be attributed to lack of a real perception of the 
sophistication of the technical entities that are the creations of 
modern technology in its commercial applications, but probably more 
to the fact that engineering is an activity of 'The Deed'. Judged 
from the viewpoint of the other culture across the technological 
disjunction, it would be deemed to be a subordinate function, being 
merely an adjunct to the executive duty of the inspectorate concerned. 
On the contrary, in the technological field, engineering inspection is 
far from being a lesser complement to a given regulatory process, but 
is rather the process per se. It differs from the seven categories of 
inspection named by Rhodes (supra) in that it has the peculiarity of 
an extra dimension in technology. This extends far beyond the simple 
mechanics and metrology of the checking in the view-room or go-no-go 
inspection bay to the very frontiers of modern science itself, for 
example as practiced by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) in assuring the reliability performance of the 
U. S. 'Apollo' Moonshot project space vehicles. 
By virtue of its extra degree of freedom, the faculties of 
engineering inspection range from the skill exercised by a mechanic 
scrutinising pieceparts to the challenging intellectual task of decision 
making during the on-going processes of inspection of, say, a nuclear 
power plant during its construction, commissioning and initial operation. 
In such a process, inferences drawn from the technical assessment of 
design must be combined with information acquired by direct inspection 
and testing of the multitudinous facets of the entity in question. 
14.2.1 Orders of Engineering Inspection 
The writer has distinguished four levels of engineering inspection 
in ascending order of technological complexity and managerial 
responsibility (O. H. Critchley 1981), although the fourth, 'Inquiry', 
merges again into the administrative scene and is not discussed further 
here, except to notethat it may require both scientific eminence and 
great political acumen. The three truly engineering degrees are: 
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(i) Viewing - the most fundamental and commonly identified 
aspect involving direct scrutiny of a piece-part or 
basic element of a system to enjoin its conformity with 
plan, drawing or specification or to confirm compliance 
with detailed procedural instructions or regulations 
determining a technical process. Its exercise requires 
little or no discretion, although a high order of skill 
may be needed. It is comparable with Rhodes's fifth 
category of 'checking' and among these other things is 
used to provide sampling data in quality control schemes. 
(ii) Examining -s higher tier function of a discretionary 
nature used to assess the attainment of a design intent 
by examination and by testing of completed products or 
parts of such products, structures, equipment or systems 
of work, often depending on sampling and analyses of the 
results of viewing. It includes technical safety 
assessment of design, but not managerial decisions 
based thereon. 
(iii) Executive Inspection -a managerial activity concerned 
with e extent to which the design intent is achieved 
in compliance with drawings, plans and specifications 
and with assurance of the attainment of that intent 
during manufacture, construction, commissioning and 
operation of the given plant or system. More particularly, 
it is interpretative and involves decision making about 
deviations from the foregoing directions owing to design 
errors, omissions, equipment faults, material shortages 
and other defects. Besides, it is participative in that 
defect remedies involve negotiation with the designer or 
his client. Furthermore, it is the level at which 
sanctions may be imposed to secure the correction of 
flaws, faults and weaknesses in the artefact or its 
performance, and is concerned with policy formulation in 
respect of the purposes of its inspectional role. 
The three tier structure of Engineering Inspection was reflected 
ab initio in the organisation of the AID with a staff of 'Viewers', 
'Examiners' and 'Inspectors'. The latter was the managerial grade 
(Flight 1915). 
The third and executive aspect of engineering inspection as defined 
above is couched in terms appropriate to the work of a regulatory body, 
like the NII, USNRC or H. M. Factory Inspectorate's specialist branches. 
Of course, it applies more widely in industry and is carried out by 
inspection groups maintained by insurance companies, for instance 
Lloyd's of London, or by independents working on a consultancy basis. 
Often, it is internalised as a safety and reliability department in a 
large corporation. The (then) British Aircraft Corporation at Filton 
near Bristol used a highly qualified engineering inspection team 
during the Concorde program who worked closely with their`French 
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counterpart in Toulouse and the U. K. Civil Aviation Authority's 
(CAA) safety branch. 
Every feature of the Concorde design was analysed for safety and 
prospective reliability in service anä assessed by powerful statistical 
methods with qualitative oversight. The requirements of constructional 
quality control (QC), ie. Viewing, were carried out by lower tier 
teams (M. A. Laceby 1976). While Executive Inspection cannot entirely 
prevent the rare, catastrophic LPE, it can eliminate or reduce the 
likelihood of foreseeable major faults and accidents to a minimum that 
in most circumstances should be socially and politically acceptable. 
14.2.2 The characteristics of Executive Inspection 
It may be asked on what authority do the terse definitions of 
'Executive Inspection' and its subordinate functions given in the 
preceding sub-section rest. The answer is that there are few quotable 
sources and much of the relevant confirmatory information remains 
undivulged and currently inaccessible in classified files and papers. 
As a result the topic of Engineering Inspection has been litte researched 
and the definition is mainly drawn from the writer's personal 
familiarity with evolved practice and the lore of the engineering 
inspectors who have been his colleagues. It has been the objective 
of a private study over some 20 years from which this thesis and the 
supporting papers have emerged. Considerations of military and official 
secrecy are not the only reasons for the lack of authoritative 
references. Another important limitation has been the interdisciplinary 
nature of the field that might have been allied to management studies 
in engineering, but that topic has only been accepted by university 
engineering faculties as scientific in the past decade or so. 
There are, however, a few references that reveal at least the 
framework of the discipline. Between the wars, Lt Col. H. W. S. Outram, 
then head of the AID, finally secured publication of an article on 
engineering inspection in the supply of aeroplanes for both civil and 
military use. An abstract of the passages relevant to Executive 
Inspection is given below: 
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Inspection starts at the design stage when the designer 
defines the materials and mode of construction. It is 
the task of the inspector to see that all the design 
requirements and intents are met in respect of material, dimensions, handling during manufacture, assembly and final testing. This is an unbroken chain from raw 
material to flying machine and it is the responsibility 
of inspection to see that it remains unbroken until the 
complete aircraft is ready for trial flight. 
If any Government or other body of independent inspectors 
were to carry the whole responsibility, that organisation 
would become so large as to be unmanageable and, aside 
from consideration of cost to public funds, would have 
the undesirable effect of taking responsibility from 
existing efficient internal inspection departments that 
exist in most firms and their subcontractors. The 
British system of aeronautical inspection is, therefore, 
based on each firm carrying out its own inspection in a 
manner approved and supervised by the AID on behalf of 
the Air Ministry. It is thus possible to extend 
inspection back to the primary raw materials, continuing 
to the complete aircraft and all its ancilliary 
equipment. 
British Aeronautical Inspection, 
The Air Annual of the British 
Empire, Vol. II, 
Gale and Polden, London, 1930, pp. 226-250. 
The links in Outram's 'unbroken chain' included applications of 
the most advanced technologies of the time and necessitated the support 
of a large and well-equipped Test House with elaborate facilities and 
a staff of specialist engineers and scientists. His concept continues 
to be characteristic of Executive Inspection in the industrial 
exploitation of advanced innovatory technologies and, not least, of 
nuclear power (K. J. Meekcoms 1980 and supra). The American approach 
has been described under the title of 'Quality assurance program 
evaluation' in a book by L. Marvin Johnson (1970) among a plethora of 
works on the topic. Although orientated towards private enterprise 
involvement in matters of the inspection of government defence contracts 
with a tendency to be more prescriptive, the principles are 
substantially those defined by Outram. Johnson's treatment of 
'evaluation' is of a general nature, being little more than a survery 
of the administration of the process from which only the tip of an 
immense submerged mass of complex engineering detail is visible, to 
which he makes little reference. On the other hand, there has been 
much activity in the ancillary fields of Quality Assurance (QA) and 
240 
Quality Control (QC), but interest has been directed toward specific 
techniques of application (infra) rather than to the nature of the 
functions per se. 
Owing to the lack of research and few reports or substantial 
publications on the discipline of Engineering Inspection, its span of 
ancillary technologies and formerly acknowledged identity seem to have 
become diffused among a number of supplementary scientific specialities. 
These include materials testing, industrial radiography and other non- 
destructive methods of defect detection, stress analysis and reliability 
technology, among other applied sciences. Neither the sophistication 
of the technologies nor the requirements of military and commercial 
secrecy have helped integration. As a result these inspectional arts 
have yet to be formally drawn together once more under the title of 
Engineering Inspection, although they are practised in a unified manner 
by the major engineering inspectorates, e. g. the NII, and other groups 
such as those maintained by the insurance industry. 
To sum up, Engineering Inspection in its three domains of Viewing, 
Examining and Executive remains the arbiter of the degree of 
excellence attained in the products of the engineering and manufacturing 
industries and other, often unique, technological innovations, for 
instance nuclear power plants and the 'Apollo Moon-shot' program in 
the U. S. A. 
14.2.3 Quality Assurance, Quality Control and Engineering Inaction 
During the post-War decades there have been great increases in 
the quantity, range and complexity of the products of industry. 
Moreover, the processes of manufacture have become less labour intensive 
and more and more automated. It would, therefore, have been uneconomic 
to maintain consistent standards of conformity with specifications, of 
quality and of durability under modern factory conditions by the older 
practices of engineering inspection. To meet the need for control of 
quality, sophisticated methods of statistical sampling were developed 
to replace such operations as detailed piece-part scrutiny and the 
proportion of items viewed was reduced in step with optimisation of 
track and shop floor production costs. The risk of occasional unit 
failures or customer rejection of substandard or defective items is 
set at a level judged to be acceptable to the majority of consumers. 
These methods are known as Quality Engineering (QE) and more 
specifically as Quality Control (QC) or Quality Assurance (QA) or both. 
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After all, QE may be equated with many aspects of Executive 
Inspection. 
The confusion between the higher brackets of inspection and 
Quality Engineering is illusory, being a matter of semantics. In 
practice, the terms QA and QC are used interchangeably and are usually 
associated with batch production of military supplies procured for 
defence and of commercial articles like TV sets, motor vehicles, 
automated domestic machinery and packaged prepared foods. In this 
text Quality Assurance (QA) is taken as the administrative framework 
in which a Quality Control (QC) scheme aimed at ensuring a uniformly 
high standard of quality in manufacture is executed. 
In the case of weapons and other defence materiel, manufacture 
has to conform to elaborate QA clauses in supply contracts, as for 
example those laid down by the U. K. 'Ministry of Defence Quality Control 
Systems Requirements', Series 502-21 to 502-26, or to currently updated 
versions. Quality Assurance and Control schemes also play an essential 
part in maintaining health and safety standards in manufactured products 
by enjoining compliance with statutory regulations and codes. Quality 
Control is an offshoot of Engineering Inspection and corresponds to 
Viewing and QA to the higher tier activity of Examining, functions 
described in Section 14.2.1 above. 
The definitions are important because of the obtrusion of an 
augmented concept of QA into nuclear safety and particularly into the 
management of the potentially catastrophic low probability events that 
are identified with nuclear power. M. J. Milner (1983) in a review of 
QA in the nuclear industry describes it as 'an integrated management 
system with the task of efficaceously ensuring that company legal and 
contractual obligations to its customer and the community are met', a 
definition in accord with that of British Standard BS 5882: 80 for a 
'Total quality assurance programme for nuclear power plants'. Both 
ignore QC as an independent subordinate activity, subsuming it under 
works and site inspection and testing as a substrate in a hierarchial 
QA methodology. In the case of nuclear safety, Milner advocates a 
Quality Assurance Manager to work in parallel with the Works Manager 
and Chief Engineer to direct QA arrangements, the QA Manager having 
equivalent status, professional attainments and monetary rewards. On 
the other hand, BS 5882: 80 rejects the centralist approach and 
recommends that the organisation of QA 'must not be the sole domain 
of a single group'. 
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In the case of undertakings with internal QA departments, it is 
desirable, and in the case of those awarded defence procurement 
contracts usually obligatory, for the QA function to be evaluated by 
independent appraisal. Such investigations fail to be convincingly 
objective when made internally as the evaluators in such circumstances 
are known to be blind to all butthe most obvious of their organisation's 
faults and weaknesses (L. Marvin Johnson 1970). The observation 
confirms an earlier inference from Goedel's theorem that a system of 
the QA type cannot be self-checking throughout its structure. This 
caveat is not trivial, but has profound administrative and political 
implications. J. R. Ravetz (1974) drew attention to it in his 'Who 
guards the guardians? ' criticism of the NII. Moreover, it is of 
particular significance in the appraisal of schemes designed for the 
treatment of potential catastrophic LPEs in the case of nuclear power 
plants. 
The semantic confusion about QA and QC disappears if the former 
practice of including all these inspectional arts and faculties, 
managerial and technical, under the general title of Engineering 
Inspection, to which they properly belong, were to be followed. This 
is not to derogate the importance of QA, but to recognise it as an 
essential adjunct to modern technology, particularly in the area of 
mass production. However, inspection at its Executive level lies 
deeper, being concerned with the interpretations and decision making 
that are required to resolve the problems caused by variations in the 
supply of materials and by obscurities in a design. They often involve 
baffling enigmas which do more to frustrate progress in design 
implementation than do difficulties in compliance with the minutia of 
specifications and codes. The latter are, nonetheless, the proper 
concern of inspection, but one that falls to its lower tiers of 
Examining and Viewing, already identified with QA and QC respectively. 
In the case of nuclear power plants, QA and QC duties are the 
responsibility of staff of the utility and its principal contractors 
and suppliers, in Britain as a condition of the licence, for example 
in assaying material and in the non-destructive testing of reactor 
pressure circuit components. The wider role of Executive Inspection 
in the work of the NII in assuring the safety of the U. K. nuclear 
power program has been reviewed by Gronow and Gausden(1975/b) and 
again by Gausden (1982), the latter in a comparison with similar 
practices in Western Germany, France and the U. S. A. 
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There are other differences. For instance, in nuclear power 
owing to the high standards of quality and reliability that are 
essential in its engineering, safety inspection is a necessarily 
participative function, whereas in their formal philosophies both QA 
and Quantitative Safety Analysis (See Sections 7.2 and 7.3) appear to 
stand apart from activities in the domain of engineering. Finally, 
for brevity from now on the term 'inspection' will be used to mean 
'Engineering Inspection', unless the context implies otherwise. 
Furthermore, it will also refer to 'Executive Inspection' except when 
the subordinate operations of Viewing and Examining are indicated. 
14.3 Some misconceived ideas about inspection 
The concept of inspection generally held by the administrative 
and political establishments and certain of their scientific advisers 
seems to be one clouded by increasing incomprehension. For example, 
despite the fact that Gerald Rhodes in his study of 'Inspectorates in 
British Government ' (1981) shows that inspection is a more complex 
activity than the mere exercise of quasi-police powers, he argues that: 
'The original conception and ideal model of inspection 
was that of a means of checking that what Parliament 
intended should happen was in fact happening. It still 
has validity. This role symbolised by the traditional 
weights and measures inspector is in essentials a very 
narrow one. That alongside it there can exist a wider 
conception of the aim of inspection, one which seeks 
to relate inspection not simply to specified 
requirements but to the underlying purpose for which 
the legislation was evolved ... ' 
Ibidem (G. Rhodes) - 173-174. 
And, he goes on to treat what in his view is an odd fact as 'a matter 
of major interest'. 
Moreover, Rhodes fails to discern the existence of the discipline 
of Engineering Inspection and makes only a passing allusion to the 
important functions of QA and QC. Yet, he proceeds to made the 
following comment on the NII; 
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'The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate was established 
with a dual function. It was the body which was to 
provide the Minister with the necessary scientific and 
technical appraisal of proposals to instal and operate 
nuclear plant from the safety aspect as a preliminary 
to the granting of a licence; and it was subsequently 
to inspect installations, specifically to ensure that 
they complied with the conditions on which the licences 
had been granted. That these two functions are really 
part of a wider role, essentially that of taking care 
of the central government's concern with the safety of 
nuclear installations has been clear from the beginning. ' 
Ibidem, p. 172. 
Nonetheless, elsewhere he perversely concludes that such a remit 
is beyond the scope of inspection. In fact, his idea of inspection 
does not extend beyond Viewing, to quote him: 
'In drawing attention to this phenomenon of inspectors 
who do more than inspection we are in effect going 
beyond the aims of inspection. The distinction which 
has been made, in examining this question, between 
inspecting for specific statutory requirements and 
inspecting directed more generally to the underlying 
purpose of legislation is also relevant to the 
discussion of other functions which inspectors may 
perform. For it is in concerning himself with the 
underlying aims of legislation that the inspector may 
cease simply to be an inspector, and may pursue other 
activities which promote those aims - even though they 
be activities which have little connection with 
inspecting and do not need to be performed by officials 
possessing the special powers which are the mark of an 
inspector. ' 
Ibidem, p. 172. 
Rhodes thus poses a conundrum. On the one hand, he admits that a 
nuclear inspector is committed to a dual role, one technological and 
the other regulatory. On the other, because this is not Viewing, he 
must say that the former is not inspection, inferring that it is a task 
proper to officials who are not inspectors, if it should be done at all. 
He attempts to escape from his dilemma by the quaere: 
'But once this wider role is acknowledged and accepted, 
at what point does the inspector cease to be an 
inspector and become a man who 'de facto' if not 'de 
jure' is assuming some responsibility for the standard 
of safety? ' 
Ibidem, p. 163. 
The answer comes when the inspector extends his purview from 
Viewing to Executive Inspection, but Rhodes does not recognise the 
latter activity as inspection. 
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14.3.1 Involvement of the inspector and shared responsibility 
Actually, Gerald Rhodes (1981) has exposed the nub of the 
matter and the full response is that the engineering inspector is 
inevitably drawn into the executive role of technical decision making 
about the safety of the entities in his regulatory fief. In this he 
assumes a responsibility for the standard of safety. The novelty, 
complexity and mutability of design of modem advanced technological 
industry and its installations admit of no other course. The things 
to be inspected are seldom ones that can be made to conform to 
rigid standards, but involve interpretation of principles which 
themselves can only be enunciated in imprecise terms. 
Consider the 'enforcement' of a typical condition of a U. K. 
licence for a nuclear power plant, 'the licensee shall make appropriate 
arrangements to be approved by the Minister for the safe storage of 
nuclear fuel' (i. e. fissile material). Acceptable provisions must be 
tailor-made for the given plant and 'approval' will rest on the outcome 
of imformed technical discussions with the licensee's engineers and 
safety officers. Whether the inspector formally acknowledges his 
agreement by advising 'The Minister' (or the Health and Safety 
Executive) to 'approve' the result, is passive by failing to 
'disapprove' or otherwise signifies his acquiescence, say, by lifting 
a 'Notice' issued under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, he 
has become a participant, ethically if not legally. Only if a 
specification or regulation can be inspected to its letter in a 
Viewing approach of 'G0, NO-GO' is the inspector able to eschew 
responsibility. Technical involvement is an inseparable part of the 
higher orders of Engineering Inspection and the capability to elicit 
the necessary information owes its existence to 'the special powers 
that are the mark of an inspector' (supra). 
14.3.2 'Meta-inspection' - the need for an inspection of inspection 
The fact is that Rhodes's study is a voice from the realm of 
'The Word'. He is a political scientist, no engineering inspector 
sat on his working party and there is no record of any member of an 
engineering inspectorate being consulted (20). Though his work may 
be a contribution to political science and the theories of 'pure 
administration' (24), it is of little significance in the world of 
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'The Deed' in which nuclear safety engineering and inspection have 
their seat. Its relevance to the treatment of potential catastrophic 
LPEs in nuclear power plants is miniscule, except to expose some of 
the deficiencies in the administrative approach. 
Nevertheless, a valid query is raised. Over the past few 
decades there has been a great increase in the number of inspectors 
and of those administering them. Is this proliferation at the 
public expense giving value for money? Is inspection properly 
directed and efficaceous? Little attention has been paid to these 
things and 'the question of accountability has been blurred'. There 
is no guard for the guardians: is a meta-inspectorate of inspectorates 
required? In truth, the inspectional system is open at the top and 
a means of closing it to enhance the safety of nuclear power is 
suggested later in this text. 
14.4 Some further fallacies of the scientistic approaches 
Of recent years, certain engineering bodies with statutory 
responsibilities for the safety of nuclear power plants, and 
especially for defence against possible catastrophic radiation 
accidents, have been under increasing attack for their reluctance to 
abandon a long established modus operandi that uses a postulated 
'credible' maximum accident (MCA) as the basis for design assessment 
and inspection in favour of one centred on quantitative probability 
analysis. Both the former and the synonymous Design Basis Accident 
(DBA) are embraced by 'the doctrine of limiting accidents' that was 
discussed in Section 9.1 and 9.2 et seq. In the U. K., the censure 
has been directed at the NII as the statutory authority for 
regulating the safety of nuclear installations by licensing. 
Exemplars of the alternative methodology that has been recommended 
are the U. S. A. 'Reactor Safety Study', described in Section 7.3 
et seq., and a similar approach advocated by F. R. Farmer. 
The first hint of criticism came from the 'Inquiry into 
Safety and Health at Work' (RDbens 1972/b). Four years later, it 
was voiced more strongly by Sir Brian (now Lord) Flowers, to 
quote: 
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'276. ... ... There seems no doubt, however, that the technique (probabilistic) is the best available 
to achieve safety in design. 
282. We do not doubt the technical competence of the 
Inspectorate or the thoroughness with which they carry 
out their work. However, the discussions we have had 
on reactor safety with several authorities have left 
us with some doubt as to whether the criteria adopted 
by the NII in establishing reactor safety are soundly 
based and whether their functions are correctly 
defined. ' 
Sixth Report of the Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution: Nuclear 
Power and the Environment, 
HMSO, London, Cnmd 6618, Sept. 1976. 
This criticism was echoed later by the Hon. Mr Justice Parker 
(1978) at the Inquiry into a proposal to expand the thermal oxide 
reprocessing plant (TIDRP) on the UKAEA Windscale site. 
The foregoing strictures are oblique. Reference to the 
literature shows that, rather than overlooking probabilistic 
methods, reliability analysis and other quantitative applications of 
probability theory, these techniques had been long and extensively 
used, especially by the NII. Examples abound, as, for example, 
their use by T. Coxon (1971) in a discourse on the role of the 
Maxineun Credible Accident (MCA) in British nuclear power reactor 
design, in operational research style approaches to the management 
of fuel can operating temperatures in Magnox systems (Dale and 
Harrison 1971 and see Document No. S of the Annex) and in the 
policy of the NII for the selection of reactor sites (Charlesworth 
and Gronow 1967). 
Some years in advance of the above criticism, Gronow and 
Gausden had described the application of quantitative probability 
methods of the type referred to by Flowers (supra) in the approach 
of the NII to the safety assessment of power reactor design in 
the following terms: 
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'The design basis accident is still used to define the 
range of faults for which automatic shut-down and 
emergency cooling must be provided, but the fault 
analysis has been extended to cover a wider range of 
accidents. The object of this further analysis is to 
ensure that there is no step change in the consequences 
of accidents and, if necessary, to reduce the risk or 
consequences of such accidents by changes in the design. 
Where appropriate use is also made of the technique of 
probability analysis in a safety assessment of reactor 
components and systems and, for later designs, this 
technique has been extended to include a range of 
possible accidents and their consequences. This exercise 
has proved to be of limited value, not least because of 
the lack of reliable data on which failure rates of 
components which make up the complete reactor system. ' 
'Licensing and Regulatory Control 
of Thermal Power Reactors in 
the United Kingdom', Symposium 
on the Principles and Standards 
of Reactor Safety, IAEA, Vienna, 
1973, p. 528. 
More recently, Professor A. Birkhofer (1979) of the West 
German Reactor Safety Institute gave further endorsement to the 
validity of the DBA/MCA philosophy: 
'Experiences so far have shown that this safety 
concept has proven its worth. ' 
Ibidem: excerpt from Section 7.4 above. 
The durability of the doctrine of limiting credible accidents 
that characterises the MCA and the associated DBA approach lies in 
the fact that it is appropriate to the actualities of engineering 
on the construction site and in the control room which are beyond 
theory in the design office. The utility, advantages and dis- 
advantages of the MCA were discussed at length in Section 9. It 
remains to iterate that the New Treatment favours an approach 
according to that doctrine in which probability concepts and the 
methods of reliability technology and quantitative safety analysis 
take their proper place as useful adjuncts. 
14.4.1 The fallacy of the dependence of inspection on equal expertise 
A further criticism levelled at inspection during the Windscale 
THORP inquiry (supra) concerned the nature of inspection and its 
capability to appraise the work of experts, namely: 
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'11.24 It was suggested that NII were not sufficiently 
involved in all stages of design to ensure ultimate 
safety and that they were in any event not equipped 
with sufficient scientific expertise to check the 
designs. The former suggestion I reject. ... ... The second is one to which attention should be given. 
I make no finding that NII are inadequately equipped. 
Their task is to pass judgement on plants 
which are designed by very highly qualified experts 
and they must, if they are to perform. their function, 
have, or have access to, at least equal expertise. It was not established to my satisfaction that this 
is the position. ' 
Hon. Mr Justice Parker, ibidem, p. 67. 
Of course, an engineering inspector must have ready access to 
the most expert and authoritative scientific expertise, and be able 
to interpret such advice. This has never been otherwise. However, 
Parker's belittlement of the competence of the NII to discharge its 
higher order inspectorial functions is an expression of a fallacy 
that is commonly held about the identity, indeed the very existence, 
of the upper brackets of engineering inspection. 
Truly, as seen from the dominant half of the 'Two Cultures' 
(C. P. Snow 1959), that is to say from the viewpoint of 'The Word', 
engineering inspection to Mr Justice Parker, sitting in the Inquiry's 
chair as a senior member of the legal and administrative establishment, 
would not appear to be properly capable of achieving much more than 
verifying that a nuclear reactor and its design confirmed with 
specifications, operating rules and statutory requirements. Thus, 
according to his lights, its purview would not reach beyond Viewing. 
This is what Gerald Rhodes (supra) had in mind for his category of 
'Checking inspectorates' whose 'characteristic is to check standards' 
as in quality control, inferring that certain inspectorates, eg. 
the NII, had assumed a position that exceeded their remit. 
In practice, the higher orders of inspectional activity go 
far beyond mere checking and inevitably bring in the purposes for 
which the inspection was instituted and to the observer in the 
superior culture do, in fact, exceed their remit. Therefore, 
Rhodes is forced to the conclusion that such activities have little 
to do with inspection or could be performed by persons other than 
inspectors (supra). Likewise, both Flowers and Parker (ibidem) 
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from their very cursory examinations of the wider role of the NII 
concur with Rhodes, inferring that the formulation of nuclear 
safety policies for siting, design criteria, plant operating limits 
and so on are things that would be better performed elsewhere than 
in an inspectorate. The short answer is that they would not. 
The threat of a major radiation accident in a nuclear power 
plant is not presented by the 'marks on paper' and other information 
which constitute its design but from the operating plant that is 
its physical realisation. Moreover, it is only an engineer 'possess- 
ing the special powers that are the mark of an inspector' (G. Rhodes 
ibidem) and experienced in their use who can elicit and integrate 
the information about the given plant, or like plants, that is 
needed for a truly efficaceous assessment of its design and sub- 
sequent operational performance on which safety decisions may be 
properly and economically made. Successful realisation of that 
state is another matter. 
Parker's stricture as it concerns lack of equal expertise is 
due to a further misconception about the true role of inspection. 
This is not so much to pass judgement on the work of the 'highly 
qualified experts' as to confirm that the design is in fact the 
work of appropriate 'highly qualified experts' properly applied in 
the solution of the given safety problem. An inspectorate in its 
monitoring role must study a licensee's safety submissions, not so 
much exhaustively, as in sufficient detail to verify that the case 
presented is in fact valid and properly supported by arguments 
that can be shown to be scientifically sound. Much of the evidence 
given in a safety report will stand by the engineering consensus 
on its own merits. The proper foci of inspectional attention are 
those aspects of the design of dubious safety status or which have 
become matters of scientific controversy, as for example the 
integrity of the pressure vessel in the case of the PWR (Sir A. 
Cottrell 1980). 
It is unnecessary, therefore, that every safety relevant detail 
be meticulously scrutinised. Rather, effective engineering 
inspection requires an integrated appraisal over the widest achievable 
technical span so that the area assessed can be seen as a whole 
rather than in its parts. Moreover, no engineer, let alone an 
inspector, could attain to the depth of knowledge necessary to 
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check with equal expertise the work of the 'very highly qualified 
experts' identified by Parker over any major portion of the design 
of a nuclear power plant. For the proper discharge of his duties, 
an inspector need not, indeed should not be 'a very highly qualified 
expert' confined thereby to a related group of specialisms. 
Instead, he must be a competent and experienced engineer who can 
apply his knowledge of the several generic scientific disciplines 
that are his fortes in a broadly imaginative manner. He must 
thereby be able to engage in constructive dialogue with the given 
design authority and to consult other experts on the matters in 
question. The inspector's task is managerial as he is seeking to 
confirm the integrity of the design of the plant rather than to 
become involved in punctilious disputations about minutia. This is 
the arena of the savants from whom the inspector must confirm that 
the issues are properly resolved. 
Owing to the breadth and impartiality of his surveillance, the 
inspector can see beyond immediate concerns and special interests 
of the design office to perceive potential failure sequences over- 
looked in the formal safety case. In this exercise, members of an 
inspectorate are aided by the cross-fertilisation that is a result 
of the close association and interchange of personnel between 
design assessment and site inspection teams. This was characteristic 
of the NII's modus operandi (0. H. Critchley 1977). 
A further fallacy about inspection lies in the imputation that 
it claims to be a source of safety. It is not a source of safety, 
nor could it be. While inspection may confirm that a certain situa- 
tion is safe, this is an observation and not an assertion of truth. 
In nuclear engineering, the true source is a safety conscious 
licensee with an adequate understanding of the science and 
technology embodied in the reactor whose operators are thoroughly 
familiar with the plant in their charge. 
14.5 A role for inspection: a quasi-cultural aspect of safety 
Notwithstanding the impossibility of preventing all reactor 
incidents of serious import, commercial nuclear power has so far 
escaped a truly calamitous accident because of the effectiveness of 
its policy of safety defence in depth. Even 'Three Mile Island', 
the worst accident so far, caused no known radiological casualties. 
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Nonetheless, there have been happenings which have smacked of in- 
competent management, neglect and shoddy engineering. Moreover, 
the botched or blown attempts to cover up embarrassing operational 
failures have not lessened the adverse public impact of such events. 
Often highlighted by the media in a sensational and sometimes 
derogatory way, these things have tended to give nuclear power a 
poor image. Against such a backdrop, a severe reactor accident 
involving a significant number of fatalities and extensive 
environmental and economic damage could halt the progress of the 
nuclear industry for a generation or more. An incident of this 
scale is indicated by the point on Figure 2 at which the 'Public 
Reaction' vector cuts the boundary curve that indicates the level 
at which the incident's consequences in terms of casualties would 
evoke serious public disquiet. Its position suggests a catastrophic 
event involving some thousand or more disastrous experiences of 
fatalities, malignant illnesses, civil disruption, consequential 
property losses and environmental damage. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to devise any feasible scheme 
of safety management or of regulation that can do more than reduce 
the threat of such an event in a large and complex technological 
artefact like a nuclear power reactor which contains an intractable 
residual hazard. Although the hazard cannot be eliminated, it can 
be held at a level that may be regarded as negligible, defence 
against the danger being secured by engineering safeguards in the 
maintenance of which inspection plays an essential part. Its role 
is to assist in sustaining the safety ethos that has become a 
cultural feature of nuclear engineering. In this it has to encourage, 
indeed enjoin, management in the industry to establish and maintain 
a standard of engineering that will ensure an adequate defence of 
safety in each installation at risk. 
Inspection itself is not necessarily free from error and meta- 
inspection, that is the surveillance of inspection, is a topic to 
be developed in the passages that follow. One source of error 
comes through obsessive attention to the letter rather than the 
spirit of a regulatory duty. An intrusion by inspectors that has 
the effect of validating a presumed state of safety on the basis of 
overt compliance with statutory regulations and codes of practice 
while being blind to more subtle frailties, may create false 
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confidence that can conceal incipient danger. Some think that this 
was the case at 'Flixborough' (G. Atherley and R. Booth 1975) and 
a similar charge has been levelled against the U. S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in respect of the 'Three Mile Island' 
incident (See Section 5.3.1). 
In a societal environment of increasingly stringent factory 
safety laws, product health and safety regulations and new concepts 
of liability, the continuing pursuit of the mirage of unquestionable 
safety for nuclear power has been one of rising costs not commensurate 
with the public confidence so inspired. Progress in industrial 
health and safety is reaching an-impasse. Nonetheless, the 
achievements in protection of workers, public and environment cannot 
be diminished and some continuing escalation in costs is inevitable, 
but ways of making such investment more economical must be sought. 
In the case of nuclear power, the burden suffered by the 
industry was described in evidence given to the Commons Select 
Committee on Energy by Charles Komanoff, an eminent American energy 
cost consultant: 
'Costs are being ratchetted up by late safety requirements. 
Estimates consistently fail to anticipate the cost of efforts 
to reduce the hazards of nuclear plants ... (and) ... 
putative, intangible reductions in accident possibilities 
have been introduced which are now belied by the TMI affair. 
Fossil fuel stations do not suffer this handicap, ... (but) 
... nuclear plant, often delayed during construction or 
overtaken by new safety requirements, suffers cost 
escalations which are much larger than those for conventional 
systems. ' 
Cost escalation at U. S. nuclear 
power stations, 
Minutes of Evidence, 
House of Commons Paper HC 397 V, 
HMSO, London, 12 March 1980. 
In addition to the costly changes that have been forced upon 
the design, often in a technical morass of 'safer than safe', must 
be added the expense of the many inquiries, the cost of supporting 
research and the fees of expert witnesses required for debating the 
pros and cons, which in the case of the current Sizewell PWR 
inquiry has exceeded £10 million (David Mellor 1982). Not least is 
the financial penalty owing to the delay in bringing the project to 
a useful state which, in the case of an electric power station, may 
involve very large sums to pay for lost output. 
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Nonetheless, the issue of societal risk assessment for which 
nuclear power has been the focus continues to be a matter of prolific 
research and vigorous debate. The open ended nature of the topic has 
been described by J. R. Ravetz in a report to the Council for Science 
and Society: 
'The problem of risk management should not be seen 
statically as if it could be solved satisfactorily 
once and for all by scientific analysis or administrative 
procedure. Rather, the social dynamics of risk extend 
to perceptions and evaluations of risks themselves. 
Risk management should evolve through an interaction 
of all the diverse interests concerned in each case. ' 
The Acceptability of Risks, 
Conclusion 8, 
Barry Rose (Publishers), 
London, 1977. 
The scientistic path of design safety enhancement has reached a 
point of diminishing returns, having failed to win public confidence. 
Progress lies in securing public belief in the safety achievements of 
nuclear engineering, the standards of which can be assured by inspection, 
but an inspection that not only is, but can be demonstrably shown, to be 
efficaceous. The required philosophy and organs for such inspection 
have, in fact, emerged to meet such a need, though this has yet to 
receive proper acknowledgement. 
14.5.1 The new style of engineering safety regulation 
The association between technological progress, the concomitant 
threats to man and his environment and the development of engineering 
inspection has been discussed earlier in this text and in document No. 4 
of the Annex. The point of interest here is the change in the 
inspectional function that has reflected the growing sophistication of 
modem industrial technologies, a change that has been most pronounced 
in the special style of regulatory inspection that has evolved to meet 
the unusual and severe hazards created by the exploitation of atomic 
energy and nuclear power in particular. Inspection is the central 
feature in a group of related activities of sufficient consequence to 
be called 'Regulatory Science'. 
Two regulatory bodies that have exhibited the characteristics of 
the new style are the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmission (NRC) in the U. S. A. 
and the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) in Britain. The 
antecedents of the latter have been discussed in the writer's paper, 
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'Technological progress, safety and the guardian role of inspection' 
which is presented as Document No. 4 of the Annex. 
In America this initiative in regulatory inspection was moulded 
according to the national pattern of civil administration and the NRC 
tended to acquire a legalistic formalism that landed it is disarray 
when faced with the exigencies of the Three Mile Island incident of 1979. 
In a characteristic British way, growth of the NII took place in that 
certain ambience of informality and flexibility and so was able to adapt 
itself to the unfamiliar field in which it had to shape its policy. 
Thus, what was, by necessity, a predominantly engineering body acquired 
a freedom to develop a new kind of safety regulation. 
Of the two inspectorates, the NII has been chosen as the exemplar, 
because, although it falls short of the requirements of the New 
Treatment, it has provided a base on which the theory has been developed. 
However, the NII was a house of many mansions and the writer as an 
erstwhile member of the senior staff from 1964 to 1978 has to some extent 
drawn upon his own practice in the interpretation of its regulatory 
procedures. 
To iterate, plant accidents do not occur in the design of a nuclear 
reactor per se, but only when the paperwork etc. of that design have 
been converted into an operating installation. Moreover, although a 
design weakness may enable a fault sequence to nn to catastrophic 
failure, the experience of reactor accidents has been that they are 
precipitated by human error. In consequence, a singularly important 
part of the NII's function lay deeper than safety assessment of design 
and the division of effort between assessment and site inspection had 
to be made accordingly; for while sound design of high integrity is 
paramount, it is the realisation of that design in the form of a 
properly operating plant that is the true mark of safety. The design 
assessments of nuclear power stations in construction have, therefore, 
been wide-ranging, resourceful and forward-looking studies in which 
proper regard has been paid to the effect of site circumstances in each 
case. 
While appropriate use had been made of probability based operational 
research techniques, the formalism of the systems approach was not 
permitted to constrain creative enterprise (Gronow and Gausden 1975/b). 
The work of assessment thus integrated with the flow of Event-noise (En) 
combined with relevant experience derived from site inspections may be 
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called Forward Safety Analysis (FSA), though this aspect of the 
Inspectorate's activities has received far from due recognition and 
has been ignored by the august inquiries (supra). 
Forward Safety Analysis has been used by the NII to direct emphasis 
in its program of design safety assessment and to justify calls for 
fault studies and for specific probability assessments of certain design 
features such as those that arise in control and instrumentation 
problems, although FSA has not formally been recognised as an 
inspectional discipline. 
14.5.2 The question of appraisal of inspection and accountability 
Central to the case for the New Treatment is the postulate that 
catastophic low probability events (LPEs) very rarely occur otherwise 
than through human errors in the processes of physical realisation of 
design or because of unforeseen, and at times unforeseeable, 
inadequacies in the design itself. The initiating events do not appear 
until the design is realised in an operating plant. Risk and safety 
assessments, neither qualitative nor quantitative, can provide any 
reliable prior knowledge of the likelihood of very low probability 
catastrophic events. In reality those that they do foresee, are either 
designed out or otherwise reduced to a level of probability so low as 
to be metaphysical. Such LPEs never happen in human experience, at 
least in the manner predicted. Protection against the catastrophic 
LPE occurring in a nuclear power plant therefore lies with inspection 
and that particular variety of the art which has evolved in the industry 
to meet the need, Figure 13 showing the way in which inspection plays 
its part. Its methodology is largely that which has been practised in 
America by the NRC and in Britain by the NII. 
The demanding nature of the work of a nuclear inspector has been 
commented upon earlier under the generic title of 'Executive Inspection' 
in Sections 14.2.2 and 14.2.3 and also in the writer's paper, 
'Technological progress, safety and the guardian role of inspection', 
included as Document No. 4 of the Annex. The professional requirements 
seen as necessary for the working grade of Senior Inspector in the then 
Inspectorate of Nuclear Installations (now the NII) were specified some 
25 years ago by Major General S. W. Joslin, the first Chief Inspector, 
as high academic qualifications in an appropriate branch of science or 
engineering together with long and responsible experience of the design, 
research or inspection of large scale plants (21). 
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However, these attainments are not enough in themselves and must 
be coupled with that penetrating capacity of technical intuition needed 
for the effective pursuit of Forward Safety Analysis: an intuition 
that gives a profound appreciation of the likely future event field, 
that is of a plant's path on the Behaviour Surface as depicted by the 
cuboid catastophe model of Figure 12. This conceptual field is a 
construct based on an intimate knowledge of the engineering aspects 
of its design as displayed in Figure 3. To this perception must be 
added direct experience of the given plant in its existence as an 
entity on site, together with a comprehensive Gestalt of the relevant 
faults and incidents discernible in the total En flux gathered from 
the industry. Paths leading to catastrophic failure sequences and 
anomalies that may give evidence of loss of resistance to failure are 
thus perceived as likely points of instability on the Behaviour Surface 
and can be dealt with by inspectional intervention in the processes of 
design, construction and operation as appropriate. 
The effectiveness of 'executive' inspection of this kind depends 
critically on the sensitivity of the inspectional body to perceive in 
the way just described those pertinent singularities, instabilities and 
anomolies in the event fields to which it has access. This faculty when 
coupled with the collective engineering intuition of that body gives an 
awareness of the existence or imminent emergence of those efficient 
situations that could initiate a failure sequence. The necessary 
prognostic propensity, the faculty that is the sine qua non of 
efficaceous nuclear safety inspection, is a personal endowment of members 
of the team. But, its exercise is that of participation in a group 
where these propensities should combine holistically to give the 
inspectorate its necessary power of Forward Safety Analysis (FSA). 
However, in the present organisation of statutory inspection such a 
capability is incommensurable as noted by Gerald Rhodes (1981). 
Lester and Rothman (1977) have, however, shown that Signal Detection 
Theory (SDT) can be used to give a quantitative index of success for 
certain well-knownprognosticators who over the past half century have 
attempted to predict the course of future events in the field of 
technological progress. Such prognostications are analogous to those 
which are required of a nuclear inspector in his exercise of foresight 
in FSA and, therefore, SDT may be used to assess success in pursuit of 
FSA and provide a means of dealing with the ultimate gap in the heirarchy 
of inspectional accountability identified by J. R. Ravetz (1974). While 
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the use of SDT to assess the performance of individual inspectors could 
well be counterproductive and be taken as an intrusion on the proper 
responsibilities of management, an organisation such as the NII could 
be subjected to independent, disinterested appraisal in a manner akin 
to the method of 'Keeping Score' suggested by Talbot Page (1979) as a 
means of assessing the performance of risk assessors employed by 
government agencies. 
14.6 The assessment of inspectorial competence by Signal Detection 
Theory (SOTT) 
To recapitulate, in view of the central role engineering inspection 
plays in the New Treatment, verification and maintenance of the quality 
and competence of the inspectional body which performs the executive 
function in the nuclear regulatory hierarchy are paramount. However, 
as inferred earlier in this Section from Goedel's theorem, an 
inspectorate cannot effectively inspect itself and can offer no 
convincing evidence by introspection that it is fully effective, 
efficient and economic in its work. 
The human faculties of perception, discrimination and use of 
acquired knowledge in making sensitive judgements underlie all 
inspectional activities from the GO: NO-00 routines of viewing in 
industrial quality control with increasing intellectual involvement to 
the fine decision making required for nuclear safety inspection. While 
much of the simpler work of industrial inspection has been taken over 
by computers, those that involve the exercise of critical judgements are 
unlikely to be displaced by machines in the foreseeable future. 
Inspection, therefore, remains as a significant element in manufacturing 
costs. Ergonomists in seeking ways of assessing the efficiency of this 
element have had recourse to SDT because of the analogy between defect 
recognition in a flow of manufactured items and the detection of radar 
and other signals at the threshold of identification on a horizon of 
noise. 
It seems that W. P. Colquhoun in 1960 was among the first to study 
the use of SDT in the appraisal of industrial inspection and the topic 
has since attracted much attention because of the labour-intensive nature 
of inspection. David E. Embrey (1976) used SDT to assess the 
effectiveness of methods for training piece-part inspectors. Lester and 
Rothman (1977) were the first to make an empirically supported study of 
the extension ofSDT to more sophisticated intellectual activities in an 
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appraisal of predictions about the future made by Professor J. D. Bernals 
and certain other forecasters of technological progress. 
There is an analogy between technological forecasting and nuclear 
safety inspection in its discipline of forward safety analysis (FSA). 
As explained elsewhere in this text, the practice of FSA involves the 
use of engineering judgement based on studies of design in association 
with empirical data from the field. It is exercised in the prescription 
of modifications to that design as it has been, or will be, realised in 
the plant in question, or to require changes in the way in which the 
latter may be operated. In terms of Catastrophe Theory, the process 
may be seen as steering the system along a path on the Behaviour Surface 
of the Cuboid Model of Figure 12 so that the dangers foreseen by FSA and 
depicted by major irregularities on the Surface may be avoided or 
surmounted. 
An executive inspectorate like the NII in pursuing FSA receives a 
comprehensive flow of Event-noise composed of elements of safety related 
data, among which are the reports from design assessors and field 
inspectors, LERs and other information from various sources such as the 
fault and incident data banks maintained by the Safety and Reliability 
Directorate of the UKAEA (S. R. S. 1984). Its proper task is to detect 
in this stream of information (which has been defined as 'noise') those 
things perceived as signals that give evidence of loss of resistance to 
failure or other indications that the plant may suffer a loss of 
stability. 
Acting upon its interpretation of these signals with a view to 
restoring safety and reliability, the Inspectorate may use delegated 
authority under the Nuclear Installations Acts to require the operator 
of the plant deemed to present the hazard to take some appropriate action 
to reduce the potential danger. To this end, the NII works through 
licence conditions (R. Gausden 1979) in the manner described in 
Section 14.3.1, being able to shut the plant down if necessary. 
Alternatively, as in the case of non-nuclear industrial hazards, an 
inspector can use his powers under the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 to lay a 'Notice' instructing the operator of the plant to eliminate 
the danger or stop the process. 
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14.6.1 An alternative to the test of market forces in nuclear 
risk assessment 
Unlike the prognostic safety analysts of NII and NRC and their 
auxiliaries, actuarial risk assessors in the insurance industry are 
subject to the test of market forces. Errors in risk appraisal incur 
economic penalties. If insurance rates are set too high, clients seek 
cheaper cover: if they are set too low, the underwriters face 
financial loss. Indeed, failure is a phenomenon not uncommon in motor 
insurance. 
Nonetheless, a regulatory body has a protective role and the nuclear 
inspectorates were established to ensure that major radiation accidents 
would not occur. There is no direct way in which the competence of such 
a body may be proved as no experience of failure can be allowed. 
However, if it does fail, then it suffers the d6b3cle of loss of public 
confidence, that is its very raison d'etre. Nbreover, it is illusory 
to attempt to prove its competence in terms of events that have yet to 
happen or that might have happened but did not, unless there is a clear 
nexus between the envisaged approach to failure and the steps to 
prevent it. 
In many cases the required nexus could be established on the basis 
of material drawn from the studies of design which are carried out by, 
or on behalf of, the regulatory bodies charged with the safety 
surveillance of the so-called 'major hazard installations'. In Section 
8.4.7 attention was drawn to Talbot Page's proposal (1979) for 'Keeping 
Score' of the performance of government and agency risk assessors engaged 
in hazard evaluation in the field of atomic energy and other advanced 
technologies. His idea was that the serious event scenarios and the 
fault sequences leading to them as treated in their assessments contained 
numerous lesser sequences that would not run to major system catastrophes. 
Among the mass of information so assembled, there would be certain fault 
sequences that could be matched against the actualities of site and 
control room experience. The required synthetic data would come from 
the official assessments, while the empirical material is available in 
the form of Licensee Event Reports (See Note 15 and Table III) and 
elsewhere in inspectors' visit and other reports. 
In this way the skill of the official assessors in identifying the 
mechanisms of causation of lower tier accidents, faults and incidents 
could provide evidence of their likely success in predicting those major 
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potential LPEs which are the precursors of catastrophic accidents. 
Such validation of the prognostic efficiency of the inspectorates and 
the risk assessment agencies associated with them would enhance public 
confidence in the protection they are supposed to offer. Moreover, it 
is a form of validation of their abilities that could be progressively 
updated as well as imposing a measure of accountability. 
14.6.2 St1 and the psychophysics of Forward Safety Analysis 
Signal Detection Theory (SLIT) is a sophisticated decision methodology 
that can be applied to a very wide range of situations where a decision 
has to be made on equivocal evidence and, more particularly, it can be 
used to assess the performance of the decision maker. The evidence for 
the decision, that is the 'signal', must be elicited from a background 
of 'noise', comprising irrelevant information and events that tend to 
confound the decision process. The analogy with the connunications 
problem of detecting weak signals in electrical circuit noise is obvious. 
The application of SDrT to psychophysics began some 20 years ago, 
progressing from the field of sensory perception to the study of 
intellectual task performances of increasing complexity, such as medical 
diagnostics. A thorough and authoritative introduction to SDrT is 
'Signal Detection Theory and Psychophysics' by Green and Swets (1974). 
The following application of SDrT to Forward Safety Analysis is 
elementary, using the basic 'Yes-No' method, as reference to any of the 
more sophisticated techniques would involve profundities beyond the 
scope of this research. The Forward Safety Analyst looks for evidence 
in the stream of Event-noise, or in other information made available to 
him about the plant and its condition, of design weaknesses or other 
signs of loss of resistance to failure. He responds to that which he 
discerns as a signal by proposing a safeguard which it is assumed will 
be incorporated in the given plant or system. Four states of response 
may be distinguished which, using the standard terminology, are a: 
(i) 'Hit' -a danger signal has been properly perceived and 
(S/s) a correct response made to avert the pending failure. 
(ii) 'Miss' - the signal has not been recognised and no action 
(N/s) taken. In consequence a 
failure occurs unless 
the sequence is otherwise aborted. 
(iii) 'False Alarm' - an element of 'noise' has been incorrectly 
(S/n) identified as a signal and safeguarding action taken which proves to be futile. 
(iv) 'Correct rejection' - an obtrusive element of 'noise' has 
(N/n) been correctly identified as devoid 
of safety significance and no action 
taken. 
262 
By collating the analyst's behaviour for & number of cases, a 








'False Mann' 'Correct Rejection' 
P(S/n) P(N/n) 
The above stimulus-response matrix may be represented graphically 
with P(S/n) as the abscissa and P(S/s) as ordinate, noting that P(N/s) 
can be obtained from 1- P(S/s) and, if the 'False Alarm' rate is known 
(not always the case), P(N/n) is given by 1- P(S/n). The points on the 
graph representing P(S/s) against P(S/n) when joined give a curve called 
the 'Receiver Operating Characteristic' or ROC curve which describes 
the safety assessor's performance. Two important parameters may be 
deduced, namely, his 'sensitivity' and 'bias'. The former indicates 
how well he is able to make correct judgements and avoid incorrect ones. 
'Bias' is the extent to which the assessor is influenced by preconceived 
views in his interpretation of the evidence available to him. For a 
fuller description of the SIT technique reference may be made to the 
very clear and readable treatment given by D. MMNicol (1972). The method 
can be readily adapted for the purposes of 'Keeping Score' of the 
performance of official and agency risk assessors as proposed by Talbot 
Page (supra). In this application, the synthetic situations envisaged 
by the assessors would be matched against analogous real events in the 
En stream. 
14.6.3 A macroscale, synthetic exemplar 
Despite the fact that the data for a convincing demonstration of 
the foregoing SDT methodology exists, it is inaccessible on grounds of 
commercial and official confidentiality and lack of authorisation 'to 
know'. Besides it would be both invidious and impolitic to use the NII 
as a paradigm in such circumstances without formal consent. Therefore, 
a suppositional regulatory body with universal authority is used as a 
model. This so-called International Technological Health and Safety 
Comission (ITHSC) would set targets and impose those limitations and 
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requirements deemed necessary to defend health and safety, acting in 
response to its perception of harbingers in the Event-noise it might 
be envisaged as receiving. 
By definition, the ITHSC would have no access to such microscale 
data. Despite that, it is possible to depict how this synthetic 
commission might be held to operate on the macroscale because the 
information necessary for such an exercise is largely available in 
post-disaster reports and in those from official commissions of inquiry. 
An example of how this data might be arranged for an SITE study is 
given below. 
A 'Hit' - 'Cockcroft's Folly' 
At a late stage in the construction of the UKAEA plutonium piles 
at Windscale in Cumbria, particulate filters were built into the 
tall exhaust gas chimneys. These proved their worth by acting 
effectively to remove radioactive dust from the fumes emitted to 
the atmosphere when No. 1 Pile went out of control in a massive 
core fire on October 10,1957. Had it not been for this act of 
foresight attributed to Sir John Cockcroft, the Windscale accident 
would have had much more serious consequences. 
A 'Miss' - Three Examples as described in Appendix II 
In the cases of the tragic accident at 'Aberfan' when a colliery 
spoil tip adjacent to a Welsh mining village engulfed its school 
and part of the town with heavy loss of life; when the 
tranquiliser, Thalidomide, caused hundreds of severely deformed 
children to be born; and in the case of mass poisoning by methyl- 
mercury when the wastes from a Japanese plastics factory 
contaminated the waters of the fishing ground of Minimata estuary, 
strong signals of impending disaster were ignored by those who had 
a major responsibility for health and safety. 
'False Alarm' 
The U. S. Food and Drug Administration in a misconceived action 
prevented the medicinal use of beta-blockers in cardiovascular illness for a number of years, causing the premature deaths of 
thousands of people. European experience was giving clear 
evidence of their safe use. 
'Correct Rejection' 
Information in this category is held in the files of the regulatory 
bodies and is, otherwise, inaccessible, but there are many cases in which chimerical proposals for safeguards are rejected. One 
case based on equivocal evidence was the 'Ozone layer depletion' 
hypothesis calling for restraints on the use of fluorocarbon 
propellants was properly dismissed. 
A study, somewhat along the above lines though not involving SI7T, 
provided an empirical' basis for the report of the Council for Science 
264 
and Society's working party on 'Superstar Technologies' (J. R. Ravetz 
1976) which recommended a national Technology Control Commission to 
exercise surveillance over the innovation and operation of advanced 
technology plants and processes. 
The microscale appraisal of inspectorial performance offers an 
objective criterion because the safety investment specified for the 
given minor fault sequence assessed has been made or recommended and 
the loss due to failure or the potential loss that might have been 
incurred can be costed (D. McNicol 1972). Furthermore, extrapolation 
of an appraisal of task competence made at the microscale to the 
macroscale is common in human experience, being the basis of licence 
to practice in many areas of human skills, particularly in the awarding 
of higher professional qualifications, eg. for commercial air pilots 
and surgeons. The efficient transfer of higher order intellectual 
skills is a well-known phenomenon. 
Finally, the SDT method of assessing prognosticators described by 
Lester and Rothman (1977) in 'Signals of the Future' could be readily 
adapted to Talbot Page's scheme (supra) for appraisal of the capability 
of official safety assessors and risk analysts by 'Keeping Score'. 
Unfortunately, although most germane to the New Treatment, there is 
neither time nor space to accord the topic more than the brief outline 
given above and the topic must be pursued elsewhere. 
14.7 Advantages of the MCA/SIFT philosophy of nuclear risk management 
A distasteful aspect of the quantitative risk-benefit approaches 
to safety management in nuclear power is their detriment orientation in 
terms of fatal casualties. For instance, the abscissa in the 'Farmer 
Line' graph discussed in Section 9.4 is fundamentally scaled in 
lethalities, despite its presentation in terms of fission product 
releases. On the other hand, the New Treatment escapes from the dilemma 
by retaining the concept of design that had evolved in nuclear 
engineering which is based on a credible limit for a radiation accident 
known as the MCA (See Section 9.2). Such an event would not insult an 
exposed child's thyroid with a dose greater than 25 reins within the 
bounds of the siting policy (See Section 9.3) for the scales of failure 
that could befall the plant; 'incredibility' being a synonym for the 
realm of metaphysical probabilities where events lie beyond human 
experience (See Section 9.6.1). 
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The state of 'incredibility' is to be maintained by implementation 
of a design of attested reliability in a construction and operation of 
sound engineering assured by inspection. That assurance can be 
confirmed by SDT whereby the competence of management throughout the 
whole inspectional chain is appraised by disinterested third party 
action. This meets the criticisms of the impossibility of effective 
self-inspection, lack of accountability and open-endedness in its 
higher echelons which were referred to earlier in this Section. 
Although the probability of an accident on the threshold of 
incredibility is metaphysical and will never happen in the way envisaged, 
some other unforeseen low probability event may occur instead, there 
being an almost infinite spectrum of such possibilities when human 
frailties are taken into account. No objective probability can be 
attached to such an occurrence except to say that it is exceedingly 
unlikely, but there is an upper qualitative level at which the remote 
chance of a very severe disaster presents an intolerable threat to the 
co=mity (17). This eventuality bears on the very widsom of exploiting 
a technology that presents such a dire threat and certainly espouses a 
remote siting policy until proper experience has been acquired in its 
management. The use of certain potent drugs in medicine comes into 
this class and, perhaps, even that of poison gas in warfare as being 
too dangerous for either side to use. Indeed, it is the rationale for 
deterrence in present day military strategies. 
14.8 Overview 
The end of the first decade of this century saw the emergence of a 
new kind of engineering inspection devised to control the unusual and 
grave hazards of certain of the leading advanced technologies, namely 
aeronautics and, later, nuclear power. These new methods of inspection 
with supporting disciplines of non-destructive testing, stress analysis, 
forward safety analysis (FSA) and reliability analysis grew rapidly. 
This was mainly under the stimulus of military exigencies in the approach 
to and experience of two world wars and the subsequent reaction to major 
geo-political threats, particularly after World War Two. Associated 
with these more pragmatic developments has been the application of 
operational research methods, chiefly as quantitative systems analysis, 
to administrative decision making in a wide range of situations. 
However, these attempts have been less than conspicuously successful 
because they have tended to ignore engineering as the true arbiter of 
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safety and the necessary bridge between the administrative, commercial, 
legal and political realm of 'The Word' and the pragmatic and empiric 
domain of 'The Deed' that embraces the practical skills and useful arts 
by which the discoveries of science find their societal applications. 
The inspectorates that came into being to regulate the new 
technologies with their unexpected dangers, owing to their technical 
and organisational sophistication, could no longer be effectively 
managed by the traditional higher tier administrative organs. Further, 
as may be inferred from Goedel's theorem, neither can such bodies 
effectively regulatethemselves. They can thus proliferate and extend 
their influence in ways that neither maximise attainment of their 
objectives nor inspire the necessary confidence of society. A situation 
thus exists that appears to be open-ended on the one hand and beyond 
effective political control on the other. 
Despite the foregoing doubts, recent developments in psychophysics 
can offer some of the necessary answers. The salient feature of the 
new form of inspection that has developed around nuclear power is its 
prognostic philosophy of safety by foresight or FSA. Signal Detection 
Theory (SUT) can be used both to confirm the efficacy of the inspection 
process itself and as a measure of the effectiveness of the associated 
assessment function as well as the bias with which it may be exercised. 
SUT, therefore, would offer a means of closing the accountability gaps 
that exist at the top of the official inspectional hierarchies as well 
as subjecting their performances to appraisal analogous to that 
attributable to the market forces which bear upon actuarial assessors 
in the insurance industry. 
However, in view of the novelty of the concept and the nuances of 
interference with existing organisational forms, the suggested 
application of SDT has been confined to a notional, universal 
inspectorate, an International Technological Health and Safety Commission 
(IMiSC). A few imputed successes and failures of FSA have been 
attributed to this ITHSC, and its suppositional management of the new 
technological risks has been briefly examined by a simplistic 
application of the SDT methodology. 
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15 CONCLUDING OVERVIEW AND CONSTITUTION OF TfE NEW TREATENT 
'There is no subject so old that something 
new cannot be said about it. ' 
Fyodor M. ikhailovich Dostoevsky, 
'A diary of a writer' (1876) - 
3, July and August. 
The New Treatment of Low Probability Events is the outcome of a 
critical evaluation of the achievements in safety engineering and 
reliability theory and practice that have had their culmination in the 
nuclear industry over the past 40 odd years. These advances, like 
most things in science and engineering, have, in the main, been the 
result of re-appraisal and reconstitution of long established methods 
to meet the new and unique dangers presented by the large-scale 
exploitation of atomic energy and especially those of nuclear power. 
It has been appropriate therefore to describe the New Treatment against 
the historical and societal background of growing concern about the 
darker aspects of the technological advances that began with the 
Industrial Revolution. 
The new and rapid industrial developments were doing serious harm 
to the health and safety of workers, public and environment. Life and 
limb were cheap. The risks that workers faced were no more than a 
natural consequence of their employment and there was little more regard 
for member of the higher social orders. Industrial pollution and loss 
of amenity were accepted as the unfortunate consequences of work 
activities compounded by national economic policies, e. g. deforestation, 
enclosures and the dumping of spoil. Even so, the growing prosperity 
of the community as a whole in the countries that were becoming 
industrialised, and in Britain in particular, was making life a happier 
experience for all classes and something to be valued and extended. 
Government intervention in the interests of health, hygiene, safety and 
a clean environment was seen to be necessary and steps began to be 
taken to control pollution and abate the rising toll of industrial 
accidents and diseases. Legislation was conduced by public opinion 
and intelligent economic self-interest and important health and safety 
laws were enacted, but, perhaps most effective of all the contributing 
factors, was the creation of an economic base to meet the costs they 
imposed on the comuriity. 
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By the end of the first quarter of the Twentieth Century, the toll 
of factory and mine accidents had been greatly reduced and the worst 
of industrial pollution had been brought under control. There followed 
a period of consolidation, but the advanced countries were now 
suffering a sensational series of catastrophic failures of technological 
systems, notably in the field of mass transportation of which the 
'Titanic', 'R-101', 'Hindenburg' and 'Morro Castle' are examples. After 
the Second World War, the pace of technical progress accelerated and 
broughtwith it a new dimension of danger with the development of mass 
air travel, new and potent pharmaceuticals and nuclear power. 
Public awareness of these hazards and anxiety about safety and the 
state of the environment have become acute and the measures being taken 
to allay these fears now pose a threat to essential progress, and not 
only in the case of nuclear power. It has become part of a rising trend 
of hostility towards technology which is a matter for serious concern 
per se. On the one hand, the World's population is rapidly growing and 
billions of deprived people are yearning for a better quality of life. 
On the other, the Earth's balance of natural resources against demand 
is not static and the available reserves of energy are particularly 
limited. The only escape from an eventual catastrophe is by continuing 
technical progress and nuclear power offers both an essential and 
available avenue . Besides, resolution of the problems that are 
hindering 
its progress may soon become urgent. 
A constructive outcome of the state of public concern about 
technological hazards, inspired by doubts about atomic energy, has been 
the emergence of risk science which has adopted the systems approach 
that reached a pinnacle in the U. S. Reactor Safety Study and parallel 
initiatives in Britain inspired by F. R. Farmer. While these methods 
have contributed to the technical safety assessment of engineering 
design, they seem to have done little to reduce the incidence of rare, 
catastrophic failures like the Three Mile Island disaster of 1979. 
15.1 The essential nature of the New Treatment 
Largely on grounds that evolved systems tend to be more reliable 
than those of ad hoc novelty however cleverly contrived, the New 
Treatment proposes that the practices that have long been successful in 
hazard control in the atomic energy industry should be substantially 
retained. Fran this vantage point, it has taken an engineering 
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initiative and shows a way of striking a societal balance between the 
acknowledged very small but grave and finite risks that arise in the 
commercial exploitation of some of today's advanced technologies and 
the benefits they offer. Yet, its particular application is to power 
generation by nuclear fission. 
In the welter of controversy, inquiries, reports and studies aimed 
at presenting thoserisks as vanishingly small, there is a danger that 
the expenditure on safety may continue to escalate into a region of 
safer than safe, rendering nuclear power hopelessly uneconomic. And, 
the burden is already heavy. The New Treatment differs radically from 
that of quantitative risk analysis currently being promoted in the 
industry. Safety is not defined as a static parameter than can be 
accurately measured and, thereby, judged as adequate or otherwise, 
but as a defended state that has to be actively maintained by human 
effort and vigilence. Such is the proper task of inspection. It is 
engineering that follows a course of action that uses rather than 
depends on the mathematics of quantitative safety analysis. The risks 
are recognised and assessed and appropriate technical action taken to 
contain them, but this must be a continuing and sustained effort, 
confirmed by inspectional monitoring. 
The New Treatment then suggests that plants built to good and 
properly assessed designs, well engineered and operated, very rarely 
fail catastrophically owing to known plant or equipment faults. They 
fail instead because of 'Ignorance of Mechanism' has obscured a fault 
mode; because of some act of human fallibility, culpable or inadvertent;, 
or because of an unforeseen change confluence of circumstances. The 
pattern of these fundamental factors in the causation of failure is 
shown in Figures 14 and 15 and is briefly reviewed in the Preamble 
to Appendix II. 
The remedy does not lie in the achievement of better risk 
mathematics or in attempts to enhance engineered safeguards which 
already provide for a satisfactory defence of safety, but by an industry 
characterised by engineering of demonstrable excellence. That this is 
so can be confirmed and maintained by an'accountable inspectional regime 
open to public verification. Within such a regime, it should be 
possible to secure assenting compliance with the necessary statutory 
regulations, licence conditions and other requirements of good 
engineering practice. 
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This is substantially the state of affairs that exists in the 
nuclear power industries in Britain and, to a lesser extent, in the 
U. S. A., having been fostered by the responsible regulatory bodies in 
each of the two countries, respectively the Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate (NII) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). A 
feature of the British regime has been its involvement in the 
formulation of safety policy and its participation with licensees in 
decision making in matters of nuclear plant design and operational 
safety in the manner described in Section 14.3.1. 
While the NII and NRC have been taken as exemplars, neither 
inspectorate fully meets the terms of the New Treatment. The 
regulatory body it envisages would have to be subject to appraisal of 
its efficiency and modus operandi by and, moreover, be accountable for 
the outcome of its work, to an independent public body or commission 
on the lines proposed in Sections 14.5.2 et seq. However, developments 
along these lines might meet some formidable obstacles owing to the 
'Two Cultures' divide that separates administrators and politicians on 
the one side from the engineers on the other. The former group, acting 
in accordance with what has become constitutional practice, holds the 
primary responsibility for creating the agency which would be charged 
with carrying out the foregoing inspectional functions and, what is 
more, with the formulation of the policies which would determine the 
way in which that work is to be done. 
It is obvious then that enhancement of the powers accorded to 
engineering inspectors acting as an autonomous body must diminish the 
administrative prerogative, a trend that has been manifest in the NII 
and certain other advanced technology groupings since the advent of 
commercial atomic energy (Margaret Cowing 1974/a). It may well be that 
failure to recognise the effective shift in the centre of technological 
policy formulation and decision making has led to much of the 
misconceived criticism of the advances in engineering inspection that 
has been discussed in Section 14.3 et seq. Furthermore, regulation 
of those technological hazards of innovation that have characterised 
the second half of this century, and among which nuclear has been 
salient and a pace setter, demands an inspectional approach which, as 
previously observed, is one of participation and shared responsibility. 
This is in contrast with the traditional detached approach concentrated 
on enforcment of regulations enjoined by prosecution. Clearly, any 
further errosion of administrative tier authority may be expected to 
meet opposition. 
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Despite the fact that this radical new approach to safety in 
the exploitation of advanced technology had its origin in the U. S. 
nuclear industry, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) has 
been chosen as the exemplar in preference to the U. S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). No doubt there has been substantial 
transfer of theory and practice, but the further development of the 
latter has been constrained by the dominant legalism of American 
government administration. On the other hand, the NII, by virtue of 
its emergence in the exceptional and novel circumstances that arose 
in Britain owing to the conjunction of a pressing need to regulate the 
commercial development of nuclear technology and the repercussions of 
the Windscale plutonium pile accident, was given scope to evolve a 
unique and effective system of participative statutory safety 
surveillance of non-government nuclear installations and, primarily, 
power reactors. An important factor was that the development of the 
NII fell almost entirely into the hands of some eminent and experienced 
nuclear engineers. Moreover, the NII had become the admitted leader 
in nuclear safety regulation in the Western World as, for instance, is 
inferred in the report made by Rogovin and Frampton (1980) to the U. S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
Efficaceous safety inspection depends, not only on appraisal of 
the design of the reactor plant, but on the subsequent circumstances 
of the construction and operation of the power station on site, the 
latter factor in many respects transcending the former in importance. 
The assurances as to the quality and reliability of design remain as 
bookwork, but the reality of the plant is in the practical engineering 
of building, operating and maintaining it in situ, matters being 
realised in America with the debacle of 'Marble Hill' (22). 
Therefore, catastrophic low probability events take place in the 
latter regime and not in the plans and specifications which are the 
formalised conceptions of the design office. While this has been the 
guiding principle of the New Treatment and the reason for its emphasis 
on inspection, it must be recognised that in the absence of a design, 
there would be no plant to inspect. Moreover, both relevant theory 
and a proper safety appraisal of design are essential for the effective 
pursuit of that inspection. To meet this need, New Treatment has 
attempted to develop a consistent theory about the causation of those 
low probability events that lead to catastrophic plant and system 
failures. Without such direction an ad hoc approach to safety is 
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inevitable, but inadequate as, indeed, was that of those National Coal 
Board officials who failed to perceive that the mine spoil tip poised 
above the village of Aberfan was dangerously unstable. 
The New Treatment suggests an analogy between the experience of 
industrial incidents and noise theory in which the flow of mundane 
faults, failures and accidents may be likened to the casual 
disturbances that are a feature of communications channels. In this 
background of 'noise' there are larger impulses or 'spikes' which are 
analogous to the occasional major events that disrupt the normal 
operation of the plant, even to the extent of a catastrophic failure. 
Accident records show that such events are usually preceded by lesser 
ones as precursors. These give evidence of the loss of resistance of 
the system to failure, but the harbingers are inevitably disregarded 
for if they were not, the accident would not occur. Owing to the fact 
that the true risks of nuclear power are inconanensurables in any 
precise, mathematical, predictive sense, the nuclear safety inspector 
must seek qualitative guides to his decision making. His task is to 
apprehend both objective and hidden precursors of failure in the 
constitution and behaviour of the plant and to guide its management 
accordingly. Catastrophe theory has been used in an elementary manner 
to construct a simple behaviour model to depict the operational 
scenario of a nuclear power plant. It is thus possible to give an 
overall portrayal of the operational risk situation through which the 
plant's management must pilot it, the fault and failure hazards being 
represented as irregularities in a probability field, namely the model's 
Behaviour Surface. Encounters with anomalies in this Surface represent 
destabilisation of the plant's normal performance from minor faults to 
catastophic accidents. The disturbances may be associated with Event- 
noise and a panoramic risk scenario created in which potential 
accident precursors are more likely to be identified and safety 
investment and efforts more logically and effectively apportioned. 
In a review of the state of risk science now orientated to 
quantitative methods, it has been argued that the failure modes 
foreseen by reliability analysis of design will never happen in a 
properly built and operated plant. The factors so identified in their 
causation will have either been designed out by prudent engineering or 
will be related to unlikely happenings for which the computed chance 
of their occurrence is too small for eventuation. On the other hand, 
low probability events not foreseen in such analyses can and do occur. 
273 
Nevertheless the existence of a sound design, free of identifiable 
faults is an essential precondition for safety and reliability. 
To escape from this impasse, the New Treatment suggests that 
potential accident precursors may be identified by an inspection that 
is perceptive and forward-looking. In such an endeavour an approach 
combining the powerful quantitative methods of design assessment with 
the qualitative analytic logic of Event-noise-Catastrophe theory can 
offer an effective aid, potential fault sequences being arrested before 
they are able to run to catastrophic failure. This must even now be 
the case for near-miss accidents. However, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to establish with any certainty that such a catastrophe 
would have occurred had not the preventive measures been taken. 
Nonetheless, a 'noisy' plant is inspectionally suspect as failure prone 
and measures taken to 'quieten' it should reduce that risk. Reports of 
work-accidents, faults, other incidents, and especially those of 
management difficulties made by regulatory site-inspectors and operators 
in Licensee Event Reports (LERs), provide a flow of 'noise' for 
inspectional analysis and discernment of potential precursors. 
15.2 Some matters concerning the public acceptance of nuclear power 
A major argument advanced against nuclear power by its opponents 
is that there can be no absolute assurance against catastrophic 
radiation accidents. While this is true, at least for current designs 
of nuclear power reactors, it is also the case that, if a regime of 
safety assurance could convince the intelligent, rational, opinion- 
forming section of the public that it had reduced the realisable 
likelihood of a possible severe radiation accident to one that was 
truly negligible, then the threat posed by nuclear power would be 
likely to be ignored. That threat would then be seen as the very unlikely 
chance of a low probability event against which all reasonably practical 
steps had been taken. It is further argued that, if this could be 
presented in a truly convincing way, it would be conducive to a state 
of confidence in management of the nuclear risk in which the properly 
informed and unprejudiced public would be willing to tolerate the 
minuscule residual hazard. 
This has been achieved in the realm of air transport where the 
personal risk to the prospective passenger is accepted as insignificant, 
but in this it is relevant that the keepers of safety are the pilots 
and air-traffic-control whose competence and efficiency are properly 
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subject to continuing surveillance and attestation. Catastrophic 
accidents may be attributed to failure of inspection of the latter 
kind, seldom being due to equipment or structural faults. 
But why has not this state of affairs been established for nuclear 
power, given its enviable record of safety? The answer has an 
unavoidable political flavour that limits discussion here. Nonetheless, 
two points may be made. First, those serious attempts that have been 
made to win public support have turned on bland assertions about 
almost unquestionable safety from committed public figures and certain 
eminent scientists, some of the latter truly out of their field, backed 
by tenuous excursions into risk mathematics. Second , the relevant 
arguments lie in the realm of engineering as in the case of air transport. 
In the case of nuclear power, the official guarantors of the 
engineering and operations, and especially the NII in Britain, have 
been under continuous disparaging attack, not likely to enhance public 
confidence in the efficacious surveillance of safety. Besides, the 
circumstances are bedevilled by the complex and enigmatic political 
factors hinted at above that have been treated more fully in Docunent 
No. 4 of the Annex. 
15.2.1 The new style inspectorates and public trust 
The point has been made earlier that the raison d'etre for the 
NII and other new style inspectorial bodies like the NRC was that they 
were needed to provide a defence against the envisaged disastrous human 
and financial consequences of a major nuclear mediated radiation 
accident, ie the 'infinite' aspect of the actuarial risk. The task 
was not given to the existing organisations responsible for industrial 
safety, eg H. M. Factory Inspectorate, because their post-event 
strategy of prosecution for observed breaches of regulations, usually 
after an accident, was unacceptable in the circumstances. In common 
with other statutory bodies with regulatory functions, the NII and 
its compeers lack public accountability and there appears to be no 
means whereby their competence may be openly verified. These are 
matters of importance if inspection is to be seen as the guardian of 
safety. Indeed, the accepted view is that such things are 
'incomnensurables' (Douglas Wass 1983) and the officials who manage 
the inspectorates owe allegiance to the upper echelons of the 
bureaucracy, rather than to the public in any direct sense. Moreover, 
public confidence in the defences against the unfamiliar and far 
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reaching hazards of nuclear power is not likely to reside in faith in 
the capability of faceless public officials, but in the conviction 
that the defence of safety is verifiably effective, efficient and well 
managed. 
Engineering which, unlike mathematics and physical science, has a 
societal role is the proper source of this trust, but, whereas the 
material achievements of engineering are tangible, inspection has been 
impalpable. Despite that, recent developments in psychophysics have 
shown that the performance of inspectors can be measured by Signal 
Detection Theory (SI7T) and, not only can the technique be applied to 
Viewing operations, but to the more sophisticated arts of forecasting 
technical outcomes, the relevance to design assessment and Forward 
Safety Analysis being obvious. 
An attempt has been made to show that Stir can be used to assess 
the performance of an engineering inspectorate like the NII on a 
scientific basis, justifying the claim to assure safety by foresight, 
namely that of the effectiveness of its faculty of Forward Safety 
Analysis and of an ability to discern the harbingers of failure. In 
the foregoing applications SDT also has a disciplinary use as a test 
of the effectiveness of the performance of inspectional work. It can 
thus, not only provide a check on the efficiency of inspection, but 
offers a means of securing accountability as well. 
15.3 Synthesis of the New Treatment of Low Probability Events 
The New Treatment is an approach rather than a prescription which 
sets down those principles on which an efficacious and convincing 
model of a system for statutory safety assurance of the reactors in a 
commercial nuclear power program can be built. It is therefore the 
gathering together of the themes developed during the discourses on 
the several topics examined in the preceding passages in this thesis, 
namely: 
(i) The historical background from which the modern 
attitudes to industrial hazards emerged; 
(ii) The necessity of the advance of technology, risks and 
benefits; 
(iii) Catastrophic failures in technical systems and their 
causation; 
(iv) The state of the art in risk science; 
(v) The emergence of probability and its relevance to 
hazard management; 
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(vi) The idea that very low probabilities are metaphysical 
in open systems and that the specific hypothetical 
events to which they are ascribed never happen (14); 
(vii) The analogy between the actuarial 'Zero-Infinity Dilemma' 
and the quandary of safeguarding-investment economy in 
nuclear design safety assessment; 
(viii) The analogy between the actuarial admission of 'Ignorance 
of Mechanism' and the inability of quantitative safety 
analysis to identify true low probability plant failure 
sequences rather than hypotheticalities; 
(ix) The discontinuity between the design concept and its 
realisation in an operational plant; 
(x) The growing disjunction between the 'Two Cultures' and 
the alienation of realm of administration and politics 
from the domain of science and technology; 
(xi) The concept of plant accidents, faults and failures as 
an 'Event-noise' flux; 
(xii) Representation of the possible operational experience of 
the plant as its movement on the probabilistic Behaviour 
Surface of a simple Catastrophe theory model; 
(xiii) The discernment of harbingers of major plant failures in 
terms of 'loss of resistance to failure' from evidence 
in the accidents, faults and incidents gleaned from 
Event-noise and other operational sources; 
(xiv) The central role of engineering inspection in nuclear 
power plant risk management and safeguarding; 
(xv) Signal Detection Theory and the appraisal of efficiency 
of inspection and safety assessment functions; 
(xvi) Accountable engineering inspection and public trust; and 
(xvii) Acceptance of nuclear power as the preferred 
energy option and toleration by the public of the 
minuscule residual risk. 
Although the above schema for hazard management has been discussed 
with nuclear power in mind, it may be readily adapted to other 
dangerous technologies. 
The foregoing principles provide a framework for a policy that 
could win rational public toleration of a technology of great and 
essential benefit to the community, but one that also brings with it a 
dire potential hazard. They underlie the arrangements that have made 
the grave risks of mass air transportation acceptable with little demur, 
although one yet to be achieved for nuclear power. 
In essence they meet the criteria held by W. D. Rowe (1979), Talbot 
Page (1979) and other eminent authorities to be necessary for public 
acceptance of a major technological risk, namely that: 
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(a) it is generally accepted that the risk has been reduced 
by a system of efficient and stable control to a level 
so small that it may be ignored for the practical 
purposes of daily life; 
(b) the efficient system of control is exercised by a 
credible organisation with statutory responsibility 
for health and safety; 
(c) the credible organisation is accountable to the public 
for its activities; and that 
(d) the competence of the organisation and the efficiency 
with which it can perform its functions are verified by 
a disinterested, independent agency. 
However, the opposition to nuclear power is not due to concerns 
about its technological dangers alone as the opposition gains support 
from fears of a general political nature, matters discussed in 
Section 5.2 et seq. These latter factors will sink to insignificance 
with the approach of the energy crisis that will inevitably accompany 
exhaustion of the World's oil reserves. This has already happened in 
France which has suffered from an energy dearth for generations that 
would become a major economic embarrassment in an oil famine. Nonethe- 
less, there remains a very real hazard in the case of nuclear energy 
that must be kept under effective control and similar problems may have 
to be faced as other potent new technologies are introduced. 
15.4 A concluding comment with some reservations 
A historical background to the New Treatment has been provided 
from the Industrial Revolution to the scene today when a rapidly 
advancing technology is imposing new hazards on the public and 
environment as a concomitant to the benefits. The societal reaction 
in Western society has been examined in the light of the changes in 
government administration and corporate management that have taken place 
to meet the new technological situation. 
The leading innovation so far has been the exploitation of atomic 
energy in the generation of electricity. In view of its intrinsic 
hazard of a devastating radiation accident, nuclear power has not only 
brought into being safety technologies of a new kind, but it has been 
properly subjected to a special regime of statutory regulation. 
Nonetheless, widespread unease about its safety and certain other aspects 
is hindering further progress in exploitation of the nuclear energy 
option. 
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The present regulatory scene is unsettled, although the underlying 
reasons for this do not reach the level of public debate. One of the 
more subtle of them is the divergence between the pragmatism of the 
engineers and promotion by the scientists and those favourable to their 
cause of frequency theories of probability and allied systems mathematics 
as panaceas for all problems of practical risk management. An 
attempt has been made in the New Treatment to re-establish a balanced 
perspective in which the relevant scientific and mathematical advances 
may be properly seen as tools, appropriate in some situations, but 
inappropriate in others. 
Engineering is not science, but the scientific utilisation of science 
to meet the needs of society and, more particularly, a given society. 
It has, therefore, a greater dimensionality. This divorce between the 
two disciplines has long been known, but it has been customary to 
describe it in a manner derogatory to engineering. In the days of simple 
technology, of flying machines, wireless, permanent way and rhumb line 
navigation, any serious attempt to reject this inferior status would 
have been futile. Except for the occasional genius like Edison, Watson- 
Watt, Blumlein and Whittle, engineering in the first part of this Century 
had an image of drawing office, foundary, fabrication, boiler suit and 
oil can. 
Today there is a new situation. The complexity and sophistication 
of modern technology has extended the horizons of the engineer to 
computer software and information science, aerospace, communications and 
the intricacies of micro-electronics to name but a few, let alone atomic 
energy. If a country is to compete effectively with others in the 
Western orbit, then engineering must be accorded the status of a creative 
intellectual activity on a par with the other great branches of culture 
identified in Figure 1. And, the management of technological risk is 
part of that culture. 
Much of the New Treatment is a restatement of engineering pragmatism 
in this modern setting. Another has been the creation of a rationale in 
which the challenges and quandaries of the new engineering science can 
be properly presented in the existing economic and social milieu. In 
consequence, certain aims of the New Treatment have political and 
constitutional overtones. Perhaps the most far reaching of them is the 
suggestion that the efficiency with which many engineering activities, 
and particularly those of a managerial and administrative kind, are 
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performed is determinable and, in consequence, those who are responsible 
for them can be appraised and held accountable. 
Introduction of the New Treatment would bring about substantial 
changes in the administration of the regulatory organisations and the 
complementary safety echelons in the utilities and other industrial 
managements as they exist today. As in the case of all such 
organisational change, constitutional obstacles as well as the inertia 
of the existing hierarchies would have to be overcome. It might well be 
that without the sanction of some major accident, no doubt nuclear, the 
New Treatment could not be introduced in the face of obdurate opposition. 
For these reasons, it might be more readily acceptable in a situation 
where a regulatory system for nuclear power was being considered, say in 
a country about to embark on a national program. 
A word on the philosophical tone of this study is in order. The 
arguments on which the New Treatment has been advanced lie principally 
in the arena of philosophy, logic and ethics, but in an engineering 
aspect. The problems of management of very low probability technological 
risks are now societal rather than technical. The achievements of 
reliability and risk science are not in dispute, but their intrusion into 
the former area as major determinants is. 
Finally, there is an ethical reservation of some profundity. A 
retrospective Fatal Accident Frequency Rate (FAFR) is an objective 
statistic, but the New Treatment implicitly rejects the prospective use 
of the FAFR as a design parameter. Of course, absolute accident 
prevention is impossible and there will be fatal industrial accidents, 
but an ethical safety philosophy should be centred on the protection of 
human life, not on acquiescence in death. The writer expressed this in 
relation to nuclear power plant design thus: 
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'To bridge the innate discontinuity in a logic which sums 
the products of events which may be reasonably expected to 
happen with those which must not, there is an implicit 
postulation of the inevitability of occurrence of the 
untoward and forbidden. While no plant, however well built 
and managed, can be expected to run absolutely risk free, 
this philosophy of accepting disasters so as to make 
prophecies about the harm which may be attributed to a 
nuclear power programme is questionable. Nuclear plant 
designers must be guided by an aim which secures that major 
plant disasters do not occur. Their designs and precautions 
must make them 'incredible'. Of course, experience in safety 
has shown that there is very little which is impossible. 
For this reason, the worst consequences of a plant accident 
must be known, not as a basis for a safety philosophy, but 
as a guide for siting, emergency planning and damage control 
needs. If such an untoward catastophic event occurs, it 
should be in spite of human endeavours and not because of a 
failure which could be attributed to a permitted weakness 
in design. ' 
O. H. Critchley, 
'Risk prediction, safety analysis 
and quantitative probability 
methods -a caveat', 
J. Br. Nuclear Energy Society, 
Jan. 1976,1S(1) , p. 19. (See Document No. 1 of the Annex. ) 
The New Treatment is open to the criticism that it is strong on 
philosophy, but weak on prescription. True, but to make substantial 
changes in the engineering and safety structures in the nuclear power 
industry, the commission charged with the task would have to be given 
statutory authority to inquire deeply into the administration and 
organisation of the electrical power utilities and their contractors 
and of the inspectorates that regulate them. It would also need a remit 
to prescribe staffing policies for these bodies so that their key 
managerial posts would be filled by engineers of the proper calibre. 
It would also need to direct the engineering towards standardisation of 
plant design to be enjoined by strict quality control during construction 
and operation. A mandate from the public that was endorsed by the 
political establishment would be required to secure passage of the 
enabling legislation. This essential support could not be won in absence 
of a cogently argued case, justified by reasons of polity, science, 
economics and ethics. This thesis is an attempt to outline a philosophy 
and suggest a methodology on which such a case could be made. 
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16 EPILOGUE 
The thoughts marshalled in this thesis have been punctuated by 
three disastrous Low Probability Events: initiated by 'Flixborough', 
sustained by 'TMI' and concluded by 'Abbeystead', each in its way 
emphsising the theme. There is no absolute safety, even in circumstances 
seemingly innocuous, but a proper treatment of an overtly dangerous 
technology can maintain a state of safety asymptotic to the absolute. 
From each an important lesson may be drawn: from 'Flixborough', 
dependence on the quality of engineering in management;; from 'TMI', 
the sine qua non of competent and properly trained technicians; and 
from 'Abbeystead' that there is no defence against 'Ignorance of 
Mechanism', being another tragedy of incredible causation like 'Moorgate'. 
But, the defences against these things do not take care of themselves, 
owing to the lethargy, tendency towards centripetal conceits and over- 
confidence that can afflict even the best of managements. To overcome 
their baneful effects, a continuing and intrusive, but disinterested 
inspection is necessary, though it must be an inspection of the proper 
kind that is itself accountable to the people for whose benefit it was 
instituted. 
Some of the most important advances in safety have been made by the 
use of operational research (OR). Salient among them has been the 
application of reliability technology to design safety assessment which, 
together with other developments in safety and regulatory science, have 
been studied here in the light of the growing disjunction between theory 
and practice that characterises present day Western civilisation. That 
the promotion of OR methods of risk assessment in nuclear power over 
the past two decades has been paralleled by a more general exploitation 
of systems techniques as the decision maker's panacea is not without 
relevance. 
The enhancement of safety of a nuclear power plant or other major 
hazard installation by improved reliability in design is unquestionable: 
that reliability per se can virtually eliminate the threat of a very 
law probability catastrophic failure is not. On the other hand, 
engineering inspection which has lacked due recognition of late can 
ensure the compliance of a complex technological artefact with its 
design, and this is a sine qua non of operational safety, though by no 
means a guarantee of it. Moreover, it can reveal evidence of that loss 
of resistance to failure that almost invariably precedes a catastrophic 
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fault sequence, such tell-tales being more often disregarded than 
recognised even by alert managements. 
Inspection, aided by reliability analysis, can thus offer an 
efficaceous way, not only of preventing mundane accidents, faults and 
incidents, but of reducing the chance of catastrophic failure to a 
virtual zero. Presented as a verifiable and accountable system of 
safety management, it could inspire public confidence that the risk 
accompanying the nuclear energy option, though real, was effectively 
negligible. 
In so wide a field, it has been possible to do not more than outline 
a framework for the New Treatment. Its methodologies have, for the most 
part, been only sketchily described and some passed over with little 
more than a hint. Among the areas of specific interest deserving further 
study in the construction of a more complete schema are: 
1. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 
Development of effective means whereby LERs can be analysed 
to identify trends towards 'loss of resistance to failure' 
in nuclear power plants under surveillance in both their 
individuality and generality, using noise theory as the means 
of identifying 'signals of weakness', not only from components, 
equipment and structures, but from their organisations and 
managements as well. 
2. Engineering Inaction 
An interdisciplinary research into the objectives, organisation, 
methods and philosophy of the higher orders of engineering 
inspection, recognising it as a discipline in its own right, 
embracing such supporting techniques as non-destructive 
testing, modelling, quality control and quality assurance. 
3. Signal Detection Theory (SIiT 
The use of SDT in the appraisal of inspectional functions and, 
in particular, the technical safety assessment of design; of 
executive inspection both internal to the plant and regulatory 
and the relationship between the two with a view to rendering 
the system accountable to the body politic; and of inspectors 
as individuals and teams in respect of their prognostic skills 
in assessing the likelihood of catastrophic failure sequences 
as a determinant in the management of plant safeguarding 
investment. 
4. The causation of Low Probability Events (LPEs) 
An interdisciplinary investigation oriented towards the personal 
and managerial aspects of LPE causation, namely oversights, 
behavioural aberrations, centripetal organisation tendencies, 
barriers to the flow of safety and reliability information both 
internally and externally and failures of inspection. 
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5. Amalgamation of the Event-noise and Catastrophe Theories 
A more rigorous justification of the attempt to combine the 
Event-noise concept with Catastrophe Theory with a view to 
defining the Behaviour Surface of the Cuboid Model more 
objectively as a probability field. 
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18 NOTES 
Number Title Section 
1 Natural disasters 1 
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4 Luddites 2.1 
5 Pollution control in ancient times 2.1 
6 Exaggeration of nuclear power hazards 3 
7 Panic and the management of emergencies 3.5.1 
8 Human error 4.1 
9 'Safest industry in the World' 4.2 
10 Canvey Island/Thurrock risk assessment 7.1 
11 The persisting influence of Aristotle on 8.1 
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12 Closed and Open Stochastic Systems 8.2.1 
13 Estimated cost of the Sizewell PWR inquiry 6.4.9 
14 Metaphysical probability 9.6.1 
15 Safety Data reporting schemes for nuclear power 9.7.2 
16 The value of human life 11.2.2 
17 Accidents of unacceptable dimensions 11.3.2 
18 Reliability Degradation 12.2.2 
19 Enforcement inspection philosophy 14.1 
20 Engineering inspectors ignored 14.3.1 
21 Profile of a nuclear safety inspector (INI) 14.5.2 
22 Marble Hill debacle 15.4 
23 Peculiarity of the written languages of Japan 8.1.1 
24 Pure Administration 9.5.2 
25 Markham Colliery Overwind 12.3.3 
26 Quantitative Risk and Safety Analysis in the U. K. 9.5 
* Explanatory Note 
The Section number cited refers to the place in the 
text where the given note first appears 
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(1) Natural Disasters - There is a comprehensive list in the'Guinness 
Book of Records' published by Guinness Superlatives, London, 30th Edition, 
1984. The worst known to the World was the 'Black Death' from 1347-1350 A. D. 
when some 75,000,000 died, The influenza epidemic of 1918 killed 
21,640,000. In the China famine of 1969-1971 an estimated 20,000,000 
starved to death. In the Hwang-ho River flood of Au uat 1931 397005400 
Chinese drowned. 830,000 were lost in the Shensi earthquake of 1556. 
Tidal waves are not tsunami. The latter are caused volcanic and earthquake 
forces. Tsunami 220 ft from trough to crest have been recorded. The 
biggest tidal wave observed was 112 ft from trough to crest. The most 
violent volcanic erruption of modern times was that of Krakatoa Island 
on August 27,1883 which cre4ted 4.3 cubic miles of ejecta. The resulting 
tsunami killed 36,380 people. 
(2) Life expectancy and G!: P - Indirect losses in life expectancy 
resulting from a general decrease in the gross national product (GNP) 
have been investigated recently. The effect is hard to quantify. 
In their study of 'Risk and Culture' Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky 
(1982) have identified it as a positive factor in reducing life 
expectancy. In an attempt to scale radiation risks against those due 
to other societal causes, mainly employment, J. Reissland and W. Barnes iof 
the National Radiological Protection Board (1979) note that there 
is a definite relationship between the GNP and the expectation of We. 
(3) Toll on the roads - Deaths attributable to motor traffic run at 
some 8,000 per year in Britain and are proportionate higher in the 
USA. Fatalities ities from all causes in the nuclear industry have not exceeded 
per year. 
(4) Luddites - The introduction of power looms brought ruin to the 
skilled textile workers of Northern Britian who were unable to compete 
with the new machines. Through the years of 1811 to 1816, they turned 
their fury for the loss of livelihood and distress to riot and the 
breaking of the machinery in mills. It is not known whether their 
action was spontaneous or organised, but it was attributed at the 
time to a legendary Nedd Ludd. The movement was put down with great 
savagery and machine breaking made punishable by death. Sporadic 
violence continued until as late as 1840. 
(5) Pollution control in ancient times - The tanning of hides was a major industry in Biblical times, leather being used for footwear, shields, 
helmets, girdles, etc. and parchment was prepared for writing. Owing to 
the unpleasant smells and noxious effluxes, 'tanners were compelled to 
find quarters outside towns and near water' - 'a tanner by the seaside', 
Acts 10: 32. Excerpt from Black's New Bible Dictionary, 8th Ed., 
London, 1973, p. 726. 
(6) Exaggeration of nuclear power hazards - In addition to the 
virulently anti-nuclear books like 'Poisoned Power' . 
(Gofman and Tamplin 
1973) and the more recent 'Power Corrupts' (Bacon and Valentine 1981), there 
have been more subtle and credible attacks in the media. One such is 
'The China Syndrome', a film in which Joan Fonda stars. It describes 
a hypothetical nuclear power plant accident that results in the heavy 
contamination of a large area of land by radioactivity. 
288 
(7) Panic and the management of emergencies - The lesson to be learnt 
from the appalling disaster that was the outcome of the 'Cromarty'- 
'La Bourgogne' collision is that in the operation of a system that can 
fail in a catastrophic mode emergency planning is essential. The 
principle applies no matter how remote the probability of the event is. 
With no assured leadership and officers probably unaware of what to 
do in the sudden emergency of a vessel sinking fast under their 
feet, the crew's discipline broke and they descended into mindless, 
animal panic. The comparison with the disciplined behaviour of the 
officers and men of the 'Titanic' is striking, although the emergency 
planning was pitifully inadequate. This answers the criticism that in 
emergency exercises the envisaged accident will differ from the real one 
and therefore the drill is irrelevant. The comparison between the two 
above incidents shows that it is preferable to have a crew, or team of 
plant operators, trained to behave in a disciplined way, even if that 
way is not wholly appropriate than to have disarray and possible panic. 
(8) Human error - Strictly, all failures in artefacts and systems are 
due to human error, ranging from design mistakes and oversights, imper- 
fect planning, equipment and components faults to inadvertent operator 
mistakes and negligent mal-operation. In this text, the concept of 
human error is confined to untypical aberrant behaviour, oblivious, 
mistaken, ill-informed or negligent that results or could result in 
system failure. However, the commonplace operational mistakes are 
classed with equipment failures rather than human error per se. These 
mundane mistakes occur with sufficient regularity to present stable 
patterns from which meaningful failure rate data can be extracted. In 
contrast, the former aberrations are wholly random and unpredictable. 
(9) 'Safest industry in the World' was how Lord Peter Ritchie-Calder (1969) 
described the nuclear industry in the West with radiation doses to the 
public well below natural background. There has been some recent 
evidence to the contrary in the special case of the Windscale lutonium 
pile fire of 1957. A National Radiological Protection Board 
(NRPB) 
now estimates that some 260 case of thyroid cancer resulted with a 
possible 13 deaths (Crick and Linsley 1983). However, the work did 
not include a previously unreported concurrent release of 150 curies 
of Polonium-210 to which another 20 to 50 deaths may be attributed 
(Nature, 7 April, 1983, P. 470). 
(10) The Canvey Island/Thurrock risk assessment - The report of an 
exploratory public inquiry into the desirability of revoking planning 
permission for an extension of the oil refining facilities on Canvey 
Island on the North bank of the Thames near its mouth contained a 
recommendation that a safety study was desirable. The study was carried out 
by the Safety and Reliability Directorate of the UKAEA who reported to 
the Health and Safety Executive. A summary was published by the 
Executive in May 1978 (Locke, Dunster and Pittom). The work was not so 
much an assessment of the probable risk of the Canvey Island/Thurrock 
installation as a whole, but of the added risk due to the extension. 
It found that while the extension would only increase the calculated 
risk by a small amount, the existing risk to an individual resident in 
. the area at hazard being estimated. at I fatality in 10,000 years of 
exposure which appears to be somewhat less than that of being killed in 
a motoring accident, i4.1.3 in the same period of exposure. 
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(11) The persisting influence of Aristotle on Western thought - The importance of ancient Greek philosophy upon the emerging civilisation of 
the West and its subsequent development is hard to overrate. It is the 
substrate of our culture and the names of those outstanding Greek thinkers 
have become almost household words, among whom one may cite Heraclitus, 
Pythagoras, Archimedes, Euclid, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Galen. 
The noted French historian of science, Arnold Reymond (1927), wrote: 
'Compared with the empirical and fragmentary knowledge which 
the people of the East laboriously gathered during long 
centuries, Greek science constituted a veritable miracle. 
Here the human mind for the first time conceived the 
possibility of establishing a limited number of principles, 
and of deducing from these a number of truths which were 
of rigorous consequence. ' 
Science in Greco-Roman Antiquity 
(Trans. Ruth Gheury de Bray), 
Methuen, London, 1927. 
Of all these thinkers, Aristotle's influence has been paramount. 
Logic and rationality which are indicative of educated behaviour in 
European civilisation today were not recognised as the most propitious 
ways of thinking before their identification as such by the philosophers, 
writers and lawyers of ancient Greece and Rome. Today, whenever there 
is a debate or serious discussion an appeal to logic is made. Aristotle 
of Stagira (384-322 BC) founded the science of logic and for many 
centuries logic, either overtly or implicity, has been a central part of 
further education in Europe and has left a deep and lasting mark on the 
languages and outlook of her cultured people. Emanating from them, 
logical thought has become part of the thought processes of both navvy 
and university don. But it is a particular logic, for logic of a kind 
is common to all mankind, and that of Europe is characteristic of the 
Greco-Roman civilisation from whence it came. It is one, excluding the 
domain of experimental science where the Scientific Method rules, that is 
more concerned with words, ideals and mathematics than the pragmatic 
±ealities of the world. Undeniably, it has been the central force in 
the evolution of European civilisation, yet'in certain respects its 
influence has been pernicious. 
Galileo's thesis in support of Copernicus was published in Florence in 
1632 under ecclesiastical licence. As soon as it was realised that it 
presented a serious challenge to the Aristotlean moral and philosophical 
basis of society, all Christian Europe both Catholic and Protestant was 
outraged at the heresy. Galileo was condemned by the Inquisition, silenced, 
and sentenced to life imprisonment. His book stayed on the Index until 1835. 
Toro hundred years later, the European scientific community dealt with Dr. 
Georg Ohm in a somewhat similar way, debarring him from academic preferment. 
Nicolas L. Sadi Carnot refrained from publishing his conversion to the 
kinetic theory of heat and much of his work remained as manuscript until 
many years after his death in 1832. Traces of this regressive influence 
persist today. Prof. J. Schwartz (1962) has argued cogently that mathem- 
atical formalism receives an undue deference which is detrimental to science. 
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(12) Open and Closed Stochastic Systems - In a closed system of random 
events, the probability distribution is inherently stable. The 'Ernie' 
Premium Bond Prize allocating computer program is an example. The 
manager of the weekly draw looking inward sees a closed system. Every 
properly recorded Bond number has an equal chance of about 1 in 1.4 x 109 
of drawing the top prize. This very low probability is not metaphysical 
because a winning number must be drawn. The probability associated with 
very long half-life radioactive decay is analogous, for instance that of 
uranium-238 in which each atom has a 1-iý-2 chance of decaying to 
thorium-234 over a time span of 1.5 x 10 years. A well-planned scientific 
experiment is an attempt to establish a closed system. 
On the other hand, the Premium Bond financial controller looking outward 
instructed to pay the winner may see an open system. There is a chance 
that the winner cannot be located. Some millions of Pounds of unclaimed 
prize money has accumulated. Another 'open' case arises with the very 
low probability of a catastrophic nuclear power plant incident. A. 
quantitative safety assessment of the design is based on an assumed closed 
universe of known pr allowable factors, but the system is, in truth, open 
in the case of the plant constructed to that design. There is an inevi- 
table intrusion of unknown and unanticipated elements. 
(13) Estimated cost of the Sizewell P'nR inquiry 
Reports on the cost to the Central Electricity Generating Board to 
support its case for a Pressurised Water Reactor (E R) to be built at 
Sizewell, near Leiston in Suffolk, say that 125 kg of reading matter has 
been produced. This consists of the safety report, reference design and 
supporting scientific papers which together with fees to counsel will 
involve. an outlay of between ¬5 to ¬10 million (Brian George 1982, J. 
Edwards 1982). In comparison, the U. S. Reactor Safety Study weighs 
about 10 kg. 
(14) Metaphysical probability - Very rare events in open systems never 
happen in any realisable span of normal human experience. Either the 
conditions of the probability situation change or some other event occurs 
instead. This is an intuitive conclusion reached by many eminent thinkers 
from antiquity to modern times. 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 - 43 BC) in his critical dialogue on prophecy 
had the following to say about chance: 
'Four dice are cast and a Venus Throw results -that is chance; but do you think it would be chance, too, if in one hundred 
casts you made one hundred Venus Throws? ' 
De divination (circa 40 BC), 
Book I, Chapter xiii, para. 23 
(Trans. W. A. Falconer, 1923), 
Heinemann, London, 1930" 
In the same strain, Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1717 - 1783) observed: 
'It is metaphysically possible to throw two sixes with two 
dice a hundred times running; but it is physically impos- 
sible because it has never happened and never will. ' 
Quoted by L. E. Maistrov in 
Probability Theory: a historical sketch. (Trans. and Ed. by Samuel Klotz), 
Academic Press, New York and London, 
1974" p. 125. 
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More recently, the French mathematician Haile Borel defined the very 
low probability enigma in terms of an empirical law which he regarded 
as certain. He called it 'The Single Law of Chance': 
'Events whose probability is extremely small 
never occur. ' 
Elements of the theory of probability 
(Trans. John E. Freund), 
Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1950. 
However, he hedged this around with certain reservations, noting that 
if there were enough exact repetitions of the chance situation, then 
the event could happen. Further, he defined probability bounds in 
terms of perspectives, namely the: 
'Human' as one chance in less than 1 in 106, 
'Terrestrial' ditto 1 in 1015, and 
200 'Cosmic' 1 in 10 . 
Put in practical terms, he liken the human scale to the chance of an 
expert typist producing 500 sheets of text without making a single 
mistake. The cosmic scale he compared with the chance of observing a 
reversal of the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics. 
The very long half-lives in the case of radioactive decay are examples 
of many exact repetitions of the chance situation in the circumstances 
of a closed situation. 
(15) Safety Data reporting schemes for nuclear power - In addition to 
those incidents on nuclear power plants that have involved serious damage 
to the installation or harm to people or otherwise are subject to statutory 
notification, happenings in certain other categories considered to be of 
safety relevance are reported. A number of schemes are in operation. In 
Britain one is managed by the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEXB) 
and another by the Systems and Reliability Service of the UKAEA. In the 
USA more information is available to the public. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) 
in association with the Nuclear Safety Information Centre (NSIC) at the 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) maintain a data base for'the 
collection, storage, evaluation and dissemination of safety information 
to aid those concerned with the analysis, design and operation of nuclear 
facilities'. Periodical documents and other occasional papers are issued 
which collate, summarise and review the information made available to the 
NSIC. Reports, known as Licensee Event Reports (LERs) are supplied by U. S. 
nuclear site licensees to meet the requirements of the NRC Regulatory 
Guide 1.16, Appendix A. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate maintain 
a similar scheme. Authorised users in the USA and Western Europe can 
obtain by a computer link access to a data base of nuclear safety inform- 
ation maintained by the Nuclear Safety Advisory Centre of the Electric 
Power Research Institute, the service being called_'Notepad'. 
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(16) The value of human life - Attempts to evaluate the worth of a 
human life are legion, but have mainly concerned judgements for damages 
for loss of life in an industrial accident. A comprehensive scheme was 
introduced in Britain in 1897 for industrial accident compensation. 'Until 
the 1948 Act, the maximum liability of an employer for the death of a 
vorkman with dependents was ¬700. Damages in legal actions varied 
widely, and could be much higher, depending on the judge's estimate of 
economic worth of the deceased. More recent valuations have been made 
for use in cost benefit analysis. J. E. Hayzelden (1968) found that a 
life was worth between ¬10,000 and ¬30,000, estimated on the basis of the 
actual, notional or potential earnings of the victim over what might 
have been the rest of his working life. This comes to a current ¬117,000 
at the top of the range using an inflation index of 3.9. Joanne 
Linnerooth (1981) in a review of various models quotes a value of around $200,000 (¬117,000 approx. ) for an average useful life. She observed 
that 'life value estimates are rough. For this reason, cost-benefit 
ealculationa, especially in the area of public health and safety, should 
continue to be regarded only as an aid to public decision processes'. 
Black, Niehaus and Simpson (1979) suggest that an employee's death could 
be quantified in terms of loss of years of life and a fatality can thus 
be equated with 'a loss of 6,000 man days'. 
(17) Accidents of unacceptable dimensions - In considering the propriety 
of an imposed risk, there is a reservation. If the consequences of a 
catastrophic failure, however unlikely, were to be one of intolerable 
devastation and mortality, say the extinction of a populous city, then that 
innovation is inadmissible. The criterion has profound implications in 
the choice of a reactor type for a nuclear power program 
and in siting policy, for instance as between the PWR and AGR systems. 
In the latter case, owing to the re-inforced concrete pressure vessel and 
restricted flow-area of the penetrations, it is inconceivable that in_any 
LOCA more than a relatively small fraction of the fission product contents 
of the core. could be released to the environment. On the other hand, 
total failure of the PWR steel pressure vessel is not inconceivable and 
that could result in a massive release. 
The personal or group norm of absolute unacceptability for a mortal risk 
is 10- ,a fact used by the Romans in their policy of decimation to discipline 
mutinous or cowardly legionaries. Airmen on active service have reacted 
unfavourably to a loss rate of 5x 10", whereas a risk of 10-2 seems to 
have been accepted. Most people will tolerate a risk of 10x3 of fatality 
on occasions judged favourable to their purpose, whereas a mortality of 10'5 
seems to be tolerated with equanimity, provided it does not come into the 
category- of a 'dread risk', that is one personally identified as unendurable. 
(18) Reliability degradation - Event-noise theory has an analogy with 
conventional reliability technology in the concept of 'reliability 
degradation'. Reliability engineers distinguish three agents that can 
degrade the inherent reliability of a product or system (Ronald T. 
Anderson et al. 1982). They are: 
Manufacturing - process induced defects, failures of inspection and 
of quality control arrangements and latent defects (compare Static 
Event-noise) resulting in failure in service, particularly when the 
system is under stress. 
Operation - degradation of the system in use through wear-out with 
ageing, though dominant failure mechanisms are rough treatment and 
incompetent handling. 
Maintenance -a prime cause of degradation of inherent reliability 
is due to the maintenance technician inadvertently causing damage, 
faults or weaknesses by negligence or inept workmanship. 
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(19) Enforcement inspection philoso by - The view that the task of the 
inspector is solely that of ensuring compliance with regulations, etc. 
is widely, and properly, held by those concerned with the lowest 
tier of inspection, ie. Viewing. The remark was made to the writer 
by a 'main grade inspector' during his association with H. M. Factory 
Inspectorate from 1976 to 1979- 
(20) Engineers inspectors ignored - The working group that assisted Gerald 
Rhodes in his study of'Inspectorates in British Government' consisted 
of a policeman, 4 senior administrators, 2 political scientists from 
academia, a managing director concerned with engineering and a general 
duties member of H. M. Factory Inspectorate, then serving as an adminis- 
trator in the Health and Safety Executive Corporate Services Division. 
There is no indication that any professional member of an engineering 
inspectorate was officially consulted (G. Rhodes 1981 ). 
(21) Profile of a nuclear safety inspector (INI) - In an early Civil 
Service Commission public advertisement for engineers to join the 
newly formed Inspectorate of Nuclear Installations, later the NiI, 
the Chief Inspector, Major-General W. S. Joslin, called for experi- 
enced chartered mechanical, electrical and certain specialised (eg. 
metallurgists, physicists) engineers, being graduates with good 
honours degrees of not less than 37 years of age. While experience 
in the nuclear industry was desirable, evidence of responsibility 
in management of a major plant engineering project would be taken 
in lieu (Civil Service Commission 1959). 
(22) The Marble Hill debäcle 
The magazine 'TIME' of 30 January, 1984 (p. 44) reported the 100th 
nuclear power plant construction contract cancellation since 1974 
with abandonment of the Marble Hill project by the Indiana Public 
Service Co. A capital loss of $2.4 bn has been reported, but the 
completion cost would have been $7.7 bn and probably more on a 
revised estimate. Marble Hill and other failures have been attributed 
to 'trouble over quality-control', in other words, failures of 
inspection. 
(23) Peculiarities of the written la tguags of Japan - The inhabitants of 
the Japanese islands acquired their written language in toto from 
the more advanced society on the Chinese mainland about the 4th 
Century. Initially, all writing was pure Chinese, but the two 
languages were linguistically dissimilar. Not surprisingly, the 
Chinese characters failed to represent the spoken Japanese tongue. 
Owing the immense prestige of the superior Chinese civilisation and 
culture, the Chinese form was retained for erudite and refined cor- 
respondence. But, this did not meet the needs of commerce and 
popular communications and a semi-colloquial script evolved known as 
Tana which was largely phonetio, though the formal Kanji (Katakana) is 
-still retained for official purposes. Consequently, the literate 
Japanese can read and write fluently in lexicals of two kinds, one largely 
phonetic and the other consisting mainly of ideogram. Nonetheless, 
it seems that the colloquial script is more suited to modern needs 
and is continuing to develop. 
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(24) Pure Administration - The Earl of Iddesleigh (1956) has described 
the 'Pure Administrator' as a gifted person who need know nothing about 
the details of his assignment, be it concerned with oil or crankshafts. 
He justifies this view by quoting from Earl Bertrand Russell: 
'A man who has a position of power in a great organisation 
requires a definite type of ability, namely, that which 
is called executive or administrative: it makes very 
little difference what the matter is that the organisation 
handles, the kind of skill required at the top will always 
be the same. A man who can organise successfully, let 
us say, the Lancashire cotton trade will also be successful 
if he tackles the air defences of London, the exploration 
of central Asia, or the transport of timber from British 
Columbia to England. For these various undertakings he 
will require no knowledge of cotton, no knowledge of aerial 
warfare and no acquaintance with forestry or navigation.. 
His helpers in subordinate positions will, in several cases, 
require these several kinds of skill, but his skill is, in 
a sense, abstract, and does not depend upon specialised 
knowledge. It thus happens, as organisations increase in 
size, that the important positions of power tend, more and 
more, to be in the hands of men who have no intimate famil- 
iarity with the purposes of the work that they organise. ' 
Education and the Social Order, 
Allen and IInwin, 
London, 1932 (new impression, 
1951), P. 240. 
This was not so much true as it was possible when Bertrand Russell wrote more 
than 50 years ago in the still simple technical world of the time, but his 
general conclusion is a non sequitur. A Manchester cotton magnate might 
then have been successful in organising a city's air defences. The neces- 
sary mastery of those aspects of the technology which were not general 
knowledge among the educated classes could be readily acquired by job 
contact. This is no longer the case because anti-aircraft weapons in 
common with all other major technologies have become so much more sophis- 
ticated that the 'pure administrator' is now totally dependent upon his 
specialist subordinates. Disquiet about the quality of innovatory technical 
decision making being widely voiced may well be a consequence of this lacuna. 
Something insignificant in those earlier times is becoming an essential asset 
for those at the top in a large modern industrial complex. Its chief 
executive now needs empathy with the thought processes of his specialist 
subordinates and, more particularly, to be able to assist, inspire and lead 
them in their technical endeavours. This faculty is vocationally specific 
and is not attainable without career experience in the given intellectual 
field or in one that is analogous to it. Hence, a chemical engineer 
could administer a project of major national importance in the nuclear 
power industry which had to escape from the stultifying hand of 'pure 
administrators'. The case is not without supporting evidence, for instance, 
the late Sir Christopher Hinton (latterly enobled) was by vocation an able 
industrial engineer, but he soon proved himself an outstandingly effective 
administrator. He began as a craft apprentice in a large railway workshop, 
'the best they ever had', going on to Cambridge to graduate with the highest 
honours in Mechanical Engineering. He then joined Imperial Chemical Indus- 
tries, progressing rapidly to senior management level. His record as chief 
executive and principal engineer in the building of Britain's first nuclear 
power plants was in every respect outstanding. 
295 
Compared with Hinton's success, the record in innovatory technical decision 
making and in engineering management of the 'pure administrators' has been 
notable for lack of wisdom and paucity of achievement. Among the latter 
may be listed the tower block housing program of Ronan Point odium, 'Concorde' 
and the Dungeness 'B' AGR nuclear power plant. They are tales of partial 
or total failure from which, as Sir Alan Cottrell (1976) observed, 'the 
voices of the engineers' were either muted or ignored. 
If there is such a thing as 'pure administration', then the reality of its 
practice is confined to the level of princes, prime ministers and presidents 
and their most senior functionaries and not in the organisation of major 
technological projects of much novelty. Indeed, the performance by these 
illustrious administrators has, more often than not, been far from outstan- 
dingly favourable. 
To sum up, a prerequisite of effective management at any level is that 
'definite type of ability' to handle people and situations 'which is called 
executive or administrative'. 'As organisations increase in size', so the 
measure of 'that kind of skill' needed grows in step. But today, a prev- 
iously insignificant factor has become one of major importance. It is that 
for efficaceous management of a large high-technology project, the chief 
executive must be able to command with understanding and competence its 
scientific and technical features as well, and that is what engineering 
is about. 
(25) Markham Colliery Overwind -A disastrous overwind occurred at the 
Markham Colliery in Derbyshire on July 30,1974. Owing to a mechanical 
fault, braking control of the downcast winding drum was lost when the two 
cages were mid-shaft in the 1,400 ft. pit. The immediate cause was 
fatigue failure of a single steel rod, 2 in. in diameter and 9 ft. long 
that linked a nest of powerful springs to the brake bands, the rod having 
a safety factor of about 7 in tension. Normally, cage movement would only 
be possible while the brake bands were held off by a comprehensively safety- 
interlocked hydraulic system under manual control by the engineman. The 
catastrophic fatigue failure was due to long standing action of an unfore- 
seen bending stress induced by inadequate lubrication of a pivot joint to 
which the steel rod was attached. As a result of the failure, the two 
tier cage carrying 29 men for the incoming morning shift continued to des- 
cend under regenerative braking of the Ward Leonard mechanism. The 
engineman, not recognising the nature of the fault, in prudence operated 
a safety trip that cut the 11 kY electricity supply, thereby disabling 
the regenerative braking circuit. The unrestrained cage then plunged to 
shaft bottom and the impact on landing killed 18 men and severely injured 
another 11. 
Whether the loss of lubrication was due to poor design of the pivot bearing, 
inadequate maintenance or congealed oil preventing ingress of the lubricant 
or all of these things is not clear, although the official inquiry report (J. W. Calder 1974) was at pains to attribute it to the first. The incident 
was the subject of an exhaustive safety assessment (Thomas and Burgess 1976) 
with a view to enhancing the reliability of the design of modern winders. 
As empirical failure rate records were sparse, synthetic data was derived 
as required, but with heavy reliance on engineering judgements. An 
interim quantified estimate of a major failure of cage braking was put 
at 6X 10-7 per year. 
The accident was beyond the scenarios' envisaged for the original design, one 
that had been subjected to exhaustive safety scrutinies by NCB and HM Inspec- 
torate. Moreover, the above probability is metaphysical and, given compli- 
ance with the new design, the accident will never re-occur. But, conceivable 
failure modalities remain, for instance those associated with the single-line 
arragements for the cage suspension, eg. the rope, its capels and the pulley. 
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(26) Quantitative Risk and Safety Analysis in the 'U. K. 
Despite the impressive developments that have taken place in the U. S. A. of 
which the 'Reactor Safety Study' is a prime example, the United Kingdom has 
made a major contribution to reliability technology and the use of quantifica- 
tion in risk and safety analysis, particularly in the field of atomic energy. 
The main seat of this activity has been the Safety and Reliability Director- 
ate (SRD) of the IIKAEA at Risley, Warrington, firstly in the Authority Health 
and Safety Branch which later became the National Centre of Systems Reliabil- 
ity (S. R. S. 1984) now sited at nearby Culcheth. 
In addition to the massive technical support given to the Canvey Island/ 
'lhurrock petrochemical installation risk study (Locke, Dunster and Pittom 
1978), F. R. Farmer (now retired) and his erstwhile staff in the Directorate 
have contributed prolifically to all aspects of the technology. In addition 
to those already referred to in this text, among their many works of open 
publication the following may help to identify the theme underlying their 
approach: 
Reactor safety analysis as related to reactor sitinf- (1964) 
Advocacy of quantitative methods of reactor safey analysis in 
which the Maximum Credible Accident approach is disparaged. To 
quote, it 'may be a yardstick of limited value in comparing reactors 
of the same type, but its use to compare the safety of reactor 
systems of different types is meaningless'. 
Quantitative Safety Analysis (1970) 
A long, comprehensive and authoritative exposition of the 
technology of quantitative reliability analysis and its 
application to safety assessment. 
Today's Risks: thinking the unthinkable (1977) 
After noting that a major technological accident might kill 
up to 10,000 people, though this would be an extremely unlikely 
event, but not an unknown calamity in terms of natural disasters, 
Farmer concludes, 'The public should recognise the need for wise 
and balanced judgement in situations where absolute safety can no 
longer exist'. They should look to experts to find ways of reducing 
the risk and expect them to be applied. The answer would seem thus 
to lie in securing a better informed public able to appreciate these 
matters and in further development of the techniques of technology 
risk assessment. 
What is acceptable risk? (1978) 
The case for a wider application of quantitative methods of risk and 
safety assessment in industry. After a comparison of fatal accident 
rates among workers, people at home, on the roads and those due to 
natural causes, he notes that it is 'the unusual accident affecting 
many people in one place at one time' that evokes a large public 
reaction. Special attention must, therefore, be paid to the possibil- 
ity of a major hazard in order the minimise the chance of its occurrence. 
Muclear Decisions (1979) 
One of three letters to 'Nature', the other two were from J. H. Dunster, 
Director of Nuclear Safety on the Health and Safety Executive, and M. J. 
Gaines of the National Radiological Protection Board. In his, Farmer 
calls for greater use of SRD for nuclear power plant design assessment 
and consequent decision making, observing that 'the need to obtain 
data and analyse quantitatively wonderfully sharpens the mind and 
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A SYNOPSIS OF STATUTORY HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION IN BRITAIN 
Action by the State to protect workers and the environment is by no 
means new and even in Biblical times a safety standard for those em- 
ployed in building operations was prescribed (Deuteronomy 22: 8) and, 
owing to their stench and foul effluents, tanneries were located by 
the sea (Acts 10: 32). Britain has, so far, led the field in matters 
of industrial and maritime safety, not only from considerations of 
altruism, but of economics and public health as well. Admiralty 
sponsorship by offer of a £20,000 prize for an accurate means of deter- 
mining longitude at sea encouraged the invention by John Harrison of 
his famous chronometer in 1760 which transformed the safety of navig- 
ation on the high seas. 
Following the Industrial Revolution and the introduction of power 
driven machinery, the conditions in factories and particularly in tex- 
tile mills, already bad, became worse, children suffering the most. 
Eventually the Government intervened and the first Factory Act became 
law in 1802. Although a notable political advance, it was largely 
ineffectual because enforcement lay in the hands of Justices of the 
Peace who were often beholden to factory and mill owners. A series 
of Acts followed in 1819, in 1825 and in 1831 in a climate of deter- 
iorating working conditions, but, although they attempted to re-inforce 
the controls already intended by the earlier legislation, they still 
lacked effective means of enforcement. The turning point came with- 
the Act of 1833 which authorised. the appointment of inspectors who 
could make rules, regulations and orders appropriate to the circum- 
stances and institute prosecutions for infractions. 
After 1833 in a milieu of growing social conscience, health and safety 
laws of increasing effectiveness and stringency were enacted and by 
1867 legal protection had been extended to most factories. The 
legislation was consolidated in the Factories and Workshops Act 1878 
and an Employer's Liability Act in. 1880 put worker's compensation on 
a reasonably satisfactory basis. Further consolidation was effected 
by the Act of 1901 and from then on there was little change until the 
Factories Act 1961 which brought together and clarified a large body 
of disparate laws and regulations. 
There were important parallel developments, particularly in mining 
where there had been a heavy toll of life and limb through fire damp 
and dust explosions, falls of ground and flooding. The decade aver- 
age centred on 1878 was 1,037 fatalities per year at a rate of 2.57 
per thousand miners and figures for previous decades were tragically 
higher. Once again, the failure to provide for inspection rendered 
early legislation effectual. The nettle was grasped by the Act of 
1843 when the first Inspectors of Mines were appointed. Very com- 
prehensive safety provisions are now administered by H. M. Inspectorate 
of Mines and Quarries under the Act of 1954 and over the past several 
decades the rate of fatalities has fallen dramatically to less than 
50 annually in 1979 and is still falling. Effective steps to control 
industrial pollution were taken with legislation that enabled the 
Government to appoint an Alkali Inspector in 1863. 
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Further important steps in the statutory protection of workers' health 
and safety were regulation of the manufacture of explosives in 1875, 
of the conditions of employment of shop assistants 1886, measures to 
prevent accidents to railwaymen in 1900, regulation of the petroleum 
industry in 1928 and of off-shore mineral and oil recovery iiistalla- 
tions in 1971. The aeronautical industry almost from its inception 
was in a special class, aircrew protection being secured through assur- 
ance of reliability in the manufacture and maintenance of aeroplanes 
for which purposes an Aeronautical Inspection Department was established 
in 1912. This unusual government initiative in safety has had an in- 
fluence on safety regulation in the nuclear industry through assimula- 
tion of the philosophy rather than by imitation. 
Until 1974 the regulation of health and safety was the concern of the 
Department responsible for the industry, for example the relevant 
safety legislation for mines and quarries and nuclear installations 
was administered by the Department of Energy. A large number of 
specialist inspectorates had been created for the purpose and there 
was some overlapping of responsibilities. In that year, the Health 
and Safety at Work Act 1974 which aimed at unifying the legislation 
and regulations and establishing a unitary regime of inspection became 
law. Despite that, the aim has been far from achieved and, for in- 
stance, in the important area of the handling, keeping, custody and 
disposal of radioactive substances there is separate administration 
by the Department of the Environment with an independent Radiochemical 
Inspectorate, an arrangement that has already given rise to conflicts 
of interest and in the identification of responsibility. n thermore, 
regulation of health and safety on off-shore petroleum production instal- 
lations is executed by an inspectorate in the Department of Energy. 
The lesson to be drawn the experience of government intervention in 
matter of health and safety is that it is ineffectual unless backed 
by inspection and by an inspection that is not only able to impose 
legal sanctions for breaches of codified regulations, but must be able 
to use discretion in enforcement and must also be able to prescribe 
conditions adapted to the circumstances of the hazard. Powers of this 
kind have been given to H. M. Factory Inspectors by the Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974 and to H. M. Nuclear Installations Inspectors in 
the system of control by licence conditions instituted by the Nuclear 
Installations Acts of 1959 and 1965" 
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APPFNfTX'TT 
SELECTED LOW PROBABILITY EVENTS 
(A review of some representative low probability events - LPEs - of 
disastrous outcome for the artefacts, people and systems involved) 
PREAMBLE 
The incidents discussed here have been chosen from a wide range of 
totally unexpected low probability events that ended in catastrophic 
failure of the system involved, all of which were confidently thought 
to be adequately safe. An attempt has been made to classify them using 
a pattern suggested by Sir Henry Chilver (1977) which he described as 
a 'Triangle of Failures'. Sir Henry's concept which is shown in Figure 
14 relates to failures in engineering structures whereas the approach 
adopted here and shown in Figure 15 is concerned with failures in a 
wider range of artefacts and systems, though also seeking to identify 
common patterns of causation. 
Neither approach is quantitative, but rather ideographic, the aim in 
both cases being to offer a way of presenting such untoward happenings 
in a manner that could lead to a better understanding of the engineering 
deficiencies that played a part in their causation. 
In the pattern shown in Figure 15 the events are arranged in a field of 
causation enclosed by an equilateral triangle, the vertices representing 
'Ignorance of Mechanism' as defined in Sections 8.3.1(1) and 8.4.1 of 
the main text; 'Culpable Human Error' which is not an inadvertent mis- 
take or omission, but a blameworthy act or dereliction; and tChance', 
being some wholly undesigned or unexpected occurrence or circumstance 
and includes inadvertent human error. The position of the event in 
this causal field depicts the relative contribution made by each of the 
factors in its causation, the importance of the contribution being in- 
dicated by the proximity of the point representing the event to the 
relevant vertex. 
Thus, the points representing the selected incidents have been disposed 
on a qualitative criterion according to a notional assessment of the 
weight to be attached to each of the three above factors in the causat- 
ion of the given incident. The selected events have been assessed 
according to a9 point scale and are listed in the table that follows. 
No doubt the placements of the points representing the events could 
have been made by a mathematical decision rule, giving a better 
measure of the effeot of the factors, but the theory has not been pursued 
beyond Chilver's descriptive attempt. And, this is adequate for the 
purposes of the present study. 
A brief description of the circumstances of each incident föllows, though 
rather more attention has been paid to some than to others when the 
event has been thought to be particularly relevant to the theme of the 
research. 
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A SELECTION OF TYPICAL LPEs RESULTING IN CATASTROPHIC FAILURES 
EV T 
(Described in terms of date of 
occurrence, nature, causal 
factors and consequences) 
CAUSATION 
(Ignorance of Mechanism, Culp- 
ability and Chance scored on 
a9 point aggregate scale) 
1. ABHRFAN (21 October 1966) Liability 172 
A large coal mine spoil tip overlooking a small Welsh village 
turned into an avalanche of slurry. It had been built on ground 
containing springs and had been allowed to grow in size without 
proper engineering consideration. Local warnings about its danger 
made to Coal Board officials had been ignored. The forces created 
by the slip burst a water main and created the slurry. A school 
and several nearby houses were engtYlfed and destroyed. 116 
children and 28 adults were killed and 40 houses demolished. 
2. ABBEYSTEAD (23 May 1984) Liability 108 
A violent explosion occurred in the underground control room of 
a remote show place river flood control pumping system valve 
room during an official visit. A heavy roof of concrete slabs 
was blown off. Methane gas from an unknown source: appears to 
have filled the control room and ignited when the explosive 
concentration was reached, ignition being caused by a casual spark. 
9 people were killed instantly and another 6 died later of burns. 
3. ANDREA DORIA (25 July 1956) Liability 612 
The Andrea Doria, a large, up-to-date and prestigious Italian 
passenger liner, fitted with every navigational aid and safety 
feature, was rammed amidships by the Stockholm, a similar 
Norwegian vessel. The Andrea Doria's stabilising system failed 
and the vessel listed heavily, finally capsizing. The collision 
was 'radar assisted' owing to lack of understanding of certain 
ambiguities in the PPI presentation. Out of a complement of 1709, 
59 lives were lost and the ship a total loss. 
4. BROWNS FERRY (22 March 1975) Liability 216 
A fire in the control and safety cable marshalling vault of the 
Browns Ferry nuclear power station could not be brought under control 
by normal methods of handling electrical equipment fires. The 
station was operating at full power, but control was progressively 
lost. The fire was started by a technician who, in disobedience of 
instructions, had been using a candle to check the air tightness of 
the vault sealing. He set the plastic sheathed cables alight. 
The fire was eventually brought under control by water sprays, but 
extensive damage was done to the plant in an incident that could 
have led to a major nuclear accident. 
5. DUDGEONS WHARF (17 July 1969) Liability, 342 
The accident, an explosion of hydrocarbon vapour in a disused oil 
storage tank undergoing demolition, is described in Section 3.1. 
Six members of the London Fire Brigade on site to ensure compliance 
witiji the regulations were killed. The site was also under the 
surveillance of H. M. Factory Inspectorate as a potential danger. 
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The Dudgeons Darf incident is cited in the Report of the 
Committee on Safety and Health at Work (Robens 1972) as an 
example of the confusions that can arise owing to overlap- 
ping regulatory responsibilities. The Home Office conducted 
an inquiry into the incident (Gland 4470/1970). 
6. FAVERSHAM (14 July 1847) Liability 8 
The incident, an explosion that demolished a plant 
in the manufacture of gun cotton, is described in 
It resulted in the death of 21 people. 





A petrochemical plant explosion caused by ignition of a large 
cloud of cyclohexane vapour discharged on to the site from a 
breach in a modification to the process flow. A by-pass that had 
been installed by a foreman without adequate engineering super- 
vision failed in service. The energy release of between 14 and 
45 tons of TNT wrecked the plant, killing 28 workers and injuring 
36 others. Widespread damage was done in the nearby town with some 
53 casualties, though most were not serious. The post of mechanical 
engineer was vacant on the plant management board. The event has 
been extensively discussed and there is a Department of Employment 
report (Roger J. Parker 1975)" 
8. HIXON LEVEL, CROSSING (6 January 1968) Liability 018 
A collision between an express passenger train and a 120 ton 
electrical transformer inadvertently placed in front of it by 
a slowly moving road haulage rig. 11 people were killed and 45 
injured. The accident is described in Section 3.3" 
9. )UNAMATA (April 1956 -'May 1973) Liability 26 
The incident is a story of poisoning of a city by an industrial 
effluent at first thought to be harmless. The progressive Japanese 
Chisso Corporation was established in the town of Minamata in 1907. 
In 1932, Chisso began to produce acetaldehyde, an industrial chemical 
used in the production of plastics. Production boomed in the post- 
war years, but in 1950 dead fish started to float in Minamata Bay, 
but this was not attributed to the new processes. In 1956, a new 
disease was treated in Minamata hospital and was so named. Cases 
became increasingly numerous with florid neurological symptoms and 
deformities in children. Research suggested a heavy metal, but mer- 
cury was not suspected. Attention turned to manganese, selenium 
and thalium detected in autopsied patients. Chisso used metallic 
mercury and had provision for removing it from the effluent. By 
chance a British paper of 1940 gave a link with methyl mercury, a 
far more potent poison than the metal itself. Methyl mercury was 
found in the Chisso effluent and the poisoning shown to be due to 
organic mercury entering the food chain through fish. Though the 
cause was proved to be due to acetaldehyde manufacture in 1962, 
Chisso refused to stop production until compelled to do so by the 
Japanese authorities in 1972. By that time some 10,000 people had 
be adversely affected, 103 were dead and 700 seriously damaged and 
the firm had to pay out billions of Yen in compensation. The 
story is told in detail in 'Minamata', a illustrated report by 
W. Eigene Smith and Aileen M. Smith (Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 
New York, 1975). 
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10. MOUNT EREBUS (28 November 1979) Liability 08 
An Air New Zealand DC-10 crashed into the side of the Antarctic 
volcano, Mount Erebus, during a sight-seeing flight. All 257 
persons aboard were killed. The accident involving a reliable 
and well maintained aeroplane was piloted by an experienced crew 
assisted by adequate navigational aids. At the time the accident 
was attributed to a pilot's error, but a Royal Commission of in- 
quiry under Mr Justice Mahon found that the flight path program 
in the DC-10 computer had been modified without the knowledge of 
the pilots who were thus taken over an unfamiliar route during the 
most hazardous part of the flight by the automatic control. Blinded 
by Polar light, the pilot had no time to correct his course before 
crashing into the mountain. - The Air New Zealand executive have 
denied responsibility and have been supported by the New Zealand 
Government. Mr Justice Mahon has been forced to resign his post. 
11, OPPAU (21 September 1921) Liability 8x 
The violent explosion of some 200 tons of ammonium sulphate at 
works of Badische AnilinFabrik at Oppau near Mannheim on the Rhine 
demolished the plant and destroyed the village. Between 1,000 and 
1,500 were killed and nearly 2,000 injured. The cause of the explo- 
sion has never been properly explained. Explosive properties are 
not normally associated with ammonium sulphate and the plant manage- 
ment had a reputation for safety. A French Army detachment was on 
duty to see that there was no production of explosives, banned under 
the Armistice agreement of 1918. It is not impossible 
that illegal nitrates were being produced for the German Army. An 
incident in such a clandestine process could have triggered a 
bigger explosion. (New York Times, Sept. 22,1921, p. 1) 
12. RONAN POINT (16 May 1968) Liability 413 
Ronan Point was a high-rise tower block of residential flats 
built to the Neilsen-Larsen system which had become well established 
elsewhere in Europe. The plans for the 22 storey block had been 
subjected to a scrupulously thorough safety assessment and met the 
statutory building regulations. The design may be likened to a 
House of Cards 1q but of massive interlocking, reinforced concrete 
slabs. Flat 90 on the 18th floor was occupied by a single lady 
of middle age. She opted for a gas cooker, but there was a defect- 
ive brass union nut in the flexible pipe to the wall gas outlet. 
No smell of gas was reported during the relevant night, but when she 
awoke early the next morning and attempted to light the gas to-boil a 
kettle, there was an explosion. The slabs forming the outer walls 
of 'the flat were blown out. Support was removed from the floor of the 
flat above, causing a pattern of ebllapse that continued upward 
to the top. The unsupported floors crashed down on the floor of . Flat 90. It collapsed, a disastrous progress that continued down- 
wards. 4 people were killed and 17 injured, remarkably few in the 
circumstances. (Vide V. Bignell, G. Peters and C. Pymm 1977. ) 
13. TAY BRIDGE (28 December 1879) Liability 17 
At the time of its construction, the railway bridge over the 
Firth of Tay was a vaunted triumph of British civil engineering. 
Sir Thomas Bouch, an eminent engineer, was in charge of the pro- 
ject which was completed and went into service on 31 May 1878, 
after tests and inspections. All went well until Sunday, 28 
December, 1879 when a central span collapsed in a high gale under 
the load of a train said to be going too fast. 75 lives were lost 
among whom were many children. There was a great scandal. An 
official inquiry, chaired by Mr Justice Rothery (1880), found that 
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the design was inadequate, materials of less than the specified 
strength had been used, necessary test and experimntal results 
had not been analysed, there had been no proper stress analysis 
and no competent expert had been consulted about wind loadings. 
The inquiry found that Bouch had been seriously remiss in his 
duties. 
14. TITANIC (14 April 1912) N. B. Treated as two accidents * 
Event 'A' - Collision with iceberg Liability 117 
The white Star liner, Titanic, was one of the most remarkable 
ships for size, luxury, speed and safety ever built. She was 
of watertight construction with a double bottom and 16 watertight 
compartments. She could withstand a head-on or amidships collision 
and was considered 'unsinkable', anything worse than one at the con- 
juncture of two compartment being 'incredible'. She was on her 
maiden voyage to New York and some 1250 miles East of her destinat- 
ion. The Captain was aware of the iceberg danger and had ordered 
a special watch. However, a wireless message from another company 
vessel advising that she was hove to owing to ice failed to reach him. 
The huge ship brushed a giant iceberg before the proper avoiding 
action could be taken by the bridge and contact below the water- 
line holed six compartments. She could float with four compartments 
holed, but not six. It took her two and a half hours to founder. 
Event 'B' - Loss of life Liability 11 7 
The Titanic foundered in a sea that was almost dead calm, though 
icy cold. The lack of waves, wind or swell eased the filling and 
lowering of lifeboats, but hundreds of lives were unnecessarily . lost. There were 2,206 souls aboard in toto of whom 703 were saved 
and 1,503 perished, of these 156 were women and children. Although 
the lifeboat capacity was inadequate, there were seats for 1,178. 
In the event the boats pulled away with several hundred empty seats. 
The crew behaved with exemplary discipline in the face of certain 
death, but the management of the emergency was chaotic. They had not 
been instructed in how to marshal the passengers. The oddest fact 
. was 
that the Californian was only 10 miles away from the sinking 
Titanic, saw that she was stopped and firing rockets. Her captain 
did not ask his wireless operator to make contact and did nothing 
to help. Had he done so, few lives would have been lost. 
15. TKALIDOME (1958 - 1962) Liability 540 
The drug Thalidomide was promoted as an effective and innocuous 
tranquiliser which had survived extensive safety testing. It 
was being widely prescribed in Europe. Concurrently, a sudden 
and considerable increase in the number of cases"of amelia and 
other deformities in neonates was reported. Suspicion soon fell 
on Thalidomide and evidence of its involvement mounted. The 
manufacturers continued to promote it, ignoring the warnings. 
Ultimately it was withdrawn, but hundreds of deformed, though 
otherwise healthy, children were born to face life seriously 
crippled. 
* Walter Lord (1976) in 'A night to remember' has written a well- 
illustrated, graphic, moving and factual account of the loss of 
the 'Titanic'. 
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16. THREE MILE ISLAND Liability 612 
The reports, summaries and analyses of the Three Mile Island 
(itt) PWR incident are legion and the conclusions about it 
diverse. TMI Reactor No. 2 was operating at full power when a 
feed water pump failed. Pressure rose in the primary circuit. 
The control room instrument display indicated that the reactor re- 
lief valves had properly closed, whereas, in fact, they had remained 
open. Dry-out in the steam generators ensued. In response to the 
loss of pressure in the primary circuit, emergency cooling water 
(ECW) injection began automatically. The operators, now confused 
about the state of the plant, first shut off one ECW pump and then 
the other. Deprived of adequate coolant, the core 'started to 
over-heat. Not properly understanding what was happening to the 
plant, the operators took further inappropriate actions which led 
to melting of the fuel and discharge of a large volume of highly 
radioactive coolant into the containment, some of which was pumped 
into the auxiliary building (L. I rddin Davies 1979). 
After some 3 to 4 hours when the operators realised that there had 
been severe overheating of the fuel and a massive escape of active 
coolant, the plant was effectively shutdown, though there was great 
confusion about what had in fact gone wrong and fears for the 
continuing stability of the core. The confusion extended far bey- 
ond the control room and 3 days after the incident, the head of the 
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission told the Pennsylvania State Gov- 
ernor, 'We are totally blind, your information is ambiguous, mine 
is non-existent. ' (The Guardian, p. 4, Sat., April 14,1979) 
As the outcome of ZMI, no one has suffered a significant dose of 
radiation, though there may have been psychological damage to some 
members of the public, owing the the atmosphere of panic that ensued. 
On the other hand, the financial loss has been enormous, running 
into many billions of Dollars. Technological shock-waves from the 
event have gone around the World, causing the basis of nuclear 
safety philosophies and management to be questioned. Two diver- 
gent lessons have been drawn that concern this study. One is that 
the operating staff should be selected for engineering ability and 
aptitude for the work, being thoroughly trained both technically 
and practically. The other is that the reactor should come under 
fully automatic control for the first 30 minutes of an incident, 
during which time the operators should be prevented from interfering 
while expert assistance is being obtained. The writer holds to the 
former view. 
17. WELDER'S RADIATION BURNS Liability 072 
In the morning of May 3rd, 1967, a welder working on an Argentinian 
petroleum distillery site picked up a bright metal 'bolt' and put 
it in his right overall pocket. Next day he transferred it to the 
left. That evening he felt 'rheumatic pains in his thigh'. On the 
5th, they had become so severe that he was taken into hospital. 
As severe erythema was observed, he was treated for chemical burns 
of an unknown nature. He did not respond to treatment. On May 
27th, loss of a 13 Curie, Cs-137 radiography source was reported. 
It was found in his overalls, and radiation burns were diagnosed. 
His condition continued to deteriorate over the next six months. 
In November, his left leg had to be amputated and by March 1969 
both legs had been amputated at the hip (Benison et al. 1969). 
It was subsequently reported that he died of cancer in 1971. 
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WEIGHTINGS OF THE CAUSAL FACTORS COLLATED 
Event Ignorance of Mechanism Culpability Chance 
1 Aberfan 1 7 2 
2 Abbeystead 1 0 8 
3 Andrea Doria 6 1 2 
4 Browns Ferry 2 1 6 
5 Dudgeons Wharf 3 4 2 
6 Faversham 8 1 0 
7 Flixborough 2 6 1 
8 Hixon Level Crossing 0 1 8 
9 Minamata 2 6 1 
10 Mannt Erebus 0 8 1 
11 Oppau 8 1 
12 Ronan Point 4 1 3 
13 Tay Bridge 1 7 1 
14 Titanic 'A' 1 1 7 
Titanic 'B' 1 7 1 
15 Thalidomide 5 4 0 
16 Three Mile Island 6 1 2 
17 Welder's radiation 0 7 2 
burns 
Weighting totals 51 63 48 
Percentages 31% 3 996 30% 
ANALYSIS 
The percentages calculated from the aggregates of the weightings of 
three causal factors tabulated above for the 18 selected events provide 
some experimental support for the conclusions in the study about the 
treatment of catastrophic low probability events (LPEs). Suggestions 
of bias because the weightings as quoted rest on the writer's judgement 
may be set aside In-view of the obvious nature of the weights given in 
each case. While it would have been better to have obtained the percen- 
tages from questionnaire data, there has been neither time nor opportun- 
ity to do so, nor has it been necessary for the present purpose. For 
example, the tragedy of Aberfan was unequivocally the fault of officials 
blind to the danger presented by the tip. The radar assisted collision 
between the Andrea Doria and the Stockholm was clearly due to Ignorance 
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of i'lechanism, while the incompetence of'Bouch's civil engineering led 
to the Tay Bridge disaster. The personal bias of an assessor might 
make a point or two difference one way or the other from case to case, 
but such differences would be expected to balance out as between indivi- 
duals. Anywavy, a trend rather than a precise result is adequate for 
. 
the purpose. 
The analysis shows no great difference in the generality of causation 
among the three factors, though Culpability, ie. negligence, failure to 
follow instructions, etc., at 39% presents as the one of major weight. 
This underlines the importance to be attached to inspection of the 
appropriate kind. Ignorance of Mechanism and Chance tie in second 
place. The first emphasises the role of engineering competence and, 
it is now generally agreed in the industry, that, had the operators in the 
Control Room at 'I'II been better informed, the incident could have been 
averted. Chance is generally a contributory element, but by no means 
a major factor, though in exceptional cases being the principal cause, ' 
indeed of the LPE by definition for the regime of defended safety that 
is maintained in nuclear power plants,. eg. at Browns Ferry. Chance 
determined the Titanic's encounter with the iceberg and the extraordin- 
ary event at the Hixon Level Crossing. 
To sum up, better engineering and effective regimes of inspection can 
greatly reduce the probability of a catastrophic LPE, but can never give 
iabsolute protection against a potential hazard. It is a fact that must 
be taken into account in siting policy and before a risk held to be 
intolerable is imposed on workers, public or environment. 
NOTE 
Where explicit references to publications, reports, etc. dealing with 
the above events have not been provided, recourse should be made to 
the press, in particular the London or New York 'Times' or 'Lloyds 
Register of Shipping' for which journals comprehensive indexes are 
published annually. 
308 
FAILURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCE'S 
The two ideographic event triangles of Figures 14 and 15 when taken 
together suggest a figure of 6 apices in hyper-dimensional conceptual 
space in which most technological events ending in catastrophic fail- 
ure may be positioned. Broadly, two contiguous volumes representing 
the principal aspects of engineering can be envisaged; one, a physical 
domain of 'Chilver-space', and, the other, a domain of 'Managerial- 
space', illustrated by Figures 14 and 15 respectively. A given fail- 
ure mode then becomes articulated when the point representing the 
doomed system arrives at the place in the hyper-volume where all the 
factors necessary to precipitate the catastrophe are appropriately 
linked. Usually, one of them is dominant as indicated by the bias in 
the positioning of the points in the two figures. 
It is the proper task of engineering in its roles of design, construct- 
ion and operation of plant to steer these complex artefacts away from 
zones of danger as suggested in the application of Event-noise/Catastr- 
ophe theory described in the text and depicted in Figure 12. Owing to 
the inability of an integrated system to be self-checking, an infer- 
ence from Goedel's theory, the external intervention of engineering 
inspection is necessary to discern and deflect or stop an incipient 
fault process from running to catastrophic failure as suggested in 
Figure 13. Failure to achieve these ends when combined with the capr- 
ice of chance opens the door to catastrophe. The horrific consequences 
that can be the result are displayed in Figures 16 to 21. 
Tay Bridge - Event 13 - Figure 16 
The collapse of the bridge was a classic failure due to inadequate 
design (Structural Deficiencies) under the exceptional stress of a 
Chance confluence of Unkncnm Environmental Forces. The designer, 
civil engineer Bourch was guilty of grossly Culpable Human Error, ie. 
Culpability, that obscured monumentally pathetic Ignorance of Mechanism. 
Ronan Point - Event 12 - Figure 17 
As is often the case, chance circumstances; namely, occupancy, the fact 
that all the tenants were in bed, except for the early morning old lady 
who struck the match, and the relatively fortunate location of the 
explosion in Flat 90 on the 17th Floor of a 22 storey tower block, min- 
imised the consequences of the accident. As can be seen from Figure 12, 
had the event occurred in the middle of the structure, the whole front 
face of the affected side of the building would have fallen out or been 
crushed with appalling loss of life. The incident was the result of 
Ignorance of Mechanism in the process of design and malevolent Chance 
of the combination of an elderly woman who must have had an easily sat- 
urated sense of smell with a defective gas pipe union joint, the latter 
permitting a massive leak into the ill ventilated flat of which she 
was the sole occupant. 
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Hixon Level Crossing - Event 8- Figure 18 
This incredible happening involving the placement of a massive block 
of metal (120 tons) directly across the immediate path of an express 
passenger train only seconds before the impact was an odd freak of 
Chance. Nonetheless, Ignorance of Mechanism and Culpability also 
played a significant part. Experience of the type of unmanned cross- 
ing was limited ih British conditions of road traffic behaviour. The 
administrator who sanctioned its introduction was Culpable of a common 
human error in that he did not appreciate his lack of understanding of 
the subtleties of technology, road traffic engineering in the case. 
An executive system that requires that technical decisions are made by 
'pure administrators' on the advice of technologists was at fault, 'alth- 
ough the element of Chance predominated. Despite that, it was an ac- 
cident waiting to happen. 
Argentine Welder - Event 17 - Figures 19 to 21 
This poor man was the victim of a gross Culpable Human Error in which 
Chance again was an important factor. Also guilty with the radio- 
grapher who 'lost' the 13 curie iridium source, were the managements 
of the petroleum refinery and its radiological protection organisation, 
if there were one, and the local and national regulatory officials. It 
was their duty to ensure that all persons on such. a site were properly 
instructed in the nature and dangers of radiography and to enforce 
effectively the custodial regulations. Clearly, this was not the case. 
The three figures show the course of the accident, Figure 19 in which 
it's tragic history is epitomised, Figure 20 which shows the overdose 
profiles and Figure 21, a photograph of his somatic injuries at a 
late stage in the course of his radiation illness. 
CONCLUDING RE1ARKS 
The ideographic representation of the factors that can precipitate a 
catastrophic failure given by conceptual combination of the models of 
Figures 14 and 15 provides a global and comprehensive way of describing 
the complex processes that lead to these low probability events. 
Despite having no direct conventional quantitative utility, indeed it 
explains the intractability of Identity (viii) and its summation in 
Equation (xi), the compound model has positive value in its ability 
to reveal those risk features most prone to failure in the system it 
represents. In comparison, the quantitative approach of which the 
U. S. Reactor Safety Study is an exemplar tends to direct attention 
obsessively towards design, something manifest in the current debates 
on the safety of nuclear power. Moreover, the model shows that at- 
tempts to quantify overall plant failure sequences, as in the case of 
nuclear power, are illusory owing to the impossibility of constructing 
a stable data base. It is precluded by the complex and inconstant 
nature of the linkages that transiently connect the diverse factors 




An activity that makes industrial technology 
possible and the enigma of the persisting 
lowly status of the Engineer 
The two letters to the press appended hereto were inspired by Auguste 
Comte's (1825) vision of the role of the engineer, emergent as a scien- 
ist of a new kind to be the link between the scientist-savant and the 
commercial exploiters of scientific discoveries, namely the entrepre- 
neurial class of industrialists and investors. Thus, engineering is 
not science as such, but the art of understanding science so that it 
may be used in the interests of society. In performance of this of- 
fice, it has become one of the main pillars of contemporary technolog- 
ical civilisation as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Attention is drawn to the odd editorial deletion from the letter to 
the 'Financial Times' which was written in response to public concern 
at the dearth of engineers in Britain. The passage deleted read: 
'While good engineers are in short supply, able administrat- 
ors, accountants, entertainers, politicians and writers ab- 
ound. But, in spite of their commendable contributions to 
the public weal, there has been a continuing downward drift 
in national prosperity and prestige. May not this be linked 
to the reluctance of the talented young to choose engineering 
as a profession or vocation? The. hard fact is that a career 
in engineering today does not offer rewards commensurate with 
the ability demanded of those who might aspire to enter it. ' 
This failure to recognise the central role that engineering must now 
play was also exposed in a 'Guardian' editorial of June 1,1977 to 
which the second letter attempted to give answer. The 'Guardian' 
had failed to attach due importance to Alan D. Blumlein's outstanding 
achievements as an electronic engineer. It was his technical genius 
that made that indispensible contribution to TV and, later, radar which 
gave our Forces an extended vision that could penetrate darkness, fog 
or storm and which could peer around the curvature of the earth. With- 
out impugning the gallantry of the fighting men, it is to the effect- 
ively then unchallenged lead in radar that can be attributed the defeat 
of the German air offensive against Britain in 1940, the destruction 
of the formidible Italian fleet of Cape Matapan, the shattering of the 
Japanese naval arm in the battle of the Midway Islands- and' the success 
in countering the U-boat threat to Atlantic shipping. In all these 
actions-the enemy was either tactically blind or had comparatively 
limited vision in dealing with the attacking force. 
Throughout history, the essential contribution of the engineer has 
either been ignored or his'calling denigrated. To quote the famous 
Greek general and statesman, Xenophon (ca 444 - 354 BC): 
"What are called the mechanical arts carry a social stigma 
and are rightly dishonoured in our cities. ... Their prac- 
tice causes a physical degeneration that results in a deter- 
ioration of the soul. ... Those who engage in them have not 
got the time to perform the offices of friendship and citizen- 
ship. Consequently, they are looked upon as bad friends and 
and bad patriots. ' 
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Despite the fact that engineering is held in far greater esteem today, 
having risen from a sub-culture of slave and lowly 'mechanical' to 
become in itself a major discipline of head and hand with its manager- 
ial stratum recognised as a learned profession, it still is of inferior 
standing in the body politic. 
The present circumstances of the engineer at the professional level 
have been described by Eric (Lord) Ashby (1966), thus: 
'Technology is of the earth ... susceptible to pressure 
from 
industry and government ... under obligation to deliver the 
goods ... ... And so the crude engineers, the mere 
techno- 
logists, are tolerated in the universities because the State 
and industry are willing to finance them. Tolerated, but 
not assimilated, for the traditional don is not yet willing 
to admit that technologists may have anything intrinsic to 
contribute to academic life. ' 
Technology and the Academics, 
MacMillan, London, 1966, p. 66. 
Though apparently irrational, this inveterate attitude has its ration-s 
ale. 
As the Western state has become ever more dependent on technology, so 
has the part played by the engineer become increasingly important and 
central to the public weal in national economic performance, defence 
and geo-political prestige. Then, to accord the engineer his due and 
proper recognition would bring about major structural changes in the 
traditional social pyramid, in particular near its top. There can be 
only so many chiefs, and for those who would go up, some would have to 
come down. For instance, there is no engineer in the top echelon of 
the Civil Service, ie. at Permanent Secretary level and, but few, in 
the highest managerial brackets of industry. Moreover, as Thorstein 
Veblen (1921) claimed. the engineers, as a conscious social group aware 
of their proper status and power, could exert a tranquil, but nonethe- 
less potent, industrial pressure that could bend any democratic gov- 
ernment to their rational desires. 
Well-known examples of influential professional associations are those 
of the doctors in Britain and the U. S. A. The source of the prestige 
and influence they have in society lies in their existence as cohesive 
groups, cognisant of the interests of the profession and ready on oc- 
casion to speak out in order to secure them. One might then suspect that 
that among certain incumbent sections of the Establishment and upper 
executive classes there is cognition, though perhaps subliminal, of an 
incipient threat and of a natural reaction to it. Accordingly, the 
engineer must be kept on tap and any move to the top frustrated. This 
might explain the unusual politics associated with the creation of the 
Engineering Council that has brought about the demise of the Council 
of Engineering Institutions which had a governing board on which half 
the members were elected by an enthusiastically supported franchise. 
On the other hand, the Engineering Council is managed by a Director- 
General and an executive of Ministerial appointees on which the engin- 
eers have no direct voice. 
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TWO LETTERS TO THE PRESS - 
On the major contribution engineering has made to 
the United Kingdom's prosperity -a waning asset 
'Financial Times' 'The Guardian' 
3 April 1976 7 June 1977 
Engineering Bias against the 
From qtr. u. Crttchtey: rude mechanical 




opportunities in Britain has, irtlcle on the remarkable 
coincided with falling status for achievements of Alan Dower 
engineering, both as trade and Blumleln (June 1) needs eor- profession; perhaps because of section. 
its dependence on manual skills, 
though many of our great en- Yes Blumiein was Indeed a l th i gineers began as craftstnen. The ec ent tt, but more an that ' professionalism of our engineers Editorial was an engineer. Unfor. he 
is not Iq question; Indeed, their deletion of 
ýnately, the procession still 
past achievements have been cables the ancient stigma 
unexcelled. More successes like passage here. ettac itng to the useful arts 
those of Watt, Brarnah, Brunel, gee remarks and. ' particularly, the Whitworth, Crompton and Hinton 
so depress- are needed. Are they 
in the text 
mechanical ones. Old Seneca 
drew attention to this when 
, Ingly rare nowadays because so of Appendix noting that 
to his time there 
had been the development of few people of such high calibre 
enter the vocation and those with tentrpl heating, transparent 
the potential often lack oppor- glass windows and shorthand, but " in bis view "the inve - tunities or leave, an exodus 
abetted by Fultonism? ' 
n 
on of auch things Is drud. 
What is to be done? Pro- fiery for the lowest slaves. " Engineering Is not science fessional engineers need a better 
as that of backroom image 
, but an art which Includes 
, designer, struggling inventor, aclence. It 
Ii an orgy islng 
function of the highest order tough site manager or second- 
'string functionary, worthy and alma at meeting the 
whir = 
most necessary roles, is too, s of society 
by n need
the findings of scieence. It nce. 
W 
limited an ultimate prospect. 
Neither higher salaries alone nor " covers a range of 
talent from 
hliýhly skilled craftsmen to 
. altered titles are 
likely to give managerial engineers, whose it, nor can it be won. by empty ' ve In their day by=antine" publicity.. elitism, _. havbeen en the wonders of the e manoeuvres In learned institu"" ; and have left al stleg World 
" tions or by Industrial union, them 




schools to guide some of their' &us hold words, such as Ste. 
more outstanding pupils into 
engineering will not be of much vertsört. Brunel, 
Edison and 
avail as the policy cannot work 
Whittle. 
upwards to be self-reinforcing, It is almost as it tigere is a 
time being too short for some- " 
conspiracy to maintain the 
thing which would take genera. ancient curse and the very 
Lions to realise. word engineer seems to 
The way of engineering when 
k f " 
conjure up some Irrational 
In spite of unpleasant image seen from the des o the gifted . ublicity to the contrary it and ambitious child must be as p 
likely as any other discipline to was engineers and supporting h t l h d l ° bring fame. Evidence of this n eve tec e ans w oped o 
could be given by appointing radar, television and com" 
able and deserving engineers puters and put a man on the 
atilt In the course of their pro- moon and, more recently, 
fession to those top administra"' sent the Viking probes to 
Live posts to which their speclali-' Mars and. beyon . One must 
ties are broadly relevant Here' give due recognition to the il i b the Civil Service could help by' u ng blocks provided by d 
'setting a pattern, but only one' 
' 
the % scientists, but the 
achievements are those f or two practising engineers have o 
reached as high as Deputy Sea; engineering. Blumlein should therefore be acclaimed ss a retary so far. A change of style,! 
widely publicised, would show' great engineer and not mis. 
that not only has the need to! cut as a scientist. 
accoc&blglier statics to engineer- This country is desperately 
ing been acknowledged but that In need of more Slumleins, 
something Is"being done about' Whittles and their kind to 
ft. Nothing. less is likely to have enrich and enlighten our in- 
'the'required impact on cödntry duatriN potential and to 
schools. m»ake T Be d 
Critchley, 
Octavius 
n , more o this Department of Liberal scientists should metamor- 
Studies in Science, phose Into engineers. enter. 
The University. ing Industry to lead Inspire 
and create as Baumkin did Manchester. . 0. H. Crltchley, 
Hounslow, Mld i etex. 
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THE FIVE INTERACTING BRANCHES OF CULTURE: 
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1 in 1 
The event may be 
expected to happen 
1 in 102 
1 in 104 
1 in 106 
Borel's limit for 
eventuation 
on a human scale 
1 in 10 
1 in 10 10 
1 in 10 12 
Borel's limit for 
eventuation on a 
terrestrial scale 
1 in1o15 
Borel's probability limits * Situational chance - nuclear 
Metaphysical probabilities - The chance that a specific 
See Section 9.6.1 and event will occur during the 
Note 14. operational lifetime of a 
nuclear power plant. 
Situational * 
scale of chance 
FIG 4 
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PROBABILITY OF THE WORST CONSEQUENCES OF A US NUCLEAR POWER STATION ACCIDENT 
(Rasmussen - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 'The Safety Study and its Feedback' Vol 31 1975 p 28) 
TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN EVENTS IN A GIVEN PLANT 
Time span Precipitating Safety system 
between events event occurs x (worst breach! 
10' years once every occurs once in 
1,000 yeas 1,000 years 
Worst weather The highest 
conditions population density 
occur once x to be affected 
every will be present once 10 years 
every 100 years 










1Probability of vorst breach 
of safety x 
defence 
system 
Lo Iö 3 
Probability of Probability of 
voret weather exposure of 
conditions :X area of higheet" 
9 10 1 population density 
9 1072 
Note All events are presumed to be independent of one another, there 
being no common modes. 
The above probability of 16-9, that is a chance of eventuation once in 
One Thousand Million Years, is metaphysical and the accident sequence 
or sequences so predicted will never happen. Nevertheless, a catas- 
trophic failure outside the fault-event systems conceived by the 
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SCENARIO OF REACTOR FAULTS TERTINATING IN CATASTROPHIC FAILURE 
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SCENE OF EVENT-NOISE INCIDENTS 
FRECEEDING CATASTROPHIC FAIT RE (7) 
LEGEND Event-noise_ Display 
fSpikea' - the more serious Event-noise 
transients, is. S1 incidents Fig 11, 
Pr(L) - the probability (very low) 
of catastrophic failure, a r) 
326 
d 'b am dm 
LO cd 4.0 4 
































_ m Qi 
m0 ýý 
W L' vC 
? ,. {y 
°° 

















14 q- 0 




a i dNO 
















O O- C 1 q ". W 'I'd 
++ +-1 4- 1 U ed b P. 
mG> d co 
0 





































> U- f 
to ýl 





















z 0 U 
ý Cß r G ý 
NT7C CCmm 
13 U)a ä 
ýtý Cj ýO 
0 Q 31 W 
A 0 N 2 U W W J 0 A Co Q 
W 
ö >o ö oN 3 CL 4) 
CL C) 
93 


















































A NEW OUTLOOK ON LPE CAUSATION 
ýn ideogram that proportionately ascribes three generic 
oauees for the failures of major engineering artefacts 
UNPREDICTABLE 
BEHAVIOUR 
Flixborough Tacoma Narrows 
1974 
/\ 
Bridge, 1940 I/ 
r 
Ferrpbrldge Roo. n Point 
cooling towers 1968 
1965 
/ 




1907 Comet Tay 1906 
/ aircraft bridge- 1953/54 1879. 
UNIQ4OW N 
STRUCTURAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
DEFICIENCIES L-ý. -- -- - -' '- - FORCES 
FITTING FLIXBOROUGH INTO A PATTERN 
From an article by Sir Henry Chilver, 
Nature, 10 February 1977, Vol. 265,494 
Using the explosion of June 1,1974 which devastated the petrochemical pro- 
cessing plant at Flixborough as an example, Sir Henry Chilver writing in 
Nature early in 1977 identified the important issues raised by the event in 
respect of the safety and reliability of complex installations of the kind. 
Be saw them as the adequacy of the engineering skills available for their 
design and construction and the effectiveness of the supervision of these 
engineering activities in practice. He observed that, not only must all 
engineering disasters be individually explored with a view to discerning the 
causes, but they must be seen more broadly as matters of concern to engineer- 
ing science as they may disclose 'some general pattern of engineering fail- 
ures as a whole'. He attempted to generalise the case by 'fitting Flizborough 
into"a pattern' that could embrace other engineering failures. 
He distinguished three main causal factors among a number of notorious 
failures, namely: 
(i) Unknown structural or material deficiencies, for example, the 
materials used may have been substandard or a vital component 
have suffered accidental damage, Is. 'Structural Deficiencies'. 
(ii) Unknown forces in the environment of the structure, for example 
a long-span bridge may suffer exceptionally high winds or a 
building experience an unusually severe earthquake, is. 
'Unknown Environmental Forces'. 
(iii) Unknown forms of behaviour of the structure within its environ- 
sent, for example a new form of oscillation, or buckling may 
occur for a new structural form, is. 'Unpredictable Behaviour'. 
Chilver relates these factors to apices of a (Triangle of Failures' as shown 
in the figure above. Failures of very different sorts aay be located in the 
Triangle and, where a failure involves mixes of factors, it can be placed 
nearer to the apex associated with the cause deemed to be dominant. 
The representation is not quantitative, but it can assist in foiling a qual- 
itative judgement about the main sources of loss of resistance to failure. 
This can provide a basis on which policy in regard to design and inspection 
may be formulated. 
THE CHILVER FAILURE TRIANGLE (Appel II refers) FIG 14 
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The size of each dot gives an indication of the scale of the 
incident in terms of injury to humans and damage to property. 
In the cases of the Three Mile Island (TALI) and Browns Ferry 
nuclear power station accidents, though there has been very 
heavy financial loss, no known harm was done to either workers 
or the public by leakage of radioactivity from the plant. 
The clustering of the dotr is in accord with the findings of 
the Analysis in Appendix II. It show a definite trend towards 
culpable human error, defined in the diagram as 'Culpability', 
as the major factor in accident causation, a deduction that 
has been confirmed by more generalised accident studies. It 
iss however, one that can be effectively minimised by a re- 
gime of inspection of a suitable kind, 
Nixon Crossing 
Oppau (? ) 
Titanic 'B' 





TRIANGLE OF INCIDENT CAUSATION Fig 15 
































RONAN POINT TOWER BLOCK COLLAPSE OF 16 MAY 1968 
Fig 17 
A gas explosion in Flat 90 on the 16th floor of the 22-storey Ronan Point 
Tower Block blew out the re-inforoed concrete slabs which formed its front 
walls. A 'house-of-cards' collapse followed involving the whole tier of 
flats above and below from roof to podium. 
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AUTOMATIC LEVEL CROSSING CRASH OF 6JANUARY 1968 
The 120 ton electricity transformer, in 
effect a block of iron, can be seen near 
the middle of the picture thrust from its 
platform on the transporter and turned 
through 90° to lie against two carriages 
HIXON LEVEL CROSSING DISASTER 
Fig 18 
Appendix II refers 




CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTAL EXPOSURE TO A 13 CURIES Cs-137 
WELDING RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE PICKED UP BY AN ARGENTINIAN 
WELDER (VIENNA, IAEA SYMPOSIUM ON HANDLING OF RADIATION 
ACCIDENTS-MAY 1969) 
COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT TISSUE DETERIORATION 
1. SOURCE CARRIED IN POCKETS AT WORK 
2. EVENING 4 MAY- PAINS IN THIGHS ATTRIBUTED TO RHEUMATISM 
3. MORNING 5 MAY- BURNS OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN DIAGNOSED 
4. DAY 27 MAY- LOSS OF RADIATION SOURCE NOTIFIED. INJURIES 
DIAGNOSED AS RADIATION BURNS 
5. INTERREGNUM- SLOW AND PROGRESSIVE EXTENSION OF LESIONS 
AND ATROPHY IN HEAVILY IRRADIATED AREAS. >500 REMS REGIONS 
6.14 NOV. - HAEMORRHAGES FROM INJURED ZONE OF LEFT 
THIGH. AMPUTATION NECESSARY 
7. MID JAN. 1969- SIMILAR EVENTS RIGHT THIGH-AMPUTATED 
S. MARCH 1969- BOTH LEGS AMPUTATATED AT HIPS. HEAVY DAMAGE 
TO ABDOMINAL WALL (SKIN). REPAIR BY GRAFTS. DAMAGE TO GENITAL 
ORGANS. LEFT ARM PARALYSED. PROGNOSIS-CANCER. NOW DEAD. 
Fig 19 
(Appendix II refers) 
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IONISING RADIATION DOSE PROFILES EXPOSURE 
OF THIGHS OF AN ARGENTINA REFINERY WELDER 
Incident on 
O Unquantified Dose to 
3&4 May 1968 Left Abdominal Wall 























Doses in Rems 
The man picked up and carried in tiis overall pockets 
at his work a 13 curies CS-137 radiography source 




("p. aaix II reform) 
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WELDERS RADIATION BURNS- DEGENERATIVE COURSE 
'Early stage' - July 1968 -3 months post-exposure 
'Intermediate stage' - November 1968 -6 months post-exposure 
'Late stage' - January 1969 -9 months 
post-exposure - Further haemorrhaging 
Amputation of the right thigh followed 
(Appendix II refers) 
Fig 21 
Development of extensive necrotic scabs 
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I Life Expectance Changes 55 
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III Licensee Event Reports 106 
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TABLE I 
Life Expectance Changes 
THE EJCPECTMICE OF LIFE FROM BIRTH IN RELATION TO THE CHANGING POPULATIONS OF THE 
WORLD. WESTERN EUROPE MID RUSSIA OVER THE CENTURIES 
LATE =(P'C2-. TION 
UP LLr Al- 
B_ 1H 
(B.. 18 years 10,000 
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Cosslett Palmer Putnam, 
: energy in the Future, 




Vol. 10, Readers Union & 
J. 14. Dent, London, 1968. 
n n n 
II n n 
U n n 
n n n 
n o n 
Whitaker's Almanack, 





























(a) The bracketted figures are estimates. An asterisk (*) indicates an 
. 
interpolation by the writer. 
(b) The figures are 'accurate' in the case of those countries in which some 
form of census has been possible, otherwise they are broad estimates 
which vary by as much as 20% among those authorities held to be expert. 
(c) There is a widely held view that the spurt in growth of the World 
population after 1650 was not due to increased fertility, but to a fall 
in mortality, particularly amongst children and young adults which 
coincided with the increasing standard of living attributable to the 
growth in the productivity of labour characteristic of the Industrial 
Revolution. 
(d) C. Palmer Putnam does not seem to be wholely in agreement with the 
opinion quoted in Note (c) above. He observes that the population of 
China (a country where some sort of attempt to enumerate the total 
population has been made throughout its long civilised existence) together 
with that of all the West passed through a minimum in the 7th and 8th 
Centuries. There was little change until about 1600 when a population 
explosion began in both areas and which has followed broadly the same 
continuing pattern ever since. He attributes this, like others, to an 
increase in life expectancy, though the reasons for this are not fully 
understood. The effect of improving standards of living is less than 
might be expected. Some suggest that it might be due to an evolutionary 
change expressed as lengthening of the human life span. 
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TABLE II 
Accidental Death-Average Risk of Fatality 
pRCBp3ILI7Y CdüSE OF DEATH PADIVIDIIAL'S CHAIQCE OF FATALITY SOURCE 
CLASS (accident Type) (Annual risk to member of 
OF DATA 
group exposed to the hazard 
- rounded-off figures) 
MIIIIDa2W Industrial Accidents I in 2,500 (employees - UK) 
(a, b) 
(Construction sites, 
factories and mines) 
" Falls at home 1 in 3,000 (B8) (c) 
(Age group 45 - 65 Years) 
Traffic Accidents 1 in 4,000 (UK and USA) (c, d) 
IINCSUAL Fires I in 25,000 (USA) 
(d) 
Drowning 1 in 30,000 (USA) (d) 
Air Travel I in 100,000 (International) (d) 
  Railway Passengers 1 in 400,000 (UK) (e) 
" Struck by lightning 1 in 2,000,000 (IIK and USA) (cad) 
LOW PROBABILITY (Chance of death due to given 
GROUP OF EM ; TS cause not calculable. Data 
exiguous and unstable. Zero- 
Infinity hazards presenting 
vestigal risk of unlimited losses. ) 
Actual 'Titanic' 1503 fatalities (f) 
'Andria Doria'/'Stockholm' 59 " (f) 
collision at sea 
Collapse of tower block 4 (f) 
flats - Ronan Point 
Explosion at Flixborouu 28 (f) 
petrochemical plant 
" Three Nile Island nuclear No casualties, but financial (f) 
power plant losses greater than $4 billion 
R, pothetical 
(These are potential accidents 
for which the assessed risk 
has been formally quantified) 
Canvey/Thurrock 1 in 10,000 - Notional (g) 
petrochemical installation estimate using data from S e 
note 'h' below) analo-ous actual happenings 
Nuclear Power - for a1 in 5,000,000,000 (USA) (d) 
program of 100 reactors - Estimate derived by quantitative 
Radiation accident - analysis of synthesised model 
casualties among the public 
EMS- 
(a Report by H. M. Inspector of Factories for 1973- 
b Nickenden and ! ayhew, ATOM, June 1980, ülºAEI house journal. 
c F. R. Farmer (Ed. ), Nuclear Reactor Safety, Acadecic Press, 1977. 
d N. C. Rasmussen, U. S. Reactor Safety Study - Main Report, VASE-1400(NRC), 1975- 
01 Chambers's Rncyclopaedia, Vol 11,1950, p. 502 (tends to be as invariant statistic). 
(f) See Appendix II. 
((g) locke, J. et al., CA1VZT, ESE, London, 1978, Table 4, p. 25. 
h Included as an exemplar of a hypothetical risk prediction, but anomalously 
placed in the Low Probability Group of Events. Note 10 refers. 
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TABLE III 
Licensee Event Reports 
(fro specimen sets of Licensee Event Reports excerpted from returns 
by U. S. nuclear power plant operators to the Nuclear Safety Inform- 
ation Center and issued after processing in February and April 1980) 
PER 26. *${E EER MONTHLY REPORT SORTED RY FACILITY 
PROCESSED DURING PERRUARY, Gal FOR POWER REACTORS 
PICIEITY, $YSTER/COMºONENT/ OOCRET NO. / EVENT DATE/ 
COIIPONEN1 IURCODE'CAUSE CODE/ LEA N0. / REPORT DATE/ EVENT OESCRiºTIOAi 
CAUSE SURCODEIIuNUTACTURER CONTROL MO. REPORT TYPE CAUSE DESCRIPTION 
8REANSAS-1 13111313 111779 DURING PLANT NEATUP TO NOT SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS. THE OPERATIONAL TEST (OP 
FIEDUATER SYSTEMS " CONTROLS 70"622,03L-E 121479 tUA. O{) OF THE TURBINE DRIVEN EMERGENCY fEEDJATER ºUhº (P7A) WAS NOT º 
ºUNPS 927712 30-DAY ERPORMED. HOWEVER, THE REDUNDANT t! 010R DRIVEN PUMP IP711 WAS JESTED SAY 
OTHER ISPACTORILY WHILE IN COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS ON I1-12-71 ON 11-20-71 
DETECTIVE PROCEDURES THE "7A EMERGENCY UEEDWATER PUMP WAS SATISFACTORILY TESTED. THERE NAVE 
NOT NNW" SEEN NO SIMILAR OCCURRENCES. REPORTABLE PER 1.3. t. 12.1.2(11. 
ITEM NOT APPLICABLE 
THE º7A EMERGENCY fEEDYATER PUMP WAS NOT TESTED PER OF 1146 06 DUE TO A 
SCHEDULING MISTARE WHICH WAS NOT COVERED By TWO STARTUP PROCEDURE 1102 1 
1. THEREFORE, A STEP WAS ADDED TO THE STARTUP PROCEDURE TO ºROWI11T ANY 
FUTURE SIMILAR OCCURRENCES. 
AREANSAS-I /9/01313 121A79 DURING THE OPERATIONAL TEST (OP. 110{. 9{ SUºº. 11) Of THE TURBINE DRIVEN 
EEEDUATER SYSTEMS " CONTROLS 70-E24#OSL-1 111011 EMERGENCY PEEDYATER PUMP (P7A), THE PUMP WAS DECLARED INCPERAILE IN LC4 
TYR0tNES "27{{3 30-DAY PUMP DELTA º. THE REDUNDANT PUMP (P71) WAS STARTED AND ºR3FED OPERABLE 
SUICOMºONENT NOT APPLICABLE . ON 12-6-79. "THE º7A EMERGEUCT FEED. ATER 
PUMP WAS REPAIRED AN7 S'ýCCESS 
COMPONENT FAILURE FULLY TESTED. THERE NAVE BEEN NO SIMILAR OCCURRENCES. REPORTABLE PER T 
AECNANICAL , 5., {"12. S. 2. IR). 1 ERRY $T EAN TURBINE COMPANY 
THE SPEED GOVERNOR LOCK NUT WAS FOUND TO RE LOOSE ON THE TURBINE PUP DR 
TVE. THIS CAUSED THE PUMP SPEED TO It LESS ? H1. NORMAL THE PUMP SPEED 
WAS INCREASED TO ALLOW NORMAL OPERATION AND TNE, tOCK NUT WAS TIGHTENED 
ARKANSAS-1 33010313 12217E DURING A NORMAL MAKEUP OPERATION TO THE RCS. THE so . 1c ACID PUMPS WERE I 
CHEM, VOL COMT 4 LIO POISN SYS 79-923/E3L-9 RIIIOS MADVERTANTLT LEFT OPERATING. THIS RESULTED IN OvER SOR"I: CN OF THE REAC 
PUMPS 127164 31-DAY TOR COOLANT AND AUTOMATIC WITMENAWAL OF RODS ASO\C THE LIMITS PER 7S3 
CENTRIFUGAL 5.2.3.3. THE RCS WAS IMMEDIATELY DILUTED AND THE ROD IWCCG WAS RE'UTNED 
PERSONNEL EºROR TO THE NORMAL RANGE WITHIN THE ALLOTTED A HOURS. LEE SO-313'71-:: S HAS 
LICENSED S BENIGN. OPERATORS A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE Of THE ROD INDEX OUT OF LIMIT. REºCRTASLE PER 1. S 
ITEM NOT APPLICABLE . 3.12.3 R. I. DURING A NORMAL MAKEUP OPERATION TO OWL RCS, A REACTOR OPERATOR INADVERT 
ANTLT FAILED TO SECURE THE SONIC ACID PUPS. INE OPERATOR WAS COJNSELED 
AND COPIES Of THE FAILURE REPORT WERE DISTRIBUTED TO ALL LICENSED OPERA 
TORS. 
ARKANSAS-2 13000318 "11N79 DURING MODE I OPERATION. REFUELING WATER TANK LEVEL TRRNS-ITTER. 2tT-SRI 
OTNR INST SYS REGO FOR SAFETY 71-001/03X-1 111&33 9-3. SENSING LINE FROZE, MAKING THE TRANSMITTER INOPERABLE IKE LOW RUT 
INITRUMENTA110N " CONTROLS 125219 OTHER LEVEL TRIP ERAS) SIGNAL ON ºFS CHANNEL "C' WAS BYPASSED PER THE REQUIRE 
TRANSMITTER MENTS OF ACTION STATEMENT T. S. TAILE 3.3-3. V. 1 OE. THE QErAINIMG R. JT LE 
COMPONENT FAILURE VEL INDICATIONS WERE VERIFIED TO SE NORMAL. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES ARE LEN' 
OTHER ! SI-364E/79-902 A 79-101. REºORTASLE PER T. S. E N. 1. Q. E. 
FISCHER E PORTER CO. 
INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE TEMPORARY NEAT LAMP PLACED IN THE TRANSM 
OTTER DOS HAD BURNED OUT. THE LAMP WAS REPLACED AND REMAINED IN SERvICE 
UNTIL NOYEMIER, 1171. WHEN NEAT TRACING WAS PERMANENTLY INSTALLED. 
APR ON, IRIN LEO MONTHLY REPORT SORTED By FACILITY 
PROCESSED DURING APRIL. ISIS FOR POWER REACTORS 
FACILITTISYSTEH/COMPONENT/ DOCKET NO. / EVENT DATE/ 
CCrºDNONT SL'ICODE, CAUOE CODE/ LER MO. / REPORT DATE/ EVENT DESCRIPTION/ 
CAUSE SUICODE/MANUFACTURER CONTROL NO. REPORT TYPE CAUSE DESCRIPTION 
SFºVER VALLEY-1 95010334 RORORO MALE PERFORMING THE MONTHLY RADIATION MONITOR SURVEILLANCE TEST, IT WAS 
FRCSS " EFF RADIOL MONITOR SYS $$-315'04T-S 132110 DISCOVERED THAT THE COMPONENT COMING WATER RADIATION MONITOR MIGM-NIGH 
COMPONENT CODE HOT APPLICABLE 131533 E-WEEK LEVEL ALARM DID NOT FUNCTION. THIS RADIATION MONITOR SERVES NO AUTOMAT 
SU$COMPONENT NOT APPLICABLE IC CONTROL FUNCTION AMD IS SACRED UP BY THE RIVER WATER RADIATION NONITO 
OTHER IS. THERE WAS NO SAFETY IMPLICATION INVOLVED WITH THIS INCIDENT. 
NOT APPLICABLE 
ITEM NOT AºFLICASLE 
THE COMPONENT COOLING WATET RADIATION MONITOR NOON-NION ALARM DID MOT CO 
ME IN YNEN THE TEST SIGNAL INPUT WAS HIGH ENOUGH TO CAUSE THE METER TO I 
MDICATE OFF-SCALE, SIGN. SUOSEQUEMT INVESTIGATION SV MAINTENANCE PERSON 
NEL REVEALED THAT THE ALARM POTENTIOMETER WAS OUT or ADJUSTMENT. 
E14 *Oct POINT ISOOIISS 1124EI DURING MONTHLY SPECIFIC GRAVITY CHECKS. CELL 14 of THE BATTERY FOR CHAMP 
DC ONSI)E POWER SYS " CONTROLS t1-IQ2/ISl-1 622160 EL C OF THE REACTOR of SYSTEM. READ 1.111. THIS IS IEtDN TN 
SATTEFIES " CHARGERS 131237 3Q-DAY E LIMIT OF 1,280 SPECIFIED IN TECH SPEC 11.4.3.3. A. I IR). ALL OTHER CELL 
. M.. DM"ONENT NOT APPLICABLE E EXCEEDED SPECIFICATIONS AND THE CHANNEL IS DEEMED OPERABLE FOR THE SRI 
COMPONENT FAILURE CIFIC DEFICIENCY. THE BATTERY WAS PUT ON EQUALIZING CHARGE. INCIDENT S 
OTN! R IMILAR TO RD-79-26 AND RO-71. SR. MO HAZARD TO THE PUBLIC OCCURRED. 
EDIDI INDUSTRIAL DIY 
THE CELL DID NOT RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO THE EQUALIZING CHARGE AND THE CNA 
NNEL WAN REMOVED FROM SERVICE. AS ALLOWED ST TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 11. 
3.1.5. TO REPLACE THE DEFECTIVE CELL ON 11P2E0E1. REºORIAEILITY EASED ON 
TECH SºEC Q. ý. 2. EE2). 
BIG *Oct POINT 13001153 122611 DURING ROUTINE OPERATION A7 1713 HOURS, EICESSIVYE VISRATIOM WAS NOTED 0 
CNIMMNI ISOLATION SYS " CON? 8D-007/13L-1 131130 N CONTROL ROD DRIVE PUMP 12. THE PUMP WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE AND II P 
VALVES 1311.4.6 31-DAY UHF WAS PLACED IN SERVICE. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE SUCTION ºON 
CHECK IT VALVES WERE DEFECTIVE. THE PUMP SUCTION VALVE WAS MANUALLY CLOSED ON 
CI PC"ENT FAILURE 2/2R/EJ TO PROVIDE A REDUNDANT CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY PENDING COMPLETE RE 
NATURAL END OF LIFE FAIR TO THE VALVES. NO HAZARD OCCURRED. REPORTABLE BASED ON TECH SPEC 
UNION PUMP COMPANY 
101YESTIGATION REVEALED WORN SUCTION POPPET VALVES ON THE PUMP AND DAMAGE 
TO PUMP PIPING MANGERS FROM THE VIRRATIOM. THE POPPET VALVES WERE REAL 
ACED AND LAPPED AND THE 14AMOARS REPAIRED AND THE PUMP TESTED SATIFACTORI 
LT OM 2/2A/OS. SIMILAR TO INCIDENT REPORTED AS RO-77-29. 
OROWMS PENNY-1 0S101239 150378 WITH UNIT IN NORMAL OPERATION RT TST POWER, INSPECTIONS WIRE MADE IN ACC 
OEMIN Wait* MAKE-UF 71-0111017-1 "31131 ORDANCE WITH It BULLETIN 71-11. DURING THIS INSPECTION, IT WAS FOUND TN 
NANGERS. SLPPDRTS, SNOCK SUFFRSS 1267)9 2-MEEK AT RESTRAINTS ON CERTAIN CISC SYSTEMS WERE INOPERABLE IM THAT THEIR COMP 
OTHER DURATION 010 MOT CONFORM TO THE DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS. THERE WERE NO E 
T GNIFICANT OCCURRENCES, 110 AND PREVIOUS SIMILAR IS DI C & $ U 
ROT APPLICABLE OR . IN UNDER SPORTED EVENT THE FROLIC. TO HAS EE 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ". 7.2. AC Q>. 
PIPE VIBRATION AND/OR IMPROPER INSTALLATION DURING CONSTRUCTTOM CAUSED T 
NE INGFERASILITY ON RE TYPE RESTRAINTS, ON RMOSN. FIFTY OF THESE RESTAA 
INTS IN UNITS 1, It. AND 3 WERE INSPECTED WITH REPAIR WORK REQUIRED ON NI 
NEUEM Of THESE. THIS IS A FINAL REPORT. 
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) are made by U. S. nuclear site licensees' 
to a data base at the Oak Ridge Natidnal Laboratory (ORNL) maintained 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (NRC), the Advisory Committee on 
Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and the Nuclear Safety Information Center 
(NSIC). After being collated and summarised, the LERs are issued 
monthly by the Lioensee Operations and Evaluation Branch of the NRC. 
(Situation as at August 1980. See also Note 15. ) 
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TABLE IV 
Stub Vector Attitudes 
Explanatory Note - In discussing the Event-noise (Eh) features of the 
Behaviour Surface (EFCE) of the Cuboid Model, it is appropriate to assign 
meaning to its upward slope from E-F to G-H. The bumps, creases and folds 
that form the 'asperities', the 'wrinkles' and the 'fold-curve' which repre- 
sent the Fn probabilities then appear as changes of slope with respect to the 
z-anis. The magnitude of these changes is indicative of the severity of the 
particular En experience, potential or realised, and is described by the tilt 
induced in the Stub Vector as 'Q' proceeds around the operational hysteresis 
loop and encounters the various Behaviour Surface irregularities. 
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SLOPE ANOMALY IN 8TCTB VECTOR ATTITUDES EVENT-NOISE E 'ER ENCE 
TIE BEHAVIOUR? surface cross-section in terms of system 
SURFACE and Vector tilt) stability)- 
System stable Normal operational state 
with minor Event-noise 
asperity Quasi-stable, major 
industrial accident, 
fault or incident, i. e. 
D-En or S-En 
Wrinkle Unstable, severe fault 
or incident - En 'spike' 
Fold-curve Catastrophic failure - 
severe radiation accident 
or disruptive fault with 
terminal shutdown, pr( 7) 
ALL- A aWaeyýlc f"31 Pwulu am Q. 
P-- w. r W. LAP or U. rwsn.. 
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22 RErERENCES 
The name of the author, authors or source is followed by the year 
of publication (in brackets), title of the work, identity of the'pub- 
lisher or its origin otherwise and, where appropriate, the page, section 
or paragraph number or numbers. On occasion, certain other information 
is given, eg a note telling of the existence of another relevant docu- 
ment. In some instances, abbreviations replace the title of the company or 
institution under whose imprimatur the work appeared. The meanings are 
given in the legend below. The prefix 'J' or 'P' indicates a Journal 
or Proceedings of the learned society concerned. In the case of a 
periodical, both the title and volume number are underlined. 
AHSB Authority Health and LNG Liquid Natural Gas 
Safety Branch, UKAEA 
MIT Massachusetts Institute 
AID Aeronautical Inspection of Technology 
Directorate IMechE Institution of Mechanical 
AQD Aeronautical Quality Engineers 
Assurance Directorate NASA National Aeronautics and 
BAC British Aircraft Space Administration 
Corporation NCB National Coal Board 
BMJ British Medical Journal NII Nuclear Installations 
BNES British Nuclear Energy Inspectorate, formerly 
Society Inspectorate of Nuclear 
CEI Council of Engineering 
Installations 





CSC Civil Service Commission s n . . 
CSS Council for Science NRPB National Radiological 
Society Protection Board 
CUP Cambridge University OUP Oxford University Press 
Press PWR Pressurised Water Reactor 
DOE Department of the RES Royal Economic Society 
Environment SIAD Society of Industrial 
DSIR Department for Scientific Artists and Designers 
and Industrial Research SRD Safety and Reliability 
FOE Friends of the Earth Directorate of UKAEA 
HMSO His/Her Majesty's SRP Society for Radiological 
Stationery Office Protection 
ESE Health and Safety SRS Systems Reliability 
Executive Service, unit of the 
IAEA International Atomic National Centre of Systems 
Energy Agency Reliability. in the UKAEA 
ICRP International Commission 
UKAEA United Kingdom Atomic 
on Radiological Protection 
Energy Authority 
IIASA International Institute for 
USAEC U. S. Atomic Energy 
Applied Systems Analysis Commission 
INI See Nil (title changed) 
WHO World Health Organisation 
INucE Institution of Nuclear Engineers 
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DOCUMENT NUMBER 1 
RISK PREDICTION, SAFETY ANALYSIS AND QUANTITATIVE 
PROBABILITY METHODS -A CAVEAT 
Synopsis -A critique of attempts to displace the qualitative 
philosophy of technical design safety assessment that has been 
evolved in the nuclear power industry and is characterised by 
the design basis concept of a maximum credible accident (MCA) 
with a quantitative systems methodology. This initiative is 
criticised from an objectivist standpoint on grounds of the 
metaphysical nature of the very low failure rate probabilities 
educed, the inherent instability of the data base and the 
failure to take the design-to-construction interface and the 
incidence of human error properly into account. Eight criteria 
for data validation are proposed and a plea is made for a 
pragmatic strategy of design assessment and safety management 
that combines the proven worth of the MCA with the quantitative 
methods and other mathematical tools in a rational balance. 
On an ethical note, the orientation of the quantitative systems 
approach towards appraisal of technological risks in terms of 
lethalities rather than by a pursuit of safety through excellence 
in engineering is denigrated. Moreover, the proposition that 
the inevitable, but essentially trivial, low level environmental 
pollution emanating from a nuclear power plant can be merged with 
the consequences of a very unlikely, but nonetheless possible, 
major radiation accident is seen as an undesirable tendency in 
radiological protection. It is deceptive and could lead to 
policies deriving from expediency rather than from a due concern 
for public safety. Moreover, by positively linking detriment on 
the one hand with investment in protective measures on the other 
an economic criterion is established that could lead to a progres- 
sive reduction in safety standards below the high levels now 
expected in matters of protection of the public. 
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Correspondence 
Risk prediction. safety analysis and quantitative probability methods-a caveat. 
0. H. Critchley' 
Nuclear engineering is notable not only for its internal con- 
cern with safety, but also for the effectiveness of the practices 
which it has evolved and for the impact which these have had 
and are still having elsewhere in safety technology. It is 
reasonable then to suggest that certain current attempts to 
introduce a mathematical methodology which would sub- 
stantially modify or even replace long-standing and proved 
procedures should be carefully examined before the initiative 
receives general acceptance I refer to the increasing use of 
quantitative techniques as the determinant of value judge. 
merits in nuclear safety assessment, hazard evaluation and 
risk prediction. 
. 1t would be trite to do more than note the influence which 
numbers have had upon man and the importance of their 
role in policy-making. While their precision and certainty 
are essential to the conduct of human affairs, their magic has 
beguiled and often misled the great-not the least, Pythago- 
ras (though today we are perhaps more rational than he). 
The quotation of figures can swing the course of an argu- 
ment, not always wisely, and even Mark Twain in his day 
was sceptical of the intrusion of numbers into politics, dis' 
irtguishing 'lies, damned lies and statistics'. ' 
It would be stupid to deny the important role which nu- 
merical methodologies hale played in nuclear plant safety 
assurance in the areas of reliability and design optimization. 
Netertheless, it is not unreasonable to sound a note of 
caution when these attempts to quantify value judgements 
intrude into realms of nuclear safety where factual data is 
notoriously weak and personalities and politics are notably 
strong On the other hand, criticism which springs merely 
from a nostalgic attachment to the old ways is worthless. 
There has long been in uses. ' a group of broadly similar 
analytical methods of design guidance known severally as 
the design basis accident', 'the maximum credible accident', 
'the maximum hypothetical accident' and so forth. They 
hale formed a basis for nuclear plant safety analysis and are 
related to a concept of design, construction and maintenance 
of components, systems and plant and of continuing opera- 
tion and surveillance to such standards of excellence that 
failure may be deemed ' incredible'. 
The methods drew limited support from operational 
research in appropriate areas. This prosided artifices such as 
the 'fire risk criterion' in the Magnox stations which pre- 
scribed an upper safe limit for the operating temperature of 
the fuel'"e and logic for assessing the provision of sufficient 
control rods to assure certainty of pile shutdown. Reliability 
methods were also widely used in the design, safety assess- 
ment and proofing of electric and electronic control and safe- 
guarding systems. 
This simple synthesis served the industry well during the 
first cycles of nuclear power station building in the UK. 
However, in its simple form it appears to be Less than ade- 
quate in application to more advanced nuclear plant where 
" Simon Fellow, University of Manchester on secondment from the 
Nuclear installations Inspectorate of the Health and Safety Executive. 
(The views expensed are the personal opinions of the writer. ) 
Is 
a dangerous fault sequence can lie hidden in the complexities 
of the design or it is necessary to apportion investment 
among the parts of a diversified safeguarding provision. 
An intriguing aspect of the new numerical methodology 
being proposed is its seeming presentation of reactor risks as 
quantified Lethality, attributing a prospective number of 
deaths and malignancies to a given nuclear power pro- 
gramme. Such notions of harm are among the findings of the 
US Rasmussen study` and of certain other similar initiatives 
elsewhere. The problem of nuclear safety, as indeed that for 
safety assurance in the face of any other major technological 
hazard, has two poles, namely, dangers and safeguards, 
the task being to design out the first and to ensure compliance 
with the second. Accidents grow on apathy: safety on vigi- 
lance. Indeed, slackness in matters of radioactivity in general 
and in nuclear power in particular could undoubtedly give 
rise to an unacceptable toll of harm. In spite of this the Ras- 
mussen brief pays scant attention to vigilance. Maybe its 
philosophy is affected by the acknowledged coupling of its 
approach to that used for safety and quality control assess- 
ment of space missions and military hardware. For any 
technological initiative there is an acceptable risk related to 
the objectives which it aims at achieving and to that part of 
the environment and population on whom harm may be 
inflicted. In exploration and even in the passive use of mili- 
tary might, safety lies in successfully skirting the brink of 
disaster. In civil affairs it lies in pushing safeguards and sur- 
veillance to reasonable limits of economic tolerance. 
There is also a strange bias in the Rasmussen criteria for 
accident selection, as perhaps the most dangerous of all. 
reactor pressure vessel failure, is dismissed as too small to 
contribute to the overall risk'. ' But it could happen: un- 
quantifiable without doubt, immensely disastrous-yes, 
impossible-no. 
Reliability methods make an essential contribution to 
technical design management in electronic control, com- 
puters, military hardware, aircraft and in many other 
applications However, these are all notable as manifold 
replication industries where the axioms, on which the statisti- 
cal and probability techniques stand, are met. Criteria for 
meaningful application of the methods arc that 
(a) performance requirements for the plant and its sub" 
systems must be clearly and finally specified. 
(b) manufacture and construction of the components, 
subassemblies and the plant must be verified by in- 
spection to be according to specification; 
(c) the materials used in all aspects and phases of manu- 
facture and construction must comply with relevant 
specifications and come from quality-assured supply; 
(d) failure rate data must be drawn from verifiable sources 
established by user experience and'or realistic and 
reproducible tests; 
(e) such data when it is drawn from inferences deriving 
from observation of the performance of analogous 
systems does not meet criterion (d) and therefore must 
have an appropriate uncertainty factor attached to it; 
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(f) the sources or all data must be accessible for verifica- 
tion and the confidence limits or uncertainty factors 
must be stated; 
(g) an independent analyst using the data must compute a 
similar figure or figures; and 
(h) there must be enough user experience so that all 
credible faults and failures have occurred or the 
sequences leading to them have been identified. 
Although the internal decision logic of such statistical 
and probability methods may be impeccable, there is doubt 
about their meaningful extrapolation into the realms of safety 
analysis, risk prediction and design guidance in respect of 
plant which is largely experimental or prototype. Even when 
constructed in nominally similar groups. such plant exhibits 
variations introduced to meet local site situations which 
render each unit largely unique. The methods will be un- 
reliable if the axioms on which the decision logic is structured 
are not true. Further, owing to the paucity of the failure rate 
data in respect of novel or 'one-off' features, the confidence 
limits may be so wide that predictions are of little substance. 
No high-risk, major-hazard, safety-assured plant like a 
nuclear reactor should be built unless it is so well designed. 
constructed and operated that disastrous failure cannot be 
foreseen in the anticipated circumstances of its existence. 
that is. such an event must be 'incredible'. Thus, the per- 
mitted net chance of occurrence of a catastrophic radiation 
accident arising from any envisaged cause must tend to be 
vanishingly small. A risk so forecast cannot be true. The 
true hazard is given by the summation of the occurrence 
probabilities of all accident-producing causes which includes 
an almost infinite spectrum of unexpected, unusual or highly 
improbable though possible happenings or coincidences. At 
the present time, at least, the task of catching such a large 
number of rare, random and diverse things is Sisyphean. 
There is, thus, a severe limitation on the input data which 
vitiates any quantitatise predictions, and such serious acci- 
dents as might occur will be most likely to be 'rogue' events 
which would not be identified in the quantifier's philosophy. 
For example, quanutativg predictions of explosion risks for 
the Flixborough factory based on its design and 'reliability 
data' would have had little bearing on what in fact hap- 
pened' as the causes of the disaster are attributable to a 
management weakness! - s° The recent nuclear power station 
failure at Browns Ferry is a similar example of a serious 
incident precipitated by a freak cause. " 
It is therefore not surprising that the threatened excursion 
of quantified decision theory into nuclear plant design and 
safety analysis has been viewed with misgisings by many 
experienced engineers, some of whom have published their 
doubts. '- """In fact not even 'Rasmussen ' is fully confident 
of its validity. " 
Support for the foregoing strictures has also been ex- 
pressed by William Bryan. an experienced safety engineer 
who spent some ten years in the US space programme as a 
safety analyst and reliability expert. He has stated that the 
much-publicized Rasmussen study is 'an exercise in futility' 
whose methods have long since been discarded in the aero- 
space industry as useless for developing the kind of proba- 
bility numbers the Rasmussen group seek. " This is rather 
extreme as it excludes certain positive outcomes of the study. 
It presents a way of making a thorough, consistent and wide- 
sanging safety appreciation of highly complex, major. 
hazard plant. Indeed, many protagonists of it justify their 
acceptance for just this reason, even though sceptical of the 
validity of the figures. No doubt this aspect has its value. 
The question left is whether this 'spin-off' is really in the 
CORRESPONDENCE 
ultimate such an efficient and effective way of disclosing 
design weaknesses and subtle failure modes or whether better 
methods could be developed which do not have the primary 
objective of making numerical predictions. 
Also questionable are concomitant methods of population 
dose evaluation which group together releases of radio- 
acti. ity to the environment from unrelated sources On the 
one hand are those which are authorized during the opera- 
tion of the plant or will arise from unplanned but unas oid- 
able minor radiation handling accidents. This relatively 
small effusion of radioactivity will properly be a major 
design factor and can be reasonably attributed to a nuclear 
reactor during its life. It is possible for it to be controlled 
downwards if need be. On the other hand are those massive 
releases which might occur as the result of a major plant 
disaster. To bridge the innate discontinuity in a logic which 
sums the products of events which may be reasonably 
expected to happen with those which must not, there is an 
implicit postulation of inevitability of occurrence of the 
untoward and forbidden. While no plant, however well 
built and managed, can be expected to run absolutely risk- 
free, this philosophy of accepting disasters so as to make 
prophecies about the harm which may be attributed to a 
nuclear power programme is questionable. Nuclear plant 
designers and safety engineers must be guided by an aim 
which secures that major plant disasters do not occur Their 
designs and precautions must make them 'incredible' Of 
course, experience in safety has shown that there is %ers little 
which is impossible. For this reason, the worst consequences 
of a plant accident must be known, not as a basis for safety 
philosophy, but as a guide for siting, emergency planning 
and damage control needs. If such an untoward catastrophic 
event occurs, it should be in spite of human endca% ours and 
not because of failure which could be attributed to a per- 
mitted weakness in design. 
There are other reasons, more political in nature, which 
suggest that it is unwise to place reliance on quantitati%e 
probability methods of risk assessment and design guidance 
for nuclear plant at this stage. Efforts directed towards such 
quantification of value judgements in safety and the mathe- 
matical activities necessary to derive them could dien 
attention from hazard-generating factors outside the assump- 
tions on which the judgements are based. It follows that they 
could lead to ill-founded confidence in the safety of nuclear 
plant or, indeed, of other major-hazard installations either in 
respect of judgements about their ultimate safety or in 
making comparisons of one system against another. There 
could thus be an undesirable impact on top level decision 
making which rests with politicians and administrators but 
not with engineers. 
Another disturbing feature is that figures which give a 
vanishingly small though really spurious prediction about 
the chance of occurrence of a major plant or system accident 
could have the effect of directing design and quality of 
construction downwards to some quantitatively assessed 
level of adequacy instead of upwards towards the best 
reasonably achievable in the state of the art. " This tendency 
could effectively hamper an inspector who would otherwise 
press for the highest available standards of design and con- 
struction which it might be reasonably practicable to attain 
and for progressive improvements in them. While back- 
fitting of safeguards is not always feasible and may be un- 
desirable, it is generally agreed that safety must always be 
forward-looking and move towards a continuing reduction 
in accident possibilities. 
The critical examination set out above does not aim at 




merely at cautioning against the unjustified extension of 
their quantitative aspects to an area to which at this stage 
they may be inapplicable. Nor is it suggested that there is 
something wrong with the safety assessment of nuclear reac- 
tors or other plant in the UK. Where, as in the case of reac- 
tors. major-hazard plant has been subject to a thorough 
safety appreciation, the operational scene is one of sub- 
stantially trouble-free working. 
However, the problem of safety assessment is made more 
difficult by the complexities of new designs. It is imperative 
that these are subjected to searching, thorough, consistent 
and reproducible safety analysis. Simple techniques such as 
those based on a maximum credible accident do not appear 
to be adequate in the case of more complex modern types, 
eg., UK pressure tube and fast reactors. It is doubtful if 
anything of lasting value can be provided by artifices of 
probability stretched beyond valid limits, even as a spin-off 
stratagem using the tactics but discarding the numbers. 
If such quantitative techniques are to be eschewed, then 
what can be used instead? No doubt decision theory can 
provide logical methods which can be developed within the 
traditional framework. Bourgeois has hinted at a solutions' 
and a reference to possible suitable procedures is even given 
in the Rasmussen study. " It seems that the required tool 
may come from a development of Boolean logic which is 
applied so successfully to problems of switching in computer 
penpherals and other devices. 
The history of plant disasters is the story of the unexpected 
often combined with slack operation, and of components, 
subassemblies and materials which carry unexpected defects 
and weaknesses. Therefore, in spite of the utility or otherwise 
of the various methods of safety anal)sis, it is impossible to 
overstress the importance to safety of sound basic engineer. 
ing design, of high standards of construction (with confirma- 
tion of effective quality assurance) and of %igilance in secur- 
ing a high standard of operation by staff of adequate calibre. 
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as set out below: 
Historical Background (1 - 10) 
The Fleck Inquiry and the Nuclear Installations Act 
Adequacy of safety and the level of investment in 
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Quantitative Approaches (23 - 27) 
Aspects of Quantitative Safety Analysis 
The problem of induction (28 - 29) 
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Probability and resolution of the enigma of induction (33 - 40) 
Use of the probability of rare events in engineering 
safety analysis 
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Quantitative analysis as a tool in qualitative 
assessment 
Concluding overview (41 - 43) 
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3. Aspects of the historical; philo- 
sophical and mathematical background 
to the statutory management of nuclear 
plant risks in the United Kingdom 
Q li CRrrcHLEY. MSS FIE& HnnP, Supenean&V 
inspector (Neckar), Health and Safety Excecuti ve 
'Piere is an ancient but extant rehocl of philosophy rhieb aer"rts that the only realityeis change 
and anotLer, more recent and also current, which bolds that the crimes of the future mast alreed; 
exist and can be observed and analysed scientifically (ref. 1). The two are eombired in a theec 
which examines the impact of modem technology upon Western society especis113 in respect of atomic 
easrgy and its regulation, consequent developments in safety and the emerging now role of the 
engineer. Qualitative and quantitative methods of risk assessment are discussed from the viewpoint 
of eapistemology and a synthesis eostining elements of both in a systematic approach to hazard 
waagement is suggested. Finally, it is noted that problems arising from the interaction of 
technology, society and politics may not be soluble by mathematical logic alone. 
ILTrORICIIL BACXcIP CND 
1. "Nothing is permanent but change" said 
Reraclitus in about 500 BC. Though this is a 
principle in setaphysics of wbich determinists 
have always been sceptical, it bam:, nevertheless 
pined some currency recently 
(ref. 2). Hoý"sver, 
few vovld deny that the sein agent of social 
change is the advance of technology and its 
impact on the gout of industrial production 
and thv demand for goods cnd services so stis- 
alated. And tte rate of change is accelerating 
and the style changing. While nan has obvioua4 
benefited, the process has less pleasant and 
disturbing features mich can for the inter- 
vention of the State. On the one hand as the 
discoveries of science have made available wcre 
powerful forces cd agents for use in indu3try, 
so the potentiality for serious accidents and 
oelaoities increases. For example. liquid 
natural gas as a fuel is anre useful and easier 
to transport than coal, but its disaster 
potential is rany tines grastet. It is like- 
eise for atomic energy. On the other hann the 
expectation in the ec+amunity for a longer life 
of better quality has risen correspondingly 
among all classes and access to modern means of 
coorunication has made them more vocal in 
demanding it. Thus, the achievement of safety 
in its broadest sense becomes ever more 
isportart. 
The management of safety in the n clear industry 
srpresaes all aspects of the history and 
progress of a modern big-technology in siero- 
eoets, indeed beiný a recognised forerunner for 
other industries (ref. 3). 
2. The demands of the body politic for control 
of aethin6 to the presumed inter. ata of 
society are normally expressed b political 
intervention, leading to ledalation and Its 
Implementation by the executive. lach action 
in respect of nuclear safety na an acknodedaed 
entity followed the Windeeale plutonium lo. I 
Pile incident (rof. 4) in October 1997. Althau. 
thin accident vac aimiocult in its detriment to 
property and human health, its serioue potent- 
iality was universally recognised. Z4rther, 
the story of events and human factors leading 
up to it are typical of the pattern of cansaton 
of a major industries plant catastrophe, such 
as that repeated at Tli)dborough (ref. 5) some 17 
years later and indeed of many other disaetrcue 
happenings elsewhere, eg petroleum gas transport. 
She Fleck Inquiry and the Nuclear Ineta]lstiona 
Act 
3. Though they were published two decades ago, 
slaw attention to the findings of Fleck'& 
characteristically independent enq=ry into 
the organization of safety in the UK atotic 
energy industry after the Vindacale affair 
(ref. 6) is still most relevant to the theme of 
safety management of high-technology today. 
Fleck recognised that the burgeoning unclear 
industry in Britain bad bben highly safety 
conscious from its inception and had already 
sade substantial and novel contributions to 
safety technologi, a fact to which üoring 
(ref.? ) and others have drawn attention. This 
it itsf+lf was clearly not enough. 
%. Like the rest of the nuclear John try, the 
Vindscals plant Lad been of naceeait/ staffed 
at all levels with competent engineers and 
managers of high calibre who had been success- 
fully achieving their prod ction targets. The 
sea" of Vindscale and future accidents thus 
lay, not w such with the bazarda of the 
complex and rapidly advancing technology, but 
with tho blindness of self-satisfaction. 
Fluther, the safety status of such a plant and 
its operations eouli be perturbed by technical 
innovations and modification to operating 
procedures which. ehiie appearing safe when 
assessed at their loco, of application. could 
bold nnraoogaised dargers. Again, divergent 
JFaiiation prot. ctian in rwcZemr parsr ptmits od"th. Z opoi.. MSS. London, 1978, I1-18 11 
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tendencies arming fron the usnsl personal and 
inter-d"partmentel conceits had to be resisted 
and a confident and easy interchange of tecbnioel 
information and intentions fostered iasteed. 
Study of the incident had shown that these aims 
were unlikely to be secured to a local plant 
bailed organisation. To meet these desiderata 
and to check the inevitable drift towards 
complacency as time went by monitoring was 
necessary. This ras not available from any of 
t` e , ezieting ?. gulatory 
bodied mach an HK 
7actory 2n . ctorate and acmething of adder 
scope than the detached enforcement of regulat- 
ions was ryquircd. 
5. Looking for a new approach, Flock. ear an an- 
alogy in the sax transport industry stich had a 
continuing safety problem. Be recommended that 
rwtety surveillance should be entreated to an 
independent specialist division in the Authority 
and that safety in the emerging coccercial 
applications of atomic energy should be over- 
looked by a new atetutory body similar to the 
dir Registration Beard (ref. 8). This latter 
group would work in concert with a similar but 
more elaborate structure in the Atomic Energy 
Authority itself. Also, it could draw upon the 
technical expertess of the Authority while 
remaining free to interpret the information and 
advice supplied according to the needs of and 
particular operation in the eo®ereial sector. 
6. An inescapable accompaniment of any such 
system is that the safety officer or inspector 
who does the monitoring inevitably participates 
in and shares responsibility with the party 
falling under his surveillance because control 
involves him in complex technical judgments. 
In addition, the plan or process under review may 
not be assessed so much for its scientific just- 
ification as for the manner in which this has 
been reached and the supporting arguments often 
invoke managerial factors. Not least, safety 
must be achieved without undue restraint on 
technical progress and the decisions are seldom 
clear cut but are reached by discussions, lead 
ing to a balanced assessment of risk against 
safeguard.. to be adopted. 
7. Fleck's reco®endationa were largely written 
into the Nuclear Inatallationa (Licensing and 
Insurance) Act 1959 and they resulted in the 
eatablieheentearly in 1960 of the Nuclear 
Installations Inap. ctorate which has been den-. 
cribed by Joelin (ref. 9). 
Adequacy of safety and the Leval of investment 
in safeguards 
S. boz ca, die cue novel and paauliar scientif- 
ic and engineering features associated with the 
hazards of the industrial use of atomic energy 
give rise to may problem which required new 
and unusual solutions, but the very groat 
emphasis put upon safety itself led to 
difficulties in organising the safety assessment 
of the plant and processes sad in sattere of 
parsonaet sanagaseat. The central recurring 
question is "how safe is safe? " and what level 
of inveatnent in a particular item is needed to 
achieve adequat% safetj7 The need to balance 
tnveetaunt agsioat the level of safety to be 
achieved vas clear, but aatety dofiad measure- 
ment so the initiu approach was almost entirely 
qualitative. Moreover, there »s little or no 
q. uatitative data. The difricaltiau were ov r- 
cose by as intuitive development of the tradit.. 
ima. i safety factor concept coon to engineer- 
inn dasige. The problea which is not unique to 
tae nuclear industry has yet to be satisfactor" 
fly resolved and merits urtb*r consideration. 
The tradition of safety by for"lxht, not 
aeitt 
9. rho attitude of "safety by foresight rather 
than by hinoaight" ras eeeimilated to the 
nuclear inouatry in Britaan from the beginnin 
As this led into largely untrodden ground the 
now inspectorate had to develop a novel style 
of consultative regulation and inspection with 
participative overtones. Of neceeaity it drew 
upon the theory end practice of safety manage- 
mat which had evolved in the United Ringdom 
Atomic Energy Authority and its precursors 
during the wartime perioa of collaboration with 
the United States. A blend of these elements 
had to be adapted to the unprecedented task of 
regulating tae expLoltation of a technology 
which had moved outside the envelope of close 
government and Authority control. 
10. Th. approach adopted involved the safety 
assessment and acceptance, within a licensing 
regime, of the design, siting, quality control 
and inspection during construction and commas. 
ioning and of the rules and supporting instruct- 
ions for the operation and maintenance of 
rvactors, nuclear fuel manufacturing aha gocess- 
ing plants and other installations. Consequent- 
ly. style of regulation was evolved to cope 
with a new form of corporate management in 
which safety decisions on matters of design and 
operation bad to be reacned by debate among 
designers, operators and safety assessors so as 
to secure that the most econoniual and effective 
mode of safety technolo#7 was used. As noted 
earlier, characteristic of this type of 
statutory safety surveillance is a measure of 
shared responsibility among the parties to the 
safety debate because the inspector participates 
in ans contrabutes to the decision making 
process. This is in autitheeis to control by 
statutory regulation vnere the obligation is 
on the operator to aomp4 and there is no 
formal place for discretion in technical 
interpretations. In such statutory control the 
situwtion is one of either compliance or breach, 
though the inspector may contribute by advising 
on ways of securing coepliaaoe. 
TEE VAST POTENTIAL OF THE AT01QC LYERGT HAZARD 
11. Man's ability to rela. ao ate is energy made 
radio Isotop. of all idada and lovsL of act- 
ivity availabia is iarR+ V44-titioa eoapamd with 
the provias ors. UP poanliar ann maid.. 
ioua haaa: ds of radioaotinty wort muti- 
yaiod by magy ordere as thoae associated rite. 
the use of radius aoa z-sys vkiek had airoady 
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tax= a serious toll smaing those working with 
them. There a now a lethal potentiil and 
longer term detriment to large numoere of people 
am extensive damage to property was possiole. A 
massive release of radioactivity to the snviroo- 
aant surramaing a nnclsar power station could 
follow a major catastrophic awcident to the 
plant. In a study published by the U. S. Atomic 
kergy Cavniseion Cref. i0) it rau estimated that 
as extremely severe accident to a nuclear power 
reactor giving rise to a major release of radio- 
activity couia "uiii ttouaaaaa (over }, 000) 
injure thousands more ans cause billions of 
dollars in property damage" ans tacos so affected 
would know lithe of it until they became ill or 
were otherwise aavisel of the harm that might 
have been doge to them. This extreme estimate 
has been confirmed. though substantially tamp- 
ered by the use of quantitative analysis in a 
begase asseasoant which directs attention to the 
gall level of ruin rather than to the grave 
consequences of a major accident (ref. 11). 
Again, the hazard from ionising radiatsona 
emitted from "nuclear matter" (ref. i2) is sap- 
eciahy trsacheroua in its nature as many 
victims of over exposure have found to their 
scat. 1ccept in a fed of the most serious saget 
there ban been no sensory war ag of impending 
harn and only in a very few of those any iemed- 
iats evidence of injury, though the cumulative 
effects are obvious. The fission products held 
in a reactor care were identified by dc Wolf 
8aytb and Wer in snout "w as "a particular- 
ly vicious Zorn of poison gas with considerable 
nlitary significance" (ref. "iy). 
12. As Smyth has recorded, in the government 
agency which directed the vorn leading up to the 
major reiease of atomic energy in the IISA early 
in December 1942, the. rns a Health Division 
Whose major oojwctive was to ensure no one a, ff- 
ered ssioca harm from the peculiar hazards oflhe 
enterprise. Under Ganirar Groves direction, a 
feature of the safety approach was to slake the 
safety factors so Large that the chrnce of fait- 
ure was very saaL. compared with otner hazards 
and, where knowledge was lacking. every feasible 
precaution was observed (ref. 1. ). 
D02GWCE OF A NEId ADPW4ISTRATIVS STYLE IN THE 
)WAGE? OF t LEAR SAFETY 
13. Traditionally. policy direction %an the him. 
or aaoageoent of goverameat and quasi-govern.. 
sent bodies engaged in regulatory u. tivitive, 
"u4: h as inspection and safety ruveiuance, have 
been aaaoet "xciu"ivly the province of the 
gan. ralist "amini"trator reu exercises "finan- 
oial and other control ... over tn" wort of ... 
engineers and other sp. ciaai"ts^ (ref. 45). This 
p"ttern was implicit in the philosophy or the 
1forthcote. d'revsiyan Report of 1854 vnich laid 
the foundations or modern goverment organi". 
"tioa in Britain (rsf. 16). Mt was based on the 
concept or a superior kind of intellectual 
activity ich can perceive a prob. in canine 
and not obscured by " confusin; uses of 
technical details. Thus, a broader and so: -* 
j eras solution can be achieved. It derives 
fron antiquity bsn the  anag"oent of affairs 
of comerce and the state eserged in a society 
CRMELEY 
share intsilsctusl functions were sharply del- 
ineated from senusl skia. La, even those which 
required tbw highest orders of creative mental 
activity. For exaspie, Seneca. one of toe most 
y. roeptive of the Roman phiioeophers and i&vyers 
described s»cbanieau invention as "drdgery wor- 
thy only of the lowest of "Teo". Fulton and 
the passage of years baº" only diluted this 
ouaaical attitude which is still influential 
today and iss indeed, inherent in the wag in 
which . enaeswat is normalj4 affected in indust- 
ry and goverment (ref. i?, i . Thun, the 
professional is deputed to the carrying out of 
subordinate functions according to policy deter- 
ain. d by a superior structure and in the form-. 
elation of which be has littie say. 
The leading rolw of the eagineer in tae 
nuclear inmutri 
14. Tbv rapid advance of teebnologJ has eo 
complicated industrial management and civil 
administration that changes in iheir traditional 
organisational structure became neoeeaary ans 
control in man- circumstances passed into the 
hands of engineers. Norbere has this Dean more 
the case tbaa in the nuclear industry. Amm 
the start of its application in rar and later 
in pace it would have been veritably isposeibly 
to have developed the tecanology of atomic 
energy successfui. lf without professional eng- 
in-gering control in all aspects of its management, 
ans during the last war it was true even to tee 
highest level of government. This exceptional 
feature of the industry 1s instanced by the 
successes of General Groves (ref. 14), in the 
case of the Manhattan atomic bomb project in the 
USA, and of Sir Christopher, no. Lord Hinton, 
in Britain. 
15. In a simiur manner, safety which is central 
to the successful exploitation of atomic energy 
boa avowed in the general framework or to. 
cosmsna of policy by professional engineers ana 
scientists. An outstanding example is the 
emergenue of the International Coommiseion on 
Radiotogicat Protection (ICRP) weich is a 
learned professional boa7 of a new type, dom1a- 
sting international policy in natters of rsaiom 
logicR1 protection and receiving aiaaet un» 
Questioned vorla acceptance. The statutory 
regulation of the industry has foIInrd a pattern 
which in the UK has been described on many 
aucasions by members of Inspectorate (NII), eg., 
in 1973 by Gronow ans ßausden (ref. 19). 
16. While the approach of the KII into tow 
ground in safety regulation not n: rpriaingly 
evored some criticism (ref. 20,21). It has cont- 
ributed arterially to the very high standard of 
safety in the nuclear industry. It is a fact 
that no one has been killed nor has anyone 
been seriously injured by radiation on any 
licensed nuclear site. Further, there is 
Mdenc" of a spin-off into the realm of con- 
ventional inautrial safety rnere tar accident 
record in "nuclear" plant 1s better than that 
is the generality of induatriai premises. 
23 
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THE EVOLUTION OF A TB:; OOMCT OF A WAt KIND 
17. These novel, peculiar and complex safety 
probteetis of design and operation associated with 
the use of atomiu energy in power production in 
particular, called for safety concepts of a nuv 
type as wvu as for the further development of 
existing teehaignes. In adaition to those of 
plant operation within safe limits, there were 
other new problem arras, being chi. fly those 
associated with such. things am criteria for the 
choice of sites for reactor plant, reactor con. 
tainm. nt technology, remote handling t(chniquet, 
criticality considerations in the use and stor- 
age or fiesilm materiais, rigorous anti- oontea- 
ination nuesuree for the handling of material 
suuh as plutonium, the management or active 
wastes and, lest but not least, commercial 
considerations of liability and ineuranu.. 
18. Th. foregoing strategeme were not only 
assimilated to the nuclear industry in Britain 
from its start, but important national contrib- 
utions were made in plant management tactius. 
Among them were the Technical Plant Safety 
Committee as a swans of self inspection and a 
str. ctured step approach to technical safety 
assessment of design, from the early form deed 
proposals to that of the full seals operation 
of the plant. The letter is not by a scaeme 
whi4h proceeds in eevura. L stages and has a 
formal beginning for a given installation in an 
initial eatety report (ref. 19) describing the 
design and safety features or the proposed 
plant and justifyinit its operational safety by 
analyses, feuit studies and supporting calcul,. 
atione. It is reglir"d that the report be . asceeeed by an independent group of engineers 
who can weigh the safety arg: iments and specify 
any steps which have to be taaun to reinforce 
weak points, recommend improvements and spec- 
ify further fault studies. Such an assessment 
for a n. iulvar power station,, say "Magaox", 
would take 1V - j0 man-years of highly akit. ºed, 
well qualified and ezperivnced engin. ering 
effort. 
99. The invoivement of the NII in its super- 
visory rote which has been described by Gronow 
and Ga'u+'en (ref. 19) is largely concerned 
with executive safety assessment and the n c. e" 
vary supporting executive inspections. These 
sr+ higher tier opwrationa which confine by 
special studies, sampling inspections and tests 
on site and technical invest! getions that the 
utility's and constructor's safety asaeasrents 
are aufZiclent in depth, are sound, well 
founded inc are proper. y isplemented on the 
construction site. 
THE PROBLEM OF = BkLANCZ ffiNE MK AND 
L'yEST)Q21T IN SAFEGpARD6 
2U. The inepactor's main tank is to conrirs 
the o; wrntor's assurance that tits inatnllatio% 
built and op. cotod in souor was With the 
reie, ent plans and designs is sale, aMd not to 
demand tyt it be safer thaa safe. This aoev. 
itsoi7 involn4 tar inspector in the qu«stion 
of eherv to put a proper Limit on his inspe. t- 
onal r quireaants for the expanditu v of "rfort 
sacs T on safet', but satisfactory meaua of 
rusol'ring the di1Na art slueivt. 
Interest in methods using probability in eafetZ 
analysis 
21. As tho qualitative syproaah shove no ebv- 
iwswyof setting a Limit on the required invest. 
sent in safeguards without a uoneeptue. t reduct- 
ion in safety, by 190; the NII were activeiy 
considering tnw utility of quantitative prob- 
ability sethode in their technical design 
safety assessment (22). They were not found 
very rewarding (ref. 19) and, other than for the 
use of quantitative probability tschaiques in 
seUcted arega where adequate and stable data 
were available, eg., in the aseessm at of 
instrumentation Sud control systems and for 
dtezmination 3f the 'Fire Risk Criterion" ebnen 
sets the upper limit of the output ßý temper- 
aturv in a "Magnox" r. actor (ref. ')), they 
were not p r-, ued much further at this stage. 
Nevertheless, in the IIKAFA through the aotiv- 
ities of its Health end Safety Branch, interest 
was maintained and in 19b? ! armer published his 
r titative approach to reactor site sel.. tion 
. 24). Auttvity wes extended 
from the rel. 
iability an*lyeis of coc onents and sub-eyeteda 
to the quantitative eaeeaament of the instal. - 
ation as a whole and this has been described 
in detail (ref. 25). The methodology is akin 
to that used in the Rasmussen "Reactor Safety 
Study" (ref. 26) ant it is now fostered by the 
Systeme Reliability Directorate of the 
Authority for a wide range of industrial safety 
investigations and studies, notably the recent 
Canvey Island (petro. chemicau installations) 
safety report. 
22. Interest in Quantitative Safety Analysis 
(q6A) has increased greatly in recent years and 
has had many advocates which includes some 
Russian engineers who published their method in 
1969 (ref. 2'/). The movement is part of the 
growing use of systems ansiysis in public policy 
madng (ref. 2o), but this has not been received 
uncritically. While the NIX employ the methoa 
in certain selected areas of design assessment 
(ref. 29) it is interesting to note that it also 
had apparently only limited uae. in the US 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
which used mixed quantitative and iterative 
techniques of "design-dake-teat-tail-fix" to 
establish the reliability of its moo -ehot 
vehicles. 
TU toGIc OF SAFETY AMISIS -"DETEPI ISTZ0 
AND QWNTITAT VE AYPROACUS 
23. The qualitative or so called "deterministic" 
approacn to design safety analysis begins with 
the implicit assumption that no major tsehnol- 
ogy is risk free. Thus, if there is a sequence 
of events and faults which may conceivably lead 
to an accident, than in spite of all precaut- 
ions that accident hem a continuing finite 
potentiality to happen which can never be dis- 
siesod. It is a view of causation which has 
received sash ssinent support of an ontological 
14 
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Mind such as that of the Aaerican pragmatist, 
Peirce, in hin theor. of chance (ref-30). The 
assessment process follows by identifying the 
significant risk modes by qualitative safety 
analysis. The technology or activity, . ¢. use 
sf a nuclear installation. is then vei $h*& in 
terms of the maximum adverse consequences of 
various postulated serious accidents. In an 
early application, the analyst identified a very 
serious accident in a credible node which was 
assured to bound a spectrum of less serious ino- 
idents and this was called the Maximum Credible 
Accident OCA). A credible mode leans that a 
mechanism by which the accident can be precip- 
itated is conceivable and may be accepted as 
reasonably possible. 
24. The rate in which the )CA could occur were 
examined by fault studies, by qualitative safety 
analysis programmes and by operational research 
techniques. The assessed liklihood of the 
accident occurring ras then minimised by modif- 
ying the design appropriately so as to provide 
barriers of various kinds against any identified 
fault initiating a chain of events which could, 
in the ultimate, precipitate that accident. 
These barriers, which included containe. nt str- 
uctures, design limitations, engineered safe- 
guards, operational restraints, regimes of 
inspection and other such strategems aimed, not 
only at preventing the accident but also at 
securing that the consequences of a given )CA 
were socially and economically tolerable, eg, 
of minimum detriment without the plant boundary 
or restricted zone. This latter was established 
as part of the siting policy which was determin- 
ed by assessment of the fission product release 
from the plant to the environment in the event 
of the )CA and relating thin to an L ergancy 
Reference Level (i21. ) of postulated radiation 
dose to the population likely to be exposed. 
25. Beyond the }CA there was envisaged a second 
tier concert of a possible, hi4h1y improbable 
Maximum Hypothetical Accident (!! A) which could 
conceivably break through barriers establisbed 
at the )CA thresholds. It via posited that the 
chance ocaurreace of such a disastrous accident 
node could be made vanishingly ema11 if not 
impassible, by appropriate barrier strategies. 
For example, in the cane of a aas cooled nuclear 
reactor in a ps>-stress. d concrete pressure vessel 
catastrophic failure by bursting is virtualay 
imposaible and this limits the extent of any 
conceivable calamity to the core. Nevertheless, 
the consequences of the NIA were taken into 
account is siting policy in subseq'ent control 
of residential development and in planning esar- 
Leney schemes. 
26. The saxi a accident approach has fallen 
into desuetude of recent years and hau bess lrr- 
6a1y replaced by a variety of quantitative and 
quasi-quantitative methods. 
Aspeet" of Quantitative Safety Analysis 
2i. Quantitative sa: etj analysis which is a sea 
toms approach sales the assumption that all Ch- 
ains of future events can be associated with a 
CRITCMET 
probability of occurrence which is expressible 
in numerical terse. Therefore, given suitable 
data. it is possible to deduce a definite risk 
for a required failure rate in numerical terms 
within calculable confidence : Snits. For exair- 
ple, in applying it to assess the risk which 
 sy be associated with a nuclear powerproge e, 
individual failure rates for the components, 
sub. -sssembiiea and subsystems which make up the 
plant are collected in data banks. These elem- 
ents are then used in calculations of the 
reliabiliiy analysis type using "fault trees" 
and "event trees" to cast the chances of varies 
possible fault sequences giving rise to certain 
assessed releases of radioactivity to the reac- 
tor environment. The results may then be aver.. 
aged over the expected operational life of the 
plant or of a group of reactors to give a prob- 
able rate of exposure per year per person at 
tick. Thus the risks attributable to the tech- 
nology may be expressed in quantitative terns 
of probable lethalities per year among the 
exposed population or in shortening of the 
average life span. The result may be compared 
with similar risks for existing hazards taken 
from statistical tables. Thus, the rims att- 
ributable to a nuclear power programme can be 
compered with the lethality attributable to 
that associated with public transport, dam 
failures, lightning and so on. The acceptabil- 
ity of the technology or activity can than be 
weighed in terms of the social need for its 
introduction against the iapnaed risk. If the 
balance is favourable then the risk is judged 
to be "acceptable". For example, the Rasmussen 
Safety Study (ref. 26) assesses the accident 
risks from a large atomic power procrarme at 
orders less than that to which peo; le in the 
USA are exposed, in normal living. Though it 
specifically avoids waking any recommendations, 
a decision maker would conclude on scientific 
grounds, that nuclear power is an acceptable 
risk. 
TEE PPOBLP OF fl t TION 
28. All safety analysis techniques whether 
qualitative or quantitative are attempts to 
make rational forecasts of future events and as 
such involve the so-called "problem of induct- 
ion". Induction is the name given by philos- 
ophers to the process of making inferences fo¢ 
past and present experience about what will 
happen in the future. While it is one of the 
fundamental problems of the metaphysics of 
engineering, it is in fact nothing more than 
the application of ooemonsense. However, that 
attribute, like many other common things such 
as gravity and inertia, is far from simple and 
has presented an intractible challenge over 
the ages to some of the world's 6: -ee, test 
intellects and is still a matter of intense 
d5bate with political overtones. 
29. While induction may be the most frequent 
form of reasoning, it presents great difficulo. 
ias to epistemology, that is the theory of 
lmorledge. Although in a given case one event 
euy follow another in a seemingly orderly 
chain, there is no reason why we should 
IS 
365 
RLGMATO" REQfJUM rS 
inter that this will happen in the geaeral. 
Jroc the standpoint of methodology it is not 
good enough to say euch an event is likely to 
happen or to believe that it will, for such 
inferences can not be established by strict 
logical reasoning. Wittgsnstein dismisses the 
proposition with the statement that belief in 
any casual nexus between events of the present 
and future happenings is superstition (ref-31)- 
Tot in spite of this theoretical dilemioa order- 
ly civiliad life would be impossible unless 
reliance can be placed upon inductive reasoning, 
for it is the basis of all planning. Bertrand 
Busnah in his "Principia Mathematics" describ- 
ed it as the ability to make plausible guesses. 
More particularly, the argument concerns the 
relationship between causality and the stoch- 
astic nature of the universe and has developed 
as understanding of'the latter has tdvancd and 
it may therefore be useful to pay sow attent- 
ion to this aspect. 
M APPROACHFS VH1 R PFMEDM TEE DAWN or 
PROBABIUTY 
30. Cicero, the sceptical Roman augur and 
politician, in hie dialogue on prophecy envisag- 
ed causation as a sequence of causes leading up 
to a future event in which each acted through a 
link on the nett. To foretell the future it was 
necessary to have knowledge of those causal 
factors and the nature of the links between th- 
em. There is no hint of probability in this 
argument. Unfortunately, information about the 
state of the link. is available only to the 
Gods and not to men. So much the worse for 
augury. Shortly after this revelation be was 
proscribed and killed. 
31. St Thomas Aquinus and the Schoolmen (ref. 
32) put future happenings into three classes. 
There were inevitable events which happened 
because they were "natural" and "neceeaary", 
such as the falling to the ground of an uo- 
restrained object. Those events which were 
predictable with lese certainty were classed 
as "natural" but not "necessary" because they 
could be influenced by a perturbing force such 
as that exarciaed by the hand when a thing was 
thrown. The third type of event was seen ea 
neither "natur: " nor "necessary" and could not 
be predicted by the lairs of science. Such 
things just happened and were termed "contin- 
genciea". 
32. tM Hume, the British empiricist, also 
triad to rationalise the theory of causality, 
but foundered on the problem on induction, 
sharing with his predecessors an almost total 
ignorance of probability. 
P! c EA. BIL=Y AND RESOLUTION OF THE ENIGMA 
OF INDUCTION -- 
33. The undarstandina of induction which is 
still far fron complete, has improved with many 
grasp of the ralati, +lr now discipline of pr- 
obability. Gaa. ralising from the science of 
statistical awchanica which about a century ago 
w resolving many of the knotty problems of 
ph . ica, James Clark Harwell va moved to oboor- 
vs that logic could deal only with certainty, 
doubt and impossibility, whereas reason went 
beyond these thin s. Mo link was provided by 
"the calculus of probabilities" which was "the 
true logic" for m%a and science Crof.. 13). 
34. Now that probability has allowed an escape 
from the iapasss of the problem of induction, 
the debate bas moved on to the understanding 
of probability itself and that may be more 
difficult and contentious than the former 
challenge. A current view of a determinist 
flavour which would reject qualitative and thus 
subjective probability is that a definite numb. 
erical frequency like a failure rate exists for 
all events. Than, if this number can be seo- 
ertained or be shown to lie between detormin- 
able confidence limits, it is possible to ass- 
ign a mathematical probability of occurrence in 
numerical terms to such an event. Aa example 
is the chance of one's death from a given cause 
eg, cancer from smoking cigarettes. It is 
central to actuarial operations in the insuran- 
ce industry, applying to such things as 
expectation of life tables, etc. and is a basic 
premise in systems analysis. 
Dee of the probability of rare events in 
engineering safety analysis 
35. Probability now plays a major role in 
technical design safety and reliability assess- 
ment which is a form of inferential reasoning 
used in engineering design and management of 
plant operation. In particular probability is 
used is the aspect of plant accident risk 
prediction which attempts to forecast the very 
unlikely occurrence of disastrous accidents in 
baaardoua installations which, like nuclear 
power stations, are normally reliable, well- 
built and well-run. The application employe 
methods which have been developed for expect- 
ation of rare ev nts such as the inundation 
of coastal lands by exceptional high tides. A 
mathematical technique for raking calculations 
of this kind was published by Poisson in 1h37 
as his "low of Large Numbers" which was re- 
nasad by Bortkievics of "horse kick" fass the 
law of small numbers (ref. 34). 
36. Mors recently interest is this kind of 
prophecy has increased greatly and diverse 
methods of prediction and especially systems 
analysis have flourished under the atiauluaand 
encouragement of politicians and adniniatrats 
The apparent reduction of dilemmas to a choice 
between numerical values is attractive 
b. cuaao it enables proriaat" decision makers 
to compensate for lack of knowledge of the 
disciplines involved, and this is especially 
so in technology. 
Sam. rw. rvatiod . boat quantitatln urobab. 
ility methods 
37- A o-a aritisi of ga. ntitatirs method 
of risk prodiotiw is toot their roonUt" are 
only truly ManiotRU i 6In derived in what 
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may be called "closed situations". In these, 
all the rel. vant factors operating in the usual 
sequences are known and can be rationally 
quantified. Allowances can be made for recog". 
nisable lacunae and iaginesing variants and 
stray effects which might perturb the sequences. 
The numerical chance of occurrence of a rare 
event say then be realistically calculated bet- 
ween comprehensible confidanoe limits as 8as- 
mussen attests to show in the Reactor Safety 
Study (ref. 11). 
38. While this wy be the state of affairs for 
the "closed situation" of a scientific s=per- 
isent on the laboratory bench or for a planned 
series of observations (indeed, it is the 
investigator's aim to achieve such a state), 
it is a dubious sasuaption for a complex and 
hazardous industrial plant or process. In such 
cases, c. sual temporal and physical factors 
and other things beyond the analyst's control 
or ken may disturb the expected pattern of 
causation. Then, the postulate of adequate 
knowledge about cause and effect is false and 
any confidence limits which might be cast to 
meet the deficiencies could be so wide as to be 
empty. 
39. f further criticism is due to Keynes (r*f. 1) 
who wrote of the danger of assuming without 
justification that a statistical frequency is 
stahls. Be associated this fallacy with Poiss- 
on's a.. ggeation of "what is certainly false, 
that every class of event shows a statistically 
regularity of occurrence if only one takes a 
sufficient number cf instances of it. ..... some 
statistical frequencies are, within narrower or 
wider limits, stable. but stable frequencies 
are not very common, and cannot be assumed 
lightly". 
Quantitative anelyeis as a tool in a qualitative 
assessment 
40. If the statistical frequencies on which a 
systems analysis of a technological process is 
based are not stable or contain major elements 
of instability, the predictions drawn from it 
will be unreliable and say be false and mis- 
leading. Neversheleas, the structured approach 
and disciplined data search and manag sent 
needed for such an analysis can throw light on 
previously unrecognised dangers in the plant 
and process and on weaknesses in the provisions 
made to secure safety. As such, systems analy- 
sis is a valuable tool. In fact, what is need- 
ed is a synthesis of qualitative and quantit- 
ative methods in a systematic approach which 
draws on all appropriate aids to decision mak- 
ing according to the uture of the task, be it 
desigz, safety aaeesen. nt or other operation. 
This latter is in fact the style of safety 
analysis in technical safety assessment adopt- 
eo by the NIX (ref. 29) and is equally suitable 
for the safety analysis of other hazardous i. n- 
stallations. 
CONCI XNG OV VTi 
41.7Ynall7, in respect of all the for+eoirg 
oooeiderstions, it Is worth taking into aooouat 
CR17VM EY 
as important anthropological factor which may 
bear upon use of probability techniques in the 
reale of politically related decision mkizg and 
one which say have attracted lass than due 
attention. As the planners who commissioned 
the Boskill coot-benefit exercise which just- 
ified Cublington as the abortive choice of 
location for the Third London Airport found out, 
the subjective reaction of the population 
affected by a decision is more significant than 
any rational arguments based on actuarial comp. 
utations. 
42. The man in the street (there is no average 
man, he is a sere statistic) is a distinct 
individual who will behave in a personally 
characteristic style. Be is more likely to be 
influenced by his concept of the nature and 
consequence of a hazard, should it affect his. 
than on mathematical variations in söme calcul- 
ation of its predicted frequency. Be in 
perverse; he may be prepared to accept the very 
considerable risk of riding a motorcycle, yet 
refuse to travel by air. This irrational 
personalised response to risk and chance is 
readily observable. If it were not so the 
football pool section of the gambling industry 
would collapse tomorrow and very few premium 
Bonds would be sold, for the personal chance 
of winning a fortune in such a way is almost 
zero. Moreover, the problems which have to be 
solved are not infrequently confounded by 
inadequacies of data and by political and social 
considerations. Weinberg has defined them as 
"trans-scientific" and holds that to treat them 
by the methons of conventional scientific 
analysis is inappropriate (ref. 36). 
43. The ocneept of probability and its use in 
inductive reasoning are new to human thought 
and, naturally, are not yet tally grasped. 
While soma of its applications have been naive, 
probability is rapidly becoming asaimilat3d 
into our culture as a powerful intellectual 
tool. In parallel with the emergence of 
probability methods. certain new style. of 
qualitative reasoning are ma3dng an appearance. 
They ais at solving the enigmatic problem of 
forecasting the behaviour of complex systema 
by perceiving them as wholes rather than as 
chains of linked elements and causes whose 
group behaviour spy be predicted by exhaustive 
calculations. Among than is Thom's hypothesis 
(raf. 2) that Tuch systems s+y be seen as 
particular structures of temporary stability 
but contain! n complexities of multifarious 
interacting parts in constant flux. Each one 
moves predictably towards a 'Ica taatropho" 
resulting in its metamorphosis or and an the 
case may be. Thus, while the pursuit of 
detailed calculations concerned with the spec- 
ific behaviour of the elements and their 
effects on one another say be of little general 
relevance, the pattern of behaviour of the 
whole can nevertheless be profitably analysed 
and the specific future trend or trends ident. 
ified. 
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1. Relevance of the ! nesgy CriAii 
2.1-r 
She looting supply difficulties which face a Vorld already overdependent on oil are- 
focusing attention on the need to secure stable and continuing sources of energy and 
so to be free from this thraldom. Of the many options other than a greatly intensified 
exploitation of coal, only atomic energy is readily available and can be a growing 
rather than a dwindling source. Alternatives like wave and wind power are not feasible 
before an oil shortage could heighten international tensions to a level where any 
peril. from nuclear power generation shrinks into insignificance when co parad with the, 
Sorror of sode_ru war (Eoyla 1979). The health and safety reckon ng owing to the 
prolific production and burning of fossil fuels cannot be ignored, but they have been 
hallowed by long acceptance, although in the long tam the human and environmental 
detriments attributable to tbse may well outweigh those of atomic energy. In contrast, 
the dangers of nuclear power, real and imagined, have effectively frustrated its once 
happily envisaged function as men's main and inexhaustible future power source. It is 
appropriate therefore to sxamirye how the vital nuclear option sight be freed in time 
fron these ? rasant curbs which are holding back its further development and wider use as 
an alternative to oil. 
2. M=lear 4ow. r and its Hazards 
Without doubt the utilisation of atomic energy is a very dangerous process. The 
hazards to man and his environment which are associated with it have the disturbing 
property of being unke rn except by backward extrapolation from the destruction caused 
by atom bombs, by the mforssan consequences of weapons tasting and by speculation about 
a few well publicised radiation accidents. The measures for accident prevention are 
thus based in the main on theoretical studies and postulated event sequences leading 
to severs faults which, though very -likely, could have very harmful and destructive 
affects. Scenarios of the worst accident to a power reactor such as the well known 
p. S. Nuclear Regulatory Censnission study of 1957 depict a grin and heavy toll of Maue 
deaths and injuries and heavy property damage. Notwithstanding these prognostications, 
is over 20 years of ca®arcial nuclear power plant operations, in wastes countries at 
least, no member of the public has been killed or *van hammed, in spite of dubious 
spacial pleading to the contrary (Gotman and Tamplin 19731 and very few of the operating 
staff have been hurt. It has in fact ben the 'safest industry in the World' and such 
notable incidents as have occurred, e. g. 'Rrorns Tarry' and 'Three Mils island' have 
been safely contained, though in these cases the plants have sustained serious damage. 
3. The foundations of Nuclear Safety 
To what then can this paradox of safety-in-danger be attributsd7 It is cartaialy not 
inherent in the technology as the experiences of 'Nindscals Plutonium Pils' incident, 
the 'tnsioo rand, meltdown, and the 'ST1' reactor prompt criticality explosion among 
a number of other incidents have shown. They are all wamplea of the occurrence of 
the unexpected whose causes have been revealed after the event. 
Ibs answer is that it can be attributed to the novel and innovative approach to health 
and safety which has characterized the atomic energy industry from its start. The 
dangers associated with the large scale rolsasa of nuclear energy were immediately rec- 
ogaisod by Groves who enured that all possible care was taken to safeguard his uployNs 
/Contd.. 
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in the Manhattan Project and associated works (Groves 1962). This philosophy of 
safety by foresight rather than hindsight has continued and been further developed. 
An important application is the precept of requiring prior safety assessment of design 
of plant before construction or modification. An underlying principle which is unitary 
posits that, not only is safety of the plant as a whole dependent on that of its 
component systems, but that good design must ensure as far as possible that the per- 
formance of the parts linked together secures a greater level of safety for the whole' 
entity with overlapping protective zone reinforcing one another. This is also expressed 
in the guardline concept of protective instr mentation in depth. 
The principle of unitary safety in engineering applies to management systems as well 
as to hardware, particularly as the former are prone to break into disparate sub-groups 
to perform technically distinct functions and drift into introversion. Co-operative 
working is not inherent in human society and identifiable groups in organisations tend 
towards hierarchial entities rather than to merge as sharing teams. Such behaviour in 
the management of large, complex and risk prone plants can be inimical to safety and 
among the special measures taken in nuclear installations to promote functional inte- 
gration are the practices of maintaining a plant technical safety committee and that of 
requiring submission of a 'safety report' ensure that the safety of the design of the 
plant, any modification, change in operation or experiment has been assessed and 
considered before it is put into effect (Gronov and Gausdan 1975 and Haire and Shaw 
1979). 
while it is the duty of management to evoke unity of function in the organisation 
it controls, it can be itself beset by the same individualistic trends. This foible 
was disclosed in the working of the WCAFA prior to the occurrence of the Windacale 
incident inquiry (Fleck 1957) and more recently in the U. S. A. following the Three 
Mile island accident (Rogovin and Frampton 1980). Restructuring of both bodies to 
overcome the weakness was recommended. In the case of the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority (UI). EA), the Fleck Committee strictures were met by establishment 
of a Safeguards Division with responsibility for overall monitoring of safety, but 
with an advisory rather than an executive role. It had two branches, one devoted to 
radiation protection and the other of the nature of an inspectorate called the Authority 
Health and Safety Branch (ASSE) concerned with siting, the overlooking of safety in 
plant and process design and operation and criticality. The Committee made analogous 
proposals for the then burgeoning civil sector of the nuclear industry (Fleck 1958) with 
a recommendation for the formation of an independent licensing and inspecting body 
which led to the establishment of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) under 
the Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 (Joslin and Griffiths 1962). 
Much of the duty of both AHSB and NIX Was concerned with the oversight of the safety 
aspects of work in design offices and of activities is factories and on power station 
and other nuclear sites during construction, eommissioninq and operation managed by 
the Authority of Generating boards and other licensees as the case might be. Without 
executive authority over this lower tier. AHSB had recourse to the management board of 
the Authority in the case of serious differences of opinion which could not be resolved 
in direct debate with the managers involved. Similarly, Nuclear-Installations Inspect- 
ors were without the powers of prosecution normally given to government inspectors, 
for example to members of H. M. Factory Inspectorate, but could invoke more general 
sanctions through the licensing regime. A novel kind of participative regulation 
maintained by a continuing dialogue between licensees and inspectors had come into 
being and, thus, the sustained level of adherence to the required safety procedures 
which have been described in detail by Haile and Shaw (1979) is evoked rather than 
imposed. Although this style of supervision might appear to be weak, it has in fact 
a profound but subtle influence on those who fall under its aegis. These offices by 
requiring members of the lower tier to report, to explain and to render an account has 
a most stimulating, powerful and integrative effect (Vickers 1967). It can be one 
of the most important benefits of an inspectional regime, not least by correcting 
innate introspective trends in management structures and by encouraging conversation 
among their elements which otherwise drift in isolation. 
AHSH had its own research facilities as well as being able to call more widely on 
Authority resources. These were made available as appropriate to NIX who could also 
require licensees to make specific investigation relating to safety features of their 
installations, though research of a more general nature was commissioned from 
universities and commercial services. /Contd... 
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4. Thd Stran4. Phenamanon of Public Hostill 
In vier of the great attention vhieh is being paid to the achievement of safety in 
nuclear plants and the consequent investment of money and human effort which has been 
rewarded by an outstandingly good accident record by the industry, the public hostility 
to atomic poser is not easy to understand. As it seems not to be related to any 
balanced view of risks and benefits, it may be attributed to factors other than the 
true safety of the plants. Among these may be distinguishedi 
(i) Lack of understanding of the actual nature of the nuclear hazard] 
Ui) Perception of the hazard as totally unacceptable in spite of its pres- 
entation as an exceedingly small risky 
(iii) neotional associations with atomic weaponst 
(iv) ! ears about the safe management and disposal of active nuclear wastes, 
(v) Apprehension that the standards of safety will decline as the scale of 
nuclear operations increases; 
(vi) ! ears that plutonium and other fissile materials might fall into the 
hands of terrorists; 
(vii) Concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons; 
(viii) tear that civil liberties may be eroded by spreading security pre- 
cautions (Flood and Grove-Nhite 1976), 
(ix) Objection to the growth of bureaucratic power in the nuclear corporations 
(Cotgrove 1978), and 
(2) Hostility to Technological progress in which nuclear enargy has led the 
field. 
Attempts to assuage critics by quantitative safety analysis, presenting the risks as 
negligibly small in comparison with those of every day life, have failed because the 
objections do not primarily relate to the efficacy of engineered safeguards. Moreover, 
the relevance of such techniques is in question because they are pertinent to design 
and not to its realisation in the physical entity of the operating plant on site. 
Risk assurance in that domain depends on successful inspection and not on the in- 
constancies of prediction for it cannot account for the vagaries of human error which 
inspection may apprehend. 
S. The Problem of Securing Public Acceptance of Nuclear Patter 
Acceptance of the nuclear option as one of the nation's long tern sources of electric 
power cannot be won without a struggle on two fronts, one political and the other 
engineering. Consideration of the tan factors listed above reveals that the opposition 
is primarily of a political kind and does not in truth relate to the achievement of 
greater reliability in the hardware of nuclear installations which have already been 
shown to be exceedingly safe when compared with other industrial dangers. Truly, the 
phenomenon of the toleration of the mortality and malm caused by motor transport which 
is one of the greatest modern hazards to life and limb is proof that acceptance by the 
public of this risk turns, not on logically weighing it against benefit, but upon the 
need to endure the dangers so that the activity of motoring with its high utility 
may be enjoyed. 
In the political field, the dedicated opponent of a technology can always find a now 
conjectured technical weakness to attack when an earlier one has been contained (Nelken 
1975). when plant reliability and safety have been demonstrated beyond reasonable 




accident is known to be negligible, the proper response to critics is not to suffer a 
permanent state of seige, but to Carry the controversy on to opposition ground by 
shoring that technical stagnation can bring unacceptably harsh social detriments, that 
it is not possible to remain stationary and that the choice is to advance or regress " 
with the latter leading to deterioration in the standard of life and derogation of 
national status to levels which may well be incompatible with social justice, political 
tranquility and the existence of democracy. 
6. Towards a Solution 
public acceptance of nuclear power would seem to turn on two points. The first is 
political and requires the conversion. of the sensible, silent majority of the public 
to the view that the utilisation of atomic energy is essential to their wellbeing and thing! 
may soon be unpleasant without it. The existence of Holland gives evidence that the 
case can be won. Eight-tenths of that land are below the maximum Spring tide surge, 
yet its industrious population dwell there in prosperity and content, confident that 
their engineers have built and can maintain a system of dykes and sluices which can keep 
out the flood from the sea. These defences are not absolute and have on occasions been 
overwhelmed by a combination of exceptionally high tides and storms with heavy loss of 
life and damage to property. Yet, they are demonstrably sound and accepted as adequate 
in the knowledge that all reasonable steps which could be taken have been taken in spitf 
of the fact that on those rare occasions when they have failed, the scale of the disaster 
has exceeded that most pessimistically envisaged for the worst reactor accident (Every- 
's Encyclopaedia 1968). 
A change of this kind involving a major shift in public opinion cannot be brought about 
without effort, but it is possible and necessary. The design of a successful campaign 
is a major research in itself which should be pursued. To be successful it must inspire 
confidence among the informed public who must feel that they are being assured and not 
beguiled. The image of the persuaders is of paramount importance and must be one of 
voracity and relevant professional authority. As Cottrell claimed during his Graham 
Clark Lcture of 1976, the voices of ccapetent nuclear engineers are likely to be more 
convincing than those of professional publicists, politicians or eminent scientists 
expounding out of their field. 
while it is not appropriate here to explore the tactics which might win the political case 
for nuclear power in the national consensus, the second contention which is technological 
and calls for engineering research will be examined in more detail. The body politic 
met be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, though unquestionable safety cannot be 
obtained, adequate safety has been realised in the design of nuclear power stations an, 
that the safety aims so expressed can be attained in their construction, cc®issioninq,. 
maintenance and continuing operation. That is to say that they are safe in concept and, 
if the designer's intentions are fully set, then in no way will there be a serious 
accident with dire effects off site. But, engineering experience gives a lie to this 
hope as human error cannot be designed out because it can always circumvent that design. 
Therefore, in the building and running of such installations determination to adhere 
faithfully to the prescribed specifications, however sincere, is not enough, but the 
fact that it has been done must be verified in all respects, and that independently. It 
is then possible to give the concerned public a confident promise that the power station 
and its reactor can meet the safety claims and do not present an unacceptable hazard. 
Zhis kind of scrutiny and quality assurance is the duty of engineering inspection, 
but it goes beyond the more checking of plans, materials, parts, fabrications and per- 
formance of tasks, being concerned as well with the way in which these things come about, 
the relationships between workers and supervision, the reliance which can be put upon 
their work and the more subtle consequences of their interactions on the interpretation 
of the design, a thing which is seldce wholly complete. If engineering inspection can 
most this challenge effectively and convincingly, than the battle for nuclear power is 
in sight of being von. 
7. Tb. nature of Inspection 




being defined is the dictionaries as 'looking closely into or "=*-+"Ing officially, 
especially for faults or errors's true enough but inadequate. Again, while the 
administration of health and safety inspection and the medical and physical things 
which it must find or prevent are dealt with exhaustively, out of 500 sections in 
the Rnbens Committee Report of 1972 only some tan discuss the function of inspection 
itself. It is worthwhile therefore to review the topic briefly before consideration of 
research in the discipline. 
%hough faults in design occasionally cause accidents, they are mostly due to human 
failings in Interpretation or implementation of it. 
Never deliberate unless malicious, the human factor is usually a story of cutting 
corners, boredom, fatigue, ignorance, lack of training, ambiguous instructions, poor 
communications, weak supervision, failure to obey rules or comply with regulations, 
concealment of mistakes, personal unsuitability for the given task or carelessness, 
all such transgressions usually being compounded by a measure of arrogance. Discounting 
the coon toll of site and factory accidents as irrelevant to the case, faults in the 
generality of industrial processes and things made by them may endanger the public 
image, but seldom have serious consequences for health and safety. Product checking 
is often cursory and defects are left for the user to find. This state of affairs 
is not satisfactory in the case of complex and costly installations and processes in 
which faults can cause heavy financial damage, harm to workers and the public and 
perhaps fatalities. Human error must then be revealed and corrected before it can 
precipitate events of this kind and the necessary checking, testing and verification 
of design and exposure of errors are the defined role of inspection. While good 
management must be untiring in its attempts to correct human frailties, is the long 
rum unless subject to oversight, the management line itself can exhibit these failings 
and the scene may be set for a major mistake. Internal or self-inspection is an 
important part of health and safety management, but it can be afflicted with the same 
defects and must also cope with internal organisational barriers which can defeat 
the most assiduous quality control examiner, safety officer or representative. 
The task then is to establish an internal regime of inspection of assured consistency 
and efficacy which can interact profitably with an external surveillance. Engineering 
inspection whether it concerns plant safety or quality assurance exhibits common 
characteristics and in its executive applications where an outside inspectorial body 
overlooks the performance an in-house or lover tier group or the inspectional element 
o! a firm, corporation or establishment has its focus in management structure and morale 
rather than process or product, though these latter must be given the attention they 
merit. 
Lffective quality assurance or safety surveillance when involved with high- technology, 
e. g. nuclear installations, cannot be attained in a go/no-go gauge style nor by a 
regimen of strict compliance with the details of an engineering specific ation or the 
rigid enforcement of regulations. This kind of inspectional work can only proceed 
satisfactorily, and secure safety, in an atmosphere of participation which allows 
justifiable discretions instead of insistence that technical requirements be fully 
met or that safety rules and instructions be obeyed in their entirety. While strict 
observance of these things may be appropriate In the case of the traditional engineer- 
ing production and factory safety, the drafting of specifications and safety rules for 
plant employing advanced technology and particularly where there is an element of 
novelty is complex and imprecise and interpretation is invariably needed. - Such is 
the case in the system of safety assessment and inspection established by the NIX whereby 
a broad technical safety requirement for a nuclear plant os process is written as a- 
condition of licence to which the operator must respond by submitting his proposals for 
approval by the inspector. The latter then becomes party to the arrangement which 
be will have duly assessed as appropriate to the circumstances (aronov and Gausden 1975). 
while justifiable discretionary flexibility in the interpretation of specifications, 
rules and regulations may be appropriate to the safety inspection of nuclear power 
reactors, it cannot be extended to the general industrial health and safety management 
of the factory side of the power station. Again, proper relaxation must be distinguished /Contd... 
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from lax obsarvancs of quality and safety norm and clear lines of accountability for 
the exercise of discretion sat be identified. 
S. The Evolution of Modern Znspeetion 
It became clear shortly before the First World War that the product consistency, 
reliability and safety of flying machines being made for the British Army could not be 
assured on the basis of foreman inspection, and an Inspection Department for aeronau- 
tical material was formed in 1914 (Army Orders 1914). The inspectional procedure 
ras based on a traditional go/no-go philosophy with Government examiners and viewers 
stationed at every critical point of production in the aircraft factories who were 
instructed to reject all out-of-specification material. By 1918 many thousands of 
'Ministry' inspectors of various grades were in post. A system designed to monitor 
all scale quality manufacture of a few machines was not a success in large scale 
production of aeroplanes of increasing technical complexity and it is said that a worrying 
assortment of scrap was coming in increasing quantity off the production lines as 
well as Sopwith Pups, Camels and SESs. 
After the Kar Lt. Col. out-ram was appointed to head Directorate of Aeronautical 
Inspection (AID) and was charged with re-organiciaq the inspection of aeronautical 
matiriel. Drastic staff reductions followed and by the early Twenties his AID numbered 
but a few hundred of elite staff. Outsam introduced concepts of delegation and 
'executive inspection' which were well suited to maintenance of the quality of the 
supply of successive generations of ever more complex and sophisticated aeroplanes 
to the RA! between the wars (Outran 1930). By delegation of inspection he was not 
only able to reduce his staff by many-fold, but transferred responsibility for product 
quality to the manufacturer where it properly belongs. Contracts were awarded only to 
firms which secured a certificate of approval from the Ministry on AID advice and to be 
approved meant meeting a tight specification which included such things as assessment of 
the organisation for its technical competence to meet the terms of the contract, good 
working conditions, attention to the welfare of employees and a clean and well ordered 
factory. It was necessary to have a chief inspector who reported to the managing 
director or his deputy and was responsible for the observance of the specification, 
the quality of the product and compliance with the AID and purchasing department's 
conditions. The chief inspector was accorded formal AID approval which became a 
much esteemed accolade. Great emphasis was placed on maintaining the identity of 
materials and this was secured by a release note and bonded store procedure. By virtue 
of the concept of 'executive' or supervisory inspection, the AID inspectors took no 
part in direct inspection but were responsible, not so such for the quality of the 
product though evidence of its acceptability would be required, but to confirm that 
the contractor's inspection system was working satisfactorily, that the firm's chief 
inspector certified that the specification was fully met and for signing documents whisk 
authorised payment for partial or full completion of contract. This last power provided 
an important means of exercising pressure on the firm to comply with the AID's require- 
ments. Sampling inspections and tests were carried out by AID Examiners of various 
grades and there was back-up from a well equipped Test House. The AID inspection system 
covered all matiriel used by the RAF and included radio, radar, clothing and furniture 
and weapons among other things as well as aircraft. There is little doubt that the 
AID properly shares the credit with other parts of the British aircraft industry for 
production of the superb generation of aircraft which oade its mark in World War It. 
The system continued with little change until 1975 when it had beccos outmod. d 
by the increasing complexity and range of modern military hardware and the need to 
adapt to a general NATO quality assurance arrangement for all types of military supply 
(Defence Standards 1971 and 1976). There are an interesting number of parallels 
between the inspectional regimes of the pre-1975 AID and that of the NZZ, although 
there has been no direct interchange of information. 
Again, the reputation of the Air Registration Board which rau the civil side sister of 
the AID attracted attention is the re-organisation of the nuclear safety arrangamanta 
which followed the Windscals Plutonium Pilo firs and it was rsco®endad that the body 




should be modelled on it (Flack 1958). It was not adopted on grounds that such a body 
i1OIIi have too great a sap in matters of policy vb. tch should not be delegated to an 
organisation not answerable to Parliament. 
9. Inspectorates and Instmctors 
The Factory Inspectorate, the Alkali and Clean Air, Minas and Quarries and the Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorates are government organs concerned with statutory safety 
regulation. They perform the higher tier function of 'executive inspection' which is 
to cossfira that the legal responsibilities of occupiers, operators, the National Coal 
Board, quarry managements and licensees for safety have in fact been act* though the 
approach to safety regulation varies greatly amongst them. Any direct inspection or 
tasting such as that made from tine-to-time by NCI is of an investigational, sampling 
or confirmatory kind. 'therefore, their work is basically the inspection of management 
and of the performance of in-house safety function and duties. 
'Executive inspection' of the foregoing regulatory type makes great demands on the 
skill and professionalism of the inspectors who in the case of the three technological 
inspectorates, 'Alkali', 'nines' and 'Nuclear', must also be highly qualified spec- 
ialists in an appropriate branch of engineering or applied science. An industrial 
background with managerial ezpariance is an advantage and often essential. To be 
affective as inspector must command respect which depends upon his technical competence, 
being a product of the right six of qualifications, experience and an imponderable 
personal quality which may be identified as a potential to secure the objectives of 
the safety legislation with which be is concerned amicably and only rarely and in special 
circumstances seeking recourse to legal sanctions (Roben 1972). 
The three senior industrial inspectorates, 'Factories', 'Alkali' and 'Mines', have 
achieved notable successes in their work over many years and have won public respect 
and esteem throughout the world as well as in Britain. The Prime Minister (Thatcher 
1979) has drawn attention to the essential part the Nil must play in securing the 
safety of nuclear power. The concerned members of the public have learned by experience 
that they can put trust in statutory inspectional and regulatory bodies when they have 
proved themselves to be competent, independent and disinterested. Thus, the NII is 
establishing itself as an essential complement to the design, construction and oper- 
ational sectors of the nuclear power industry, making a safer whole in which public 
confidence may be properly placed. 
10. sr Relevant Research Topics 
Inspection has been identified as a function of great antiquity, ranging fron the 
collection of tributes in ancient tines, through many police operations to the chairing 
of a major committee of inquiry (lyres 193S). Surprisingly then, there has been little 
or no academic interest is the topic and it has had less than due recognition as an 
engineering discipline, though this is one of its major areas of application today. The 
opportunities for research are thus eataasive and of great breadth. Excluding the tech- 
nical matters which are the subject of safety inspection such as personnel protection, 
management of toxic substances, radiation protection and safety engineering among others, 
the topic is mainly interdisciplinary and is of the nature of 'liberal studies in 
engineering' to paraphrase a well established title. Nevertheless, it is vary much an 
engineering study because it requires, at least in the high-technology and advanced 
scientific industry fields, the approach and sensibility of the experienced professional 
engineer. This may well account for the lack of interest in the ranks of social 
scientists as they are not properly equipped to take it up. 
Although the opcaings are legion, the list below is liait. d to a few major research 
topics. Aooaq these as. i 
(i) The invention of a means of assessing the efficacy of specific inspec- 




ass. = tt, 
(11) A broad study of means of intaxpretirq inspectors' reports and of 
reports by licensees and operators supplied to inspectors, such as the 
Licerisess Event Reports (IZRs) which are collected for the U. S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Coaalssion, so that meaningful dati of safety relevance can be 
gained from them (Carbon 1979), 
(lii) A eompazative study of tha diverse modes of saf. ty and quality assurance 
inspection which have bean d. vaiop. d with a view to assessing the contrib- 
utions they can maka to industrial safety; 
(iv) In view of the importance of inspection as a compleaaatasy factor in a 
Unitary philosophy of angin. erinq safety, weak or ineffective inspection 
can be a major cause in accident genesis and particularly in relation to 
events like the Three Nile Island incident. There is a need to develop: 
(a) Personality profiles of effective iaspoctors for the assessment 
and selection of applicants for key inspectional posts, and 
(b) ! Maas of assessing techniques of inspection most likely to detect 
'loss of resistance to fail=*' in coupler and technical sophisticated 
spsteas with high hazard potential, ". q. nuclear power plants: and 
(v) Strategies for sampling inspections and tests and for the beat apportionment 
of inspectional effort between site or shop contact and technical safety 
assessment of design. 
11. Succary 
An attempt has been made to support the Claim that the continuing development and 
expansion of nuclear power are necessary to meet a probable energy famine in the for- 
seeable future. Failing that, there will be a growing and intractable energy shortage 
which can destroy the country's standard of life, debase national status, threaten 
public tranquillity. seriously increase international tensions and, perhaps, ua' ' ne 
democracy. Therefore, the need to convince the public to accept and promote the nuclear 
option is pressing. 
The debate over the very small risks associated with nuclear power lies outside the 
domain of scientific method, as experimental results must be extrapolated into the 
realm of hypotheticality, and no firm conclusions can be drawn from then (Sifele 1974). 
The case to be put which is interdisciplinary has two sides of which one is political 
and has not been dealt with in any detail except to note that a Nicavber-like quiescence 
is likely to prow disastrous. Instead, the arguments in favour of nuclear power 
should be shifted on to opposition ground by pointing out the serious detriments which 
can come from a failure to meet future energy needs. The other is that nuclear engineers 
have made thermal reactors exceedingly safe. They will not fail on account of intrinsic 
design defects, but a serious accident could be caused by human error which can affect 
every aspect of design, construction and operation. However, such shortcomings can be 
anticipated and prevented by inspection which is a discipline which has arisen to over- 
co m human failings. It can complement design and operational excellence and so make 
the chance of a major plant accident truly negligible. This argument can be put con- 
vincingly to the informed public with good hope of acceptance. 
Inspection is a neglected discipline and there is much scope for study and original work. 
In many areas a positive research contribution may be made which would enhance the 
effectiveness of inspection and add still further to safety and success in the nuclear 
debate. Several important topics have been identified as worth investigation. 
/contd... 
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DOCUMENT NUMBER 4 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS, SAFETY 
AND 
THE GUARDIAN ROLE OF INSPECTION 
Syn opsis - Public attitudes to technological hazards are examined 
in the light of the series of disastrous accidents that have 
afflicted plants, systems and vehicles thought to have been 
unquestionably safe before the event. Since the Industrial 
Revolution and more particularly in this century, succeeding 
generations have become increasingly distressed by the hazards that 
are concomitant with technological progress, concerns much 
exaccerbated with the advent of nuclear power. This disquiet has 
now reached a stage at which the need for technological innovation 
itself is being questioned. Nonetheless, it is certain that 
technical progress cannot be halted without severe and incalculable 
societal and political consequences. Efficaceous technological 
hazard management has, therefore, become a social necessity. 
The history of major accidents bears witness to human error as the 
principal cause of these incidents. Inspection is the function 
that has evolved in society to check human mistakes and oversights. 
It may be classified in four hierachical levels of increasing 
complexity and involvement of the judgement and discretion of the 
inspector from the mundane tasks of 'Viewing' to the august 
chairmanship of an official inquiry. In the field of engineering 
inspection, a notable development was the creation of the 
Aeronautical Inspection Directorate (AID) immediately before the 
First World War to ensure reliability in the manufacture of warplanes. 
The AID has been the indirect antecedent of the sophisticated modus 
operandi of modern engineering inspection, and particularly that 
which has come into being in the nuclear industry. In the 
regulatory field, these practices have been exemplified by the 
approach developed by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII). 
Whereas the doubts about the safety of nuclear power plants which 
still pervade public opinion have not been allayed by the various 
efforts in public relations made by the utilities and government 
bodies which currently dominate the industry, it is suggested that 
people would be more likely to tolerate the risk if they were 
convinced that they were efficaceously protected by well-organised 
and accountable inspection. On the other hand, such inspection 
when backed by statutory authority must avoid the trap of 
ratchetting safeguarding investment in areas where safety may be 
already adequate, the criterion of adequacy being one of the most 
difficult of the challenges that faces regulatory science. 
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Technological progress, safety, and the guardian role of 
inspection 
OH Critchley, MSc, ARCS, FLEE, 
FInstP, FINucE, CEng, 
Reardon-Critchley International, 
9 Sutton Lane, 
Hounslow, Middlesex, 
1W3 31313, UK 
Not even God himself could sink this ship' 
commented a well-wisher just before the 
lightly White-Star liner, Titanic, left 
Southampton on her maiden voyage to New 
York. She foundered in the icy waters of the 
worth Atlantic a few days later during the 
early hours of 15 April 1912, some five 
hundred miles East-south-East of Halifax, 
'ºova Scotia, with the loss of more than 
IS00 lives following a freak encounter with 
'huge iceberg South of its expected haunt. 
khappened in spite of every reasonable 
precaution, scientific and human, being 
taken to avoid such an occurrence. The sea 
'as calm, though deathly cold, and the 
*"sibility good. She lay holed beyond the 
: aPacity of her powerful pumps in a busy 
Aping lane with passing vessels less than 
14hour's steaming from her site, yet their 
"reless rooms were deaf and their bridges 
14nd to her cries of SOS and distress rockets, 
Ough she took nearly 3 hours to sink. 
'King World War 11, a radio operator and radar '-Anician, with nearly 600 hours of airborne 
`, and escaped unharmed from several 
'es. Graduated in Physics at Imperial College, 
'Adon, 1949. Electronics and instrumentation 
muh thereafter. Founder member of the 
'dear Installations Inspectorate of the Health ý Safety Executive; he retired as a Superintend- ! 4ýspector in 1979. lie was concerned with 1t mspection, technical services, technical safety, anent of design for Advanced Gas-cooled 
4 ýaors, and radiation protection. In 1974-76, 
on Fellow, Department of Liberal Studies in 
'NU, Manchester University. 
Towards the end there was panic on the 
decks which added to the death roll and, 
though many famous and eminent men 
sacrificed their lives, 156 women and 
children still perished. 
Within 3 years a further 1800 lives had 
been lost in shipping accidents, excluding 
another thousand odd with the controversial 
sinking in 1915 of the Lusitania a few miles 
off the West of Ireland by a German torpedo. 
This awesome mortality coupled with a 
mounting score of factory and mine fatalities 
brought a new awareness of safety to the 
body politic as the hazards were no longer 
confined to the proletariat but affected all 
sections of the community. Working people 
whose unions were growing stronger were thus 
able to press effectively for greater safety in 
pit, on shop floor and construction site. 
In fact, safety had become part of the great 
humanitarian change which had its birth 
in Europe and America a little more than a 
century ago. A growing trend, rather than a 
sudden change, it began in Britain with free 
elementary education through Forster's 
Board School Act 1870, to be followed 
over the next few decades by laws ensuring 
the purity of food and drink, control of 
foul factory effluents, for old age pensions, 
national health insurance and unemployment 
benefits, moves towards the full emanci- 
pation of women and legislation to improve 
working conditions in factories and mines. 
Of course, there was stimulated interest in 
the safety of life at sea and many inter- 
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national conferences held and conventions 
signed, notably in respect of wireless tele- 
graphy and provision of lifeboats. Before 
this awakening of public conscience, but 
for some notable exceptions, industrial 
risks were taken to be more or less 
inherent in one's way of life. The `madness 
of hatters', scrotal malignancy in chimney 
sweeps and the respiratory diseases of 
miners and glass cutters were taken to be 
unavoidable. 
Cost of change 
History teaches that the introduction of a 
new technology almost invariably brings 
with it unforeseen consequences which not 
only disturb the established social order but 
are often very damaging to man and his 
environment. Eventually, these adverse 
effects are understood and the dangers are, 
thereafter, avoided, mitigated or accepted. 
In the entrepreneurial enthusiasm to secure 
the benefits of innovation, the lesson from 
the past is often unlearnt, but in arresting 
cases such as the examples just cited there is 
a permanent imprint upon society and its 
mores. This is especially so when there are 
many victims, children are involved or the 
circumstances grisly, and popular reactions 
seem to obey a sort of power law relating 
to the number of casualties, ' the extreme 
reaction to the tragedy of Aberfan2 being 
a case in point. 
Few can deny that technology has brought 
great benefits to mankind, liberating him 
from slave civilizations, substituting leisure 
for druggery, relieving him of pain and 
disease and disseminating culture, albeit 
often of depressingly shallow content, 
widely amongst the masses. Without it, 
Western civilization with its liberal, 
humanitarian ethos could not have attained 
the heights that have so far been reached. 
Yet, there is a counterpart of hazard 
associated with each advance in a kind of 
proportion to the potency of the agency 
exploited. For example, the invention of 
nitrated explosives has been one of the most 
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commercially rewarding of technical Gov_ 
ations, making possible great achievements 
in civil engineering, giving more ready access to the Earth's mineral riches and enabling 
canals and highways to be cut through haj 
rocks impermeable to pick and shovel. But, 
the cost in human terms has been thigh with heavy loss of life and limb and extensive 
property damage caused by unforeseen plant 
explosions such as that at Faversham, Kent, 
in 1847, a few months after the discovery of gun cotton (nitrated cellulose) and nearly SO 
years later at Oppau on the Rhine near 
Ludwigshafen in Germany when over 1,000 
people were killed, many more injured and tlo 
town wrecked. 3 Not least, the new 
explosives made war more murderous; 
civilians could now be attacked with bombs 
and shells and battle casualties counted in 
millions instead of thousands. 
Growing doubts 
In addition to the pressure for more specific 
protection for life at sea, in factories and is 
mines, there has been growing concern about 
more general threats to citizens, community 
and environment as people have become 
aware of the apparently inexorable, and 
often unwanted, thrust of technical and 
medical innovations which have brought 
unpleasant consequences and unexpected 
side-effects to mar their vaunted benefits. 
The drug Thalidomide comes into this latter 
group; high octane leaded petrol may soon 
b 
prove culpable; and, in addition to the 
worries about atomic energy, there are 
growing doubts on the consequence of ex- 
posing populations seeking longevity to somt9, 
of the products of modern food technology, ji the highly refined cereals used in the manu- 
facture of bread and pastries. 4 "i 
While efforts to protect the environment, to . 
''a 
conserve economic resources for use by 
future generations are commendable, and, '-"to indeed, essential, it is unrealistic to think ;c 
that the political majority of the people in 
any developed country are going to accept ICq 
regression to a more primitive and less oy 
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abundant life style. The reaction to the 
coming famine of natural resources and, of 
course, fossil fuels would be a demand for 
a continuing advance of technology to beat 
the shortages and science would be expected 
to discover new ways to maintain the desired 
supply of customary creature comforts. This 
reaction will be particularly true for energy 
vhich, though it may be more economically 
used, may nevertheless be needed in increas- 
g and not diminishing amounts. 
5 For 
example, an economy in which hydrogen 
aanufactured by atomic power replaced oil 
as the main local energy source can be 
envisaged as commercially viable early in 
Ite next century. 
6 Assuming satisfactory 
%lution of the questions of reactor safety 
and nuclear waste disposal, such a hydrogen 
based economy would be ecologically safe 
and environmentally very clean as the 
combustion product would be water instead 
the pyro-products of the hydrocarbon 
els, oil and coal, ie the oxides of carbon, 
tiphur and nitrogen, now massively con- 
cainating the atmosphere, locally and 
kbally. 7 Notwithstanding the environ- 
lental gains, hazards of a new kind would 
xintroduced as hydrogen, the most 
tammable of gases, replaced stable hydro- 
bons as the basic fuel and energy source. 
stechnological progress and innovation 
innot be stopped without severe social 
er 'sequences which are likely to be beyond 
power of known political institutions 
manage, the way ahead lies in an 
`'? roach which makes the benefits 
; zonal and the threats and detriments 
)m6 ": timal so ensuring that the introduction 
gy, 94 '1 exploitation of the technics remain 
u- ' er the control of 
democratic agencies 
" 1institutions and does not slip into the 
zds of elite, technocratic bureaucracies. 
to fortunately, the very complexity and the ! Q-intensive 
nature of high-technology 
'xes such a transformation and political 
ence must be ready to meet the challenge. 
in 
pt ýitiong schemes for monitoring technical 
1'. ovation is one advanced by Ravetz8 
I 
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`for those cases in which technical com- 
petence is likely to be monopolised by a 
few specialists concentrated in institutions 
committed to the same interest', eg national 
electricity generating utilities and atomic 
energy agencies. Nevertheless, the proposed 
'Technical Innovation Commission' (the 
task of which would be `to foster the 
discovery', assessment and diffusion of 
reliable information about advanced 
technical projects so as to provide con- 
ditions for effective monitoring with 
appropriate public participation .. . ') is 
not enough for it would operate in the 
political rather than the practical industrial 
realm of plant, operators and accidents, 
at least in respect of high-technology, major- 
hazard installations. Moreover, it is the 
pit, shop-floor and site from which the 
troubles come'. The toxic cloud of the 
virulent poison, `dioxin', which spread over 
Seveso was emitted from the factory and not 
the board room of Givaudan, yet the adminis- 
trative responsibility lay with the latter. 
Risk acceptance 
While some of the reactions to technology 
border on the fatuous or lack any obvious 
rationality other than being displacement 
responses to different threats and fears, 9 
there is nevertheless justifable unease. 
Brett-Crowther has drawn attention to a 
disturbing political aspect of technological 
progress which he defines as technocracy: 
"the tendency of unelected officials, 
secure in established posts, and having the 
advantage of government authority as well 
as an apparent impartiality, to offer advice 
and take decisions as if science and tech- 
nology were boundlessly good and reliable, 
fully understandable elements of a material 
universe which was also entirely rational. 'lo 
Indeed, some of these technocrats are 
tempted to define this kind of lordly 
imposition of their concept of `progress', 
coupled with a beneficiently motivated but 
imperious interference in the discretionary 
areas of human conduct, as a sort of `divine 
right' of administrative government. There 
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is an associated belief in elegant risk mathe- 
matics by which hazards may be reduced 
by presenting them in a mist of vanishingly 
small numbers, a tendency which might be 
likened to Sorokin's `quantophrenia'. 11 
Public toleration of the danger from a 
technology, from an inadequately managed 
environmental threat or from unhealthy 
or risky social activities or involvement does 
not depend on probability of its realization, 
unless the chance is disturbingly high. The 
ordinary person will accept a risk known to 
be very small, heedless of any consequences, 
though they may be severe, but does not 
normally act so as to subject himself to a 
clearly perceived and likely chance of death, 
injury, or particularly unpleasant sequel. 
The topic is highly controversial and the 
subject of much research. Farmer puts the 
threshold of popular concern for risks 
endured during normal living as I0' 12 
and there is some evidence on a broad 
statistical basis to support his figure; but 
few people are average and the range is 
very wide, not only among individuals 
but as a function of the perceived nature 
of the threat and personal feelings about it: 
a person who would go to great lengths to 
avoid walking under a ladder might well 
refuse to wear a seat-belt in the front 
passenger seat of a sports car. 
Dutch courage 
When people at large see that a technology 
is worthwhile because it serves their needs 
and pleasures, eg in the cases of air and 
motor transport, the risks are taken with 
little complaint or hesitation. An interesting 
example of the phenomenon is given by the 
case of the Netherlands. But for the elabor- 
ate system of dykes which effectively keep 
the waters back, 80 percent of its land 
would be washed over by the sea at the 
equinoxial spring tides. Occasionally, though 
very rarely, these defences are overwhelmed 
and the inundations flooding in from the 
North Sea have drowned tens of thousands. 
Yet, people continue to live happily in that 
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country though folk tales abound to reed 
them of their peril. Dutch engineers are 
highly competent and respected for their 
sound and reliable work in building and 
maintaining the sea walls; but the caprice of tides and extremes of weather have on past 
occasions proved beyond the ranges of these 
defences, and so it will be for ever because 
considerations of cost determine their height 
and there can always be a surge of water 
driven by tides and storms which win 
exceed that economic limit. 
The reasons for acceptance of these rare 
cataclysms are profound and beyond the 
logic of cost-benefit analysis. Such social 
phenomena are not well understood, as the 
contrariety of the spate of theories on the 
acceptability of risks shows. In this case 
however, acceptance probably turns on the 
basic human social instincts to follow 
traditional paths of established worth and 
to put trust in the judgment of respected 
leaders and in the wisdom of experts of high 
repute. It is known that all that is reason- 
ably practicable has been done under the 
circumstances and that advances in the 
sciences of meteorology and hydrography, 
by making possible more effective prediction 
of the approach of danger coupled with 
efficacious modern communications and 
transport, can reduce the hazard to one of 
inconvenience rather than drowning. Thus 
to leave a comfortable and prosperous 
existence in Holland to avoid a very remote 
risk of death in an unlikely, uncontained 
flood would have been seen by the Dutch 
public as behaviour lacking in commonsense. 
On the other hand, evidence of increased 
risk attributable to incompetent engineering 
or other kinds of human error would not 
readily be tolerated, to say the least. 
Safety technology 
Accident experience drawn from the domain 
of large and complex technical installations t, 
and systems - aeronautical, coal mining, es 
marine, nuclear and petrochemical, has been 
the story of the unexpected leading to 
August 1981 - Science and Public Policy 
1 
technological progress, safety and inspect 
sensational events, often disastrous in human, 
environmental, financial and operational 
terms. These happenings, combined with the 
toll of life and limb in more mundane 
industries which are caused by apathy, 
carelessness, ignorance and negligence on 
the part of both managements and workers 
have shown that strong watchdog functions 
are needed; not only to enjoin compliance 
with health, safety and environmental 
protection standards, but to ensure that 
management does not become lax about 
safety and keeps abreast of dangers 
associated with technical change. 
Few disastrous accidents in advanced 
technical systems have been caused by 
failures of equipment or structures although 
they have played a contributory part in the 
event sequence, but by human fallibility 
mainly as operational mistakes and blunders. 
Examples of disasters in which human error 
has been the salient causative factor are the 
Tay Bridge collapse in 1879,13 the Gen. 
Slocum horror of a living funeral pyre for 
nearly 1,000 people in New York's East 
River in 1904,14 the foundering of the 
titanic referred to above, the R-101 airship 
explosion which killed 46 including 11 
Notable people in 1930,15 the Aberfan tip 
Cde of 1956,2 the Thalidomide tragedies 
of the early 1960s, the Flixborough petro- 
temical plant explosion in 1974 and the 
3uclear plant accidents at Windscale in 
1957 and that at Three Mile Island in 
1979; all of which have transcended their 
scores in fatalities or financial loss by their 
pact on public opinion to produce 
tceptional political reactions which have 
' ulted in vigorous government intervention 
ad strengthened safety regulation of the 
chnology and its practice. Profound 
`anges in the administration of safety 
chnology and equipke"ntgncöuraged 
trough government funding and research. 
n lstage has been reached at which `safety 
'gineering' and `regulatory science' can 
It defined as distinct disciplines, meriting 
a `'; e foundation of University departments lb "their name. 
In the realm of high technology, safety can 
not be assured merely by the enforcement 
of regulations or by routine observance of 
codes of practice, no matter how conscien- 
tiously. These are responses to things which 
have happened and are inadequate in the 
face of that which is new and unexpected. 
Hence, an added forward-looking technique 
of `safety analysis' has come into being 
which consists broadly in assessing the 
design of the plant so that possible fault and 
accident event sequences may be discerned 
with a view to devising engineered safeguards 
or prescribing plant operating procedures 
and rules which can forestall them or abort 
their progress to catastrophe, 17 but even 
such foresight can be rendered futile by 
human mistakes". 
And so over the past half century there 
have been novel and very positive develop- 
ments in safety technology and regulatory 
practice which have been inspired by 
military necessity as well as concern for 
workers and public safety. They have led 
directly to the notably high levels of safety 
achieved in the nuclear industry in partic- 
ular which, although potentially very 
hazardous, has during the 40 years of its 
existence, in the Western world at least, 
caused only three deaths, very little proven 
harm to the health of its employees and 
none to the public which has been established 
beyond question. There has been little or no 
lasting environmental damage and there has 
been an apparent spin-off from the safety 
conscious atmosphere in `nuclear' plants of 
a general industrial injury rate running at less 
than one-third of that for industry as a 
whole. 19 
Human error 
Disastrous happenings in man-made systems, 
aircraft, buildings, factories, coal mines and 
ships are very rarely, if ever, the result of 
single, unique act or thing, but come about 
because a series of consequent events leads 
to the catastrophic conclusion. This postu- 
late has a sophisticated analogy in Thorn's 
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Catastrophe Theory which is a relatively 
new development of mathematical logic 
to describe the evolution of forms in nature. 
It has been much elaborated and can be 
applied to a wide range of biological, 
physical, psychological and social phenomena 
including economics20. The development is 
in keeping with a change in the attribution 
of blame in reviews of serious plant and 
systems accidents. Previously, news reporters, 
the general public and even government 
investigators have looked for a sole precipi- 
tating act, fact, fault or erring person, thus 
seeking some specific agent or scapegoat on 
which to place the responsibility for the 
untoward happening. 
Despite the fact that the application of 
Thom's hypotheses to the problems of 
safety are far from obvious and that the 
present scientific approach, which is mainly 
dedicated to quantification, appears to need 
considerable refinement before it can yield 
convincing and definitive results in accident 
and process loss prevention21, there has 
emerged a better understanding of fault 
causation through the work of a number of 
inquiries and related studies22. Of particu- 
lar relevance are those which have followed 
some of the more sensational nuclear plant 
incidents notably the Windscale Plutonium 
Pile fire' and that at Three Mile Island in 
Pennyslvania, USA24 . 
The latter which is 
classic has been exhaustively studied by 
Presidential, Congressional and regulatory 
commission (US NRC) teams, not excluding 
multifarious investigations by concerned 
research bodies2s. The new tactics amount 
to a systems approach, although perhaps 
not overtly so oriented. Catastrophic events 
in complex or large plants and technological 
systems are seen as the interaction of an 
ensemble of things, equipment, components, 
structures, procedures, external influences 
and men, all actually but not obviously 
related, which become linked together in 
the manner described earlier, to make the 
fault sequence or sequences that end in the 
ultimate calamitous 
happening. A result 
has been to discourage what has been the 
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notably mechanical approach of many 
previous formal inquiries, turning more 
towards recognition of the part which 
human behaviour plays, if not directly, 
then to set the scene for a better under- 
standing of the engineering malfunctions 
which caused the disastrous event. 
Flexible theory 
This is in keeping with a general trend to 
replace philosophical mechanism25 with 
more flexible systems conceptualisations, 
explaining an untoward event as a system's 
response to unexpected changes in its 
circumstances, internal and external. Thus, 
the ultimate catastrophe is seen as the inter. 
action of physical and human factors which 
cohere in the given situation, thus driving 
the system irreversibly towards breakdown 
or destruction, as in Thom's theory. The 
approach has disclosed the not surprising 
fact that men plays the main part in 
accident causation through carelessness, 
ignorance, negligence, stupidity and frequent 
capricious aberrations in his performance of 
actions which are often of a routine kind. 
Though attention has been directed to the 
importance of this factor which has been 
defined as ̀ human error', in the case of 
nuclear accidents, it is equally responsible 
for disastrous failures in other advanced or 
complex technological systems, like petro- 
chemical installations. 
The baneful influence of human error has 
long been realized, but perhaps not overtly 
identified in plant and systems accidents. ' 
Human error is a continuum and not some- 
thing unique and manifest unexpectedly in 
control room, on a ship's bridge,. in signal 
box or diver's cab. Everything in the man- 
made world may tautologically be defined 
as an artefact or the result of action by an 
artefact. Even in those few cases where the 
accident may appear to be attributable 
wholly to failure of components, equip- 
ment, structures or mechanical or electrical 
systems, there is almost invariably an element 
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of human blunder or mischance, often at the 
Level of design. The exceptions are those rare 
events in which there has been a true lack of 
knowledge and the factors to which the 
failure was due were scientifically unknown 
before the thing happened. Such was the 
radar-assisted collision between the luxury 
kalian cruise ship, Andrea Doria, and the 
! orwegian liner, Stockholm off New York 
is 1956 which sank the former with much 
loss of life and injury?? Both ships were 
fitted with the most up-to-date of available 
devices and systems to ensure the safety of 
fife at sea and were crewed by alert, efficient 
and well trained officers, but without the 
falsely trusted help of radar, traditional 
methods of navigation would have prevented 
the collision. The truth has been revealed; 
interpretations of the `Rule of the Road' 
take the failings of radar into account28 
and seamen now have no excuse for being 
snaware of the hazards of unwitting reliance 
on novel scientific aids. 
Approaches to control 
one accepts that human failings are at the 
got of most industrial accidents and the 
use of serious process losses and those 
faults which when affecting large installations 
'r means of transport could result in harm 
%people, damage to property and injury 
'a the environment, then one must conclude 
. at the 
best means of preventing such 
mtoward things is to find ways of detect- 
it or correcting human error before it can 
Ito to the unwanted event. Moreover, 
4quiries into accidents could profitably 
pace more stress on the part played by 
11 %ople in accident situations and in particu- 
1e on management blunders, defaults and 
Udequacies29 which have received less than 
'le attention in the past. Board room and 
sign office are as prone to make mistakes 
; operators and workers. 1sere 
is much current interest in the 
emery of means to detect and anticipate 
`izman error. In accord with the present 
ent 
,:,, 
pularity of numerical probability concepts 
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in science, serious attempts are being made 
to classify, measure and quantify human 
error. 30 Though such work may throw light 
on its manifestations and vagaries and 
perhaps create a better terminology, the 
tractability of such an amorphous and 
capricious phenomenon to mathematics 
and quantification is open to doubt. It 
would seem that greater progress might be 
made by combining traditional engineering 
practices with the powerful facilities of data 
collection and analysis provided by infor- 
mation science. 31 
The traditional approach has derived from 
the reaction of the body politic to the cost 
of faults and to the dangers and disasters 
caused by human mistakes. To reduce the 
threat and its expensive consequences, it 
has evolved the art of `inspection', a generic 
term for a group of diverse activities all 
concerned with the detection of errors, 
faults and mistakes of various kinds by 
examination, and particularly close exami- 
nation, of the circumstances and systems 
in which they may arise. Its practice ranges 
from routine piece part examination of the 
products of repetition engineering to 
inquiries of a constitutional nature when 
the functions of august public bodies may 
be reviewed. It will be worthwhile to look 
closely at the role of inspection in the pursuit 
of health and safety in industry and particu- 
larly in advanced-technology plants and 
systems as represented by nuclear power 
stations. 
Informed inspection 
Protection of the community, citizens and 
workers and the environment against undesir- 
able aspects of human activities and the 
ill-consequence of human error has long 
attracted intervention by the state, and may 
be broadly called inspection. It is inherently 
a police function with its origins in antiquity 
when its main task was to ensure proper 
performance of the duties assigned to public 
officials, eg the collection of taxes, tolls, 
customs, tributes and the surveillance of 
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trading by merchants. 32 In modern societies 
governments regulate many less tangible 
things, such as commodities and banking. 
The state can not achieve these ends by the 
promulgation of rules alone as they become 
dead letters, even when backed by severe 
penalties for infraction, unless some form of 
surveillance is imposed. This is the object of 
police power which in its broadest sense is 
the exercise of the authority of the state in 
the interests of all citizens. Policing is carried 
out by special bodies of people who, as the 
police proper, enforce restraints against 
such anti-social activities as are defined as 
criminal, and civilian officials who are 
generally known as inspectors, concerned 
with such commercial things as the 
regulation of weights and measures and 
industrial safety. 
The bodies concerned with industrial safety 
have grown up piecemeal and show great 
diversity. The two senior inspectorates in 
Britain are those responsible for safety in 
factories and in mines and quarries, the 
former identifying its birth with the appoint- 
ment of 4 inspectors in 1833 to enforce the 
'Act to regulate the labour of children and 
young persons in mills and factories' and the 
latter with the appointment of the first 4 
mining inspectors in 1850. Later additions 
to the roll were the Alkali Inspectoratt 
which dates from 1863, the Explosives 
Inspectorate which came into being in 1875, 
the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate about 
which more will be said later and the Radio- 
chemical Inspectorate, both of which were 
established in 1960. There has been an 
attempt to impose a measure of unification 
under the Health-and Safety at Work Act 
1974, implementing recommendations made 
in the Report of the Robens Committee of 
1970-72. A further stage of integration was 
recommended with the eventual aim of an 
amalgamated service oriented more towards 
the formulation of safety policies and the 
provision of expert advice and assistance in 
safety matters to industry than to the 




Whether these varied activities are suscep- 
tible to a centralised administrative control 
`speaking with one authoritive voice on ' 
matters of health and safety', is still far from 
clear. Moreover, competent opinion in 
properly informed quarters is by no means 
convinced that the enhancement of advisory 
code drafting and other `policy' functions 
with a diminished role for inspection as 
recommended by Robens33 will be any 
more effective in the achievement of greater industrial safety than its promotion by 
inspectors making visits to premises and 
installations which result in persuasive 
personal contacts backed by a hint of 
enforcement. It is appropriate, therefore, 
to examine the long established art of 
inspection which Ayres32 identified as a 
practice ranging from quality control in 
manufacturing through civil police work 
and the surveillance of matters of health 
and safety, which has already been viewed 
in some detail, to its highest level in a public 
inquiry when the presiding officer, often a 
member of the judiciary, is known as the 
`Inspector'. 
Illusory control 
The esteem which was once accorded to 
the engineering discipline of inspection has 
waned of recent years as the purchasers 
of mass-produced motorcars learn to their 
cost. The above reference to `inspection' by 
Professor Edith Ayres, 32 dated 1935, is 
unique. It has been replaced in later editions 
of the same source by a highly mathematical 
effusion on `Quality Assurance' and all direct 
reference to inspection deleted. The Robens 
Committee Report of 1970-72 devotes only 
10 of its 500 sections to the art of inspection 
and even these concern its administration 
rather than its practice. Lastly, there is a 
judgement by an eminent safety scientist, 
and not untypical in some establishment 
circles, that: 
There is a widely held and, in my view, rather 
quaint opinion to the effect that inspection is the 
primary source of safety. Again, from my point of 
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view, it is a somewhat gratifying opinion, but it is 
got, I fear, entirely true. Certainly, the new look 
which an inspector can give to a situation which 
! bs become over familiar to the operating manage- 
t enables safety issues to be raised and improve- 
ments suggested. But I suspect that these improve- 
ments are essentially marginal. The thing that really 
provides safety is a proper management attitude 
and a proper management understanding of the 
cence. technology and engineering of the operating 
$ant. 34 
The statement is notable for its apparent 
lack of understanding of the part to be 
played by inspection in the given circum- 
¢ances of safety surveillance of an advanced- 
technology installation. Most certainly, 
äupection is not a `source of safety', nor 
could or should it be. Competent manage- 
Unt is its true source. The role of inspec- 
6on which remains paramount is then to 
assess the quality of that source which, as 
f 4e author says, is `a proper management 
attitude and an understanding of the science, 
xchnology and engineering operation of the 
.! ant'. The inspector must have the appro- 
; date engineering attainments to make the 
squired assessment and be vested with the 
fecessary authority so that he can, if 
xquired, take effective steps to ensure that 
aanagement discharges its responsibilities 
: ficaciously. 
Engineering safety 
%e nature of engineering inspection as 
i ; plied to nuclear power reactors which 
tay be taken as a paradigm has been 
iescribed in detail by Gronow and Gausden35 
Xd by Haire and Shaw. 36 
agineering inspection which is concerned 
". th the product quality of engineered 
, stefacts and plant and systems, particularly 
afety in this instance, can be identified at 
discrete levels; and, though of less concern 
s this study, other types of inspection may 
ýo be classified in a like manner: 
(i) Viewing - routine scruinty of 
manufactured work-pieces with 
little or no exercise of discretion, 
eg printed circuit boards for 
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computers, product u tyof 
confectionary and quality 
control test of photographic 
films. It is the most commonl3, 
identified kind of inspection and has been the subject of a nurnbe 
of studies in social science; 37 r 
(ii) Examining -a higher order 
function, being examination of 
products, structures, equipment 
machines and systems to 
confirm compliance with 
specifications or rules and 
permits a necessary exercise 
of discretion and is often an 
interpretive function, eg 
customer acceptance inspection 
and routine factory inspection 
of minor premises; 
(iii) Executive Inspection - it 
requires high and appropriate 
professional attainments for its 
effective conduct and may be 
divided in two sub-classes, ie: 
(a) Managerial Inspection - 
investigation of the manner 
in which persons, teams 
and groups discharge their 
contractual obligations or 
perform their official 
duties, eg staff inspections 
in large organisations like 
the Civil Service, with a 
view to assessing manage- 
ment or professional 
competence, inspection 
of schools; 
(b) Assessment Inspection - 
chiefly an engineering 
activity concerned with the 
extent to which a design 
intent is achieved in plans, 
designs and specifications 
for a technological plant, 
system or piece of equip- 
ment and with confirm- 
ation of the satisfactory 
attainment of these goals 
in the manufacture, con- 
struction, commissionin8 
209 
technological progress, safety and inspection 
309 
and in use or operation of 
these things which usually 
involves design office, shop 
floor and site contacts (an 
example is the technical 
safety assessment of design 
in nuclear engineering as 
applied to power reactors 
- ); 
Note - Executive Inspection 
often combines the two 
sub-classes when, in 
addition to technical assess- 
ment of the design of an 
installation or system, its 
organization and staffing 
are also subject to scrutiny 
and report and such is 
often the case in the 
statutory inspection of 
nuclear installations, eg 
power reactors; both 
activities are essentially 
participatory and involve 
the formulation of technical 
policy, the inspector being 
continuously required to 
make critical professional 
judgements; 
(iv) Inquiry - the highest order of 
inspection and is concerned with 
the examination and assessment 
of the roles, appropriateness of 
function, efficacy, integrity and 
propriety of state, commercial 
and social institutions, corporate 
bodies, government functions 
and programs. 39 
Unresolved problems 
Management fully aware of its role and of 
`the science, technology and engineering of 
the operating plant' may be expected to run 
a safe factory or installation. An efficient 
management will have this capability and a 
proper concern for safety, but human error 
is everywhere, afflicting even the most able 
of men and organizations. The task of 
executive inspection is, then, to enquire, to 
seek explanations and to perceive changes or modifications in plant, processes and per- formance of the human part of the entity 
which may provide evidence of the `loss of 
resistance to failure' that so often appears as a portent before an accident. The duty of the inspector is not to tell the operator or 
management how to do the job, but to assess the performance of the system and to judge 
the capability of its elements to work in 
co-operation with one-another. Intervention 
by an inspector provokes an introspective 
reaction in management, encouraging those 
of its components drifting towards egotism 
and introversion, which is a centrepetal bias 
inimical to safety, to become more outward 
looking and communicative. If the foregoing 
criteria are met, then a management is more likely to be able to discharge its safety 
responsibility efficaciously and have the 
resilience and flexibility to abort the progress 
of a fault or mistake which could lead to a disaster. 
It cannot be denied that executive inspection 
so involved in safety surveillance is labour 
intensive, costly and may at times impose 
severe financial burdens on the managements 
of factories and other installations subject 
to it. This is especially pertinent when an 
inspectional safety assessment discloses 
a serious fault or weakness in the design of 
a plant, imposing a late change, an affair 
widely publicised in the case of the 
Hartlepool nuclear power station which the 
CECB claimed cost £25 000 000.40 
No design which contains significant novelty 
can be expected to be perfect in its early 
realizations in hardware, as this is a state of 
grace attainable only by trial and error and 
through experience in use. 41 The inspector 
must wisely resist a tendency to ask for 
apparently desirable features or modifications 
in an entity which is already adequately safe, 
lest the job be priced out by ratchetting costs. 
Furthermore, an important aspect of the 
technical safety assessment of an engineering 
design is to discover flaws and weaknesses 
and arrange for their correction before they 
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have been irreversibly incorporated during 
the progress of construction and commision- 
iag of the plant of system. Although retro- 
spective modifications are exceedingly 
expensive, safety must be defended and in 
the case of a serious threat, the fault giving 
rise to it must be rectified; in extreme cases 
even to the extent of stopping construction 
or of shutting down the installation. Clearly, 
the balance which must be struck between 
problematical dangers and the cost of 
removing them presents the inspector with 
i most difficult task and is one of the main 
challenges facing regulatory science. 
Ia spite of the fact that the responsibility 
for regulatory safety inspection in Britain 
i spread amongst a number of specialist 
hspectorates, it is, perhaps, the most fully 
cyeloped, efficient and satisfactorily 
operating regime of its kind, this being 
. specially true for commercial nuclear 
zstallations. The latter aspect is a com- 
;x mix of engineering, legal and 
ranagerial practices which has been largely 
Zodelled on the notable developments in 
rdety technology which have characterised 
tcnoic energy since the Manhattan Project 
a World War II, its skill being transferred 
nm that milieu to the UK Atomic Energy 
knthority42 and so to the Nuclear Instal. - 
Cons Inspectorate (NII). 
There has thus come into being a versatile 
xheme for the licensing and inspection of 
Uctors and other atomic energy installations 
rescribed under the Nuclear Installations 
kt 1965, which has received a delegation 
(statutory administrative responsibility to 
aengineering body unusual in Western 
smocratic government practice. It is a 
story which began with developments to 
%eet the needs of the military aeronautics 
Adustry early in 1914 and, though full, 
'k h and interesting, has received less than 
äße attention with only a few scanty 
! erences in specialised technical literature. 
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An attempt to make good some of that 
deficiency is contained in the Appendix. 
A conclusion to be drawn is that all ap- 
proaches to safety are asymptotic, and 
absolute reliability (which may be equated 
with safety) is unattainable. This is certainly 
true of attempts to secure ever greater 
safety by design and by organizational 
improvements in management, as the 
evidence confirms. Such improvements will 
be likely to be marginal. Human error will 
always break through to confound such 
efforts. Thus, the greatest gains are likely 
to derive from well directed inspection, 
because inspection bears directly on human 
fallibility. That is the purpose for which it 
has been developed. 
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Appendix: Antecedants of the Nil 
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Notwithstanding the reservations of some 
senior military officers, it had become clear 
to the Army Council by 1913 that aero- 
planes were going to play a very important 
military role and that their engineering, 
being very complex and the most advanced 
technology of its time, merited special 
consideration. It was further recognized 
that 'foreman inspection' which was then 
the usual practice in the manufacture of 
sophisticated artefacts would not be ade- 
quate to detect and correct errors in work- 
manship, particular under conditions of large 
scale production, which could lead to 
accidents and the loss of expensive machines 
and pilots who would be costly to replace. 
The military consequences could be 
disastrous. To meet the need for high 
quality and reliable manufacture of military 
aircraft, an 'Inspection Department for 
Aeronautical Material' was formed early 
in 1914 (Army Orders, Military Aeronautics, 
AO 5/1914 - January). The new inspectional 
body was set up at Farnborough, Hants, and 
recruited a small body of highly qualified 
engineers from both the Army and civilian 
life, the latter being sought by discreet 
advertisements in the technical press, eg: 
Candidates for Examiner appointments should be 
gentlemen having good theoretical and practical 
training in engineering .... Preference will be 
given to gentlemen unfitted for military service. 
These appointments give patriotic men, having the 
necessary qualification an unequalled opportunity 
to serve their country. Salary from £3-14s. to 
£4-4s per week .... 
(A substantial amount at the 
time. ) ... 
Viewers are needed at 38s to 48s weekly. 
The inspectional procedure was based on a 
traditional go/no-go philosophy with Govern- 
ment examiners and viewers stationed at 
every critical point of production in the air- 
craft factories who were instructed to reject 
all out-of-specification material. After the 
outbreak of World War 1, there was an 
explosive growth of the aeronautical 
industry and at the Armistice in 1918 the 
Aeronautical Inspection Directorate or 
391 
AID as it came to be known, employed 
18 000 odd inspectors, viewers and examiners, 
either on its own strength or as agents. The 
change in size brought with it a change in 
function and at all key points in the processes 
of aircraft production throughout Britt a 
representative of the AID was stationed to 
detect faulty workmanship. 
The result was not that which was expected, 
that was a marked improvement in both 
production flow and quality. Although the 
machines which went into service were 
well made and out of the last 28 000 aero- 
planes accepted by the AID, there were only 9 cases of accidents in service which were 
traceable to defective workmanship, the 
proportion of rejects found in the pro- 
duction lines was steadily increasing, reach- 
ing as much as 90 percent in some factories. 
Growth of the industry had altered the scene 
from one in which an engineering inspector 
could be identified as a personality in 
the manufacturing process, able to partici- 
pate in the work by assuring product 
quality, to one in which an agent of an 
impersonal government presence imposed 
the requirements of the specification in an 
inflexible manner. The result was to take 
away the responsibility for good workman- 
ship from the site of production and instead 
of a feeling of involvement in the effort and 
product quality, there arose an attitude of 
`let it go through because it is the job of 
inspection to find it. '. 
By 1917 there was a dire need for aircraft 
and the rising tide of scrap in the aero- 
nautical factories was a cause for serious 
government concern. It was felt that a 
measure of militarisation might improve 
morale and enjoin better workmanship. 
With this in mind, senior ranks in the 
Aeronautical Inspection Department (AID) 
were granted General List commissions 
in the Royal Flying Corps with apparently 
no very great effect on the shop floor. 
Clearly, the system had broken down and, 
so, at the end of the War when the vast 
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flow of airplanes was no longer required and 
the huge staff of whom over 10 000 were 
directly employed by the AID had to be 
stood down, an opportunity to remodel the 
whole inspectional function was taken. 
Within 12 months of the Armistice, the 
strength of the Directorate had been reduced 
to some 500, mainly people of previously 
jenior rank. The slimming process continued 
as part of the re-structuring and even during 
the early 1930s the complement did not 
exceed 300, although aircraft production 
ras still substantial and technical innovation 
continued apace. The responsibility for good 
workmanship and quality was now placed 
wholly on the manufacturer who carried out 
Eia own inspection, though under AID 
approval and supervision. The name princi- 
pally associated with the AID during this 
period and until his untimely death at the 
cad of the War was that of Lt Col HWS 
Outram. 
The scene was changed to one in which each 
fam tendering to make any aeronautical 
zateriel ranging from minor components 
to complete machines, had to agree to terms 
(contract which defined not only require- 
tents for inspection, but that the working 
Conditions were of a high standard, eg that 
lie lavatories were clean and pleasant. A 
most important condition was that the 
contractor should appoint a Chief 
äspector with direct access to the most 
tnior levels of management, the person 
zppointed being further subject to approval 
'y the AID, carrying with it authorisation 
o certify that the products leaving the 
xtory met the specifications. This approval, 
wing formal government recognition of 
zmpetence, became a much esteemed 
iecolade. 
gnat emphasis was placed on maintaining 
, 
Se identity of materials and this was 
`; icured by a release note and bonded store 
yocedure. By virtue of the concept of 
'xecutive' or supervisory inspection, the 
: ID inspectors took no part in direct inspec- 
cn but were responsible, not so much for 
'ilimce and 
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the quality of the product though evidence 
of its acceptability would be required, but to 
confirm that the contractor's inspection 
system was working satisfactorily, that the 
firm's chief inspector certified that the 
specification was fully met and for signing 
documents which authorised payment for 
partial or full completion of contract. This 
last power provided an important means of 
exercising pressure on the firm to comply 
with the AID's requirement. Sampling 
inspections and tests were carried out by 
AID Examiners of various grades and there 
was back-up from a well equipped Test 
House. The AID inspection system covered 
all materiel used by the RAF and included 
radio, radar, clothing and furniture and 
weapons among other things as well as air- 
craft. 
While AID approval when granted to an 
inspector was a valuable vocational 
qualification, failure of inspection was a 
serious misdemeanour. If a bad failure 
occurred in service, its source could be 
identified and the firm's Chief Inspector 
could be held to be reprehensible with loss 
of AID approval and probably employment. 
Thus was the AID presence transformed 
from that of a horde of officials scrutinising, 
checking, cross-checking and stamping the 
bits and pieces of production, to a few 
officers of long experience and recognized 
ability who could achieve esteem and respect 
amongst contractors and their staffs. This 
can be confirmed by reference to the litera- 
ture of aeronautics during the period. 
Outram's important contributions to 
engineering inspection by his concepts of 
`delegation' and `executive inspection' 
should be given their due recognition. In 
application they proved to be well suited 
to maintenance of the quality of the supply 
of successive generations of ever more 
complex and sophisticated aeroplanes to 
the RAF between the Wars. By delegation 
of inspection he was not only able to 
reduce his own staff by many-fold, but 
transferred responsibility for product 
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quality to the manufacturer where it 
properly belongs. There is little doubt 
that the AID properly shares the credit 
with other parts of the British aircraft 
industry for production of the superb 
generation of aircraft which made its mark 
in World War II. 
The system continued with little change 
until 1975 when it had become outmoded 
by the increasing complexity and range of 
modern military hardware and the need to 
adapt to a general NATO quality assurance 
arrangement for all types of military supply 
(Defence Standards 1973 and 1976). There 
are an interesting number of parallels 
between the inspectional regimes of the 
pre-1975 AID and that of the Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate, although there has 
been no direct interchange of information. 
The Air Registration Board which was the 
civil side :. aster of the AID was largely 
modelled on the lines of the latter and it 
also earned much esteem in its regulation 
of the commercial aspects of the aero- 
nautical industry and of air transport. This 
attracted the notice of Sir Alexander Fleck 
(later Lord Fleck) who was chairman of the 
commission of inquiry set up by Mr Harold 
Macmillan after the Windscale Plutonium Fire, 
which was charged with making recommen- 
dations for re-organization of safety in the 
nuclear industry and for regulation of its 
commercial aspects. Fleck saw analogies 
between the task of the regulatory body 
needed for the burgeoning nuclear power 
industry and the work of the Air Registration 
Board and recommended tht the proposed 
inspectorate be modelled on it. While this 
general line was followed, it was thought 
appropriate to set up an Inspectorate of 
Nuclear Installations in the Ministry of 
Power so that matters of policy would not 
be delegated to an organization not 
answerable to Parliament. 
The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate to 
which its name was changed began its life in 
April 1960 with commencement of the 
Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insur- 
ance) Act 1959. Its philosophy and 
procedures have derived with appropriate 
modifications from those extant in the 
UKAEA at the time and thus are a corn- 
pound of the traditions and practices of both the aeronautical industry and those 
which had grown up in the Authority. 
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THERMAL CONTROL OF THE MAGNOX NUCLEAR HEAT ENGINE 
Synopsis, - The paper in its original form was written in October 
1962 as a report on a 'Free-thought' research into one of a number 
technical problems that arose in the course of regulatory inspection 
during the early phase of the first British nuclear power program. 
The paper is offered now in its revised form as an example of how 
a complex and sophisticated technological system may be inspected 
in circumstances where the inspector's expertise could not reach 
the level of that possessed by the particular 'very highly 
qualified experts' who designed it (R. J. Parker 1978). The 
question facing the inspector is, then, not to be a judge of the 
scientific merit of their findings, but to appraise their proper 
deployment in the case under scrutiny. To meet this requirement, 
a functional presentation of the elements and actions of the 
particular system in its holistic contribution to the plant as an 
entity is needed. This what the approach-described attempts to do. 
The treatment is by no means out-of-date because the nine Magnox 
power stations operated by the utilities have a prospective useful 
life that extends into the first decade of the next century or 
longer. It describes how a relatively few fuel element can 
temperature thermocouples may be best disposed amongst upwards of 
the 25,000 or more fuel elements in the nuclear core, the ratio 
between the two populations being of the order of several hundred 
to one. 
Effective temperature control of the system is necessary to assure 
safe thermal conditions, taking into account the narrow temperature 
margin between the reality of the hottest, but unknown, fuel element 
and the melting point of the Magnox (a magnesium alloy) cladding 
and consequent inflammation of the exposed uranium metal rod. The 
operational problem is to strike a proper balance between the thermal 
efficiency of the reactor in the useful heat it delivers to the 
turbines and the chance of fuel element fires in the core in the 
event of a LOCA. The prescription for optimisation of the can 
temperature parameters is called the 'Fire Risk Criterion'. 
The paper is also offered as an example of the ideographic modelling 
of an engineering problem that would otherwise be difficult to 
communicate verbally. The complex statistical relationships 
between the can temperature parameters and the reactor operating 
limits and margins are depicted in Figure 5 of the document. The 
utility of the presentation in ideographic form may not be 
appreciated by those outside the engineering vocation because most 
people not schooled in the discipline do not easily follow the 
engineer's line of reasoning. It is one that is mainly inductive, 
involving Gestalts, visuo-spatial concepts, synthesis and judgements. 
Those not trained in engineering, or in certain kindred professions, 
tend to be limited to the more general intellectual faculty in which 
their thoughts are engrossed in analysis and deduction with an 
affinity for quantitative relationships. Their cogitations use 
constructs that are linguistic and logical rather than intuitive. 
The competent and creative engineer can think fluently in either 
mode. The existence of two different kinds of intellectual activity 
side-by-side in the same brain has been established by recent 
neuropsychological research (Springer and Deutsch 1981, T. R. 
Blakeslee 1980) It is also mentioned in Section 8.1.1. 
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Preface to the revised version 
This paper is an abridgement of a report entitled, 
'Some thoughts about criteria for fuel element temperature 
assessment in Calder type nuclear reactors', 
which was written by the author when a member of the Technical Section 
of the Inspectorate of Nuclear Installations (INI). It was published 
early in October 1962 and circulated widely in the U. K. nuclear power 
industry during the ensuing 18 months. It was read to a public meeting 
of the Nuclear Power Group of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers 
in London on 2 January 1964 in collaboration with Dr. N. V. Nowlan, an 
erstwhile colleague. 
The need for a generic study of the function and distribution of 
fuel element temperature surveillance thermocouples in the Magnox reactor 
core may be less than obvious in a retrospect of more than two decades. 
The Inspectorate, itself a novel essay in engineering inspection, was 
breaking new ground. Regulation of nuclear power reactors required the 
wise and expeditious solution of many complicated and unfamiliar 
technical problems. Models were required so that these problems could 
be presented to the inspectors, a mix of plant construction and 
commissioning engineers and R and D scientists from a variety of 
specialisms, as integral parts of the Inspectorate's regulatory task, 
yet broken down into individual technical assignments. The models by 
their ideography enabled unfamiliar concepts bearing on ranges, limits 
and the interactions between disparate, complex systems, both technical 
and human, to be conveyed clearly and unambiguously with economy in 
words. Among the more pressing of them at the time was that of temperature 
and flux management of the Magnox reactor core. It was one of paramount 
interest as the Maximum Credible Accident was catastrophic rupture of 
a main coolant duct which was thought likely to be followed by a spreading 
fire in the core and release of fission products to the environment. 
The model offered by the study, as depicted herein, presented the 
decision parameters affecting the various fuel element can temperature 
operating limits and margins in terms of the given thermocouple provision 
in the core in a manner that could be readily grasped and appraised, not 
only in cloistered discussions in the Inspectorate itself, but in one 
that could be used to make a point across the table in negotiations with 
the electric power utility's engineers. It facilitated the discussions 
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by enabling the points at issue to be put in direct and comprehensive 
terms which would have been difficult to achieve by conventional 
engineering drawings and talk alone. 
The purpose served by re-issuing the paper is, then, twofold. 
Firstly, it is a contribution to the philosophy of engineering in which 
the artifice of modelling, as it has long been used in atomic and 
particle physics, is employed to describe the inaccessible thermal 
reality of the fuel element population in the reactor core. Secondly, 
it is an attempt to give long overdue recognition to the Magnox 
technology as a viable energy option. 
The experience that has been acquired in nuclear technology since 
the earlier paper was written has provided sure and abundant knowledge 
of the systematic parameters and random factors that affect fuel element 
can temperature measurement. Moreover, the scatter in the values has 
been reduced by better and more effective methods of quality control in 
fuel element manufacture. Many less thermocouples than suggested by the 
statistics of the model are now known to be adequate for core temperature 
management. Therefore, as surveillance of the neutron flux pattern in 
the Magnox core can be achieved with fewer can temperature thermocouples 
than thought to be necessary from considerations of thermal statistics, 
some of the material in the earlier text that dealt with core stability 
has been deleted. 
When the report was first issued, the channel contact method of can 
temperature instrumentation by thermocouples appeared to be one of 
promise, but this aim was not realised in practice because of 
contamination of the channel-in-situ contacts by deposition of graphite 
from the coolant. A further cause was fatigue fracture of the in-pile 
connections by movement of the core blocks. On the other hand, the 
method of obtaining such thermal data by 'hard-wired' can temperature 
thermocouples installed during commissioning and initial fuel loading 
proved to be more reliable, although the technique had the disadvantage 
that the connections would be severed in the process of fuel changing, 
though some could be reinstated with the new fuel. In the long run, the 
build-up of information in data banks maintained by the principal 
licensees and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority together with 
the greater confidence in the quality of the nuclear fuel have provided 
a reliable store of data on which predictions about core behaviour can 
be based. 
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The relatively trouble free nucleonics of the Magnox heat engine 
over so many years justifies confidence in the basic reliability and 
safety of its behaviour as a commercial heat source for electricity 
generation, although the story of its conventional features have been 
less happy. One may conclude, therefore, that Magnox in a pre-stressed 
concrete pressure vessel is one of the safest nuclear fission reactors 
available in today's state of the art. This view may be extrapolated 
to the Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor which shares with Magnox the low 
power density, large thermal mass of the core and its certain contain- 
ment by the pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel, despite the teething 
problems that have afflicted the first of the commercial AGR units. 
Although the Magnox reactor may appear to be obsolescent, it seems 
likely that it will be making an important contribution to Britain's 
energy balance into the first decade of the next century. The eight 
CEGB Magnox stations have been assessed as having a prospective further 
life of between 30 to 35 years (David Fishlock 1984). Moreover, the 
gas-cooled technology has positive advantages over PWR (C, P. Haig 1979, 
1980), and in certain situations it can provide a base-load system of 
choice with its relatively simple engineering, proven reliability, 
inherent safety and ability to use natural uranium. However, in the 
case of AGR some enrichment is necessary because the stainless steel 
cladding impairs the neutron economy. 
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1 Introduction 
Knowledge of the thermal state of the core of a nuclear power 
reactor is necessary for its safe and efficient operation and the 
Magnox type has a very large number of fuel elements for which the 
cladding temperature is a parameter of prime importance. Unfortunately, 
in a reactor of this type it is feasible to provide only very limited 
can temperature measuring facilities and, if the data is to be properly 
used, it must be treated statistically. To this end the deviations of 
the fuel element can temperatures from their calculated design values 
are taken as separable into systematic components assumed to be exactly 
known, and random components ascertainable in magnitude but of unknown 
incidence. From this a most probable fuel element can temperature 
distribution, or thermal model, may be constructed. 
The temperature measuring instruments are then arranged to monitor 
the essential safety and control aspects of the fuel element population, 
namely, overall core stability, the difference between measurement and 
prediction and hottest can temperatures likely to be reached in certain 
channel groupings. Within these sampling strata, a randomised 
distribution of measuring points is desirable and formulae for 
determining the minimum numbers of temperature measuring instruments 
needed for each function are deduced. 
Operating temperatures and margins in relation to such transient 
temperature excursions as may be expected to occur under fault conditions 
are discussed. As an example, the case of a hypothetical, though 
typical, gas cooled Magnox reactor is considered. 
A most important conclusion is that, while the Magnox reactor may 
be satisfactorily controlled in normal operation and protected against 
large scale catastrophic accidents, it is impossible by any arrangement 
of the very limited temperature instrumentation feasible to protect the 
reactor against the effect of a capricious fault involving only a few 
channels, as the probability of detecting such a temperature excursion 
must be small. Safety in such cases, therefore, depends upon very high 
standards of design and quality control during fuel element manufacture, 
prudent and effective thermal management of the reactor core during 
operation, prompt detection of an abnormal condition by means of the 
burst-fuel-can detection facilities and, in the event of damage to fuel, 
containment of any fission products that escape to the coolant. 
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TYPICAL REACTOR GAS CIRCUIT AFTER 
'BURST DUCT' ACCIDENT AND LOSS OF 




2 Characteristics of the Maximum Credible Accident 
The design of a typical Magnox, gas-cooled, graphite moderated 
nuclear power reactor is shown diagrammatically in cross-section in 
Figure 1 and the several coolant duct arrangements in Figure 2. The 
reactor is depicted in the state of the maximum credible accident (MCA) 
with one of the bottom main coolant ducts completely severed. The ducts 
are between 5 ft to 6 ft in diameter and total rupture of one of them 
would result in catastrophic depressurisation of the whole coolant 
circuit. The event would inflict major damage on the core structure 
and inflammation of fuel elements in the hottest channels or of those 
at the time suffering cladding weaknesses or already faulty could follow. 
The C02 coolant discharged from the pressure vessel in the course of 
this 'Burst Duct' LOCA would be replaced by air which, reacting 
exothermically with the hot irradiated graphite, could combine with 
further fuel can ignitions to produce a major core fire and a massive 
release of fission products, mainly iodines, to the environment. 
The mechanics and possible radiological consequences of the accident 
have been described in some detail by F. R. Charlesworth et al. (1970). 
The envisaged outcome could be very serious for people in the vicinity 
of the plant and it has been estimated that in an extreme case there 
might be a large number of casualties and fatalities. The indicated 
fuel can temperature used for thermal control of the core is determined 
by a statistical method referred to as the 'Fire Risk Criterion' (Dale 
and Harrison 1971) which aims at limiting the severity of damage to the 
fuel following the LOCA. Siting and control of development policies 
(Shaw and Palabrica 1974) have the objective of minimising the 
radiological detriment by restricting population growth and residential 
and other developments in the environs of the plant. 
Post-LOCA damage control has been extensively studied and has reached 
a stage of considerable sophistication. Among the measures provided is 
a facility to stop the fission process by boron dust injection should 
other means of control be lost (David Fishlock 1975,1976), though this 





























Coolant Aas - CO2 
Pressure - 150-600 psi 
Vessels. Steel 
Membrane thickness 
41n. - 61n. 
Internal diameter 
60f t- 70f t 
Duct diameter 
5ft - Eft 
Oldbury - Pre-stressed 
concrete vessel with a 
steel liner, also for 
Wylfa (not shown) 
dig, 2 Shop ducting at civil magnox stations 
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3 Strategy for thermal management of the Magnox nuclear core 
A nuclear reactor is a heat engine and sure knowledge of the 
thermal state of its core is essential for its safe and efficient 
operation. The temperature of the fuel elements, which is a most 
important parameter, must be a compromise between two conflicting 
needs. On the one hand, the core must be run as hot as possible for 
maximum thermal efficiency. On the other hand, there are hazards if 
the reactor is run at too high a temperature, as a fuel element melt- 
out or fire may occur. Hence, the maximum fuel element temperature must 
be kept below an upper bound, set so that any credible accidental upward 
temperature excursion will not be enough to make any fuel element 
dangerously hot. In the case of Magnox plant, this is determined by 
the need to ensure an adequate margin between the temperature of the 
can of the hottest fuel element in the core and an upper value of about 
630°C. at which the natural uranium fuel, clad with magnox (a magnesium 
alloy), will melt and inflame in the C02 coolant. 
At first sight, it would seem desirable to measure the temperature 
of all fuel elements, and a reactor could be run with safety by scanning 
the lot so as to present the hottest can to the control system. The 
controls could then be adjusted to maintain the greatest core heat output 
for the maximum permitted can temperature. Unfortunately, in the case of 
the civil power stations there may be upwards of 25,000 fuel elements in 
3,000 or more channels, and the instrumentation needed would be so 
complex and costly that this is not practicable. However, it is 
unnecessary for the purposes of safe and efficient control as statistical 
methods of temperature analysis may be used. A thermal model, representing 
the core, may be inferred from design data, information from 'rig' 
experiments and from studies of the behaviour of reactors of similar types. 
The model may then be used to define temperature limits for safe operation. 
Safetywise, the most significant core temperatures are those of the 
hottest fuel elements, and for the Calder type reactor, these are the 
temperatures of the Magnox cans in the hottest plane across the core, as 
portrayed in Figure 3 for a quadrant of the core of a typical reactor of 
this kind. From knowledge of the neutron flux distribution, the rating 
pattern, channel coolant mass flow and Stanton number, the nominal 
temperature of the can of every fuel element may be estimated, but the 
actual values will differ from those calculated because of random 
deviations in the flux, rating, flow and heat transfer parameters from 
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Predicted Fuel Element Can 
Temperatures at Hottest Level 
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their design values. Hence, in a steady state condition of maximum 
power generation, the can of each fuel element may be taken to be at 
a temperature in part precisely calculable, but to which must be added 
a second part of random incidence, so that the actual temperature of an 
unmonitored can may be predicted in terms of the odds against it 
exceeding some set limiting maximum. If these odds are sufficiently 
large then there will be no normal fuel element with a can hotter than 
this upper limit, because of the cut-off arising from the finite value 
of practical engineering tolerances. That is to say, the effects 
causing temperature variations arise from errors in construction and 
manufacture of the reactor and its components, and those errors that 
pass inspection do not have a continuous range of magnitude from zero 
to infinity, but have a real maximum value at which there is a certainty 
of rejection and exclusion from the process. 
The strategy for safe reactor operation is, first, to calculate 
the so-called 'systematic temperatures' that are obtained by adding the 
specifically known variations to the design temperatures and, second, to 
assess the magnitude of the contributions attributable to the random 
effects. From these values it is possible to set safe operating 
temperature limits for the fuel and to prescribe instrumentation so that, 
not only may the calculations and assessments be confirmed, but the 
reactor run with confidence inside them. Moreover, in accepting that 
such a reactor may be safely operated on the basis of the assessed 
temperatures associated with the model, an assumption is made that only 
reasonably small errors of random incidence in manufacture and 
construction remain after fuel loading and commissioning, much of the 
relevant data being obtained during the latter phase. 
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4 The can temperature pattern 
In commissioning a Magnox reactor an attempt is made to equalise 
the maximum can temperatures by adjusting the channel mass flows. 
Nevertheless, the actual maximum can temperatures are spread over a 
range of 100°C or more principally because of flux flattening, the 
higher rating of the central as compared with the peripheral regions of 
the core, perturbations in the flux pattern and differences in heat 
transfer parameters. The criterion for the operational temperature 
limits is the temperature of the cladding or cans of those fuel elements 
considered to be running hottest. There are several methods for 
defining and calculating the temperature expected to be reached by the 
hottest can in each channel (D. Wilkie 1978) during steady-state full 
power operation, but all have a common pattern. 
From design considerations, a temperature, T0, may be computed for 
each fuel element can, but systematic effects in construction, plant 
arrangement and fuel element manufacture (e. g. known irregularities in 
coolant mass flow, voids in the core, proximity of neutron absorbers, 
variations in Stanton number, etc. ) give rise in each case to a calculable 
error, 6A. Thus, at full power under steady-state conditions each can 
may be expected to run at a so-called 'systematic' temperature, 
TS = TD + SA. 
Figure 4 gives the systematic distribution of hottest can temperatures 
for the quadrant of the typical Calder type core shown in Figure 3. 
On account of a local combination of systematic effects or because 
of some temporary condition such as the proximity of an empty channel, 
effect of absorber pattern, etc., one or more cans will be expected to 
be hotter than the rest and will have the peak systematic temperature, 
TSp. Now, although Tsp is calculable and its site thus known, it is not 
necessarily the highest can temperature in the core because of the 
influence of further effects of a random nature. The actual temperature 
of a can must, therefore, include this random effect. 
TA Ts ± 6B, 
where 8B is the random error in the prediction. Likewise, the temperature 
of the 'peak systematic' fuel element can may be expressed as TSp± 6B. 
In Figure 5a histogram of the frequency of the calculated 
systematic can temperatures is displayed. The figure provides a model 
that gives an ideographic portrayal of the can temperature pattern in the 
Can Temperature Distribution Fig 4 411 
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core, showing the margins and control parameters, and will be used to 
explain the control strategy. The smooth leptokurtic curve represents 
the probable frequency distribution of can temperatures whereby some of 
the temperature limits may be expressed in statistical terms. The 
derivation is considered to be reasonable because the actual can 
temperatures, most of which are unknown because they cannot be measured, 
will not vary in discrete steps as indicated by the histogram, but may 
be associated with a more continuous function owing to the incidence of 
the 'randoms'. Thus, the upper skirt of the smooth curve shows the 
expected frequency of can temperatures above the peak calculated 
systematic value TSP. 
The random error is relatively small because SB arises from the 
residual uncertainties in the estimation of the systematic effects and 
from likely errors in calculations and measurements which may, with 
equal chance, be either positive or negative. In spite of the fact that 
it cannot be specifically predicted in any particular case, a measure 





This standard deviation, aB, may be estimated from either rig experiments 
or from operational temperature measurements after commissioning a reactor. 
As some cans are likely to be hotter than the peak systematic 
temperature, TSP, for safe operation of the reactor it is necessary to 
set some upper limiting temperature, TA max. 
This must be sufficiently 
above TSP so that the chance of the random scatter giving rise to a can 
hotter than this limit is acceptably small. Applying statistical theory, 
TA 
m= 
TSP +X aB, 
where A is number of standard deviations needed to make the chance of 
there being a can hotter than TA max 
so small as to be accepted as 
impossible in the case of practical reactor operation. The probability 
and associated value of A may be calculated by non-central 't' statistics 
(Colin Stevens 1957), although a satisfactory approximation may be 
obtained by use of the normal law. Further, there must be a sufficient 
margin (4ý) between TA max and 
the nominal can melt-out temperature (6300C) 
so that in the conditions of the worst credible fault a can that happens 
to be or near TA max will not 
be raised to the melt-out value. These 
relationships are shown on the temperature axis in Figure 5. 
FUEL ELEMENT CAN TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTION 
AT HOTTEST LEVEL IN CORE OF A CALDER TYPE 
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For a reactor to be run at its maximum power output consistent 
with safety, information about the thermal state of the core and the 
instantaneous temperatures of the hottest cans must be continuously 
available. As the number of can temperature measuring points is limited 
to a fraction of the total number of fuel elements, the required 
information must be inferred from a sample. Obviously, such an estimate 
will be less definite than that derived from rapid scanning of every 
fuel element, and it may be objected that statistical concepts are being 
substituted for measurable quantities. Nevertheless, the can of a fuel 
element is not an isothermal surface, and point metal temperatures when 
used to represent the whole are themselves statistical extrapolations. 
Further, no instrumentation, however comprehensive, is likely to be 
fault free, and there is no certainty that the hottest temperature is 
in fact being displayed. 
Using sampling theory to treat the data, estimates of mean and peak 
temperatures, the scatter, and the probability that some values are above 
a set upper limit may be reliably estimated and, to run the reactor, the 
mean can temperature of a designated group of fuel elements may be 
measured to the desired precision (E). 
4.1 Standard deviations 
The standard deviation, aB, expreses the dispersion of the actual 
can temperatures about their predicted systematic values, and it is the 
parameter to be used in fixing the maximum permissible operating 
temperatures. Before the reactor has been run, measured temperatures 
will not be available and a predicted value of aB must be used to set 
temperature limits. For this purpose a value QR is used which is the 
standard deviation assessed from estimates of random effects and expected 
errors in measurement and calculation, and as QR will be nearly equal to 
aB and should be slightly larger, it is a safe substitute to use during 
commissioning. 
At an early stage when the potentialities of a reactor design are 
being assessed, the concept of a distribution of systematic temperatures 
is useful to avoid the labour of calculating several thousand fuel 
element temperatures. 
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The standard deviation of systematic effects is then expressed as 
T 
6Al.. n- 'f' 
It may, however, be confusing if this distinction is not kept clearly 
in mind. 
For the typical reactor of Figures 3,4 and 5 the standard 
deviations for random and systematic effects are respectively 
i 8°C 
and ± 30°C. A good working estimate for the standard deviation of 
the difference between measurement and prediction (Q B) would be 
± 7.5°C. 
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5 Criteria for fuel element can temperature measurement 
In applying the postulate of the statistical model to the reality 
of thermal conditions in the core, the link between theory and reality 
is the limited network of temperature measuring points. The number 
needed to get adequately representative samples on which control 
decisions can be based will be determined by the allowable margin of 
uncertainty and the confidence limits imposed. It is impossible, 
however, to make any sound quantitative decisions about the number and 
disposition of these points, without knowing the purpose for which the 
information is being obtained. In addition to purely operational 
requirements, other criteria which may determine the number of temperature 
measuring points necessary are: - 
(i) Verification of the model and determination of the standard 
deviation (GB) of the difference between prediction and 
practice, and measurements for experimental studies aimed at 
improvement of the model by validation of assumptions and 
investigation of any unexpected effects. 
(ii) Information for instant-by-instant control of the reactor in 
terms of nominal 'hottest cans' and designation of trip 
thermocouples. 
(iii) Redundancy to compensate for instrument wastage. 
It seems that the can temperature thermocouple still provides the 
only direct means of measuring fuel element can temperature despite the 
fact that it gives a point value on the surface of the cladding. 
Channel gas outlet temperature measurement, though an important 
parameter, gives a value for the string of elements with no indication 
that a particular element may be running too hot, but so much is now 
known about fuel element quality and performance that the latter is of 
diminished value. 
With the exception of the groups disposed for the investigation of 
special features and for reactor tripping, the measuring points should 
be distributed on an equal weight basis, being randomised so that no one 
aspect takes on more importance than another. A further consideration 
is that the instruments and circuits for control and safety surveillance 
must be independent of one another, a principal which it is generally 
agreed is not only sound, but essential if interactions and common mode 
effects are to be avoided. 
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TEMPERATURE MEASURING POINTS NEEDED FOR THERMAL 
MODEL VERIFICATION AND TO DETERMINE THE STANDARD 
DEVIATION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEASUREMENT 
AND PREDICTION (Q"B ) 
FIG 
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5.1 Verification of the statistical model 
Safe operation of a reactor depends upon correct forecasting of 
the thermal behaviour of the core from an assumed knowledge of the 
specific systematic effects and of the magnitudes of the random effects. 
Thus, the parameter to be determined by sampling is the standard 
deviation (aB), of the difference between the predicted systematic 
temperatures and measured values, and the acceptable standard error in 
this determination is the criterion by which the number of measuring 
points needed can be assessed. Then from sampling theory (C. E. 
Weatherburn 1961) one can obtain the standard error eB of the standard 
deviation aB from 
Q2 
E2=B """. (1) B2n 
s 
To determine ns in the design stage it is appropriate to use YR in place 
of aB and define an acceptable value of eB. The magnitude of ns for 
several values of eB has been plotted in Figure 6 for a range of values 
of ßR. 
These measuring points would be attached to fuel elements at the 
hottest level, but this is not essential because, if the temperature of 
one can in the channel is known, then that of the others is calculable 
from flux and coolant mass flow data. In this case, however, a larger 
allowance must be made for measurement errors, and it is, therefore, more 
efficient to measure the temperature of the hottest can, though some 
provision should be made to confirm assumptions about the axial 
temperature distribution. 
5.2 Reactor Control 
In full power steady state operation, the reactor must be run so 
that the can temperatures are effectively at their calculated systematic 
temperatures, the maximum thermal output being determined principally by 
the scatter of the actual temperatures about the predicted maximum values. 
The function of the control instrumentation is to realise the desired 
safe thermal output by holding the fuel element cans close to the 
designated temperatures. 
The reactor core and thermal control apparatus form a servo loop as 
shown in Figure 7. As rapid response to temperature changes and freedom 
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from overshoot are essential for stable, efficient and safe operation, 
can temperature thermocouples rather than channel gas outlet temperature 
instruments are desirable. 
It is not feasible to have instrumentation to indicate the 
temperature of the hottest point on every can and thermal control of 
the reactor must be based on a confident assessment of the instantaneous 
distribution of can temperatures, particularly those of the hottest cans, 
made by referring to the systematic model, which has been confirmed at a 
known error (aB) by verification measurements. An allowance must be made 
because the can temperatures are estimated from a sample rather than from 
knowledge of the temperatures of the whole population of fuel elements 
in the core. The optimum number of measuring points may be determined 
by considerations of convenience and reliability in operation and of the 
balance between capital investment in instrumentation and revenue loss 
through derating. This is a problem in the economies of sampling 
inspection (Owen L. Davies 1956) too complicated for treatment here. 
However, the number (nc) of can temperature thermocouples needed to 
control the reactor, or a sector of its core, at a level of confidence 
(X) within a given derating allowance for a precision of sampling (E) by 
measurements obtained from a systematic group containing Nc fuel elements 




S ...... (4) 
1 +ß2 (Nc-1) 
where $= XCQ B, 
or XCQ R 
very nearly since QB 
* QR 
and x=a multiplier appropriate to the confidence limits X, defining 
the percentage of cases in which the precision of sampling 
is not exceeded. 
The curves in Figure 8 show the relation between the number of 
control thermocouples needed and the confidence limits for a given 
precision and various sizes of control group, and a derivation of 
equation (4) is given by Yule and Kendall (1947). 
If the core is divided for operation into sectors under independent 
temperature control, then in determining the numbers of control thermo- 
couples required each must be treated as a separate unit. Clearly, more 
instrumentation will be needed than if the core alone were the operational 
unit. The distribution of thermocouples in a quadrant of a typical Magnox 
reactor is shown in Figure 9. 
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5.2.1 Trip thermocouples and reactor protection 
The instrumentation for safety shut-down of the reactor in event 
of mal-operation or occurrence of anticipated faults should be separated 
from that for normal operational control. Hence, independent 'trip' or 
quick acting excess temperature limit stop instrumentation is needed, 
and this may be provided by 'trip allocated' can temperature thermocouples 
and associated equipment, the number required being determined by the 
safety circuit philosophy. For 'two-out-of-three' protection, three 
such thermocouples would be needed per sector, sited in the peak 
systematic fuel element cans, independent of the control and surveillance 
instrumentation, shutting down the reactor when a sector temperature 
exceeded the maximum by a suitable margin. These trip thermocouples 
will respond reliably only in the event of a sector or whole core 
temperature excursion. This is a consequence of reactor control by a 
relatively small number of temperature measuring points, the general 
assumption being made that the reactor will behave in a predictable way 
and that any digressions from normality will affect the core as a whole, 
a sector or a large region. 
In the case of small isolated faults which cause overheating of a 
few or even only one of the fuel elements, it is not possible by any 
arrangement of the relatively few metal temperature measuring points to 
cover the whole core and give any acceptable probability of detection. 
Such incidents, however, are likely to be very infrequent, arising from 
occasional fortuitous combinations of anomalies, such as odd system 
faults, exceptional errors in operation, fuel elements damaged during 
loading into the reactor or other defects or chance obstructions to the 
channel gas flow. The fault could lead to a local temperature excursion, 
unlikely to be observed by the instrumentation and to a channel melt-out 
or fire. 
It is illusory to think that a reactor can be protected against 
such exceptional events by rigorous inspection of the fuel, by great 
care during loading, by strict operational discipline and by imposing 
conservative operational safety margins. These precautions may reduce 
the likelihood of an unusual, anticipated fault, but over a number of 
years of reactor operation such an event must be accepted as possible. 
In fact, they are more likely than the postulated catastrophies against 
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that for the greatest safety it is necessary to devise some means by 
which abnormally high can temperatures in the core may be immediately 
detected. 
It might be thought that indication of the gas outlet temperature 
for every channel would suffice, and it is a feasible scheme of 
instrumentation. While there would then be added protection, this would 
not be complete, because there would be little or no response to hot 
spots or overheating in reduced or stagnant coolant flow. The lag in 
indication of the temperature also introduces an undesirable delay in 
response to the fault. 
It seems that the most promising means for detection of such faults 
is through the burst cartridge detector or similar instrumentation. 
Rupture or burning of the overheated element would then inevitably be 
detected. 
6 Operational temperature limits and confidence margins 
The nominal melt-out or ignition temperature for the Magnox cladding 
is a cardinal point in reactor safety and economics of operation. 
Experimental results suggest that it has a value of not less than 650°C 
in both C02 and air, but cautious estimates put the ignition point 
between 620° and 630°C. 
The relations between the margins, operational limits and the 
population of can temperatures are shown in Figure 5 where it can be 
seen that the prescribed values are in effect obtained by 'working 
backwards' from the designated melt-out temperature. 
Most of the metal temperatures in the core must be inferred by 
sampling measurements made by the few can temperature thermocouples and, 
in addition to the transient margin, an allowance for sampling 
uncertainties (E) must be made. Thus, the upper permissible can 
temperature (TA 
max) 
is obtained by subtracting from the melt-out 
temperature a margin (0) for transient excursions and the sampling 
allowance (c). 
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7 Temperature measuring points needed for a typical Magnox Reactor 
The typical Magnox reactor as depicted in Figures 1,3,4 and 5 
has some 3,200 fuel channels, a TSM of 436°C , maximum and minimum 
systematic temperatures of 451°C and 343°C respectively and a random 
standard deviation (CY B) of ± 8°C. Operating at full power under steady 
state conditions, an adequate number of temperature measuring points 
are needed for model verification, reactor control and safety circuit 
trips. Assuming that these are can temperature thermocouples, sited 





(a) For model verification and assessment of the 
standard deviation (ag) of the difference 
between prediction and measurement, using 32 
equation (1) and allowing a standard error 
(e 
B) 
in the estimation of (v$) of ±1oC. 
(b) For reactor control through nine independent 
sectors at a precision of ± 2°C and 99% 
confidence limits, the operating temperature 
is maintained with reference to the 448°C 
systematic group of fuel element cans. The 89 
central sector contains 20 cans of which 17 
are monitored and the 8 peripheral sectors 
contain 10 cans each of which 9 in each are 
monitored. 
(c) For trip or excess temperature shut-down of 
the reactor on a2 out of 3 safety philosophy 27 
in 9 independent sectors, using 20 channels 
at 451°C and 7 at 448 
°C. 
A minimum number of 148 can temperature thermocouples would therefore 
seem necessary for safe and efficient operation of the reactor. 
Nevertheless, some extra measuring points may be desirable to carry out 
experimental studies and some provision must be made to allow for wastage 
through instrument failures. These additional points would be extra to 
those defined above. The arrangement of can temperature thermocouples 
for the core of a typical Magnox reactor is shown in Figure 9. 
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8 Operating temperatures and margins 
Safe operating temperatures and margins for the typical reactor 
at full power in steady state and with the temperature instrumentation 
described in Section 7 above are set out below. The basic reference 
temperature is the nominal point for Magnox melt-out or ignition in C02, 
and the relations are shown diagrammatically in Figure 5. 
The actual mean operating temperature (T ) of the 
control group of cans must not exceed 
p° 448°C 
Allowance for precision of measurement Q) of the 
control group mean 2°C 
Hence indicated mean operating temperature (0 p° 
) the 
° 
control group of cans must not exceed 446C 
Maximum expected mean temperature for peak 
systematic group of cans (TSP) 451°C 
Standard deviation for random effects, QR, used in 
early operational phases in lieu of Cr B± 
80C 




upper maximum limit for dispersion of fuel element 
can temperatures from their systematic values, set 
at a value so that it is incredible that any normal 




(The margin is A vR where A is the appropriate to 
multiplier. Take A=4. ) 
Upper limit of temperature, TA very unlikely to be ° 
reached by any can max 483C 
Nominal ignition in C02 and can melt-out temperature 630°C 
Transient margin (D) 147°C 
Probability that the temperature of the can of any 
fuel element in the reactor exceeds TA max as 
calculated by normal law statistics 0.0017 
It should be noted that the maximum permitted can operating 
temperature is directly dependent on the nominal melt-out temperature 
and the transient margin, It is good practice to take a realistic 
value for the melt-out temperature and to set the transient margin 
appropriately, basing it on credible faults occurring to normal fuel 
elements in normal channels, that is operational faults capable of 
427 
being detected by the instrumentation. To try to ensure protection 
against rare and isolated small scale faults with any acceptable 
level of confidence, must involve uneconomic derating of thereactor 
or perhaps shutting it down. 
9 Can versus channel gas outlet temperature measurements 
A number of channel gas outlet temperature thermocouples are also 
appropriately sited in the core, a typical arrangement being shown in 
Figure 3. If the individual channel mass coolant flows, the Stanton 
numbers and axial neutron flux profiles are known, then the respective 
can temperatures may be inferred from the channel gas outlet 
temperatures. The likely errors in can temperature assessment by this 
method are put at between ± 3°C to 4°C, depending on the stability of 
the values assumed for the other parameters. In comparison, the 
estimated error in can temperature as measured by a directly attached 
thermocouple is put at ± 2°C. On the other hand the figure derived 
from gas temperature is an aggregate for the whole fuel element stringer, 
while the metal temperature is a spot value for a point on one can. It 
must be noted that the data given above is dated and values now available 
will have been refined and could be quoted with greater confidence. 
Finally, the metal temperature is a prompt indication whereas the gas 
temperature suffers a delay in response. This is a disadvantages if the 
latter is used for trip or control purposes. 
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10 Overview 
Since the first version of this document was published, the Atomic 
Energy Authority and the electrical power utilities in Britain have had 
more than 500 reactor-years experience with Magnox units. While most 
of the operational difficulties have lain with the steam raising 
auxiliaries, the salient reactor problems have been ones of internal 
corrosion, core restraint weaknesses and faults in the external main 
coolant duct assemblies. These disabilities have been satisfactorily 
overcome (David Fishlock 1984). The statistical approach to thermal 
management of the reactors, associated with the 'Fire Risk Criterion' 
(Dale and Harrison 1971), outlined above and modelled ideographically 
in Figure 5, was generally adopted and has been justified by results in 
practice. The technique has been refined over the years and its 
application made more efficaceous, energy-wise and safety-wise, by 
research and introduction of sophisticated data processing facilities. 
The aim of the study presented here was not to elaborate the 'Fire 
Risk' methodology already well developed in the industry, but to offer 
an inspectional guide for assessment of the provision and disposition 
of fuel element can temperature thermocouples in Magnox reactor cores. 
The suggested figure of 148 randomly place thermocouples in the hottest 
plane was determined by a 'Transient Margin' ($) of 147°C and a 
'Temperature Margin' (A aR) of 32°C to allow for the presence of 'out- 
of-spec' fuel elements and rogue random effects. This gave an interval 
of some 180°C between the assumed highest temperature can in the core 
and the nominal melt-out and inflammation point for Magnox alloy 
cladding. Such a thermocouple provision is patently pessimistic. It 
was also assumed that the interval presented by the summated margins 
would not be exceeded in less than 100 LOCAs. However, the greater 
reliability of instrumentation systems, better knowledge of the dispersion 
and distribution of systematic and random errors and enhanced confidence 
in the quality control of fuel element manufacture have led to reductions 
in the theoretical temperature excursion that might follow a LOCA. 
Despite that, the resulting contribution to thermal efficiency by 
optimisation has been lost in practice by temperature limitations imposed 
to minimise the rates of graphite errosion and steel corrosion. 
While the 'unquestionable safety' (Kirk and Taylor 1971) of the 
containment provided by the pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel (PCPV) 
429 
and internalisation of the boilers characteristic of 'Oldbury' and 
'Wylfa' have made the risk of a catastrophic LOCA negligible in their 
case, the remaining 14 of the Magnox reactors operated by the utilities 
have steel main pressure vessels. The latter group have a prospective 
operational life of at least 450 reactor-years. Despite the higher 
risk factor attributable to a steel membrane, the reliability of these 
massive steel containment vessels is high, being put at not less than 
2x 10-5 per service-year for catastrophic failure (Phillips and Warwick 
1970). Taking a reliability of the order of 10-5 reactor-years for the 
main coolant ducts in combination with a 'Fire Risk' probability of 10-2 
per LOCA, the overall theoretical probability of a serious radiation 
accident for this particular causal sequence is of the order of 10 7 per 
reactor-year. It is a metaphysical figute and such event will not occur 
as an outcome of the envisaged sequence. Furthermore, the chance of a 
catastrophic duct failure has been substantially reduced by recent 
advances in structural engineering (David Fishlock 1984), giving the 
Magnox system a very favourable safety prognosis in comparison with other 
reactor types, and an even better case can be made for Magnox in PCPVs. 
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13 Appendix: Meaning of Symbols 
Can Temperatures, Calculated, Actual and Indicated 
TSm = the expected average value of Mel element can temperatures 
at the hottest level in the core with the reactor operating 
under design conditions. . 
TD the basic design temperature for the fuel element can, being 
a function of the flux distribution, rating pattern, coolant 
mass flow and Stanton number, but ignoring systematic and 
random perturbations of these parameters. 
T3 = the systematic fuel element can temperature calculated with 
respect to known perturbations but igncring random effects. 
TS = the peak systematic fuel element can tamperature, being the 
peak value of T. (This differs from some definitions in that 
it is a calculable temperature fer a specific can or group of 
cans and does not have an associated probability. ) 
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Probabilities, Confidence Limits and Multipliers 
A= the probability that there is an actual fuel element can as 
hot as the extrs.: a uppor limit of the range of fuel element 
can tea_ er. turc scatter (with the rest : or in norr. il full 
power o; err. tion in a steady state). 
p(. ) the probability that a group of jr fuel elements, however 
t: k: n, in a conron horizontal layer across the core contains 
oxactly 'm' can tonpcrcture thermocouples. 
P(< M) = the probability that a oup of jr fuel elements, however 
taken, in a corr: on h rizontal layer . cross the core contains 
less than 'm' can tonperature thexrocou, les.. 
X= confidoace Units for reactor tecporetura control, 3ofining 
the per: entaCe of cases in which it is expected that the 
allowan: o for precision of sanpling (F. ) will not be exceeded. 
the =ultiplior to give a temperature margin (x) between TSp 
and T Amax so that the chance A of thoro baing a fuel element 
can as hot as TAmax is acceptably small. 
x= the rule. plier :: p ropriate to the control confidence limits 
(X), defining the porcontage of cases in which the allowance 
(ý) for precision of snapling will not be exceaded. 
TA the extreme upper limit of the range of fuel element can 
temperature scatter owing to random effects and very unlikely to 
be reached by any fuel element can in the reactor core in normal 
full per operation. (The probability A of such an event is 
defined in terms 'f a temperature margin Xcr, above Tsp, and will 
be very small. ) 
TA = the actual temperature of a fuel element can, being the highest 
temperature experienced on the can surface. 
Tpo = the actual an can operating temperature of the group of fuel 
elements chosen for control. 
g= the indicated or measured an can operating temperature for the 
po group of fuel elements chosen for control. 
Temrerature Deviations 
bA = the irno: m or systematic component of the deviation of the fuel 
element can temperature from its design value, TD. 
bB the unknown component of the deviation of the actual fuel element 
can temperature from its calculated systematic value, T3. 
Standard Deviations 
W. the standard deviation of the difference bet: aeen the measured or 
indicated fuel element can temperatures and the corresponding 
calculated or systematic values. 
ýg = the deduced standard deviation for the random effects which 
perturb the fuel element can temperatures and distribute them 
about their calculated or systematic values. (TaB). 
432 
Earor Allowance and Margins 
t$ = the standard error permitted in determining 0ý3. 
the cllo; "anco for pr.; cisicn of s =plin6 in doter-inine, the 
ee. surod or indicatod con tazper^tura of the group of fuel 
eleconts chosen for reactor control,. 
= the =arZi: cllo. rd for a temperature oxcursion bet". 7oon TAB 
cnd the n^. xinal temteraturo for melt-out or ignition of the 
fox fuel element cans. 
Channels and Measuring Points 
N= the tot^1 r: i. _ber of fuel oler. mt ch-tnnols in the reactor core. 
vo = the tot^1 ^tirber of fusl alemonts is a 3rou; salýcted for 
re-otor to reraturo control. 
na = the nu. nbcr of fuel o1o: nont c--n torpsrc. tures which _: zst be 
r. o: sured f: -o, --i the Croup of N fuel elc. aonts in ir. or to obtain 
for rcrctc_ to , ýar_taro control an 
indicted s_nole necn fuel 
ele-: ant cri operating tonporcturo (e0) at the required 
precision (& ) ithin to confideace limits (A ). 
ns = the number of c: n temperature me_suring points distributed at 
r^ndon in the layer of hottest cans across tho core which are 
needed to determine QB and to vorify the thorra1 model. 
ti. - nuibor of randomly distribu. t,: d fuel a13o-ant cnn 
t:. n orztturo t: iamocouplos n_o. 2i_d for core stability 
survail? anco. 
ýr = tho mini uit nuabor of coati; uous chmne13 in . `roue, 
ho:: aver disros:, 3, r ich is ox: cctcd to includa a designated 
number 'm' of can t; -cp. rrture tharcocouples at a co-on !: orizont. l 1^yor in the core. 
m tho numbor of fual olozient can tanporatura t errocouplo 
signals ind-ic: tLng t=?:, r:: turc excess neadod by tho safety 
circuits for an alarm or trip. 
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